festo reached him in the country, to think he had been completely misled by the previous Information; that surprise increased on finding that the public prints had been more accurate in their representation of facts than his majesty's declaration. Never had any paper been brought forward with the stamp of official authority so little connected with the documents on which it was professedly founded; it entirely concealed the most important facts of the negotiation, and stated the others so loosely, as not to exhibit them in any precise or distinct shape.

The right honourable gentleman had stated that disrespect had been shown to a foreign court by the French directory, and an inference drawn of a disposition thus manifested to throw contempt on all established usages. It was asserted as an apology for bringing forward the manifesto, previous to the publication of the papers, that much mechanical labour was necessary for preparing them for the inspection of the house; but for his own part, he could not but suspect, it was thought expedient to give a bias to their sentiments by the publication of the manifesto, before the facts were submitted to their cool and sober investigation; and the delay which was imputed to mechanical labour was purposely designed to afford ministers an opportunity of revising the papers, and of deciding what part of their contents is might be prudent to suppress, and what might be submitted to the public eye. Lord Malmesbury was sent to negotiate for peace, and furnished with full powers to conclude, but not to treat; he had no instructions with respect to the terms he should propose, and no direction upon which to act concerning the propositions he might receive. When he was asked if he came to treat for the

king of Great Britain separately? he answered No; but for the king of Great Britain, jointly with his allies. When he was asked if he was furnished with any powers from those allies? he again replied, No. Had he any terms to propose? He answered he would send for instructions. Thus it appeared, that he was empowered to conclude for the king of Great Britain, but not qualified to treat; and that for the allies, for whom he came to treat, he had not power to conclude. Could there be a more palpable mockery of the forms of negotiation?

We next come to the basis: in the present instance it was laid so wide, as to comprehend no distinct object, and to be reducible to no precise meaning; the French stated that they had agreed to your principle, and only disputed its application. The principle of mutual compensations is substantially recognized in every negotiation, and did not require to be specified. The general objects of dispute have been', in fixing a basis, whether it should be regulated by the status quo ante bellum, or the uti possidetis?

The minister had stated, as a proof of reluctance on the part of the French, that they for some time hesitated to admit our proposed basis; but in fact they virtually recognized the principle when they entered into the discussion of terms. He who asks, what will you give, or states what he is willing to receive, at once admits the basis of mutual compensation.

When the French asked Lord Malmesbury what terms he was prepared to propose, he was unprovided with any answer, and obliged to send to this country for instructions.

What inference can be drawn from this conduct on the part of ministers, but that, by thus bringing F 2. forward

forward a futile, illusory, and unmeaning basis, they expected to disgust the French in the first instance, and so get rid of the negotiation; and if the French, who must have felt themselves mocked by this treatment, and have been more and more assured of the insincerity of our ministers, had stopped all further proceedings, would they not have been fully justified? Undoubt edly ministers expected that they would have resented the insult, and have broken off the negotiation at the onset. They thus hoped to have obtained an easy credit for their pacific intentions, and to have thrown upon the enemy the odium of a determined purpose of hostility, and an unreasonable rejection of the preliminary basis of negotiation. Unfortunately, however, for this project, the basis was recognized. The disappointment of ministers was evident; Lord Malmesbury was unprepared how to act and compelled to send for further instructions. The question then became," since the French have so unexpectedly accepted the basis we intended to be rejected, what we can find that they must be indispensably called upon to refuse?" Lord Malmesbury, who had before no terms to propose, was now instructed to bring forward such as could not be supposed to undergo much discussion; such as could not readily fail to effect the purpose of being rejected.

Mr. Fox then considered what had been said by the minister respecting the terms offered: it had been urged, by way of apology for those proposed by Lord Malmesbury, that it was usual to be somewhat high in our demands in the first instance; that any propositions, in the beginning of negotiations, were never to be regarded as desisive; and that in the progress of treating

we might relax as circumstances should render it expedient. But was the right honourable gentleman so ill qualified to judge of the conduct proper for these times, as seriously to maintain this argument?

