The Anne,
(444) 430
17. Irregularities on the part of the captors, orig-
inating from mere mistake, or negligence, which
work no irreparable mischief, and are consistent
with good faith, will not forfeit their rights of
prize.
Id.
(448) 431

18. Under the 6th section of the patent law of
1793, ch. 156, the defendant pleaded the general
issue, and gave notice that he would prove at the
trial, that the machine for the use of which, with-
out license, the suit was brought, had been used
previous to the alleged invention of the plaintiff,
in several places which were specified in the
notice, or in some of them, "and also, at sundry
other places in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and else-
where in the United States." The defendant, hav-
ing given evidence as to some of the places speci-
fied, offered evidence as to others not specified.
Held, that this evidence was admissible; but that
the powers of the court, in such a case, are suffi-
cient to prevent, and will be exercised to prevent
the patentee from being injured by surprises.
Evans v. Eaton,
(454, 503) 433, 445
19. Testimony on the part of the plaintiff, that
the persons, of whose prior use of the machine the
defendant had given evidence, had paid the plaintiff
for licenses to use the machine, ought not to be ab-
solutely rejected, though entitled to very little
weight.
(505) 446
20. The circuit courts have no power to set aside
their decrees in equity on motion, after the term at
which they are rendered.

Id.

Cameron v. M'Roberts,
See Jurisdiction.

PRACTICE-4.

Evans v. Phillips,

(591) 467

1. A writ of error will not lie on a judgment of
non-suit.
(73) 516
2. The refusal of the court to grant a motion for
a new trial affords no ground for a writ of error.
Barr v. Gratz,
(220) 555
3. Where a cause is brought to this court, by
writ of error, or appeal from the highest court of
law or equity of a state, under the 25th sec. of the
judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, upon the ground that
the validity of a statute of the United States was
drawn in question, and that the decision of the
state court was against its validity, &c.; or that the
validity of a statute of a state was drawn in ques-
tion, as repugnant to the constitution of the
United States, and the decision was in favor of its
validity; it must appear, from the record, that the
act of Congress, or the constitutionality of the
state law was drawn into question.
(311,315) 578, 579
4. But it is not required that the record should,
in terms, state a misconstruction of the act of Con-
gress, or that it was drawn into question. It is
sufficient to give this court jurisdiction of the
cause, that the record should show that an act of
Congress was applicable to the case.
Id.

Miller v. Nicholls,

causes.

(315) 579
5. Depositions, taken on further proof, in one
prize cause, cannot be invoked into another.
The Experiment,
(84) 520
6. Practice of invoking testimony in the prize
1d. Note 1,
(Ib.) 520
7. A sale under a fi. fa., duly issued, is legal, as
respects the purchaser, provided the writ be levied
upon the property before the return day, although
the sale be made after the return day and the writ
be never actually returned.

Wheaton v. Sexton,

(503, 506) 626
8. Depositions taken according to the proviso in
the 30th sec. of the judiciary act, of 1789, c. 20,
under a dedimus potestatem, "according to common
usage, when it may be necessary to prevent a fail-
ure or delay of justice," are, under no circum-
stances, to be considered as taken de bene esse,
whether the witnesses reside beyond the process
of the court or within it; the provisions of the act
relative to depositions taken de bene esse being con-
fined to those taken under the enacting part of the
section.

PRESIDENT-3.

See Admiralty, 13.

PRIORITY-2.

See Duties, 2, 3, 4.

PRIORITY-4.

1. The United States are not entitled to priority
over other creditors, under the act of 1799, c. 128, s.
65, upon the ground of the debtor having made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, unless it is
proved that the debtor has made an assignment of
all his property.

United States v. Howland, (108, 116) 526, 528
2. Where the deed of assignment conveys only
the property mentioned in a schedule annexed to
the deed, and the schedule does not purport to con-
tain all the property of the party who made it, the
onus probandi is thrown on the United States to
show that the assignment embraced all the debtor's
property.
Id.
(116) 528
3. The decisions on the subject of the priority of
the United States in case of insolvency, &c., col-
lected.
Id. note 1.
(118) 529

PRIZE-1.

