system of the war had been a faulty system; the system of domestic politics had been equally faulty; whatever the result of the negotiations might be, it was the duty of the house to re-consider the general system of politics adopted of late years, and whether it were possible to go on if that system should be pursued. Peace was certainly the great object; but whether peace would be effectual if there were no change in domestic politics, was matter of doubt; that it would be beneficial whatever system was pursued, he was ready to assert. If it continued to be a bad one, peace would diminish the calamities of it; if it were amended, it would augment the benefits: at all events it was desirable; in one case it would be a palliative, in the other a remedy; and in both it could not but be good, and therefore should have his warmest support.

What were likely to be the terms of peace, he would not even conjecture; but he would not hesitate to say, we ought to negotiate in the spirit of great moderation. With regard to the Austrian victories, which made a topic of animated exultation in his majesty's speech, it might be right to rejoice in the gallantry they had displayed, and the laurels they had recently acquired; no man admired their great military exertions more than he did; but let it be remembered that we were called to rejoice on their having recovered only a part of what was lost in this compaign, and that it was not because they had reaped successes calculated to obtain what ministers had stated to be the object of the war, but be cause they had saved the house of Austria from the destruction with which it was threatened. We

could not presume to flatter ourselves that the Austrians were likely to recover all they had lost in the present campaign, much less what they had lost in all the campaigns that were past. The achievements of our navy had been brilliant and glorious; at no former period had they displayed greater gallantry, and never perhaps equal skill; yet after all this, the peace we were desirous to obtain, and the utmost we could expect was, that it should be solid, and of permanent duration. Then what must be the sort of conflict in which we were engaged, when after a four years successful exertion of all the skill and all the valour of the navy, all our efforts could not produce a peace either brilliant or glorious, but we must content ourselves with hoping it may be solid and permanent ? Might we not suppose that there was something in our cause radically defective, which palsied our efforts, and disappointed our strength? something which demanded from the common sense and prudence of Englishmen a strict and rigorous investigation, that we might discover what this something was, not merely to retrieve the present calamity, but guard our offspring against the error in future. great length of time would elapse before he should think it his duty to bring this matter before the house; for it was of the most essential importance to the wellbeing of the country, and to the true support of the crown, that an inquiry should be made into all the causes which had brought the nation into its present state, and produced the evils of the present war, for the purpose of advising his majesty to make a fundamental change in the system upon which we had lately acted, both

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with regard to foreign and domestic policy. He found it necessary to say so much, that he might not preclude himself from the discussion of these topics at some future day; and with this reserve, he did not oppose the address.

Mr. chancellor Pitt said, that he considered it as matter of just pride and honest satisfaction, that at so critical a conjuncture there should be no difference of sentiment in the house upon the only great and substantial question on which the address expressed an opinion. Such a circumstance exhibited the most decided proof that the steps which his majesty had taken for negotiation, and the clear and explicit declaration he had made, were in themselves so unexceptionable, and so well calculated for the end in view, that they must command assent from any man who retained the smallest care for the interest and honour of his country.

The honourable gentleman had justly stated, that what hitherto had been done only amounted to an overture for peace; it was indeed impossible to state what would be the result, what would be the disposition of the enemy, or what circumstances would occur to influence the fate of the negotiation. We ought to look fairly to our own situation; it held out to us a chance of peace if the enemy were disposed to accede to it on just and reasonable terms; but, if not,-if they were actuated by ambitious projects, we should gain another object by the course we had pursued; we should unmask them in the eyes of Europe; we should expose the injustice of their policy, and their insatiable thirst for aggrandizement; and if no other advantage were gained, we should

at least be able to put to the proof the sincerity of the pledge which had that day been given-that, if the enemy were not disposed to accede to peace on just and reasonable terms, the war would be supported by the unanimous voice, and the collected force, of the na. tion. If the unanimity were not founded merely on the pleasing sound of peace, the captivating charm of renewed tranquillity, and the prospect of the termination of those scenes of horror with which war is always attended; if it were the result of rational reflection, founded on a careful consideration of the situation of the country, and prepared to meet every conjuncture, it could not be too highly prized. We ought not to put out of view those means of exertion which we yet possessed; we ought to compare our state with that of the enemy; and the amount of our own acquisitions with the losses of our allies we ought to estimate the extent of those sacrifices, which, under all these circumstances, it may be fitting for us to make, to effect the restoration of peace. The right honourable gentleman had intimated that we ought to change the whole system of our interior policy, considering it as inconsistent with the constitution of our country, yet professing himself so well satisfied with the constitution as to ascribe to it that internal and undisturbed order and tranquillity which for some time past had been enjoyed; at the same time reprobating the laws which were passed in the last parliament, and refusing to subscribe to any construction of that part of the speech which included these amongst the means which had secured tranquillity. He, on the contrary, was of opinion that, exclusive of the influence of

