flict in the evidence, the presumption of wrong will be against the
steamboat. Seaman & Gillespie v. Steamboat Crescent City, 105.
2. Where damage is done by a boat in motion to one lying at a wharf,
the presumption of wrong is against the moving boat, and to avoid
liability it must appear that the greatest caution and vigilance were
observed. Mills v. Steamboat Holmes, 352.
3. Ordinary care under such circumstances will not protect the boat
which commits the injury from responsibility. Ib.
See EVIDENCE; FRAUD.
PROCEEDS-
The proceeds of the sale of a boat will be ordered to be brought into
the registry of the court, to be apportioned among the parties ac-
cording to their respective interests, as found and adjudged by the
court. Thurston v. Steamboat Magnolia, 93.
PROCEEDINGS IN AID OF EXECUTION.
PENDENS.
1. If, in a joint action against two defendants, both residents of another
State, brought in an Ohio court, as to one of whom the process is
served, and as to the other, returned not found, the party served re-
moves the case to the Circuit Court of the United States, pursuant
to section 12 of the judiciary act of 1789, the plaintiff is entitled to
process from that court against the defendant, who was not made a
party in the State court. Fallis, Brown & Co. v. McArthur & Berry,
2. In such case, the plaintiff may proceed against the defendant, who has
been served with process, as the Circuit Court has jurisdiction under
section 1 of the act of February 28, 1839, and may hear and decide
the case as against such defendant, without making the other defend-
ant a party to the suit. Ib.
PROOF. See FRAUD; CHARACTER; INDICTMENT; DEDICATION; PLEAD-
ING; EVIDENCE; PERJURY; EXAMINING Court.
PROMISSORY NOTES-
The law does not require any particular form of words in the transfer
of negotiable paper. Any words which show an intention to trans-
fer a note or bill, without restriction or limitation, will constitute a
valid indorsement, and the indorsee, upon non-payment, may resort
to the prior parties. Lee & Co. v. Chillicothe Branch Bank of Ohio,
See INDORSER; INDORSEMENT.
PUBLIC USE. See DEDICATION.
PURCHASER. See LIEN; FRAUD; EQUITY.
RATIFICATION. See AGENCY; LIEN.
The application for the appointment of a receiver is always addressed
to the sound discretion of the court to which it is made. As a gen-
eral rule, such appointment will be made in all cases where the
interests of parties seem to require it. Crane v. McCoy, 422.
1. A recognizance is sufficiently certain if it sets out an act punishable
by the statute without any of the particulars. United States v. Den-
nis, 103.
2. Where an action of debt was brought on a recognizance, the condition
of which was that the defendant should appear "to answer to the
charge of stealing from the mail of the United States, contrary to
the statute of the United States in such case made and provided:
Held, that the felonious or criminal character of the act was charged
with sufficient certainty. Ib.
3. Where a defendant and another person signed a recognizance before
a justice of the peace, conditioned for the appearance of the defend-
ant, before the District Court of the United States, to answer to a
charge of stealing from the mail; and three days subsequently to
said signing, a third person, whose name did not appear in the body
of the recognizance, also signed the same: Held, that a joint action
could not be sustained against all of said persons upon such recog-
nizance, and that it did not, upon its face, import a joint liability on
the part of all the signers thereof. United States v. Pickett, 123.
4. There is no statutory provision, either of the United States or of the
State of Ohio, requiring parties to sign a recognizance. Ib.
5. An acknowledgment, without the signatures of the parties, certified
by a justice of the peace, is all that is required to make a recogni-
zance valid and obligatory. Ib.
REGISTRY OF THE COURT. See PROCEEDS.
Property which has been replevied, does not pass into the possession of
the plaintiff after he has given a bond which has been accepted by
the officer, until there is a formal delivery of the property by the offi-
cer. Crane v. McCoy, 422.
See JURISDICTION.
RETURN-
The return of an United States marshal is conclusive of the facts
which it sets forth, and its truth can not be collaterally impeached.
Crane v. McCoy, 422.
ROAD. See DEDICATION.
1. The defendant, as secretary of Minnesota Territory, having a fixed
salary as such, was not entitled to claim, in addition thereto, the
salary of governor, during the absence of that officer; as the act or-
ganizing the territory made it the duty of the secretary, "in case of
the death, removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the gov-
ernor," to discharge the duties of that office, without any provision for
an increase of compensation to the secretary. United States v.
Smith, 68.
2. The proviso in the second section of the act of September 30, 1850,
expressly prohibits the allowance of double salaries in all cases.
lb.
3. Where an officer, with a salary payable quarterly, is appointed for
four years, "unless sooner removed by the President," and a removal
is made during a current quarter, he is not entitled to his salary to
the end of the quarter. Ib.
SALE. See AGENCY; DAMAGES; PROCEEDS; EQUITY; FRAUD; MATE-
RIAL-MEN; TITLE.
1. A salvage service, in raising and preserving a steamboat sunk in the
Mississippi river, has a priority of lien over claims for wages earned
and supplies furnished before the accident. Collins v. Steamboat
Fort Wayne, 476.