1. Where an enemy's vessel was captured by a
privateer, recaptured by another enemy's vessel,
and again recaptured by another privateer, and
brought in for adjudication, it was held, that the
prize vested in the last captor: an interest acquired
in war, by possession, being devested by the loss of
posession.

The Astrea,

(125) 52
2. A neutral ship, chartered for a voyage from
London to St. Michaels, thence to Fayal, thence to
St. Petersburg, or any port in the Baltic, and back
to London, at the freight of 1,000 guineas, on her
passage to St. Michaels was captured, and brought
into the port of Wilmington, N. C., for adjudica-
tion. A part of the cargo was condemned, and part
restored. The freight was held to be chargeable
upon the whole cargo, as well upon that part
restored as upon that condemned.

The Antonia Johannah,
(159) 60
Quere, Whether more than a pro rata freight
was due to the master in such case.

Id.

(168) 62
3. The charter-party is not the measure by which
the captor is bound, where the freight is inflamed
to an extraordinary rate by the perils of naviga-
tion.
Id. note 1,
(170) 63
4. Where the goods were shipped in the enemy's
country, in pursuance of orders from this country,
received before the declaration of war, but previ-
ous to the execution of the orders the shippers be-
came embarrassed, and assigned the goods to cer-
tain bankers to secure advances made by them, with
a request to the consignees to remit the amount to
them (the bankers) and they also repeated the same
request, the invoice being for account and risk of
the consignees, but stating the goods to be then the
property of the bankers; held, that the goods hav-
ing been purchased and shipped in pursuance of or-
ders from the consignees, the property was origin-
ally vested in them and was not devested by the in-
termediate assignment, which was merely intended
to transfer the right to the debt due from the con-
signees.

The Mary and Susan, (B. G. &. H. Van
Wagenen, claimants.)
(25) 27

5. The property of a citizen engaged in trade with
the enemy is liable to capture and confiscation as
prize, whether that trade be carried on between an
enemy's port and the United States, or between
such port and any foreign country; and the offense
of trading with the enemy is complete the moment
the vessel sails with the intention to carry a cargo
to an enemy's port.

The Rugen,

(74) 40

6. Enemy's property cannot be transferred in transitu, so as to protect it from capture. Where the invoice of the goods was headed, "consigned to Messrs. D. B. & F., by order, and for account of J. L.," and, in a letter accompanying the invoice from the shippers to the consignees, they say, "for Mr. J. L. we open an account in our books here, and debit him, &c.; we cannot yet ascertain the proceeds of his hides, &c., but we find his order for goods will far exceed the amount of those shipments; therefore, we consign the whole to you, that you may come to a proper understanding with him" held, that the goods were, during their transit, the property, and at the risk of the enemy shippers, and, therefore, subject to condemnation.

The St. Joze Indiano,

(208) 73 7. Where enemy's property is fraudulentlyblended in the same claim with neutral property, the latter is liable to share the fate of the former. The St. Nicholas, (431) 128

See Alien enemy. See Contraband.

See Domicile.

See Duties.

See Error.

See Jurisdiction, 1, 2, 3.

See License, 1, 2.

See Practice, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8.

See President.

See Sale, 3, 4, 5.

See Salvage.

PRIZE-2.

The Dos Hermanos,

1. The evidence to acquit or condemn, must come, in the first instance, from the papers and crew of the captured vessel. (76, 79) 189 2. It is the duty of the captors to bring the ship's papers into the registry of the District Court, and to have the examinations of the principal officers and seamen taken on the standing interrogatories. Id. (79) 189 3. It is exclusively upon these papers that the cause is to be heard in the first instance. If, from the evidence, the property appears clearly to be hostile or neutral, condemnation or restitution immediately follows. If the property appears to be doubtful, or the case suspicious, further proof may be granted according to the rules which govern the legal discretion of the court. ld. (80) 189 4. If the parties have been guilty of gross fraud, or misconduct, or illegality, further proof is not allowed, and condemnation follows. Id. (lb.) 189 5. Although some apology may be found in the state of peace, which had so long existed previous to the late war, for the irregularities which had crept into the prize practice, that apology no longer exists; and if they should hereafter occur, it may be proper to withhold condemnation, even in the clearest cases, unless the irregularities are avoided or explained. ld.

