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be controuled nor altered by any philosophical theory or fpeculation whatsoever.

The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system it embraces, it must find itself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which it takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the skill of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence fenfible of her temerity, when she pries into these fublime mysteries ; and leaving a scene fo full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!

SECTION IX.

of THE REASON OF ANIMALS.

A LL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded A on a species of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the 'objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degrees of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are, by this reasoning, extended to all animals; and 'tis certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is proved clearly to have place in a particular species, as a frog, or fith, it forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in the others. These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we are now treating ; and any theory, by which we explain the opeVOL. II.

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rations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the fame theory is requisite to explain the same phænomena in all other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothesis, by which, in the foregoing discourse, we have endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and 'tis hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

First, It seems evident, that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowlege of the nature of fire, water, earth, ftones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects, which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are. here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and fagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what. hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old grey-. hound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himfelf so as to meet with the hare in her doubles ; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but his obfervation and experience.

This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of re

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wards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent ?

In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers fome fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same events, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

Secondly, 'Tis impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philofophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions : Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the fame maxims. Nature must have R2

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provided fome other principle, of a more ready, and more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of reason and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute-creation; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any exception or reserve. 'Tis custom alone, which engages animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that strong and lively manner, which we denominate belief. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall under our notice and obfervation *

But

* Since all reasoning concerning facts or causes is derived merely, from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much furpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same influence on all ?

We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human underftandings : After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.

1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. 'Tis therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things; and as one man

may

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