2. A salvor is favored in law, on the assumption that without his service
the res might have been wholly lost. Ib.
3. The salvage agreement having stipulated for a compensation of twenty-
five per cent. on the value of the boat, assumed in the policy of in-
surance at $18,000, and it appearing that the actual value did not
exceed $9,000, the sum claimed for salvage is unreasonable, under
the circumstances of the case, and subject to reduction by the court.
lb.
4. Where a steamboat, on the Ohio river, laden with flour, was sunk by
floating ice within a few feet of the shore, and her cargo was saved,
at the request of the master of the boat, by fifty or sixty persons on
the bank of the river, such service entitles the parties to a decree for
salvage. Spencer v. Steamboat Avery, 117.
5. It is a well-settled principle of the maritime law, that risk or danger
of life is not a necessary element of a salvage service. Where such
risk or danger is incurred in saving property from destruction, it will
place the salvors in a high position of merit, and entitle them to a
more liberal compensation for the service than would otherwise be
accorded to them. Ib.
6. The controlling inquiry in salvage cases is, was the property in peril
of being lost, and was it saved by the efforts of those claiming to be
salvors. Ib.
7. The measure of compensation, in salvage cases, depends wholly on the
circumstances attending the service. Where there has been great
personal exposure and risk, and property has been rescued from in-
evitable destruction by the intrepidity of the salvors, a liberal allow-
ance will be made. One-half of the value of the property saved has
been allowed in such cases. There may be cases where the service is
attended with so little difficulty and peril that it would entitle the
parties to little more than a quantum meruit for work and labor. Ib.
8. It is not material whether the salvage service was rendered spontane-
ously or by request, or whether with or without a previous contract
between the owner or his agent and the salvors. lb.
9. Persons who aid in a salvage service, and receive pay therefor from
the owners of the property saved, abandon their right as salvors. Ib.
10. In a suit for salvage against a boat and cargo, a written instrument
of abandonment, signed by the officers of the boat, is admissible in
evidence to prove the perilous situation of the vessel. Blagg v.
Steamboat Bicknell, 270.
11. If a forfeiture of insurance results from a deviation in navigation
made for the purpose of rendering a salvage service, it might be
legitimately considered in fixing the amount of allowance to the
salvors, but where no such consequence has followed, the mere possi-
bility that it might have happened is a contingency too remote and
speculative to enter into the computation. Ib.
SECESSION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The rejection of an account or claim against the United States, by an
accounting officer of the government authorized by a special act of
Congress to adjust the same on equitable principles, does not pre-
clude the defendant, when sued, from setting up such rejected claim
or account as a set-off. United States v. Smith, 68.
See EVIDENCE; TREASURY Department.
The sheriff of a county has no right to disturb, or in any way interfere,
with the possession of property legally in the possession of an United
States marshal. Crane y. McCoy, 422.
State Statutes-Territorial Government.
STATE STATUTES. See CONSTRUCTION; ASSIGNMENT; PRACTICE.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-
1. A judgment was obtained by plaintiff against W., and a levy made on
his real property to satisfy the same. H. verbally promised to pay
plaintiff the amount of said judgment in six months if he would for-
bear to collect the judgment against W., and extend the time of the
payment of the judgment. Held, that such promise by H. was an
original and not a collateral promise, and was not required to be in
writing within the statute of frauds of the State of Ohio. Stewart
v. Hinkle, 506.
2. The agreement of the plaintiff was a sufficient consideration for the
promise of H. to pay the amount of the judgment. Ib.
STEAMBOAT. See COLLISION; DAMAGES; PRESUMPTIONS; SALVAGE;
AGENCY; CONTRACT; LIEN; ADMIRALTY; NEGLIGENCE; MATE-
RIAL-MEN; EVIDENCE.
SUITS. See PARTIES; POSTMASTER; CITIZEN.
SUMMONS. See PROCESS.
SURETIES-
1. The sureties upon a bond, wherein the principals have obligated them-
selves to the United States to open a ship canal three hundred feet
in width, and twenty feet in depth, and keep it open the same width
and depth for four and a half years from the time of the acceptance
of the work by the secretary of war, are discharged from all liability
on the same if the principals do not perform their agreement for
opening the channel according to its terms, and the government ac-
cepts the work with a channel only eighteen feet in depth instead of
twenty, as required by the contract. United States v. Corwine, 339.
2. A surety is not bound beyond the terms of his contract, and his lia-
bility can not be extended or enlarged by implication, and any
change in terms, unless expressly assented to by him, releases him
from his legal responsibility. Ib.
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT-
1. By the organic act of Minnesota Territory, the general government
became pledged to defray "the expenses of the legislative assembly
the printing of the laws, and other incidental expenses;" and the
defendant is entitled to a credit for services rendered, or expendi-
tures made, within the fair scope and meaning of these terms, so far
as they did not pertain to the office of secretary of the Territory;
but the words, "other incidental expenses," must be restricted to
such expenses as were incidental to the legislative assembly and the
printing of the laws. United States v. Smith, 68.
2. The second section of the act of August 29, 1842, which applies to
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