reversed, and, in delivering the opinion of the and just construction of it, as to the general court, Judge Wallace said: “It is evident that body and position of the land it calls for." when the entry was made, Boone's old trace, *This case, if not overruled, certain- [*216 the little fort, and Silver Creek, were all well ly goes far in distinguishing between a call for known by those names to the generality of a marked tree, and for a tree not marked, pro214*] those who were conversant in the vi- vided such trees as the call requires are found cinity. And it further appears that about four about the place where the entry must begin. It miles from the little fort, on a southern direc- goes further, and strongly indicates the opinion tion, Boone's old trace struck Hayes' fork of that an unmarked tree was an object of less Silver Creek, which may be presumed to be the importance in the mind of the locator than one branch of Silver Creek intended; and, if the selected from all others by a mark peculiar to entry contained no other calls, it would de- itself. While the latter must have been deemed serve serious consideration whether the place important, and have strongly fixed his attenwhere the trace crossed Hayes' fork of Silver tion, the former may have been thought not Creek ought not to be assumed as the center of very essential. Coming to the place where he the survey to be made thereon. But this entry intended to begin, looking around him when calls to include a tree marked D. B., which is there, and. seeing trees of a particular kind obviously a locative and material call, and, from the common growth, he might suppose it therefore, conformably to the uniform decisions unimportant at which of these trees he should of this court on similar entries, must be taken commence and call for one of them. In such into consideration in deciding on this entry." a case, a court may well say "whether the call These cases are admitted to have settled the is regarded or rejected in the construction of law to be that a material locative call, as for a the entry is totally immaterial." There is much marked tree, cannot be disregarded; and that, reason for this opinion. Certainty is required if the existence of the tree cannot be proved, in entries for the purpose of giving notice to the entry cannot be sustained. The only dis-, subsequent locators. The subsequent locator tinction between these cases and that under the who comes to the place described in the entry, consideration of the court is that, in them, the in order to find the land he wishes to avoid, entries call for a marked tree; in this it calls will, if a marked tree be called for, search for for a sugar tree and hickory, not stating them that marked tree; and, if it cannot be found, to be marked. For the importance of this dis- may well conclude that this is not the land intinction we are again referred to the decisions tended to be appropriated; but if only a tree is of Kentucky. called for, and trees stand all around him, he will naturally suppose that the nearest may be taken as a beginning, and that to him it is quite immaterial whether the commencement be at the spot on which he stands or within ten feet or ten yards of him. *The subsequent [*217 locator is not misled by this call; nor is there any danger of his mistaking the position of the land. It is not without reason, therefore, that the call is pronounced immaterial, and one which may be regarded or rejected. The entry may be sustained by other calls which are sufficiently precise to sustain it. The case of Greenup v. Lyne's heirs,' turned on an entry of land "lying on Kentucky River, opposite to Leesburg, beginning at a beech tree and running up the river and back for quantity." The validity of this entry was affirmed in the inferior court, and, on an appeal, was 215] also affirmed in the Superior Court. *In delivering the opinion of the superior court, Judge Logan said: "Had the only call in the entry been to lie on the river opposite to Leesburg we should have concurred with the Circuit Court in the manner of surveying it, by running up and down the river equal distances from a point opposite the centre of Leesburg; and if the call to begin at "a beech tree" had been the only other call, we should still have thought that opinion correct, as the common growth of the timber there is beech, and a tree of the description could have been had at almost any point within the limits of the claim. This circumstance, we conceive, ought not to affect the entry; for whether the call is regarded or rejected, in the construction of the entry, is totally immaterial; because, it seems to the court that where an uncertainty arises from the number of objects presented, answering the calls of an entry, and it has other calls sufficiently precise to sustain it, that, of the many doubtful objects, that should be taken as intended, which will best preserve the consistency of the others; and in this case it seems the call for the tree could be complied with without changing in the least the position given by the first call, so that it is left as an immaterial call. We are more confirmed in this opinion when we consider that the entry, from any other view, must be invalid for uncertainty, although we believe no one could doubt, from a liberal 1.