(81) 190 6. If a party attempts to impose upon the court, by knowingly or fraudulently claiming as his own, property belonging in part to others, he will not be entitled to restitution of that portion which he may ultimately establish as his own.

Id.

(97) 194 7. The claimants have no right to litigate the question, whether the captors were duly commissioned; the claimants have no persona standi in judicio, to assert the rights of the United States. But if the capture be made by a non-commissioned captor, the prize will be condemned to the United Id.

States.

(99) 194 8. A question of proprietary interest, and concealment of papers. Further proof ordered, open to both parties.

The Fortuna,

(161) 209 9. Where an enemy's vessel was captured by a privateer, and subsequently dispossessed by the force or terror of another, the prize was adjudged to the first captor with costs and damages. The Mary, (123) 200 10. A question of collusive capture. Condemnation to the captors.

The Bothnea and the Jahnstoff, (169) 211 11. If the court below deny an order for further proof when it ought to be granted, or allow it when it ought to be denied, and the objection is taken by the party, and appears on the record, the appellate court can administer the proper relief. The Pizarro, (227, 240) 226, 229

12. But, if evidence in the nature of further proof be introduced, and no formal order or objection appear on the record, it must be presumed to have been done by consent, and the irregularity is waived. Id. (241) 229

13. Concealment or spoliation of papers, is not, per se, a sufficient ground for condemnation in a prize court. It is calculated to excite the vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court; but it is open to explanation; and if the party, in the first instance, fairly, frankly, and satisfactorily explains it, he is deprived of no right to which he is otherwise entitled. If, on the contrary, the spoliation is unexplained, or the explanation is unsatis factory, if the cause labor under heavy suspicions, or gross prevarications, further proof is denied, and condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence which the party is not permitted to supply. ld. (Ib.) 229 14. French and Spanish law of spoliation of papers. Application of the same. Opinions of M. Portalis. Principle of reciprocity.

ld. note 1,

(242) 230

15. A question of collusive capture. Condemnation to the United States. The George, (278) 239 16. A suit by the owners of captured property, lost through the fault and negligence of the captors, for compensation in damages.

The Anna Maria,

(327) 252

17. The right of visitation and search is an unquestionable belligerent right; but must be exercised with as much regard to the safety of the vessel detained as is consistent with a thorough examination of her character and voyage. ld. (332) 253 18. Detention, after search, pronounced to be unjustifiable under the particular circumstances of the case. ld. (334) 253 19. The value of the. captured vessel, and the prime cost of the cargo, with all charges, and the premium of insurance, where paid, allowed in ascertaining the damages.

ld.

(335) 253

20. A libel against the commander of a squadron calling on him to proceed to adjudication, or to make restitution in value, of a vessel and cargo, detained for search by the captain of a frigate belonging to the squadron, and lost while in his possession. Libel dismissed.

The Eleanor, (345) 257 21. The commander of a squadron is liable to individuals for the trespasses of those under his command, in case of positive or permissive orders, or of actual presence and co-operation. But quare, how far he is responsible in other cases. ld.

