St. Paul's prohibition, when he forbids all foolish talking and jesting, which are not convenient. What our translation renders jesting, the original styles cvrpareλía, which Aristotle reckons among his virtues, and defines it to be the habit of jesting handsomely. So that what passed in the heathen world for a virtue is forbidden to Christians; and it is probable that our Saviour, by idle words, meant those jests which were so delighted in and bore so good a character: this subject enlarged on.

Secondly, With regard to the end and design of speech, which is the gift of God to mankind.

Speech was given us for the communication of our thoughts to each other but though it be given for this purpose, yet all our thoughts are not to be disclosed as fit objects of discourse: we must judge what are proper, and must be answerable for the government of our tongues. A man may be innocent in having some thoughts in his mind, which he cannot innocently disclose; for though he cannot always choose his thoughts, he may choose what he will talk of. As to the proper ends of speech we may reason thus: God has made us reasonable creatures and fitted us for his service, and therefore expects a reasonable service from us: as he has given us all the good we enjoy, our duty is to praise him for his goodness, and raise in others a sense of gratitude: this is one end of speech. As he has made us liable to many wants, it is our duty to pray to him to supply them: this another end. Farther, the wants and necessities of nature, which are present, call for our help; we must by industry obtain the necessaries and conveniences of life; as this subject must employ a great part of our thoughts, so it is properly a frequent one of our discourse. Moreover, God has made us to delight in each other's company we are sociable creatures, and there is a pleasure in conversation; whence it follows, that men may commendably meet for the maintaining and improving mutual love and friendship: another end therefore of speech is to be a bond of society, a means of bringing and keeping men together. If then it appears that men may meet for mutual society and conversation, it follows that nothing can render conversation unlawful that is not sinful for God has made us for the society of each other, and has commanded us to love each other; and therefore, if our discourses are friendly and social, they are so far virtuous, as they serve the end of nature: this subject enlarged on.

Lastly: The nature of man is considered, and the different degrees of sense and understanding in different men.

This consideration must have place in this question, because the tongue cannot speak better than the understanding can conceive; which infers a proportion between the abilities of our mind and the soundness of our speech. To discourse profitably on the most profitable subjects, requires a clear conception and a distinguishing judgment; without which men only lower noble subjects. What then must the great body of mankind do? They must talk of such things as lie level to their capacities, since even they are fitted for conversation and have a delight therein let them be prevailed on to

abstain from envious and malicious discourse, from lewd and filthy jesting, which are too often ingredients of their conversation: for since God has designed them for society as well as others, and given them no great share of understanding, you can neither restrain them from society, nor exact more wisdom from them than they have received. This consideration will reach wiser men: you must not despise your weak brother, to whom charity obliges you to be civil and courteous. From all these considerations together, it appears that the conversation of the world on common and trivial subjects, is not blameworthy. It is a diversion in which we must not spend too much time; as, if we so offend, we shall be answerable for our neglect of weightier matters; but otherwise, if we transgress not the bounds of innocence and virtue, we trust that our harmless though weak and unprofitable words shall not rise up in judgment against us.

DISCOURSE XXXVII.

EPHESIANS, CHAP. IV. VERSE 28.

Let him that stole, steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth.

PART I.

THIS text contains a confirmation and explication of the eighth commandment: for, since all men are not equally supplied with the necessaries of life, and those who are without them are forbidden to steal, they can be obtained only by purchase or exchange; and as the only thing which a poor man has to exchange is the labor of his hands, it follows that, as he must not steal, he must work: he has as many ways to maintain himself as the rich man has wants or desires : but this latter has often very wicked desires and sinful pleasures; and though to serve the rich be the poor man's maintenance, yet to these he is forbidden to administer: he must work with his hands only the thing that is good.

Moreover, since labor to the poor is the business and employment which God has given them to do, a man is not to rest satisfied with working merely as far as the wants of nature oblige him, and spending the rest of his time idly and wantonly; but if, through God's goodness, he is enabled to gain more than is sufficient for himself, he becomes a debtor to other duties, he owes a tribute to his Maker; and he is bound still to labor, that he may have to give to him that needeth. It is shown that both the rich and the poor are equally obliged to make returns to God suitable to their abilities. The text consists of four distinct parts: I. A prohibition; let him that stole,

steal no more: II. A consequent injunction; but rather let him labor: III. A limitation of this duty to things honest and lawful; working with his hands the thing which is good: IV. The rule and measure of the same; that he may have to give to him that needeth. First, As to the prohibition: by this we are forbidden the use of all such means for our own maintenance and support, as are injurious to our neighbor. The command, thou shalt not steal, was given to secure every man in the possession of his goods; and therefore the reason of the law reaches all sorts of fraud and deceit; and there are many things which, strictly speaking, we do not call stealing, but which must be understood as comprehended in this law, in virtue of the reason on which it is founded: this point explained. Some are apt to repine at the unequal distribution of the goods of fortune; and thinking that they have as good a natural right to a share as their possessors have, they assert that right whenever it is in their power to do so. Hence sprang the sect called Levellers, who were for having the world equally divided among its inhabitants. Their opinion is destructive of all law and justice, and makes void the command given against theft. It renders labor and industry useless, since he that labors can acquire nothing that he had not before; and if it prevailed generally, it would render the world a nest of idle vagabonds. It requires but few words to show the vanity of such a doctrine; for though we cannot produce a divine law ordering the distribution of this world's goods, yet property is evidently of divine right: for when God gave the command, thou shalt not steal, he confirmed to every one the possession of his goods: this point enlarged on. From whence it follows that no man can acquire the possession of any thing which is at present another's, without his consent fairly obtained; and to this right of his own establishing even God himself submits. The poor are his peculiar charge, and he stands engaged for their support; but neither does he force us to part with our estates to them, nor does he give to the poor any right to serve themselves out of the abundance of others; but he has left them to be supported by voluntary charity: since God therefore has not, for the sake of the most necessitous, thought fit to break into the sacred law of property, no man can be warranted, whatever may be his wants, in transgressing it but in consequence of this, it follows that he who has not enough of the good things of this life for his maintenance and support, is obliged to work for his living. And this is the