-2 Bibb, 369. If in the case at bar it had been proved that sugar trees and hickories were as common at the termination of twelve miles from the mouth of Licking as the beech tree opposite to Leesburg, the two cases would, in this respect, be precisely alike. But this is not proved. Only one witness has been examined to this point, and his testimony is that there are sugar trees on the bank of the Ohio, in the neighborhood, and that the maple or sugar tree might be found for many miles above and below the corner, standing within fifty yards of each other, on the second bank of the river. The report of the surveyor shows that three elms and a hickory stood at the termination of the twelve miles from the mouth of Licking. There would certainly be much difficulty in supporting this as a locative call, although it is not absolutely certain that it might not be so supported. The not less important question is, whether it may be considered as an immaterial call. No case has been cited in which the call for an unmarked tree has been thought material; and there are cases in which a circumstance not important in itself has been dispensed with. The difference between calling for a marked and an unmarked tree has been *al- [*218 ready noticed. It is difficult to suppose that These cases are in principle the same. The one calls for land twelve miles below the mouth of Licking, which description would require land the nearest part of which is at the given distance; the other calls for land lying opposite Leesburg, which requires a tract the center of which is opposite to the center of the town. The one calls for a beginning at a sugar tree and hickory, without naming a place for the beginning otherwise than by the description of the position of the land; the other calls for a beech tree under precisely the same circumstances. the case of Greenup v. Lyne's Heirs the words “running up the river and back for quantity" have changed the place of beginning from the center to the lower end of the town, and the position of the land, so that instead of lying above and below Leesburg, in equal quantities, it lies entirely above that place. Why shall not the same words influence in the same manner, the position of Pannel's land? In they are viewed as equally important by the | be formed on a base line running up and down person making the entry, or by a subsequent the river to include the quantity. The entry locator. If the person making the entry de- could not otherwise be sustained. The inferior signed to select for the beginning a particular court laid off this entry in that manner; and tree, in exclusion of all others, it is in a high the Appellate Court declared that it would be degree improbable that he should omit to mark the proper manner were there not other words it. If he made the entry from memory, then in it which controlled this general description the place only, and not the particular tree, by one which was more particular. That more would be the object to which his mind would particular description was, "running up the attach importance. So with the subsequent river and back for quantity." locator. The distance would bring him to the place, or sufficiently near to it for every beneficial purpose, and whether a sugar tree and hickory stood at the end of twelve miles as measured by his chain, or within thirty, forty, or fifty yards, would not essentially vary his views with respect to adjacent lands. He could not doubt, to use the expression of the court in the case of Greenup v. Lyne's heirs, "as to the general body and position of the land described in the entry. The opinion that the call for an unmarked tree of a kind which is common in the neighborhood of a place sufficiently described by other parts of the entry to be fixed with certainty may be considered as an immaterial call, is supported by the decision of the court in the case which has been last mentioned. Although in that case the judge shows that a tree might be found to satisfy the call at the place fixed as the beginning, yet it is apparent that different places within a few yards of each other would answer equally well for the beginning, and that different trees might be selected for that purpose. And the judge, after stating 219] that this call *might either be considered as satisfied, or in itself immaterial, proceeds to show