(356) 259

23. The commander of a single ship is responsible for the acts of those under his command; as are, likewise, the owners of privateers for the conduct of the commanders appointed by them. Id. (lb.) 260

24. Detention for search is a right which a belligerent may exercise over every vessel, except a national vessel, which he meets with on the ocean. Id. (358) 260

25. The principal right necessarily carries with it all the means essential to its exercise; among these may, sometimes, be included the assumption of the disguise of a friend or an enemy, which is a lawful stratagem of war. If in consequence of its use, the crew of the vessel detained abandon their duty before they are actually made prisoners of war, and the vessel is thereby lost, the captors are not responsible. Id. (359) 260 26. Whenever an officer seizes a vessel as prize, he is bound to commit her to the care of a competent prize-master and crew; not because the original crew, when left on board (in the case of a seizure of the vessel of a citizen or neutral), are released from their duty without the assent of the master, but from the want of a right to subject the captured crew to the authority of the captor's officer. But this rule does not extend to the case of a mere detention for examination, which the com

mander of the cruising vessel may enforce by
orders from his own quarter-deck, and may, there-
fore, send an officer on board the vessel detained,
in order more conveniently to enforce it, without
taking the vessel out of the possession of her own
officers and crew.

The Eleanor,

(361) 261
27. The modern usages of war authorize the
bringing of one of the principal officers of the ves-
sel detained on board the belligerent vessel with
the papers for examination.
Id.
(362) 261
28. Farther illustration of these principles.
Appendix, note I.,
(13, 14, 15) 285
29. It is the practice of this court, in prize causes,
to hear the cause, in the first instance, upon the
evidence transmitted from the Circuit Court, and
to decide from that evidence whether it is proper
to allow further proof.

The London Packet,

(371) 264
30. Affidavits to be used as further proof in causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in this court,
must be taken by commission.
ld.
(373) 264
31. Principles and practice in prize causes.
Appendix, note I.,
(1) 281
32. Extent of the prize jurisdiction of the admir-
alty. Id.
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 281, 282
33. Seizures by non-commissioned captors.
ld.
(7) 283
(8) 283
35. Responsibility of captors having a bona fide
possession.

34. Probable cause for captures.
Id.

ld.

37. Capture without probable cause.
Id.

(9) 283
36. Proceedings on sending in for adjudication.
Id.
(10) 284
(11) 284
38. Proceedings to compel the captors to proceed
to adjudication.

ld.

(12, 16) 284, 286
39. Liability of commanders of squadrons and
owners of privateers for the loss of captured prop-
erty.
ld.
(13) 285
(17) 286
(19) 287

40. Custody of the captured property.

ld.

41. Prize libel and monition.

Id.

claimant to restitution; but is sufficient to lay a
foundation for the introduction of further proof.
The Friendschaft,
(14, 48) 322, 331

2. The fact of invoices and letters of advicé not
being found on board, may induce a suspicion that
papers have been spoliated. But even if it were
proved that an enemy master, carrying a cargo
chiefly hostile, had thrown papers overboard, a
neutral claimant, to whom no fraud is imputable,
is not thereby precluded from further proof.
Id.
(48) 331
3. A blockade does not, according to modern
usage, extend to a neutral vessel found in port,nor
prevent her coming out with the cargo which was
on board when the blockade was instituted.
Olivera v. The Union Ins. Co.,
(194) 367
4. Cases on the subject of licenses collected.
Note 1,

(207) 372
5. A question of proprietary interest and conceal-
ment of papers. Farther proof ordered, open to
both parties. On the production of farther proof
by the claimant, condemnation pronounced.
The Fortuna,
(237) 379
6. Where a neutral ship-owner lends his name to
cover a fraud with regard to the cargo, this circum-
stance will subject the ship to condemnation.
Id.
(245) 381
7. Relaxation of the rules of the court allowing
further proof in a case of concealment of papers.
Id.
(b) 381
8. A neutral cargo found on board an armed
enemy's vessel is not liable to condemnation as
prize of war.
The Atalanta,
(409, 415) 422, 423
9. A question of proprietary interest. Further
proof ordered.

ld.

(409) 422
10. It is not competent for a neutral consul, with-
out the special authority of his government, to
interpose a claim on account of the violation of
the territorial jurisdiction of his country.
The Anne,
(435, 445) 428, 431
11. Quare, Whether such a claim can be inter-
posed, even by a public minister, without the sanc-
tion of the government, in whose tribunals the
cause is pending.
Ild.
(446) 431
12. A capture made within neutral territory is, as
between the belligerents, rightful; and its validity
can only be questioned by the neutral state.