Second thing to be considered, as the injunction of the text; but rather let him labor. His wants must be supplied from the abundance of others; and therefore he must find some honest way of transferring to himself what at present is not his. This must be done by consent of the present possessor, which must be obtained by purchase or intreaty. A man may, if he pleases, part with his goods freely to others by way of gift; and it should seem that, what another freely gives, we may freely and innocently take. This raises a question concerning the lawfulness of begging; for if a man may lawfully beg, and can by that means raise a sufficient maintenance, then it does not necessarily follow that, because we must not

steal, therefore we must labor. In this question we must distinguish concerning persons; for some have a right to be maintained by charity, and these have a right to ask for it. Charity is the inheritance of the poor: it is, as it were, their property: and therefore, if any one who is not an object of it, lives by charity, he invades the rights and property of the poor; and this is the worst way of stealing. Who are not objects of charity the Apostle tells us in another place; if any man will not work, neither let him eat; that is, if a man can work and will not, he ought to starve. Now no man ought to starve, who ought to be maintained by charity; for such have a right to eat thereof: from whence it follows that such as can labor, but will not, have no right to charity, and consequently have no right to ask it; and therefore begging, for such as are able to labor, is an unlawful calling, or a more specious theft: this subject enlarged on.

Since then it is not lawful either to beg or to steal, it follows that a man must labor, and by his own industry maintain himself and those who have a right to be maintained by him. The Apostle adds that he must labor, working with his hands ;* which is our duty when we are not capable of any better work; for such as cannot live without it, must live by bodily labor. But the injunction is more general, and includes all kinds of labor, toil, or study, by which men may be serviceable to themselves or others: and it may properly be asked how far this duty extends, and whether such only are obliged to labor as cannot live without it.

Man was not made to be idle. God has not given him sense and understanding to sit still and do nothing. If he was made only to eat and drink, then indeed it would follow that those who have enough, need do nothing else; but if he is made for and is capable of nobler employment, then it is an absurd thing to ask, whether a man may be idle, provided he wants nothing? The necessary affairs of the world cannot be managed by the labor of the hands alone: the head must also be employed in things of the highest consequence: and every man owes it as a duty to God and his country to render himself useful in his station, &c.: hence all men are obliged to that kind of labor and work which is suitable to their rank. We generally say, that God has made nothing in vain: yet what is the rich man made for, if his business be only to eat and drink, and spend his estate? Sense and reason are great gifts of God: and if he has exempted our hands from toil, he will expect that we should improve our nobler parts, and will exact an account of the talents committed

to our trust.

PART II.

We here proceed to the third thing, which is the limitation, by which we are confined to work only the things that are good, fore

* Of this St. Paul himself was an illustrious example: see Acts xviii. 3.-ED.

going all unlawful means of supporting ourselves: let him labor, working with his hands the things that are good. Had not this condition been expressed, it might have been collected from the nature of the command; for if the law of God be superior to our necessities in any point, it must be in all. Our Saviour tells us that man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God: if so, then we must not for bread transgress any part of God's word; which would be to destroy life under the pretence of preserving it. As we are men, we are the servants of God, and his law is our highest obligation as we are poor, we must serve men, which is the law of our condition; and this can never supersede the law of our nature: therefore no necessity can justify us in despising or neglecting God's ordinances: this point enlarged on. Hence we may learn what value there is in the excuse which servants and poor men usually make, when they are sensible that they are employed otherwise than they ought to be: they dare not desert the service of their master, on whom they depend for their livelihood; the work they do is his, and his is the guilt: the first part of this excuse shown to be false, as God is superior to man: the second, as reason, which is given to us for a guide, makes us principals in all the evil we do. It is therefore manifest that, as the law of our condition obliges us to labor for our maintenance, so the superior law of reason and nature obliges us to work only the things that are lawful and honest.

But it may be asked, what are lawful and honest employments? Now the labor of the poor depends on the wants and desires of the rich but the things which men want are either the necessaries, or conveniences, or pleasures of life; and all trades or callings are subservient to one or other of these. 1. God has made nothing necessary to us which is not lawful and honest; therefore all such works as those of husbandry, &c. may be pursued. 2. When men are furnished with necessaries, they may then look out for conveniences; and if the rich may lawfully desire and enjoy them, then the poor may lawfully provide them this point enlarged on. 3. The next thing which may furnish employment are the pleasures of life. Some of these are very innocent, and some very wicked; and the rule in this case must follow this distinction: such pleasures as the rich may innocently enjoy, the poor may lawfully provide; such as are wicked may neither be enjoyed nor provided without guilt.

But there are some things, which, according as they are used, may administer to innocent pleasure, or to vice and immorality: as wine may either make glad the heart of man, or sink him below the level of a brute; hence the question, how far we may lawfully provide things of this kind? Now since the innocence or wickedness of these lies together in the use of them, he that uses them may be to blame, and he that provides them may be innocent: this point enlarged on.

When things in their own nature evidently tend to corrupt and debauch men's manners, they are capable of no defence. Whatever exposes religion to contempt, or virtue to ridicule, whatever makes vice glorious, or gives to lust dominion over reason, is of this kind.