that he thought it immaterial. Regard ing," he proceeds to say, "the call for a beech tree as immaterial, we come to consider," &c. Upon the authority of the case of Greenup v. Lyne's Heirs, then, and upon a view of the whole of this entry, it would seem that the call for the sugar tree and hickory may be declared immaterial, and the location be sustained on its other calls. The second question is, in what manner ought this entry to be surveyed? It is admitted to be a general principle that, where a location calls for land to lie a given distance from a given point, the whole land must be placed at or beyond that distance, if there be no other words in the location which control this construction. But it is not admitted that this call can overrule the plain meaning of the whole entry taken together. It is believed to be unquestionably decided that every material part of the entry is to be considered, and that such construction is to be put upon the whole as is best adapted to all its material calls. From the language of Pannel's entry, every man would expect the survey to begin at the place called *for, twelve miles below [*221 the mouth of Licking. If that is not the beginning the location is unquestionably uncertain and void. If that is the beginning it is the plain mandate of the entry to run up the river 1,060 poles and back for quantity. It is the opinion of the majority of the court that the decree ought to be affirmed with costs. Decree affirmed. Cited 11 Wheat. 220. [COMMON LAW.] PATTERSON . THE UNITED STATES. A verdict is bad if it varies from the issue in a substantial matter, or if it find only a part of that which is in issue; and, though the court may give form to a general finding, so as to make it harmonize with the issue, yet, if it appears that the finding is different from the issue, or is confined to a part only of the matter in issue, no judgment can be rendered upon the verdict. In an action of debt, upon a bond to the United States, with condition that certain merchandise imThis principle was laid down in Greenup v. ported, and reshipped for exportation, should not be relanded within the United States, and that Lyne's Heirs, which, on this point, bears a the certificate and other proofs required by law, of strong analogy to that under the consideration the delivery of the same, without the limits of the of the court. In Greenup v. Lyne's Heirs the United States, should be produced at the collector's entry called for land lying on Kentucky Riv-office within one year from the date of the bond, an issue was formed upon the defendant's plea, “er, opposite to Leesburg, beginning at a beech that the merchandise was not relanded, &c., and 'tree, and running up the river and back for that the certificates and other proofs required by law, of the delivery of the same at Archangel, in quantity." Russia, were produced, &c., within one year from the date of the bond. The jury found a verdict that, "the within-mentioned writing obligatory is the deed of the within-named R. P., &c., and they find there is really and *justly due upon the [*222 said writing obligatory the sum of $23,989.58." 66 It is perfectly settled in Kentucky, that on a call for land lying opposite to Leesburg, the cen220*]ter of the *land would be placed opposite to the center of the town, and a square would 1817 PATTERSON V. THE UNITED STATES. Held,that the verdict was so defective no judgment could be rendered upon it. nounced. A circuit court has no authority to issue a certiwari, or other compulsory process, to the District Court, for the removal of a cause from that jurisdiction, before a final judgment or decree is proIn such a case, the District Court may, and ought, to refuse obedience to the process of the Circuit Court, and either party may inove the Circuit Court for a procedendo, after the transcript of the record is removed into that court, or may pursue the cause in the District Court as if it had not been re moved. But if the party, instead of properly taking advantage of the irregularity in the proceedings, enters his appearance in the Circuit Court, takes defense, and pleads to issue, it is too late, after verdict, to object to the irregularity, and the Supreme Court will, on error, consider the cause as an original suit in the Circuit Court. PHIS cause was argued by Ogden and Harper for the plaintiff in error, and by the Attorney-General and Glenn, for the United States. But as the points made were not considered by the court, and judgment was pronounced on other grounds, the argument is omitted. WASHINGTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This was an action of debt instituted in the District Court of Maryland by the United States, against Robert Patterson, the plaintiff in error, upon a bond, dated the 2d of August, 1809, in the penalty of $35,000, with condition that certain merchandise, which had been imported into the United States, and which the said Patterson had then reshipped, in order to export the same to Tonningen, should not be relanded in any port or place within the United States, and that the certificate and other proofs required 223*] *by law of the delivery of the same, at some place without the limits of the United States, should be produced at the collector's office of the port of Baltimore, within one year from the date of the bond. After the declaration was filed in the District Court, and the defendant had entered his appearance and taken defense, a writ of certiorari, issued from the Circuit to the District Court, in obedience to which the record of the proceedings in that court was certified and sent up to the Circuit Court. In this court the defendant again took defense, and after sundry imparlances, and having had oyer of the bond and condition, he pleads, 1st. Performance 2d. That the mergenerally of the condition chandise mentioned in the condition of the bond was not relanded in the United States, and that the certificate and other proofs required by law of the delivery of the same at Archangel, in Russia, were produced at the said collector's office within one year from the date of the said bond. 3d. That the said merchandise, or any part thereof, was not relanded in the United States, and that the certificates and other proofs required by law of the delivery of the same at Archangel, in Russia, were produced to the said collector's office on the 11th day of November, in the year 1811. The replication to the first plea alleges a breach of the condition of the bond in not producing to the said collector's office the certificate and other proofs required by law of the relanding in some place without the limits of the United States, within 222 one year from the date of the said bond, to The demurrer was, upon argument, sus- A jury was afterwards impaneled to try the issue who found the following verdict, viz. : "That the within-mentioned writing obligatory is the deed of the within-named Robert Patterson, &c., and they find there is really and justly due upon the said writing obligatory the sum of $23,989.58." Upon this verdict the court gave judgment to be released on the payment of the above sum in favor of the United States, for $35,000, assessed by the jury, from which judgment a writ of error was obtained to remove the cause to this court. The court considers it to be unnecessary to decide the questions which were argued at the bar, as the verdict is so defective that no judg ment can be rendered upon it. The issue which the jury were sworn to try was, whether the certificate and other proofs required by law, of the delivery of the cargo at some place without the limits of the United States, were produced at the collector's office at Baltimore within one year from the date of the bond. The verdict does not find' the matter in issue one way or the other, but finds that the bond in the declaration mentioned is the deed of the defendant, and that there is justly due to the United States, upon the said bond, a certain *sum of money. But whether the bond [*225 was the deed of the defendant or not was not a matter in issue between the parties, and, consequently, it was a false conclusion to say that, because it was his deed, therefore he was indebted to the United States. The rule of law is precise upon this point. A verdict is bad if it varies from the issue in a substantial matter, or if it find only a part of that which is in issue. The reason of the rule is obvious; it results from the nature and the end of the pleading. Whether the jury find a special verdict, it is their duty to general or a decide the very point in issue; and although the court in which the cause is tried may give form to a general finding, so as to make it harmonize with the issue, yet, if it appears to that court, or to the Appellate Court, that the finding is different from the issue, or is confined to a part only of the matter in issue, no judgment can be rendered upon the verdict. It is true that if the jury find the issue and something more, the latter part of the finding will be rejected as surplusage; but this rule does not apply to a case where the facts found in the verdict are substantially variant from those which are in issue. The court deems it proper to take some notice of the mode of proceeding, for removing this cause from the District to the Circuit Court. It is believed to be novel in the practice of the courts of the United States; and it certainly wants the authority of law to sanction it. There is no act of Congress which authorizes a Circuit 15 225 The term "subjects" in the 15th article, when applied to persons owing allegiance to Spain, must be construed in the same sense