Id.

(447) 431
13. If the captured ship commence hostilities up-
on the captor within neutral territory, she forfeits
the neutral protection, and the capture is not an
injury for which redress can be sought from the
neutral sovereign.

ld.
(lb.) 431
14. The district courts of the United States have
jurisdiction of questions of prize, and its incidents,
independent of the special provisions of the prize
act of the 26th of June, 1812, ch. 430 (CVII).
The Amiable Nancy,
(546) 456
15. On an illegal seizure, the original wrong-doers
may be made responsible beyond the loss actually
sustained, in a case of gross and wanton outrage;
but the owners of the privateer, who are only con-
structively liable, are not bound to the extent of
vindictive damages.

ld.

(558) 459

16. An item for loss by deterioration of the car-
go, not occasioned by the improper conduct of the
captors-rejected.

ld.
(559) 459
17. The probable or possible profits of an unfin-
ished voyage (afford no rule to estimate the dam-
ages, in the case of marine trespass.

(560) 459

19. An item for the ransom of the vessel and car-
go, which had been subsequently seized by another
belligerent (as alleged for want of papers), of which
the vessel had been deprived by the first captors,
rejected under the particular circumstances of the

case.

PRIZE-4.

The Divina Pastora,"

1. The government of the United States having
recognized the existence of a civil war between
Spain and her colonies, but remaining neutral, the
courts of the Union are bound to consider as law-
ful those acts which war authorizes, and which the
new governments in South America may direct
against their enemy.
(52, 63) 512, 514
2. Unless the neutral rights of the United States
(as ascertained by the law of nations, the acts of
Congress, and treaties) are violated by the cruis-
ers sailing under commissions from those govern-
ments, captures by them are to be regarded by us
as other captures, jure belli, are regarded; the
legality of which cannot be determined in the
courts of a neutral country.

ld.

(64) 515

3. Note on the jurisdiction of neutral courts over
belligerent captures made in violation of the neu-
tral jurisdiction.

Id. note 3.

(65) 515
4. Different public acts by which the government
of the United States has recognized the existence
of a civil war between Spain and her colonies.
Appendix, note II.

(23) 686
26
6. Where restitution of captured property is
claimed, upon the ground that the force of the
cruiser making the capture has been augmented
within the United States, by enlisting men, the
burthen of proving such enlistment is thrown upon
the claimant; and that fact being proved by him,
it is incumbent upon the captors to show, by
proof, that the persons so enlisted were subjects
or citizens of the prince or state under whose flag
the cruiser sails, transiently within the United
States, in order to bring the case within the pro-
viso of the 2d sec. of the act of June 5th, 1794, c.
226, and of the act of the 20th April, 1818, c. 83.
(298, 306) 574, 576
7. The right of adjudicating on all captures and
questions of prize, belongs exclusively to the
courts of the captors country; but, it is an excep-
tion to this general rule, that where the captured
vessel is brought, or voluntarily comes infra præ-
sidia of a neutral power, that power has a right to
inquire whether its own neutrality has been vio-
lated by the cruiser which made the capture; and,
if such violation has been committed, is in duty
bound to restore to the original owner property
captured by cruisers illegally equipped in its ports.
1d.
(307) 577

5. Prize code of Buenos Ayres and Chili.
Id.

The Estrella,

8. No part of the act of the 5th June, 1794, c. 226,
is repealed by the act of the 3d March, 1817, c. 58.
The act of 1794, c. 226, remained in force until the
act of the 20th April, 1818, c. 83, by which all the
provisions respecting our neutral relations were
embraced, and all former laws on the same subject
were repealed.

Id.

Id.

