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in 1908 are applicable: The convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines, the convention respecting bombardments by naval forces in time of war, the convention for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva convention to maritime warfare, the convention relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of the "right of capture in maritime war," and, with the exception of two articles, the convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers in maritime wars.

In addition to these is the convention establishing an international prize-court, formulated at the second Hague conference, and the consequent declaration of London of 1909, both of which were ratified by the United States in 1912, the international prize-court having been modified by a protocol at the instance of the United States. The declaration of London, though not generally ratified, was signed and agreed upon by all of the delegates to the international naval conference held in London in 1908-9. This alone gives it great weight as being the enunciation of certain principles of international law with regard to maritime war and other matters likely to come before a prize-court. These conventions and declarations will be referred to in discussing questions of which they treat.

152. Attack and Capture of Public Vessels of the Enemy.One of the objects of maritime war has been given as the capture or destruction of public armed and unarmed vessels of the enemy cruising under lawful authority.

In these times the vessels just enumerated would be of a multitude of types and of many origins. Besides the usual and regular vessels of the navy in existence at the outbreak of war, the entire revenue marine service of the United States is incorporated by law into the navy, the subsidized merchant liners also follow the same course, becoming either armed men-of-war or auxiliaries and to which would be added such other vessels that can be purchased or acquired as are ca

pable of use as colliers, supply vessels, distilling ships, machine repair vessels, parent ships for torpedo vessels, submarine mine vessels, transports, hospital ships, etc.

After the outbreak of war all men-of-war and other vessels like those just mentioned of the enemy which are met by a man-of-war of the other belligerent on the high seas or within the territorial waters of either belligerents can at once be attacked after displaying the national ensign of the attacking vessel or fleet. Only a man-of-war can attack men-of-war, unless a country, like our own, not adherent to the declaration of Paris should create privateers and issue letters of marque. For the same reason as a non-adherent, privateers could be used against us in warfare.

A merchantman may be considered as having the right to repel an attack made by a vessel of war of the enemy.

"On March 27, 1913, Mr. Churchill, during a speech in the British House of Commons upon the navy estimates, announced that the admiralty proposed to encourage British ship owners to provide for the defence of their vessels in time of war by lending them guns, furnishing them with ammunition, and training gun crews for them, provided the ship owners would pay for the necessary structural alterations of their ships. The idea of Mr. Churchill was, apparently, not to arm merchant ships for aggressive action in the event of war but to enable the larger merchantmen to protect themselves. While the proposal has a different object in view from that contemplated in the creation of a volunteer fleet, and while it in no way resembles the practice of privateering, it is further evidence to show that the rôle that vessels originally built for commercial purposes have played in time of war has not yet become obsolete."1

When one or the other of the vessels engaged in action determines to yield or surrender, which circumstance is generally shown by hauling down the national ensign or by the exhibi1 Fenwick, "Neutrality Laws of the United States," pp. 154, 155.

tion of the white flag of truce, firing must cease on the part of the victor and negotiations should follow by persons or signals. To continue an attack after knowledge of surrender, or to sink a vessel after submission, is a violation of the rules of civilized warfare, only permissible in cases of treachery or renewal of the action.

A public vessel becoming a prize of war is taken possession of by the captor, its officers and men become prisoners of war, and no legal proceedings are necessary as in the case of privately owned vessels. Non-combatants on board of an armed vessel and the personnel of a public unarmed vessel of the enemy are liable to detention as prisoners of war, excepting those who are exempt under the Geneva conventions.1

Public and private vessels of the enemy are exempt from capture if they are engaged solely in religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions. Cartel ships, which are vessels of the belligerents employed in the carriage by sea of exchanged or paroled prisoners to their own country are also free from capture, provided they do not engage in trade, carry unauthorized despatches, or engage in hostilities. Hospital ships are exempt from capture if they are not used for any military purposes. They are to be designated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva convention as adapted to the principles of maritime warfare.2

The belligerents shall have, however, the right to control and search them, and they may detain them if the gravity of the circumstances require it. Any war-ship belonging to a belligerent may, however, demand the surrender of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked who are on board military hospital ships, hospital ships belonging to relief societies or to private individuals, merchant ships, yachts and boats, whatever the nationality of such vessels.3

1 Stockton, "Manual of Int. Law for Naval Officers," pp. 163, 164. 2 Art. 5, Convention X of second Hague conference.

Higgins, "Hague Conferences," Convention X, Art. 12, p. 369.

153. The Use of Torpedoes and Submarine Mines.-In using torpedoes in a naval action it is now required that they should be so constructed as to become harmless if they miss their mark. This applies also, of course, when such torpedoes are used from the shore in attacking the vessels of the enemy.

An indirect and comparatively modern method of attack upon vessels of war made either from shore or by vessels of the other belligerent is through floating contact mines, operated automatically or otherwise. The convention of the second Hague conference upon the subject which is numbered VIII arose from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. Although such instrumentalities had been used during the American Civil War, they came more particularly into prominence during the operations in the vicinity of Port Arthur. Valuable vessels of war and great loss of life occurred from the use of these mines on both sides. As a result, the use of these mines became the subject of discussion in the second Hague conference, resulting in the convention just referred to and to which the United States became a party.

It is forbidden by this convention to lay or use anchored or unanchored automatic contact mines or torpedoes unless they are so constructed as to become harmless after they have either broken adrift or missed their target or, in case of floating mines, one hour at most after those who use them have lost control over them.

154. Conversion of Merchantmen into Vessels of War.This is a matter of very considerable interest in maritime warfare, but which is left in an unsettled condition both by The Hague conferences and the London naval conference from the impossibility of agreement. The convention of the second Hague conference in regard to the conversion of merchant ships into war-ships is very vague and incomplete as to its main objects and is apparently more to secure the observance of the declaration of Paris in regard to privateering than for the regulation implied in its title. For this and other reasons the

United States did not become a signatory or ratifying power and has not acceded to its clauses, as it has not adhered to those of the declaration of Paris.

In the naval conference of London the question as to conversion on the high seas and that of reconversion afterward was the one which failed of agreement and which consequently remains open. But, besides this matter, the clause of the declaration of Paris which abolishes privateering, although agreed to by all the important states of the world except the United States, and by that country in practice, has begun to be discussed in an antagonistic manner. There are writers in Great Britain, France, and Germany who question the desirability of such abolition. It is not likely, however, that such abolition will ever be done away with, although it is possible that the practice of the conversion of merchantmen into vessels of war will be more freely practised and with less limitation in future maritime wars, even to an extent which may be construed into an evasion of the declaration of Paris. The policy of the British admiralty in favoring the arming of large merchant steamers for self-defence previously referred to is a step in that direction.

A case of this kind took place in the Franco-German War of 1870, when a royal Prussian decree was issued for the formation of a volunteer navy. German ship owners and sailors were called upon to place themselves and their ships at the disposal of the state. Volunteer ships were to be placed under naval discipline and officers and crew were to wear the uniform of the navy. A premium was offered for such enemy ships as should be destroyed or captured by volunteer ships, varying from fifty thousand thalers for an iron-plated frigate to ten thousand thalers for a screw steamship.1

The French Government protested against this decree and appealed to the British Government as a violation of the declaration of Paris abolishing privateering. The British Govern1 Higgins, “War and the Private Citizen,” p. 120.

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