having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any wise concerned in his actions; fince they are not derived from it, and the wickednefs of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other. Men are not blamed for fuch actions, as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the confequences. Why? but because the principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are lefs blamed for fuch actions as they perform haftily and unpremeditately, than for fuch as proceed from deliberation. For what reafon?' but because a hafty temper, though a conftant cause or principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by afferting, that actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by any alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal. But except upon the doctrine of neceffity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal. It will be equally eafy to prove, and from the fame arguments, that liberty, according to that definition above-mentioned, in which all men agree, is alfo effential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are fufceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as action's are objects of our moral fentiments, so far only as they are indications of the internal character, paffions, and affections; 'tis impoffible that they Q 3 they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence. I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory, with regard to neceffity and liberty. I can forefee other objections, derived from topics, which have not here been treated of. It may be faid, for inftance, that if voluntary actions be fubjected to the fame laws of neceffity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of neceffary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all, to every fingle volition of every human creature. No contingency any where in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the fame time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who firft beftowed motion on this immenfe machine, and placed all beings in that particular pofition, whence every fubfequent event, by an inevitable neceffity, muft refult. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from fo good a caufe; or if they have any turpitude, they muft involve our Creator in the fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is anfwerable for all the confequences, whether the train he employed be long or fhort: fo wherever a continued chain of necessary causes are fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the firft, is likewife the author of all the rest, and muft both bear the blame and acquire the praife, which belong to them. Our cleareft and moft unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the confequences of human action; and 8 thefe these reasons muft ftill have greater force, when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being, infinitely wife and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for fo limited a creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator. He forefaw, he ordained, he intended all thofe actions of men, which we fo rafhly pronounce criminal. And we must conclude, therefore, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is abfurd and'impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced, cannot poffibly be true, as being liable to all the fame objections. An abfurd confequence, if neceffary, proves the original doctrine to be abfurd; in the fame manner that criminal actions render criminal the original caufe, if the connexion between them be necessary and inevitable. This objection confifts of two parts, which we shall examine feparately; First, that if human actions can be traced up, by a neceffary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or Secondly, if they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowlege him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures. The answer to the firft objection feems obvious and convincing. There are many philofophers, who, after an exact fcru-. tiny of all the phænomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, confidered as one fyftem, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the ut moft most poffible happiness will, in the end, refult to every created being, without any mixture of pofitive or absolute ill and mifery. Every physical ill, fay they, makes an effential part of this benevolent fyftem, and could not poffibly be removed, even by the Deity himself, confidered as a wife agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will refult from it. From this theory, fome philofophers, and the antient Stoics among the rest, derived a topic of confolation, under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils, that those ills, under which they laboured, were, in reality, goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and fublime, it was foon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would furely more irritate, than appeafe a man, lying under the racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the rectitude of thofe general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them, through the proper canals, to the nerves and finews, where they now excite fuch acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and fecurity; but neither can they dwell with conftancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or paffion; much lefs can they maintain their ground, when attacked by fuch powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural furvey of their objects, and by an economy, more fuitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by fuch events as appear good or ill to the private fyftem. The cafe is the fame with moral as with phyfical ill. It cannot reasonably be fuppofed, that those remote confidera tions, tions, which are found of fo little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is fo formed by nature, that, upon the appearance of certain characters, difpofitions, and actions, it immediately feels the fentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more effential to its frame and conftitution. The characters, which engage its approbation, are chiefly fuch as contribute to the peace and fecurity of human fociety; as the characters, which excite blame, are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: Whence we may reasonably prefume, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection on these opposite interests. What though philofophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb fociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as fuitable to the primary intention of nature, as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are fuch remote and uncertain fpeculations able to counter-balance the fentiments, which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man, who is robbed of a confiderable fum; does he find his vexation for the lofs any wife diminished by these fublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be fuppofed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowlegement of a real diftinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that of a real diftinction between perfonal beauty and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural fentiments of the human mind: And thefe fentiments are not to be |