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From these documents it will appear that our observations in the beginning of this chapter are strictly correct; and that the importance of the bank, as a public institution, has been unwarantably magnified. If we compare the sum of 12,000,000l. which has in general been the extent of the bank-notes in circulation, with the whole trade of Great Britain, as estimated by the custom-house reports, how insignificant will it appear. And if we consider that the assistance which this institution has afforded to commerce has seldom exceeded three or four millions at any given time, how trifling must it appear in com

parison with the immense capitals which are annually turned over in our different manufactures!

The truth is, the trade of Great Britain is chiefly carried on, independent of the bank, by a kind of barter, traffic or circulation among the traders themselves, who accept and receive private bills of exchange to an infinitely greater amount than the whole circulation of the bank of England. The bankpaper is chiefly confined in its circulation to the metropolis; and the assistance which it extends to individuals is principally extended to the merchants and traders of the metropolis. It quickens perhaps,

and

and preserves, in some degree, the vital energy in that part which may be considered as the centre of commercial action; thus far, it is of use and importance, but this is the utmost limit of its utility; and it must be a consolatory reflection to Englishmen to know, that the trade

and manufactures of the country can be affected but in a very slight degree by the prosperity or misfortunes of the bank. They happily rest on a firmer basis-on the genius, industry, and spirit of the people.

C H & P. Vi.

State of Ireland with respect to France.--Observations on the abortive Attempt of General Hoche.-Becomes the Subject of Debate in the British Parliament-Debate in the House of Commons on Mr. Whitbread's Motion relative to the Invasion of Ireland.-Debate in the House of Lords on the same Subject.-Earl of Moira's Motion on the State of Irelandnegatived. Mr. Fox's Motion in the House of Commons on the same Subject-also negatived.

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we except the transactions in Italy, where the commanding genius of Buonaparté seems to have risen superior to the impediments which the weakness, folly, or selfishness of his employers might have thrown in his way, we may venture to pronounce that the present directory of France have exhibited but slender talents for conducting a war, and but little of that vigour, industry, and stratagem, which marked the politics of their predecessors. Their threatened invasion of England is become almost proverbially ridiculous; nor have they on any occasion manifested an energy equal to their resources, or a genius in directing ably even the slender preparations they have made. The attempt at an invasion of Ireland, under the direction of general Hoche, which we noticed in our last volume, was the only effort that was made to put their bombastic threats and their pompous pro

clamations in execution. That attempt, fortunately for Britain, was ill-planned. ill-planned. The whole conduct of the expedition was intrusted to one man, without, even an able second in command, who was properly instructed to supply his place, should any accident prevent the co-operation of the commander-inchief: the consequence was, that the troops and seamen who first made their destined port, were without a leader, and incapable of acting. The directory, too, appear to have been unaccountably ignorant of the state of the country, which it was their object to subdue, since late events have shewn that the descent was not made in the most vulnerable part, nor was the faction itself, which was expected to aid the design, apparently apprized of the enterprize, or prepared to cooperate. Had they acted in concert, and had the force of the French been directed to several points of M 2

the

the island, it is more than probable that this valuable appendage of the British empire would have been for ever separated from the parent land; a revolution, more sanguinary, perhaps, and certainly more disastrous in proportion to its nearness, than the American revolution, might probably have been effected. Providentially for this island, as well as for Ireland itself, the design was frustrated by the weakness of its projectors, and by the rigour of the season and the elements; and we may venture to predict, that a second opportunity equally favourable will not occur, and that Ireland will never now be reduced under the Gallic yoke.

To enter into the causes of disaffection which concurred to produce the late unhappy ferment in that kingdom, would at this season be obviously improper; and to extend these observations further would be to anticipate much of that matter which we shall, in the course of this chapter, have an opportunity of giving upon superior authority. Let it suffice to say, that the exposed situation of Ireland, and the supposed neglect of the admiralty, with respect to observing the motions of the Brest fleet, were made the subject of a motion in the British house of commons on the third of March. The opening of this interesting debate was intrusted to Mr. Whitbread, who enlarged much on the want of precaution in the ministers in general, and on the inactivity of the admiralty in particular. Information, he said, had been received through various channels, that Ireland was one great object of the meditated attack of the enemy. Had any measures then been taken towards the defence of that country, when the attack was

actually made? He intreated the attention of the house to its situation when the enemy was on the very coast; from the letter of the commander-in-chief in that quarter (general Dalrymple) it appeared, that, instead of any effectual measures having been previously adopted for its defence, every thing remain ed to be done. After mentioning the appearance of the enemy in Bantry Bay, the General says, that he will proceed to put every thing into the most proper train for de feating their designs.

Was this, continued Mr. Whitbread, a proper defence against so active and enterprizing an enemy as we have to contend with? There was not at the time more than three thousand regular troops to oppose the whole force of the French; the city of Cork in particular was in the most imminent danger of falling into their hands, had not that God alone, who has so often favoured and protected this country, prevented it. In Cork were contained stores and provisions of various kinds, to the amount of a million sterling in value; amongst those stores were the whole of the provisions intended for the use of the British navy for the following year, so that, had they been taken or destroyed, our navy would have been, for a year to come, annihilated. He proceeded to state the motions of the French fleet, and of our own, from the time of their quitting Brest. Admiral Colpoys, with a fleet of fourteen or fifteen sail of the line, was lying off Brest harbour for some weeks; the French fleet, however, in defiance of this, sailed from Brest on the 15th of December; on the 20th they arrived on the coast of Ireland, and some of them dropped anchor in Bantry Bay;

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previous to that, and during the time that admiral Colpoys was with his squadron lying off Brest, admiral Richery, with six French ships of the line, passed our squadron and got safe into Brest; so that the enemy were at sea, and on the coast of Ireland, from the 18th of December to the 6th of January. On the 20th of December news arrived in England that the French fleet had quitted Brest, and on the 31st that it was off the coast of Ireland. On the same day, exactly, admiral Colpoys, with the fleet under his command, arrived at Portsmouth: the reasons given for his return with his squadron are various and contradictory; one was, that his force was insufficient to encounter that of the enemy. If this be the real cause, said Mr. Whitbread, it furnishes additional reason for inquiring into the conduct of ministers, and of the first lord of the admiralty in particular.