(311) 578
9. In the absence of any act of Congress on the
subject, the courts of the United States would
have authority, under the general law of nations,
to decree restitution of property captured in viola-
tion of their neutrality, under a commission, issued
within the United States, or under an armament,
or augmentation of the armament, or crew of the
capturing vessel, within the same.
(311) 578
10. A cruiser, equipped at the port of Cartha-
gena, in South America, and commissioned under
the authority of the province of Carthagena, one
of the United Provinces of New Grenada, at war
with Spain, sailed from the said port, and captured
on the high seas, as prize, a vessel and cargo be-
longing to the subjects of the King of Spain, and
put a prize crew on board, and ordered her to pro-
ceed to the said port of Carthagena; the captured
vessel was afterwards fallen in with by a private
armed vessel of the United States, and the cargo
taken out and brought into the United States for
adjudication as the property of their enemy. The
original Spanish owner, and the prize-master from
the Carthagenian privateer, both claimed the
goods. The possession was decreed to be restored
to the Carthagenian prize-master.

The Neustra Señora de la Caridad. (497) 624
11. War having been recognized to exist between
Spain and her colonies by the government of the
United States, it is the duty of the courts of the
United States, where a capture is made by either
of the belligernet parties, without any violation of
our neutrality, and the captured prize is brought

Where R. G. agreed with the managers of a lot-
tery to take 2,500 tickets, giving approved security
on the delivery of the tickets, which were specified
in a schedule, and deposited in books of 100 tickets
each, thirteen of which books were received and
paid for by him, and the remaining twelve were
subscribed by him, with his name in his own hand-
writing, and indorsed by the managers, "Pur-
chased, and to be taken by R. G." and on the en-
velope covering the whole, "R. G., 12 books;" on
the second day's drawing of the lottery, one of the
last designated tickets was drawn a prize of $20,000,
and between the third and fourth day's drawing R.
G. tendered sufficient security, and demanded the
last 1,200 tickets, and the managers refused to de-
liver the prize ticket; held, that the property in the
tickets vested when the selection was made and as-
sented to, and that they remained in the possession
of the vendors merely as collateral security, and
that the vendee was entitled to recover the amount
of the prize.

Thompson v. Gray,

(75) 40

2. When commodities are sold by the bulk, for a
gross price, the sale is perfect; but if the price is
regulated at so much for every piece, pound, or
measure, the sale is not perfect, except only as to
so much as is actually counted, weighed or meas-
ured.

But where a merchant abroad, in pursuance of
orders, either sells his own goods, or purchases
goods on his own credit, no property in the goods
vests in the correspondent until he has done some
notorious act to devest himself of his title, or has
parted with the possession by an actual and uncon-
ditional delivery for the use of such correspondent.
Id.
(213) 74

6. If the thing agreed to be purchased is to be
sent by the vendor to the vendee, it is necessary, to
the perfection of the contract, that it should be de-
livered to the purchaser, or to his agent, which the
master of a ship, to many purposes, is considered to
be.

(lb.) 173
5. Rule of the French law as to the recovery of
purchase money on a failure of title.

Id. note 3,

(lb.) 173
6. It is not the duty of the vendee to communi-
cate to the vendor intelligence of extrinsic circum-
stances which may influence the price of the com-
modity, where the particular information is exclu-
sively within the knowledge of the vendee, but the
means of intelligence are equally open to both par-
ties. But, at the same time, each party must take
care not to say or do anything tending to impose
upon the other.

Laidlaw et al. v. Organ, (178, 195) 214, 218
7. Doctrine of Pothier as to the respective obli-
gations of the vendor and vendee in this respect.
ld. note 2,
(185) 215

Where a British ship was captured by two French
frigates, and, after a part of the cargo was taken
out, presented to the libelants in the cause, citizens
of the United States (then neutral), whose vessel
the frigate had before taken and burnt, by whom
the prize was navigated into a port in this country,
and, pending the suit instituted by them, war was
declared between the United States and Great
Britain, it was determined, that this was a case of
salvage. A salvage of one-half was given, and as
to the residue, it was placed on the same footing
with other property found within the territory at
the declaration of war, and might be claimed on
the termination of war, unless previously confis-
cated by the sovereign power.