as the term "citi Court to issue a compulsory process to the District Court, for the removal of a cause from 226*] *that jurisdiction, before a final judg-zens," or "inhabitants," when applied to persons ment or decree is pronounced. The District Court, therefore, might, and ought to have refused obedience to the writ of certiorari issued in this case by the Circuit Court, and either party might have moved the circuit for a pro. cedendo after the transcript of the record was removed into the Circuit Court, or might have owing allegiance to the United States, and extends to all persons domiciled in the Spanish dominions, ascertained, the proprietary interest of the cargo The Spanish character of the ship being [*228 cannot be inquired into, unless so far as to ascer tain that it does not belong to citizens of the United States, whose property, engaged in trade with the enemy, is not protected by the treaty. pursued the cause in the District Court in like APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Dis manner as if the record had not been removed. But if, instead of taking advantage of this irregularity at a proper time, and in a proper manner, the defendant enters his appearance to the suit in the Circuit Court, takes defense, and pleads to issue, it is too late, after verdict, to object to the irregularity in the proceedings. This court will consider the suit as an original one in the Circuit Court, made so by the consent of parties. Had a new declaration been filed in the Circuit Court, no doubt could be entertained as to the correctness of this conclusion. And it is not going too far to consider the declaration sent from the District Court in the same light, after appearance, issue, and verdict. This is the opinion of the majority of the court. The judgment is to be reversed, and a venire de novo to be issued by the Circuit Court. Judgment affirmed. Cited-5 Pet. 215; 14 Pet. 621; 4 How. 143, 147, 154; 14 How. 246;,12 Wall. 403; 3 Blatcht. 168; 15 Blatchf. 299; 3 Cranch, C. C: 575; Hemp. 7; 1 Bald. 406; 2 MeLean 624; 4 Dill. 9. 227*] relief. ed. *[PRIZE.] THE PIZARRO HIBBERSON and YONGE, Claimants. If the court below deny an order for further proof when it ought to be granted, or allow it when it ought to be denied, and the objection is taken by the party, and appears on the record, the Appellate Court can administer the proper But, if evidence in the nature of further proof be introduced, and no formal order or objection appear on the record, it must be presumed to have been done by consent, and the irregularity is waivConcealment or spoliation of papers is not, per se, a sufficient ground for condemnation in a prize court. It is calculated to excite the vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court, but is open to explanation, and if the party, in the first instance fairly, frankly, and satisfactorily explains it, he is deprived of no right to which he is otherwise entitled. If, on the contrary, the spoliation is unex plained, or the explanation is unsatisfactory; if the cause labor under heavy suspicions or gross prevarications, further proof is denied, and condemnation ensues from defects in evidence which the party is not permitted to supply. Under the Spanish treaty of 1795, stipulating that free ships shall make free goods, the want of such a sea-letter or passport, or such certificates as are described in the 17th article, is not a substantive ground of condemnation. It only authorizes capture and sending in for adjudication, and the proprietary interest in the ship may be proved by other equivalent testimony. But if, upon the original evidence the cause appears extremely doubtful and suspicious, and further proof is necessary, the grant or denial of it rests on the same general rules which govern the discretion of prize courts in other cases. trict of Georgia. The ship Pizarro, under Spanish colors, was captured on the 23d of July, 1814, by the private armed schooner Midas, Alexander Thompson, commander, on a voyage from Liverpool to Amelia Island, and brought into the port of Savannah for adjudication. Prize proceedings were instituted in the District Court of Georgia against the ship and cargo, and a claim was duly interposed by Messrs. Hibberson and Yonge, merchants, of Fernandina, Amelia Island, for the ship and cargo, as their sole and exclusive property. Upon the final hearing in the District Court, the ship and cargo were decreed to be restored, and this decree was, upon an appeal to the Circuit Court, affirmed; and from the decree of the Circuit Court the cause was brought by appeal to this court.. It appears from the evidence that during the voyage a package, containing papers respecting the cargo, directed to Messrs. Hibberson and Yonge, was thrown overboard by the advice and assent of the master and supercargo. The reason alleged for this proceeding is that they were then chased by a schooner, which they supposed to be a Carthaginian privateer. The ship's documents, however, were *retain [*229 ed, in which her Spanish character is distinctly asserted. These documents were as follows: 1. A certificate of the Spanish consulat Liverpool, dated the 11th of September, 1813, certifying that the Pizarro was a Spanish ship, bound to Corunna. 