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order and justice, whilst we had been contending against a country in every point the reverse of the picture. He said, that the right honourable geutleman had been suggesting what lessons we ought to derive from the experience of adversity; but when he added that the situation of this country was that of adversity, he could by no means agree to the truth of the proposition. How far it deserved to be ranked under that description, he called upon those to pronounce who were best acquainted with our resources. It could not surely be termed a state of adversity from any losses of our trade, the diminution of our capital, or the reduction of any of our foreign possessions. We had not been greatly impoverished by the events of the war in the East and West Indies; we could not be much weakened in our national strength by having our navy raised to a greater degree of glory and fame than it had ever before attained. Where then were we to' Jook for the symptoms of this adversity? In the losses and disasters of our allies? Did the right honourable gentleman hold out these as a criterion of adversity, and in the same breath as a source of complaint that we were not sure of a triumphant peace? And why could we not command such a peace? Because we would not separate our own greatness and our own commerce from the fate of our allies; because we refused to purchase peace for ourselves on any terms but those which would secure the tranquillity of Europe, and considered the situation of Great Britain as chained to that of the continent, by the bonds of a liberal and comprehensive policy.

Whilst the violence of France had been over-running so great a

part of Europe, and carrying desolation in its progress, our naval exertions had enabled us to counterbalance their successes by acquisitions in different parts of the globe, and to pave the way for the restoration of peace to our allies on terms which their own strength might have been unable to procure. If, indeed, we looked into the geographical situation of the seat of war, the emperor had not regained by his victories all that he had lost; but did we count for nothing the destruction of those armies by whom all previous successes of the enemy had been achieved? Did we count for nothing the glorious testimony which had been exhibited to mankind-that disciplined valour finally must triumph over those principles which the war was undertaken to oppose, and which owed all their extraordinary success to the violence in which they originated, and the excesses with which they were accompanied? A memorable warning had been afforded by those foreign powers, who, in opposition to their true interests, had courted the alliance of that enemy, and expected to find security in disgraceful tranquillity.

Recent events have served also to exculpate those who had been calumniated, as desirous to embrace their principles, and receive their laws; and in Germany they had left behind them nothing but the memory of wrongs, and the feelings of resentment. Germany had furnished a striking instance of fortitude and perseverance; he trusted that these were virtues which our country had not to learn: England had never shown itself deficient in firmness and magnanimity; it was unrivalled in resource, it was foremost in exertion, and it had only to maintain its accustomed vigour to effect

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the restoration of general tranquillity upon terms consistent with the dignity of its character and the security and interest of Europe.

Mr. Fox said a few words in explanation, in which he complained that Mr. Pitt had misrepresented, his argument respecting the time for negociation. He did not argue, that, because it was right to negociate now, it was right to negociate at any former period, but, (and he had not altered his opinion from any thing he had heard) that, if it were prudent and wise to send an ambassador to Paris now, when the French had carried their arms into the heart of Germany, it would not have been dastardly and pusillanimous to have adopted that measure when they had not one foot of that territory. He said, that he still retained his opinion respecting the new laws; and when be voted for the address, he did not include them in his construction of that part of it in which mention is made of the wisdom and energy of the laws.

The question upon the address was then put, and carried nemine contradicente.

On the 18th of October the house of commons resolved itself into a committee, to consider that clause of his majesty's speech which alluded to the intention manifested by the enemy to attempt a descent on these kingdoms. The clause being read, the chancellor of the exchequer observed, that, after the unanimous vote which the house had given upon the first day of the session, and their universal concurrence in that part of the address which respected a foreign invasion, it would be unnecessary to make any apology for calling their attention to the subject. That it was the duty of every one to exert him1797.

self to prevent the attempt if pos sible, and, at the same time, to take such measures of defence as should cause the invasion, if it should be attempted, to terminate in the confusion and ruin of the enemy. He said the natural defence of this kingdom was its naval force, which, at that moment, was more formidable than ever it had been at any other period in the history of the country. But, strong and powerful as it was, it was capable of considerable increase, could an additional supply of seamen, or even landsmen, be procured. For this purpose he sug gested a levy upon the different parishes throughout the kingdom, an expedient similar to that which had been practised with so much success about two years before. He observed that it must be evident to every one, that, as great numbers in the old regiments had fallen in the defence of our foreign possessions, it was necessary to adopt a more expeditious mode for their completion than the ordinary method of recruiting. He therefore proposed, in the first place, a levy of fifteen thousand men from the different parishes for the sea service, and for recruiting the regi ments of the line.

In digesting this plan, he said, there were two considerations, the first the means of calling together a land force, sufficiently strong to frustrate the attempt, keeping our naval force entirely out of view; and, secondly, to adopt such measures in raising this force as should not materially interfere with the industry, the agriculture, and the commerce of the country. The primary object was to raise, and gradually to train, such a force as, might in a short time be fit for service. The most expeditions.

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