be controuled nor altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.

The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer; nor is it poffible to explain diftinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate caufe of all the actions of men, without being the author of fin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unaffifted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system it embraces, it must find itfelf involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which it takes with regard to fuch fubjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prefcience; or to defend abfolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of fin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the skill of philofophy. Happy, if she be thence fenfible of her temerity, when the pries into these fublime mysteries; and leaving a scene fo full of obfcurities and perplexities, return, with fuitable modefty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into fo boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!

SECTION IX.

OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS.

LL our reafonings concerning matter of fact are founded

All our reafenings us turned on a fpecies of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any cause the fame events, which we have observed to result from fimilar caufes. Where the causes are entirely fimilar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclufive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a fimilarity, the analogy is lefs perfect, and the inference is lefs conclufive; though ftill it has fome force, in proportion to the degrees of fimilarity and refemblance. The anatomical obfervations, formed upon one animal, are, by this reasoning, extended to all animals; and 'tis certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is proved clearly to have place in a particular species, as a frog, or fish, it forms a ftrong prefumption, that the fame principle has place in the others. These analogical obfervations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the opeVOL. II.

R

rations

rations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the paffions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the fame theory is requifite to explain the fame phanomena in all other animals. We fhall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothefis, by which, in the foregoing discourse, we have endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and 'tis hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former obfervations.

First, It seems evident, that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer, that the fame events: will always follow from the fame causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowlege of the nature of fire, water, earth, ftones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects, which refult from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are. here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old grey-. hound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himfelf fo as to meet with the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occafion, founded in any thing but his obfervation and experience.

This is ftill more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of re

wards

wards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their natural inftiacts and propenfities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and infer, from fuch an arbitrary found, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

In all these cases, we may obferve, that the animal infers fome fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same events, which it has always found in its obfervation to refult from fimilar objects.

Secondly, 'Tis impoffible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they furely lie too abftrufe for the obfervation of fuch imperfect understandings; fince it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philofophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclufions: Neither are philofophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the fame with the vulgar, and are governed by the fame maxims. Nature must have

provided fome other principle, of a more ready, and more general use and application; nor can an operation of fuch immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain procefs of reafon and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it feems to admit of no queftion with regard to the brute-creation; and the conclufion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong prefumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be univerfally admitted, without any exception or referve. 'Tis cuftom alone, which engages animals, from every object, that ftrikes their fenfes, to infer its ufual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that ftrong and lively manner, which we denominate belief. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower claffes of fenfitive beings, which fall under our notice and obfervation*

But

* Since all reafoning concerning facts or caufes is derived merely from cuftom, it may be asked how it happens, that men fo much furpafs animals in reafoning, and one man fo much furpaffes another? Has not the fame cuftom the fame influence on all ?

We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human underftandings: After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will eafily be comprehended.

1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a fimilar event with fome degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumftances. "Tis therefore confidered ast a matter of great importance to obferve the confequences of things; and as one man

may