pretation and application of international treaties, may be submitted to obligatory arbitration without restriction. This was adopted by the conference by forty-one votes, the United States, Japan, and Rumania not voting. Attempts were made to draw up a more definite convention, giving a certain number of subjects to which obligatory arbitration would apply, but without success. In the second convention of The Hague of 1907 which treats of the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts, Article 1 reads as follows: "The contracting powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its nationals. This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromise from being agreed on or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award." The United States Senate, however, in ratifying this convention on April 17, 1908, stated that the United States approves this convention with the understanding that recourse to the permanent court for the settlement of the differences referred to in said convention can be had only by agreement thereto through general or special treaties of arbitration heretofore or hereafter concluded. 129. The Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.There has been existing a feeling which is, to a great extent, well founded, that arbitration bodies are apt to reach compromises rather than judicial decisions based upon international law and treaties. This has caused a movement in favor of more definite decisions like those delivered by judges rather than those arrived at by tribunals or conferences where the findings are more diplomatic than judicial. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States, the tribunal of appeal for disputes between the different States forming the Union, has been often quoted as the tribunal which might serve as a model for cases of international disputes. Perhaps the best differentiation of the two methods of settlement of international disputes can be found in Secretary Root's instructions to the American delegation to the second Hague conference of 1907. It reads as follows: "It has been a very general practice for arbitrators to act not as judges deciding questions of fact and law, upon the record before them, under a sense of judicial responsibility but as negotiators effecting settlement of the questions brought before them in accordance with traditions and usages and subject to all the considerations and influences which affect diplomatic agents. The two methods are radically different, proceed upon different standards of honorable obligation, and frequently lead to widely differing results. It very frequently happens that a nation which would be very willing to submit its differences to an impartial judicial determination is unwilling to subject them to this kind of diplomatic process. If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of the different states, or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States, there can be no doubt that nations would be more ready to submit their controversies to its decision than they are now to take the chance of arbitration. It should be your effort to bring about in the second conference a development of The Hague tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing less, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility.' As a matter of fact, the court established by the conference of 1899 lacks continuity and coherence. It is, in reality, a panel of judges rather than a court. In practice it has also been slow in coming into being and in its subsequent workings. As a result of this condition and to meet the defects found, an attempt was made, mainly by the American delegates, to remedy matters under the instructions just quoted. The result adopted by the second Hague conference was first in the form of a declaration, which was afterward changed in title to that of a vœu (or wish). It left out, however, the provisions relating to the nomination of the judges or their rotation in office. In this form it remains with the recommendation that it be brought into force as soon as an agreement can be reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution. Although it was adopted in this form finally by thirty-six votes and six abstentions, it has never been put in force. The Department of State has secured an amendment at the international prize convention of the second Hague conference, so that it could be used when ratified as a working system for an arbitral court, but so far this has not been utilized. Of the arbitral court and its difficulties in the second Hague conference Mr. Higgins writes as follows: "The labor of weeks spent in discussing the various projects for the composition of the proposed court of arbitral justice was frustrated and rendered fruitless for the present by the opposition of the smaller powers, headed by the Brazilian delegate, M. Ruy Barbosa. To them the doctrine of the equality of states was a dogma accepted in its crudest meaning. Equality before the law and equality in influence are two very different things. The 'primacy of the great powers' is a fact, if it is not a legal principle, and if these powers should be able in the future to agree upon a method for the appointment of the judges for the court, the lesser powers will, in course of time, gradually be found desirous of taking their part in an institution which would contain the germs of the most important judicial body ever known to the world. But are these powers really in earnest in their desire to establish such an institution? The international Palais de Justice has been built, furnished, and decorated and is ready for the judges to take their seats; it is for the powers to open the doors and send them in."1 1. Mediation TOPICS AND REFERENCES Moore, "History of International Arbitration," vol. V, 5042-6. Oppenheim, 2d ed., vol. II, "International Law," pars. 10-15. "La Médiation," etc., 1900. Mélik. 2. Arbitration Moore, "History and Digest of International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party," in 6 vols., 1898. Lake Mohonk Conference Reports on International Arbitration since 1895. List of References on International Arbitration, published by the Library of Congress, 1908. "For the Arbitration and the Hague Court," 1904. 3. International Commissions of Inquiry Hershey, "International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese 4. Obligatory Arbitration Oppenheim, 2d ed., vol. II, 25-26. Hershey's "Essentials," 329332. Scott, vol. I, "Hague Peace Conferences," chap. VII. 5. The Judicial Settlement of International Disputes Hershey's "Essentials," 321. Westlake, "International Law," 2d ed., vol. I, 363-5. Nys, "Le Droit International," vol. II, chap. V. Proceedings of Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. CHAPTER XVI MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT SHORT OF WAR There are several methods that are of a non-amicable nature by which pressure more or less forcible is brought to bring about a solution of international difficulties without actually causing formal war. The advantage of these measures over actual war is that not only do they avoid the actual fighting with its bloodshed but also the complications, commercial and otherwise, that arise in the intercourse and relations with neutrals in formal and declared warfare. These measures are the suspension of diplomatic relations, retorsions, reprisals, embargo, and pacific blockade. 130. The Suspension of Diplomatic Relations.-The suspension of diplomatic relations by the withdrawal of the diplomatic agents is a marked manifestation of disapprobation of the action and policy of one government toward another. Mr. Hannis Taylor says, with respect to this method of redress, that "as permanent ministers and ambassadors are maintained as the best mediums through which views may be exchanged and business amicably adjusted between nations, a refusal to settle just claims within a reasonable time may become a sufficient cause for the withdrawal of a diplomatic agent from the offending capital. Under such circumstances the representative may retire, leaving the business of his embassy or legation in the hands of a chargé d'affaires; or the mission may be entirely closed, and the envoy of some friendly power requested to look after the interests of citizens. Thus, in 1827, the American chargé at Rio de Janeiro, when 'his representations in behalf of the rights and interests of his countrymen were disregarded |