The Astrea, note 6. (The Adventure), (128) 52
SALVAGE-3.

1. An American vessel was captured by the
enemy, and after condemnation and sale to a sub-
ject of the enemy, was recaptured by an American
privateer. Held, that the original owner was not
entitled to restitution on payment of salvage, un-
der the salvage act of the 3d March, 1800, ch. 14, and
the prize act of 26th June, 1812, ch. 107.
The Star,
(78) 338
2. By the general maritime law, a sentence of
condemnation completely extinguishes the title of
the original proprietor.
(86) 340

Id.

3. The British salvage acts reserves the just post-
liminii as to vessels of British subjects, even after
condemnation, unless they have been after capture
set forth as ships of war.
(88) 341
U. S., BOOK 4.

Id.
Wheat. 1, 2, 3, 4.

4. The statute of the 43d George III., ch. 160, sec.
39, has no farther altered the previous British law
than to fix the salvage at uniform stipulated rates,
instead of leaving it to depend upon the length of
time the recaptured ship was in the hands of the
enemy.
The Star,
(88) 341
5. Neither of the British statutes extent to neu-
tral property.

Id.

(Ib.) 341
6. The 5th section of the prize act of 1812, ch. 107,
does not repeal any of the provisions of the salvage
act of the 3d March, 1800, ch. 14, but is merely af-
firmative of the pre-existing law.
Id.

(89) 341
7. By our law the rule of reciprocity prevails
upon the recapture of the property of friends.
Id.
(91) 341
8. Note on the laws of the different maritime
countries of Europe as to recaptures and salvage.
Note 1,

9. Law of Great Britain. ld.
10. Law of France. Id.

11. Law of Spain, Portugal and Holland.
ld.

(93) 342

(94) 342

(95) 343

(97) 343
12. Law of Denmark and Sweden. Id. (98) 344
13. Recaptures from pirates. Id.
(99) 344

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-1.
See Chancery, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-2.
See Chancery, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE- 3.
See Chancery, 1.

STATUTES OF GEORGIA-3.

ing clause of the statute of limitations of Georgia,
The terms "beyond seas," in the proviso or say-
of 1767, are equivalent to without the limits of the
state; and a party who is without those limits is
entitled to the benefit of the exception.
Murray v. Baker,

STATUTES OF KENTUCKY-1.

(541) 454

1. The law of Kentucky requires, in the location
of warrants for land, some general description des-
ignating the place where the particular object is to
be found, and a description of the object itself.
Matson v. Hord,
(133) 54

The general description must be such as will en-
able a person, intending to locate the adjacent resid-
uum, and using reasonable care and diligence, to
ready located. If the description will fit another
find the object mentioned, and avoid the land al-
place better, or equally well, it is defective.

Id.

(lb.) 54

The hunter's trace, leading from Bryant's station,
over the waters of Hingston, on the dividing ridge
between the waters of Hingston and Elkhorn, is a
defective description and will not sustain the entry.

Id.

(130) 53

the location of a warrant for lands, under the laws
2. A question of fact respecting the validity of
of Kentucky.

Taylor v. Walton et al.

56

(141)
3. Under the act of assembly of Kentucky, of
1798, entitled, an act concerning champerty and
notwithstanding an adverse possession.
maintenance," a deed will pass the title to lands,

Walden v. The Heirs of Gratz, (295, 296) 94, 95
4. The statute of limitations of Kentucky does
not differ essentially from the English statute of the
21 James I. c. 1, and is to be construed as that
statute, and all other acts of limitation founded
upon it, have been construed; the whole possession
must be taken together; when the statute has once
begun to run, it continues, and an adverse posses-
sion, under a survey, previous to its being carried
into grant, may be connected with a subsequent
possession.

Id.
(296) 95
5. Extract from the preface of Bibb's Reports of
Cases in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Appendix, note I,
(489) 143