He had described it as a negotiation, the ill success of which must tend to divide France, and to unite Great Britain; which must give indubitable confirmation to the justice of our cause, and add double energy to our future efforts. Instead of carrying his pretensions higher than he might be disposed to accept, he should have gone to the other extreme, and have stated them at the lowest point of what he deemed to be fair and equitable; thus securing the end which he professed to have had in view-to render apparent to all Europe the equity and moderation of his own sentiments, and the injustice and ambition of the enemy. Mr. Fox next adverted to the two memorials, and confessed he had never been more struck with the impossibility, even for talents the most splendid, to cover the weakness of a cause, and supply the deficiency of real argument, than in the instance of what the minister had said respecting Holland. Event if Holland should be restored to its pristine situation; if the Stadtholder should be reinstated, and the alliance renewed with this country, he does not say that he would restore to Holland her former possessions. No, he might then perhaps only relax in their favour part of the conditions on which the present state of things obliges him to insist! A right honourable gentleman, (Mr. Dundas) some time since declared, in the house, that as we had taken the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, we meant to keep them for ever. This was reasoning very much à la Française. It was curious to remark,

that

that in the very moment when the minister is at such pains to represent the demands of the French as in the highest degree exorbitant. how much he countenances them by his own. He says, 64 We have taken a great deal from Holland, they have taken nothing from us, therefore we are not bound in justice to make them any restitution: but if Maestricht, or some place, be ceded to the emperor for the security of the Netherlands, we may perhaps be induced to make them some restitution; but on no account to restore Ceylon, or the Cape of Good Hope." On the same grounds might the French say, "We have taken much from the emperor; he has gained nothing from us therefore we are not bound to make him any restitution." But what are the specific proposals to the French To evacuate Italy, to give up the Milanese, Belgium, and Luxemburg; to negotiate the arrangements of peace for Germany with his Imperial majesty, as constitutional head of the empire; and though they are already at peace with the most considerable Germanic powers, with the king of Prussia, with the electors of Saxony, Hanover, &c. they would thus be placed in a situation in which they would have all their treaties to begin anew. In return for all these sacritices, he offers to restore to them Martinique, St. Lucia, Tobago; reserving however one of them as an equivalent, if they are to retain St. Doiningo. The restoration of Belgium was a sine qua non and Mr. Fox avowed he should much regret to see Belgium attached to the territories of the republic; but if ministers were sincere in their wishes for peace, if they considered Belgium as an object of so much importance, let them not offer brass tor gold. What they had offered was trifling

indeed; and if France complied with their demands, what would be her relative situation amongst the powers of Europe? She would have given up Belgium, Luxemburg, and italy: and further, it was required, that something should be ceded to the Emperor, to render him secure on the side of the Austrian Netherlands. The three great powers of Europe would all of them be left with considerable acquisitions. The king of Prussia had gained a third part of Poland; Russia had obtained a considerable extent of territory from that unfortu nate country; and in addition t his share in the division, it was proposed that the emperor of Germany should be put in possession of Maestricht, or some other place. France was only to be left with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon. Was the state of the war such as would justify this proposition? Was it equitable that all the other powers should gain more than France? When Great Britain acted so unreasonably, France natu rally took a step calculated to give confidence to the people in those countries annexed to the Republic, by declaring, that on no account would she consent to give them up.

As to the French minister having asked Lord Malmesbury to give in his ultimatum, it evidently meant no more, than that he should make a formal declaration of what he had said respecting Belgium; a demand which surely could not be deemed unreasonable.

After having heard so much stated of the value of Belgium, and such reasons urged why it should be restored to the Emperor, Mr. Fox could not help remarking that it was not very long since the people of that country were in a state of rebellion; and it was surmised at the time, that we were by no means

averse to supporting them in their endeavours to shake off the Austrian yoke. But however great its value might be, was it sufficient to justify the continuance of a destructive war? And if it were, there was another question to be considered: if, in addition to the expense and carnage with which the war had already been attended, it were proper to sacrifice a hundred millions more, and a hundred thousand men, for its attainment, it ought to be very clear, that our object was attainable by these means. It ought also to be recollected, that the emperor, who was a friend to-day, might be an enemy to-morrow. It was not eight months since he was not so much a favourite with ministers; perhaps, indeed, they were cautious in expressing their partiality, lest it should be suspected that money was then going to the court of Vienna. At that time the king of Sardinia was extolled as a pattern of fidelity to all princes: he did not mean to impute to the Sardinian monarch any breach of faith; necessity compelled him to conclude a treaty with the republic, and we had not heard in what situation he was now to be considered, with respect to this country. Ministers had already sent large sums to his Imperial majesty, and were about to make farther advances; and the alliance could not be maintained at an expense less to the country than a sum of two millions annually. If we should not be able to grant him the same assistance, he might be reduced to the same necessity as the king of Sardinia, and compelled to conclude a peace.