2. A certificate from the same, of the same date, that Messrs. Hughes and Duncan had shipped 250 tons of salt on board the Pizarro for Corunna, consigned to Messrs. Hibberson & Yonge. 3. A certificate of health, dated at Fernandia, the 20th of December, 1813. 4. A letter from Messrs. Hibberson & Yonge, of the 10th January, 1814, to J. Walton, the navigator or sea pilot, ordering him to sail to Liverpool. 5. A bill of lading, signed by Martinez, the master, for the outward cargo. 6. The affidavit of Messrs. Hibberson & Yonge, that they had shipped the same cargo on their own account, consigned to Messrs. Hughes & Duncan, &c. 7. The shipping articles from Amelia Island to St. Augustine, or any other port in Europe, and back, dated the 11th of January, 1814. St. Augustine, and back to Liverpool, without 8. Shipping articles from Liverpool to a date. 9. A license from the Governor of East Florida, authorizing Messrs. Hibberson & Yonge to buy a vessel in the United States, and the copy of a bill of sale from Messrs. S. & W. Hale, of New Hampshire, by their agent Kimbell, dated the 24th of February, 1813, together with an order of the governor, of the 6th of March, 1813, naturalizing the ship, or permitting her to sail under Spanish colors. *In the District Court, the cause was [*230 heard not merely upon the ship's papers, and the testimony of the master and supercargo (who were twice examined in open court), but the claimants were also permitted to introduce new proofs and testimony in support of their claim, without any order for further proof. | Winder, for the appellants and captors. 1. The proprietary interest in the claimants is not proved. 2. They are excluded from the benefit of further proof by the spoliation of papers. The court below made no order for further proof; yet it seems to have been admitted and considered by that court, and has crept into the transcript of the record. This was an irregularity which will be corrected by the appellate tribunal, since the case on the original evidence was free from doubt or difficulty, and condemnation ought to have ensued. The spoliation of papers is not satisfactorily accounted for by the master and supercargo, who have prevaricated in their examinations; and the spoliation being unexplained, inevitably leads to the exclusion of further proof, and, consequently, to condemnation. In the case of The Tico Brothers,' spo 1.-1 Rob. 131. See also The Polly, 2 Rob. 361; The Rising Sun, 2 Rob. 104; In this last case the master guilty of the spoliation was excluded from further proof as to his share of the cargo. liation of papers, not being avowed with sufficient frankness by the master, was held to destroy his credit; and the defect of proof thereby induced, together with other circumstances, was deemed a cause of condemnation. In the present *case, all the documents relative [*231 to the cargo were thrown overboard, and the excuse is the same which was rejected by the English Court of Admiralty in The Rising Sun. Destroying the papers which might show the Spanish character of the cargo could not diminish the danger of capture by Carthaginian privateers, since the ship would still appear to be Spanish, and this, together with the want of documentary evidence as to the cargo, would involve both in the same fate. This explanation of the suppression of the papers is, therefore, weak and futile, and such as cannot relieve the parties from the imputation of mala fides. 3. The claimants contend that the cargo is exempt from confiscation by the Spanish treaty of 1795, which recognizes the rule that free ships make free goods. But the term "subjects," in the 15th and 16th articles, must be un- [*232 derstood of subjects who owe a permanent allegiance to the crown of Spain, *not of [*233 mere domiciled merchants, such as the claimants. A vessel found without the documents 2. ARTICLE XV.-It shall be lawful for all and ARTICULO XV.