suffered; that, whatever the power of the Commission to suspend the clause in question, that power does not appear to have been invoked in this case by an adequate and timely application to the Commission; that since, on any one of the above grounds, the Commission was free to award reparation upon finding damage suffered as a result of the higher through rate, and found such damage, its report stated a prima facie liability; and that, as the declaration embodied the report, it was good on demurrer. The argument is, in our opinion, unsound.

The aggregate-of-intermediates clause was inserted in § 4 by the Act of June 18, 1910. Since that amendment, as before, the section empowers the Commission, upon special application, to "prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section." The question whether, after the amendment, the power so conferred was still limited to the long-and-short-haul clause or extended also to the aggregate-of-intermediates clause, received careful consideration immediately after the passage of the 1910 Act. The Commission concluded that its power to grant the relief applied to both of these clauses. In its annual report for 1911 the reasons for this conclusion were set forth. Pp. 19-20. The construction then adopted has been acted upon consistently ever since.' So far as appears, no court, federal or state, has taken a different view. And Congress has acquiesced.

In support of the contention that the power to relieve from the operation of the section does not cover this case, the shippers point to the fact that, while the charge of the

1

Humphreys Godwin v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 25, 29; Through Rates from Buffalo-Pittsburg Territory, 36 I. C. C. 325; Through Rates to Points in Louisiana and Texas, 38 I. C. C. 153, Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Director General, 62 I. C. C. 109; Fares between New York and Points West of Newark, 74 I. C. C. 516; Fidelity Lumber Co. v. Louisiana & P. Ry. Co., 83 I. C. C. 499, 500.

higher through rate did not become unlawful per se until the provision to that effect was inserted in § 4 by the 1910 Act, the Commission had repeatedly held that a through rate higher than the aggregate of the intermediates was prima facie unreasonable. From this they argue that the construction given to the amended Act by the defendant carriers would result in abridging, instead of enlarging, the rights of shippers in this respect, and therefore should not be adopted. We think such a conclusion erroneous. The construction given the section by the carriers does not result in abridging the rights of shippers. As a result of the amendment such through rates, unless protected by proper application, are not merely prima facie unreasonable, but unlawful by express statutory provision. The Commission, while claiming the power to suspend the operation of the clause in question, has continued to hold that, as before the amendment, such through rates are prima facie unreasonable when attacked under § 1 of the Act.3

2

Hope Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co,, 12 I. C. C. 265; Coomes v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 192; Oshkosh, Logging Tool Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 109; Hardenberg, Dolson & Gray v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 579; Momsen & Co. v. Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 614, 615; Lindsay Bros. v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 15 I. C C. 40; Michigan Buggy Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 297; Lindsay Bros. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 6; Wells-Higman Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 339; Blodgett Milling Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 16 I. C C. 384; Smith Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, M. & G. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 447; Milburn Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 144; Windsor Turned Goods Co v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 162.

3 See, e. g., Humphreys Godwin Co. v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 25; Alabama Packing Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 47 I. C. C. 524, 529; Williams Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 50 I. C. C. 531, 533; Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 78 I. C. C. 107; Davision & Namack Foundry Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 81 I. C. C. 345; La Crosse Chamber of Commerce v. Director General, 93 I. C. C. 602.

No good reason is shown for denying to the words used their clear and natural meaning. Compare Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 564-568. On the other hand, there is good reason why the two prohibitions of § 4 should be treated similarly. Apart from statutory enactment it is prima facie unreasonable to charge more for a shorter than for a longer haul. To charge more for a through haul than the aggregate of the intermediate rates is likewise prima facie unreasonable. In each case conditions may exist which, if shown, would establish the reasonableness of the rate in question. Under the Act to Regulate Commerce as originally enacted the carriers were, in each class of cases, at liberty to introduce the rate without first securing the consent of the Commission. If its invalidity were later asserted, they could escape liability by establishing then its justification. By amendatory legislation, Congress provided, in each class of cases, that the rate should not be charged unless, prior to its introduction, the Commission had, upon special application, granted authority therefor. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476.

The shippers' contention that relief from the operation of the aggregate-of-intermediates clause was not invoked by an adequate and timely application is also unsound. Under the second proviso of § 4 the rates complained of, if in effect on June 18, 1910 and then lawful, remained so, provided an application to suspend the operation of the section was duly made and was either allowed or remained undetermined. The District Court construed the report of the Commission as finding that the then existing rates here in question were so protected. We, also, construe the report as finding, in effect, that application for relief was made and was both adequate and timely.

It is true that the due filing of such an application for relief from the aggregate-of-intermediates clause or even an order granting relief thereon, would not render legal a

Opinion of the Court.

269 U.S. rate which violated some other section of the Act. See United States v. Merchants, etc. Assn., 242 U. S. 178, 188. A through rate would be unlawful, despite such an order, if it violated § 3 because unjustly discriminatory, or if it violated § 1 because unreasonably high. The Commission is correct in holding, as before stated, that if a through rate higher than the aggregate of the intermediates is attacked under § 1, the prima facie presumption that such higher through rate is unreasonable, and hence unlawful, obtains now as it did before the 1910 amendment. But no such question could arise in a proceeding limited to § 4. In a proceeding for violation of either clause of § 4, there is no occasion to consider either the presumption of unreasonableness or the existence of a justification for making the through rate higher. Neither is relevant. For if there has been an adequate and timely application within the six months, which application remains undetermined-or an application filed later and granted-there can be no violation of that section. If there was no such application filed, the section is violated by the higher through rate, even if conditions are shown which would have justified the rate as against a charge of unreasonableness under § 1.

Since there can be no recovery under § 4 because of the pendency of an application for relief, we have no occasion to consider whether the rule of Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403, as to damages applies to violations of the aggregate-of-intermediates clause, nor whether it applies alike to suits based on reparation orders and to those instituted in the courts without such prior order.

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

UNITED STATES, EX REL. KENNEDY ET AL. v. TYLER, SHERIFF, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 125. Argued April 21, 22, 1925.-Decided October 12, 1925. 1. The power of a District Court to inquire by habeas corpus into the cause of the detention of a person held in custody by the authority of a state court in alleged violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, is to be exerted in the exercise of a sound discretion; and the due and orderly administration of justice in a state court is not to be thus interfered with save in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist. P. 17.

2. Lack of ability to bear the expense of proceedings for relators' protection in the state courts or to furnish bonds required on appeal, does not alter this rule. P. 19.

3. Persons who were imprisoned by a New York court for contempt in disobeying its order prohibiting further proceedings in the Peacemakers' Court of the Cattaraugus Indian Reservation, claimed that the land in question was outside the sovereignty of the State and the jurisdiction of its courts, and that their arrest and detention violated their rights as Seneca Indians, under treaties with the Seneca Nation, and their rights under the Federal Constitution. Held, inasmuch as the state courts were proceeding under state laws passed in response to a request of the Seneca Nation and which apparently for the greater part of a century had not been challenged as impeding the authority of the Federal Government, that it was peculiarly appropriate that the questions raised should be dealt with by those courts in the first instance, subject to review by this Court, and that a writ of habeas corpus, issued by the District Court, should have been discharged upon that ground rather than upon the merits.

294 Fed. 111, affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court, discharging upon the merits a writ of habeas corpus, issuance of which was procured by Walter S. Kennedy, on behalf of his son, Warren Kennedy and Sylvester J. Pierce, to