When all these circumstances were put together, the sacrifices which must be incurred in attempting to wrest Belgium from the French, and the uncertainty of ob

taining the object, the minister who on that account only should refuse to make peace, had much to answer for on the score of policy and humanity. By the treaty concluded with the emperor, in 1793, we engaged not to lay down our arms without his consent; if we urge the stipulations of a treaty as a rea son why we cannot conclude peace but. on certain terms, we sanction the argument which is represented as so unjustifiable on the part of France. We had no more right to talk of our treaties, than they of the regulations concerning their boundaries. If an absurd and impracticable condition be introduced into a treaty, is there not reason to suspect it is for the purpose of throwing difficulties in the way of peace? To the French is imputed all the odium and blame of breaking off the negotiation. The minister had asserted, that we were not bound by any thing as a sine qua non ; for that is impossible, in the nature of a negotiation, until it be concluded. But whatever assertions may be, the world at large will regard the memorial of Lord Malmesbury as the sine qua non of the court of Great Britain respecting Belgium. The right honourable gentleman says it may be recovered by force of arms; but what security is there that we shall not sink in our prospects upon that event, and that they will not rise in proportion as we sink? Amuse not the people of this country, continued Mr. Fox, by a delusive pretence, as you did by an amendment to get rid of an honourable friend of mine, and in which you stated to Europe that you would negotiate with France when its government was capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity with other powers.

These little artifices had had their ends;

ends; but these were times that required openness and candour. The plain question was, peace, or war? However the minister might persuade the majority of the house that his wishes and inclinations bend towards peace; it would not be believed by the people, that the sine qua non, with regard to Belgium, would overbalance the assertions of members of parliament. The house had no the credit with the public, nor did it deserve that credit which former houses of commons had.

He then proceeded to make some remarks on the cause of breaking off the negotiation. Was the emperor (said he) a party to it? No; it was a sine qua non, made in a matter intended solely for the benefit of the Emperor, to which, nevertheless, he was not a party, and which we did not know whether he himself would insist upon! Surely this might have been known before the negotiation was entered upon; when we were so often sending such immense sums to the emperor, some persons employed in these offices might have asked the questionHad any done so?- No; and let any impartial man answer, if this was not a mockery of negotiation. But, said the right honourable gentleman - Why did not the directory present a contre projet?-To whom should they present it? Not to the emperor; for he was not a party, though every thing contained in our projet was for his benefit alone.

The people indeed, said Mr. Fox, who may come into the power of another people by chance of war, cannot by the law of nations be disposed of lawfully till the definitive treaty of peace is concluded: but this was very different from a people who are left at liberty to choose a government for themselves,

and who voluntarily adopt the step of uniting themselves with their neighbours.

There was one thing very remarkable, that in all this negotiation, where almost every possession of all the parties had been taken notice of, the name of the valuable and important kingdom of Corsica had never appeared. Did ministers say, when they took it, You may form a government of your own, and be a free people" No; they sent a viceroy. Sir Gilbert Elliot went as representative of his majesty, cooked them up a constitution, half French, half English, and endeavoured to detach them entirely from any predilections in favour of French princi, les.

The French were and always have been represented by ministers as a horde of assassins. Suppose the Corsicans had chosen the king of Great Britain as their king, and intreated that they might not be given up to these assassins; could the right honourable gentleman have said, in a negotiation for peace, that Corsica was an object of restoration? Mr. Fox believed he would not; and may not the French use the same arguments respecting Belgium? On former occasions, when the conquests in the West Indies were mentioned as means of negotiation, the idea of status quo ante bellum was ridiculed. He particularly alluded to Martinique, which was not to be considered as a conquest in former wars; it was taken at the request of the inhabitants in it, who all desired to be taken under the protection of his Britannic majesty. Martinique was, however, me tioned in this negotiation; and the minister had gone off from his high language.

Peace, Mr. Fox affirmed, could not be obtained by a perseverance