Titanic and the Volturno, (the facts of which had been subjected to inquiry by its committees) where, in the one, the lack of lifeboats probably caused the loss of many lives, although in a quiet sea, and where, in the other, lifeboats lowered in a great storm were engulfed, it was thought by some, from the absence of the skill of able seamen in launching them; or like that of the City of Rio de Janeiro (In re Pacifio Mail S. S. Co., 130 Fed. 76), which sank with many of its lifeboats unlaunched because the crew of Chinese sailors were unable to understand the language in which the orders of their officers were given. The following from the opinion in that case (pp. 82-83) is peculiarly apposite:

"It is, as was said by Judge Hawley in Re Meyer (D. C.) 74 Fed. 855, 'the duty of the owners of a steamer carrying goods and passengers, not only to provide a seaworthy vessel, but they must also provide the vessel with a crew adequate in number, and competent for their duty with reference to all the exigencies of the intended route'; not merely competent for the ordinary duties of an uneventful voyage, but for any exigency that is likely to happen, . . . The case shows that the City of Rio de Janeiro left the port of Honolulu, on the voyage under consideration, with a crew of 84 Chinamen, officered by white men. The officers could not speak the language of the Chinese, and but two of the latter-the boatswain and chief fireman-could understand that of the officers. Consequently, the orders of the officers had to be communicated either through the boatswain or chief fireman, or by signs and signals. So far as appears, that seemed to have worked well enough on the voyage in question, until the ship came to grief, and there arose the necessity for quick and energetic action in the darkness. In that emergency the crew was wholly inefficient and incompetent, as the sad results proved. The boats were in separate places on the ship. The sailors could not understand

the language in which the orders of the officers in command of the respective boats had to be given. It was too dark for them to see signs (if signs could have been intelligibly given), and only one of the two Chinese who spoke English appears to have known anything about the lowering of a boat; and there had been no drill of the crew in the matter of lowering them. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that but three of the boats were lowered, one of which was successfully launched by the efforts of Officer Coghlan and the ship's carpenter, another of which was swamped by one of the Chinese crew letting the after fall down with a run, and the third of which was lowered so slowly that it was swamped as the ship went down. We have no hesitation in holding that the ship was insufficiently manned, for the reason that the sailors were unable to understand and execute the orders made imperative by the exigency that unhappily arose, and resulted so disastrously to life, as well as to property."

See also R. S. § 4463, amended c. 72, 40 Stat. 548; Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Marine Ins. Co., 71 Fed. 210, 219; Northern Commercial Co. v. Lindblom, 162 Fed. 250, 254.

It is not unreasonable to conclude that Congress determined that each of the watches, like the crew as a whole, should be "adequate in number," competent and in a state of readiness" for any exigency that is likely to happen such as a collision, the striking of the ship upon a reef of rocks or an iceberg, the sudden breaking out of fire, and other happenings of like disastrous tendency-and to this end meant to provide for successive and continuous watches to be constituted in numbers as nearly equal as the sum of the whole number would permit.

In this conclusion we are fortified by the consideration that the legislation deals with seamen and the merchant marine and, consequently, the phrase "divided into . . watches" is to be given the meaning which it had acquired in the language and usages of the trade to which the Act relates, in accordance with the rule stated in Unwin v.

Hanson, [1891] L. R. 2 Q. B. 115, 119: "If the Act is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words." In the understanding of the sailor, a division into "watches," as applied to the personnel of the ship, connotes a division as nearly equal as possible. "At sea a ship's crew is commonly divided into two watches; the Master, 2nd Mate, 4th Mate (if any) with one-half of the seamen and boys, forming the socalled 'Starboard Watch'; after four hours these are relieved by the Chief-mate, and the 3rd Officer (if any) and the other half of the men, who form the 'Port Watch"." Paasch, Marine Encyclopedia, 300, 301. R. H. Dana, Jr., in his "Dictionary of Sea Terms," p. 129, defines the term "watch" as: "Also, a certain portion of a ship's company, appointed to stand a given length of time. In the merchant service all hands are divided into two watches, larboard and starboard, with a mate to command each." And, at page 133, he says: "The men are divided as equally as possible, with reference to their qualities as able seamen, ordinary seamen, or boys, (as all green hands are called, whatever their age may be;) but if the number is unequal, the larboard watch has the odd one, since the chief mate does not go aloft and do other duties in his watch, as the second mate does in his." The point is emphasized by the use of the distinctive terms "anchor watch" and "sea watch ", the former meaning the lookout entrusted to one or two men when the vessel is at anchor and the latter being used "when one half of a ships crew is on duty" at sea. Paasch, 301.

It is true that this meaning had its origin in the customs of the sea before the advent of steam, but there is nothing

to show that it has now a different meaning; and, with nothing in the context and no evidential circumstances to suggest the contrary, we fairly may assume that the use of the technical terms of the trade to which the statute relates imports their technical meaning.

Decree reversed.

AMERICAN STEEL FOUNDRIES v. ROBERTSON, COMMISSIONER, ET AL.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 156. Argued November 16, 17, 1925.-Decided January 4, 1926. 1. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trade-mark by others on articles of a different description. P. 379.

2. The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition, the general purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing off his goods or his business as the goods or business of another. Id.

3. Whether the name of a corporation be regarded as a trade-mark, a trade name, or both, the law affords protection against its appropriation on the same fundamental principles. P, 380.

4. The effect of assuming a name by a corporation under the law of its creation is to exclusively appropriate it as an element of the corporation's existence. Id.

5. Equity will enjoin the appropriation and use by another of a trade-mark or trade name resembling the name of a corporation where, from the closeness of the resemblance and the other facts of the particular case, it appears that confusion of identity may likely result to the injury of such corporation. P. 381.

6. The provision of § 5 of the Trade Mark Act of February 20, 1905, that no mark consisting merely of the name of a corporation shall be registered under the Act, is to be construed in harmony with the foregoing principles, and does not prevent registration of part of the name of a corporation where the partial appropriation is

372

Argument for Simplex Heating Co.

unlikely to deceive or confuse the public to the injury of the corporation to which the name belongs. P. 381.

7. The fact that the word "Simplex" was a salient part of the name of a corporation other than the applicant for registration, held not a ground for refusing registration, where the goods to which it was applied by the applicant were unlike those manufactured or sold by the corporation, where many registrations of the same word, singly or in combinations, had been made by others for other goods, and where it did not appear that, standing alone, the word denoted that corporation or any other, to the mind of the public. P. 382.

RESPONSE to questions certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon appeal to that court from a decree of the District Court dismissing the bill, in a suit under Rev. Stats. § 4915 brought by the American Steel Foundries against the Commissioner of Patents and Simplex Electric Heating Co., to enforce registration of the word

Simplex" as a trade mark for articles made and sold. by the plaintiff. See 262 U. S. 209; 256 U. S. 40; 258 Fed. 160.

Mr. George L. Wilkinson, for American Steel Foundries.

Solicitor General Mitchell filed a memorandum, submitting the case without brief or argument, on behalf of Robertson, Commissioner.

Mr. Nathan Heard, for the Simplex Electric Heating Company.

The prohibition of the registration of the name of a person, firm, corporation, or association—that is, a personal name—is grounded on the same fundamental reason as the prohibition of the registration of a geographical term. It rests upon the essential character of the mark, and has nothing to do with the character of the goods. Congress has enacted that such marks are not to be given the advantages of registration, but are to be left to the protection afforded at common law and usually to the