-Se permitirà à todos y à cada uno singular the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, and de los sùbditos de S. M. Catòlica, y à los ciudadanos the citizens, people, and inhabitants of the said Unit-pueblos y habitantes de dichos Estados, que puedan ed States to sail with their ships, with all manner of navegar con sus embarcaciones con toda libertad y liberty and security, no distinction being made who seguridad, sin que haya la menor excepcion por are the proprietors of the merchandises laden there- este respecto, aunque los propietarios de las mercaon, from any port to the places of those who now derias cargadas en las referidas embarcaciones venare, or hereafter shall be, at enmity with His Cath- gan del puerto que quieran, y las traygan destinaolic Majesty or the United States. It shall be like-das á qualquiera plaza de una potencia actualmente wise lawful for the subjects and inhabitants afore-enemiga o que lo sea despues, asì de S. M. Catòlica said to sail with the ships and merchandises aforecomo de los Estados Unidos. Se permitirá igualmmentioned, and to trade with the same liberty and ente á los subditos y habitantes mencionados navesecurity from the places, ports, and havens, of those gar con sus buques y mercaderias, y frequentar con who are enemies of both or either party, without igual libertad y seguridad las plazas y puertos de any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only las potencias enemigas de las partes contratantes, directly from the places of the enemy aforemen-ò de una de ellas sin oposicion ù obstáculo, y de tioned, to neutral places but also from one place comerciar no solo desde los puertos de dicho enebelonging to an enemy to another place belonging migo á un puerto neutro directamente, si no tambto an enemy, whether they be under the jurisdic-ien desde uno enemigo á otro tal, bien se encuentre tion of the same prince or under several, and it is baxo su jurisdicion, ò baxo la de muchos; y se estihereby stipulated that free ships shall also give pula tambien por el presente tratado que los bufreedom to goods, and that everything shall be ques libres asegurarán igualmente la libertad de las deemned free and exempt which shall be found on mercaderias, y que se juzgarán libres todos los efecboard the ships belonging to the subjects of either tos que se hallasen à bordo de los buques que pertof the contracting parties, although the whole lad-eneciesen à los subditos de una de las partes coning, or any part thereof, should appertain to the tratantes, aun quando el cargamento por entero ò enemies of either; contraband goods being always prate de él fuese de los enemigos de una de las dos, excepted. It is also agreed that the same liberty bien entendido sin embargo que el contrabando se beextended to persons who are on board a free ship, exceptua siempre. Se ha convenido asi mismo que so that although they be enemies to either party, la propia libertad gozaràn los sugetos que pudiesen they shall not be made prisoners or taken out of encontrarse à bordo del buque libre, aun quando that free ship, unless they are soldiers, and in actu- fuesen enemigos de una de las dos partes contraal service of the enemies. tantes; y por lo tanto no se podrà hacerlos prisioneros ni separarlos de dichos buques à menos què no tengan la qualidad de militares, y esto hallandose en aquella sazon empleados en el servicio del enemigo. ARTICLE XVI.-This liberty of navigation and ARTICULO XVI.-Esta libertad de navegacion y commerce shall extend to all kinds of merchan- de comercio debe extenderse à toda especie de merdises, excepting those only which are distinguished caderías exceptuando solo las que se compre enden by the name of contraband: and under this name baxo nombre de contrabando, ó de mercaderias f contraband, or prohibited goods, shall be com- prohibidas, quales son las armas, canones, bombas prehended arms, great guns, bombs, with the fu- con sus mechas, y demas cosas pertenecientes à lo ces and the other things belonging to them, can- mismo, balas, pólvora, mechas, picas, espadas, lannon-bali, gunpowder, match, pikes, swords, lances, zas, dardos, alabardas, morteros, petardos, granaspears, halberds, mortars, petards, grenades, salt- das, salitre, fusiles, balas, escudos, casquetes, corapetre, muskets, musket-ball, bucklers, helmets, zas, cotas de malla, y otras armas de esta especie breast-plates, coats of mail, and the like kinds of propias parar armar à los soldados, portamosquetes, arms, proper for arming soldiers, musket rests, bandoleras, caballos con sus armas y otros instrubelts, horses with their furniture, and all other mentos de guerra sean los que fueren. Pero los warlike instruments whatever. These merchan- generos y mercaderías que se nombraràn ahora,'no dises which follow shall not be reckoned among con- se comprehenderan entre los de conirabando o cotraband or prohibited goods; that is to say, all sorts sas prohibidas, à saber: toda especie de panos y of cloths, and all other manufactures woven of any qualesquiera otras telas de lana, lino, seda, algodon, wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other materials what-ú otras qualesquiera materias, toda especie de vesever; all kinds of wearing apparel, together with tidos con las telas de que se acostumbrad hacer, el |