แ 66 qu'en guerre, certaines règles de bienséance, d'humanité et de "justice, comme de ne point attenter à la personne des ambassadeurs ou autres personnes envoyées pour faire des propositions de paix "ou de trève; de ne point empoisonner les fontaines; de respecter "les temples; d'épargner les femmes, les vieillards, et les enfans; ces usages et plusieurs autres semblables, qui par succession des temps ont acquis force de loi, ont formé ce qu'on appelle le droit "des gens ou le droit commun aux divers peuples." 66 66 (Extract from Vattel, Prélim. s. 6.) "Il faut donc appliquer aux nations les règles du droit naturel, LL pour découvrir quelles sont leurs obligations, et quels sont leurs "droits; par conséquent le droit des gens n'est originairement autre "chose que le droit de la nature appliqué aux nations. Mais comme "l'application d'une règle ne peut être juste et raisonnable, si elle ne se fait d'une manière convenable au sujet, il ne faut pas croire que le droit des gens soit précisément et partout le même que le "droit naturel, aux sujets près, en sorte que l'on n'ait qu'à substi"tuer les nations aux particuliers. Une société civile, un Etat, est "un sujet bien différent d'un individu humain; d'où résultent, en "vertu des lois naturelles même, des obligations et des droits bien "différentes en beaucoup de cas; la même règle générale, appliquée à deux sujets, ne pouvant opérer des décisions semblables, quand "les sujets diffèrent; ou une règle particulière, très-juste pour un "sujet, n'étant point applicable à un second sujet de toute autre "nature. Il est donc bien des cas, dans lesquels la loi naturelle ne "décide point d'Etat à Etat, comme elle déciderait de particulier à "particulier. Il faut savoir en faire une application accommodée "aux sujets; et c'est l'art de l'appliquer ainsi, avec une justesse "fondée sur la droite raison, qui fait du droit des gens une science "particulière." APPENDIX II. PAGE 32. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF ANCIENT ROME. I. GROTIUS is literally inaccurate, as Ompteda remarks, in citing Cicero for a direct assertion that the science of International Juris prudence was, in the abstract, an excellent thing. But unquestionably, in the passage upon which Grotius relies for this assertion, International Jurisprudence is recognised as a science, and acquaintance with it as the accomplishment of a statesman. Cicero (a), speaking of Pompey, says that he possessed" præstabilem scientiam (a) Orat. pro Lege Manil. "in fœderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus populorum, regum ex"terarum nationum in universo denique belli jure et pacis," and it would not be easy to give a juster, better, more complete recognition, or a fuller description of the science of which we are treating. In Sallust, the expression jus gentium is certainly to be found used in the sense of International Law, and also in some passages of Livy. For instance, when Sallust tells us that Marius, in putting to death the Numidians who had surrendered (in deditionem acceptos), acted contra jus belli, he speaks of it as a violation of a recognized rule of International Law, applicable now, as then, to a state of war. And Bocchus is made by the same author to claim the part of Numidia conquered from Jugurtha as "jure belli suam factam." Again Jugurtha maintains that the Senate had no right to prevent him from attacking Adherbal, who had attempted his (Jugurtha's) life. "Populum Romanum neque recte, neque pro bono facturum, si ab jure gentium sese prohi"buerit" (b). In the most barbarous times, ambassadors are said to be "jure gentium sancti" (c). In both these instances the meaning would be correctly rendered by the words Law of Nations. There is another passage in the "Bellum Jugurthinum" in which the Law of Nations, with respect to the privilege of the ambassador's suite, is clearly distinguished from the Law of Nature: "Fit reus magis ex æquo bonoque, quam ex jure gentium Bomilcar, comes ejus qui Romam fide publica venerat." The expression of Lucan, as to the violation of the Laws of Embassy by the Egyptians is very strong: 66 66 "Sed neque jus mundi valuit, neque foedera sancta Gentibus."