There was another circumstance which had occurred very remarkable: admiral Elphinstone arrived in Ireland, in the Monarch of 74 guns, accompanied by a frigate. He gave notice to the castle of Dublin, that be with the ship under his command, and with the frigate, was ready to join any other force that might be allotted for the purpose of going in search of the enemy. Admiral Kingsmill also issued orders for several frigates to sail on the same errand; yet on the 3d of Ja nuary admiral Elphinstone arrived at Spithead with the Monarch, without having seen any of the enemy's fleet. Lord Bridport, who sailed the same day from thence, and went first to Brest, and then shaped his course to Ireland, returned to Spithead equally unsuccessful; and the designs of the enemy were only

frustrated by the winds, and the safety of Ireland entirely abandoned to the chance of the elements.

Another reason assigned for the return of admiral Colpoys' squadron into port was, that it was short of provisions; but, continued Mr. Whitbread, is it possible to conceive, that, in all the time it lay off Brest, either fresh ships could not have been sent to relieve him, properly victualled, or transports have been forwarded to re-victual the fleet? When information had been received of the active and extensive preparations going forward at Brest, after the large sums consumed in secret service money, and with the immense navy in our possession, shall we be told they ought not to have sent out fresh ships to have reinforced that squadron? He concluded by moving, "that it might be referred to a committee to inquire into the conduct of ministers respecting the late attempt of the French to invade Ireland."

Mr. Dundas replied to Mr. Whitbread in a speech of some length. He exonerated the admi. ralty from any want of foresight, or failure of duty; said it was impossible to decide whether Portugal or Ireland was the object of the French fleet; asserted that it was the wisest measure our government could adopt, to divide our fleets, stationing one off Brest to watch the enemy and intercept the sailing of the expedition, and the other at home, to relieve it if necessary, or join it if expedient. He contradicted a statement that had gone abroad, that no frigate or squadron had been appointed by the admiralty to watch over the enemy in Brest harbour, and give an account to admiral Colpoys as circumstances should re-. quire. Sir Edward Pellew was ap

pointed,

pointed, and did actually cruize there. But notwithstanding the diligence and skill of the admiral, and the experience and courage of sir Edward, their exertions were in vain for the state of the weather was such, that it was impossible for the admiral to keep his own fleet under his observation, and the air was so hazy that the fog guns were continually fired. Could any man doubt sir Edward's inclination to have given, if possible, the intelligence to the admiral, that the enemy had put to sea; or that admiral Colpoys was not desirous to see it? Was it likely he should be unwilling, when he had a fleet under his command so superior to that of the enemy? It was the wisest resolution he could take, not to follow them to Portugal or Ireland, till he knew their certain destination; and he kept his station for the chance of intercepting all, or part of the fleet, in case of dispersion by a storm; he recollected also, that the circumstance of their having sailed, would be known to the admiralty, and by remaining where he was, he should receive such authentic intelligence as he could not otherwise expect to obtain.

Respecting the charge of the want of provisions, Mr. Dundas could not but admit the squadron had remained longer on its station than was at first supposed necessary, and not relieved so soon as the admiralty had intended; the reason was, sir Roger Curtis should have been in port the beginning of November, and did not come till the 18th. He had been appointed to cruize off Rochefort, where he remained a fortnight longer than was expected, to intercept the return of Richery's squadron from Newfoundland. Sir Roger's squadron consisted of seven

As to the

sail of the line, and was to have been sent to the relief of the fleet off Brest; but the wind was so adverse as to render it impossible for them to come to Spithead before the 18th of November. interval which took place between the arrival of admiral Colpoys and the sailing of lord Bridport, the instructions of sir Edward Pellew reached the admiralty on the 20th of December; and on the 21st he received information of the sailing of the French fleet from Brest, and immediately returned for answer, that all the fleet would be ready four days after, namely the 25th. [Here Mr. Dundas read the orders of the admiralty, issued on the 21st, and another order issued after, counteracting some part of them, and desiring him to proceed off Cape Clear immediately.] He wished it to be observed, that, although the French fleet arrived off the coast of Ireland on the 21st of December, no intelligence of them was received in this country till the 31st; the admiralty had taken the chance of finding admiral Colpoys on the sta tion where they expected him to have been, off the Lizard, in case of any adverse winds removing him from the French coast. Lord Bridport had always been not only a gallant but a successful admiral; yet it so happened, that, although admiral Colpoys had been hovering with his squadron off Brest, to intercept the enemy upon their leaving that harbour, although lord Bridport afterwards proceeded off Cape Clear and the Irish coast with the same design, and although the Duke and the Majestic, with two other ships of war, were sent in search of them, they were so covered by the fog, and protected by fortune, as to escape them all. The honourable gentleman,

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