Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of PhilosophyUniversity Press, 1900 - 296 Seiten |
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Beliebte Passagen
Seite 101 - All nature is but art, unknown to thee; All chance, direction, which thou canst not see; All discord, harmony not understood; All partial evil, universal good. And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One truth is clear,
Seite 172 - In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject...
Seite 167 - Such a Poet is indeed a second Maker; a just Prometheus, under Jove. Like that Sovereign Artist or universal Plastick Nature, he forms a Whole, coherent and proportion'd in it-self, with due Subjection and Subordinacy of constituent Parts.
Seite 167 - Will it not be found in this respect, above all, "that what is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is, of consequence, agreeable and good?
Seite 84 - following two false and dangerous doctrines: first, that the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and second, that we could have a knowledge of good and evil without and prior to a knowledge of God" (Rae, Life of Adam Smith, 1895).
Seite 164 - If eating and drinking be natural, herding is so too. If any appetite or sense be natural, the sense of fellowship is the same. If there be anything of nature in that affection which is between the sexes, the affection is certainly as natural towards the consequent offspring ; and so again between the offspring themselves, as kindred and companions, bred under the same discipline and economy.
Seite 123 - So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind...
Seite 126 - Leechman, who, tis said, agreed that I was a very unfit person for such an office. This appears to me absolutely incredible, especially with regard to the latter gentleman. For as to Mr. Hutcheson, all my friends think, that he has been rendering me bad offices to the utmost of his power.
Seite 100 - ... you have made my system as clear as I ought to have done, and could not. It is indeed the same system as mine, but illustrated with a ray of your own, as they say our natural body is the same still when it is glorified.
Seite 124 - If morality were determined by reason, that is the same to all rational beings ; but nothing but experience can assure us that the sentiments are the same. What experience have we with regard to superior beings ? How can we ascribe to them any sentiments at all ? They have implanted those sentiments in us for the conduct of life like our bodily sensations, which they possess not themselves.