-Lib. x. 471–472. With respect to the use of this expression, jus gentium, in the compilations of Justinian, it appears generally to be used to signify, sometimes what is called in modern times the Law of Nature, sometimes a positive Law universally instituted by all civilised nations. So, in the Digest (d), acceptilatio, or the release of a debt, is said to be juris gentium; and in modern times English Judges have said that questions relating to marriage are juris gentium. Gaius and other Roman jurists made a twofold partition of Jus : into 1. Jus Gentium vel Naturæ ; 2. Jus Civile. Ulpian and others made a threefold partition: 1. Jus Gentium; 2. Jus Civile; 3. Jus Naturale-meaning by this to include the interests common both to man and beast. Savigny rightly rejects this last partition, and adheres to the first (e). There are, however, passages in which jus gentium clearly does (b) Sall. Bell. Jugurth. 225. (c) Liv. xxxix. 25. (d) Lib. xlvi. t. iv. (e) System des R. K. i. (Beylage I.). See, too, Cic. de Off. 1. i. 3-5. mean International Law. Thus in the Digest, we read: "Si quis แ legatum hostium pulsasset, contra jus gentium id commissum esse existimatur, quia sancti habentur legati. Et ideo, quum legati apud nos essent gentis alicujus, quum bellum eis indictum "sit, responsum est, liberos eos manere; id enim juri gentium con"veniens esse. Itaque eum, qui legatum pulsasset, Quintus Muciu"dedi hostibus, quorum erant legati, solitus est respondere; quen! "hostes si non recepissent, quæsitum est, an civis Romanus maneret, quibusdam existimantibus manere, aliis contra, quia quen: "semel populus jussisset dedi, ex civitate expulisse videretur, sicut "faceret, quum aqua et igne interdiceret. In qua sententia videtur "Publius Mucius fuisse. Id autem maxime quæsitum est in Hos"tilio Mancino, quem Numantini sibi deditum non acceperunt, de quo tamen lex postea lata est, ut esset civis Romanus, et Præturam quoque gessisse dicitur " (ƒ). แ 66 In the Institutes it is said: "Sed naturalia quidem jura, quæ "apud omnes gentes peræque servantur, divina quadam providentia "constituta, semper firma atque immutabilia permanent; ea vero quæ ipsa sibi quæque civitas semper constituit, sæpe mutari solent, "vel tacito consensu populi, vel alia lege postea lata" (g). 66 Here jus gentium and jus naturale, as the Law of Nature, are clearly synonymous. But in Gaius we find this remarkable passage: after having said that only Roman citizens were competent to enter into a contract in the form spondes ? spondeo, he continues: "Unde dicitur, uno casu hoc verbo peregrinum quoque obligari posse, "velut si Imperator noster Principem alicujus peregrini populi de 66 pace ita interroget, Pacem futuram spondes? vel ipse eodem modo interrogetur. Quod nimium subtiliter dictum est; quia si quid adversus pactionem fiat, non ex stipulatu agitur, sed jure belli res vin"dicatur" (h). The reader who is anxious to prosecute his inquiries further into this not uninteresting subject would do well to consult the following. among other treatises: 83. 1. Warnkönig, "Vorschule der Institutionen und Pandekten," 2. Savigny, "System des Römischen Rechts," i. 112; and Bey. lage I. to that volume. II. 1. Observations upon the " Collegium Fecialium" and the "Jus Feciale." 2. The institution of the " Recuperatores," and the doctrine of the "Recuperatio." 1. Varro gives the following definition of the term: "Feciales, "quod fidei publicæ inter populos præerant; nam per hos fiebat ut (f) Dig. lib. 1. t. vii. s. 17. (g) Inst. de Jur. Nat. Gent. et Civ. 1. i. t. ii. s. 11. (h) The passage is cited by Savigny, System des R. R., vol. iii. (note c), p. 310. "justum conciperetur bellum, et inde desitum ut fœdere fides pacis "constitueretur. Ex his mittebantur antequam conciperetur, qui "res repeterent, et per hos etiam nunc fit fœdus, quod fidus Ennius "scribit dictum" (i). The Roman institution of the Feciales was perhaps derived originally from the Egyptians, though directly from the Greeks through the medium of their colonies settled in Italy; but it is a memorable characteristic of the Romans, that the founding of an institution having for its object the establishment and maintenance of fixed relations both in war and peace with neighbouring States, should have been almost coeval with the origin of their empire. The Feciales, occupying a middle station between priests and ministers of state, regulated, with as much precision as the heralds of the middle ages, and according to a certain ritual, the forms and usages relating to the treatment of ambassadors. the concluding of treaties, the promulgation and conduct of war (j). In these, as in all important concerns, the sanctions of religion were invoked to strengthen the obligations of morality. Cicero says: "Belli quidem "æquitas sanctissime feciali populi jure præscripta est" (k); and the facts recorded in history appear to warrant this description. If a dispute arose between Rome and another independent State, Feciales were sent to demand reparation. If the attempt failed, war was declared according to minute and particular formalities. It is not within the scope of this work to show how the decay and decline of this remarkable institution accompanied the corruption and overthrow of the Republic (). 2. We know from other sources, besides the certain testimony of etymology, that in the very earliest ages both of Greece and Rome the stranger and the enemy were synonymous terms (ix0pós, hostis) (m). To the necessity which dawning civilization soon produced, of maintaining a friendly intercourse with the inhabitants of neighbouring States, as well as to some peculiarities in the condition of the founders of Rome, we owe the institution of the Recuperatores, and the doctrine of the Recuperatio (n). For in order to satisfy this necessity, treaties were entered upon, in which the administration of justice to the individual subjects of the contracting parties within the dominions of either was mutually guaranteed. Therefore Grotius correctly observes: "Tenetur (i. e. rex aut populus) etiam dare operam ut damna "resarciantur: quod officium Romæ erat recuperatorum. Gallus "Elius apud Festum, Reciperatio cum inter est populum et reges (i) Varro, De Lingua Latina, 1. v. s. 86, p. 34 (Leipsic, 1833). Grotius, de J. B. et P. 1. ii. c. i. s. 22, p. 168. (k) Cic. de Off. 1. i. (1) Ompteda, Völkerrechts, s. 34, p. 146. (n) Ib. 339. "nationesque ac civitates peregrinas lex convenit quomodo per "reciperatorem reddantur res reciperenturque resque privatas inter se prosequantur." Sell, to whose very learned work I have already referred, cites the passage from Festus, but makes no mention of Grotius—at least, I can find none. The Recuperatores (o) were judges chosen for the purpose of deciding questions at issue between the native and the alien ally. Such a treaty, indeed, implied that the parties to it were free and independent States. For as soon as the one became actually subject to the other, the existence of such a treaty was useless, as the conquered might, and generally was compelled to, adopt the laws of the conqueror. Equally useless would such a treaty be in the case of two nations subsisting in so intimate an union as to be, as it were, citizens of one State. And if we bear in mind that in either of these contingencies a Recuperatio could have no place, and remember how rapidly the march of the Roman empire reduced foreign countries within one or other of them, we shall not be surprised that the traces of the proper and primary application of this peculiar branch of jurisprudence become fainter as we advance in the history of Rome, and at last disappear altogether from her records (p). But when the Recuperatio was no longer strictly applicable, according to the letter of its original institution, because the subject, namely, two independent States, was wanting, the principle of this jurisprudence was transferred, by the practical wisdom of Rome, to the arbitration of disputes arising between Romans and the inhabitants of their colonies, and also of the provinces which it pleased them to leave with the appearances of independent States. Livy records a very striking instance of its application, at the request of the legate from Spain to the Senate of Rome. Hispaniæ deinde utriusque legati aliquot populorum in senatum "introducti. Ii, de magistratuum Romanorum avaritia superbia66 que conquesti, nisi genibus ab senatu petierunt, ne se socios "fœdius spoliari vexarique, quam hostes, patiantur. Quum et alia "indigna quererentur, manifestum autem esset pecunias captas, "L. Canuleio prætori, qui Hispaniam sortitus erat, negotium "datum est, ut in singulos a quibus Hispani pecunias peterent, quinos recuperatores ex ordine senatorio daret, patronosque quos "vellent, sumendi potestatem faceret. Vocatis in curiam legatis "recitatum est senatus consultum, jussique nominare patronos: quatuor nominaverunt, M. Porcium Catonem, P. Cornelium Cn. "F. Scipionem, L. Æmilium L. F. Paullum, C. Sulpicium Gallum. "Cum M. Titinio primum, qui prætor A. Manlio, M. Junio con 66 (o) "O rem præclaram vobisque ab hoc retinendam recuperatores," &c.-Cic. Orat. pro Cæcina, ss. 22, 24-25. (p) Sell, pp. 339-40. |