impoffible, that what has hitherto escaped fo many wife and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may coft us, we may think ourselves fufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowlege, in fubjects of fuch unspeakable importance.

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these fpeculations is no recommendation, but rather a difadvantage to them, and. as this difficulty may perhaps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoiding all unneceffary detail, we have, in the following inquiry, attempted to throw fome light upon subjects,, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obfcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the bounda-ries of the different species of philofophy, by reconciling profound inquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And ftill more happy, if, reasoning in this eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abftrufe philofophy, which seems to have served hitherto only as a shelter to fuperftition, and a cover to abfurdity and error !

SECTION II.
стіс

OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEA S.

VERY one will readily allow, that there is a confiderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exceffive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the fenfes; but they never can reach entirely the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour is, that they represent their object in fo lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or fee it: But except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undiftinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in fuch a manner as to make the description to be taken for a real landskip. The moft lively thought is ftill inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may obferve a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man, in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks

of

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of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a juft conception of his fituation; but never can mistake that conception for the real diforders and agitations of the paffion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice difcernment nor metaphyfical head to mark the distinction between them.

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The lefs forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I fuppofe, because it was not requifite for any, but philofophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, ufe a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a fenfe fomewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, or love, or hate, or defire, or will. And impreffions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions of which we are confcious, when we reflect on any of thofe lively fenfations or movements above mentioned.

Nothing, at first view, may feem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only efcapes all human power and authority, but is not even reftrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monfters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, cofts the imagination no more trouble VOL. II.

D

than

than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie in total confufion. What never was seen, nor heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an abfolute contradiction.

But though thought feems to poffefs this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the inind amounts to no more than the compounding, tranfposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the fenfes and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two confiftent ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue, and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In fhort, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward fentiment: The mixture and compofition of thefe belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to exprefs myself in philofophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreffions or more lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be fufficient. First, When we analyse our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or fublime, we always find, that they refolve themselves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even those ideas, which, at

firft view, seem the moft wide of this origin, are found, upon a narrower scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wife, and good Being, arifes from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, thofe qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may profecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea we examine is copied from a fimilar impreffion. Thofe who would affert, that this pofition is not univerfally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an eafy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this fource. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impreffion or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any fpecies of fenfation, we always find, that he is as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of founds. Reftore either of them that fense, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his fenfations, you alfo open an inlet for the ideas, and he finds no difficulty of conceiving these objects. The cafe is the fame, if the object proper for exciting any fenfation, has never been applied to the organ. ALAPLANDER OF NEGROE has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no inftances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a fentiment or paffion, that belongs to his fpecies; yet we find the fame observation to take place in a lefs degree. A man of mild manners can form no notion of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily