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circumstances calculated to charge it with knowledge of the fact that hostilities exist, forfeits the immunities conferred by the treaty and becomes, eo instante, liable to capture. As the freight trade of the world is carried on in steamers which habitually carry only enough coal to reach their destination, the operation of the treaty is to render them instantly liable to capture, the alternative being to continue to the hostile destination and surrender.

The Convention operates powerfully in favor of a State having a predominant naval force and possessed of numerous ports throughout the world so situated that a merchant vessel carrying its flag may take refuge in such ports on being notified that hostilities exist. All other powers would be placed in a position of great disadvantage, and their merchant marine would suffer incalculable injury as the result of its adoption.

The effects upon the practice of marine insurance are also important. The ordinary contract does not cover a war risk. The operation of a war risk is simple because its conditions and incidents are fully known. But a policy calculated to cover the contingency of capture, the risk depending upon the chance or possibility of notification, would introduce an element of uncertainty into marine risks which, in view of the interests at stake, should not be encouraged.

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The Convention also presents an undesirable alternative in the treatment of enemy merchant ships, in that it provides that in certain cases they may be seized "subject to restoration after the war without indemnity, or to "immediate requisition with indemnity." As merchant marine commerce is carried on it is obvious that the condition of the cargo which is detained in indifferent or inefficient custodianship during the ordinary duration of war would approach confiscation. It would also be substantially impossible to make such a risk the subject of a practicable contract of insurance.

The foregoing Convention was not signed by the delegation, and its acceptance as a conventional obligation is not recommended. (S. Doc. No. 444, 60th Cong., 1st sess., p. 38.)

This Hague Convention, relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities has not been adhered to by the United States.

Summary. Whether 48 hours is a reasonable period to allow to belligerent merchant vessels to load and depart will depend upon many circumstances. The relative distance of the enemy ports from one another, the nature of the commerce between the ports, the character of the vessels, strategic reasons, and other circumstances may influence a state in determining the number of days of grace.

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The discussion at The Hague in 1907 showed that the States were not willing to bind themselves to any fixed period of delay to be allowed to merchant vessels in an enemy port and that the rule as adopted did not determine even that any period should be allowed, though it is asserted that it is desirable that a sufficient period be granted.

Prof. Higgins says of the rule of the Hague Conference relating to the days of grace:

The practice of granting of days of grace remains therefore as it was before the Conference. The powers have recognized its desirability, but no merchant ship can demand it, nor will there be a legal ground of complaint if all enemy merchant ships within a belligerent's ports at the outbreak of war are ordered to leave immediately or after a "sufficient" period. Whether the expression "It is desirable" will be considered as equivalent to a command remains to be seen. States will probably act in the future as they have acted in the past. Capt. Ottley stated that the British Government had every intention of adhering to the practice which it had observed during the past 50 years in granting days of grace, subject always to the reservation that the time allowed should not compromise its national interests. It was doubtless with a similar mental reservation that the other powers accepted this article. States will in the future as in the past consult their own interests in this matter, but their interests may not infrequently involve a consideration for the interests of neutrals. Each State will determine for itself whether the desire to injure its enemy by detaining his merchant ships, which might be of the greatest value as auxiliary ships for the . fleet, will "prevail over the fear of offending neutrals by causing a great dislocation of trade in which some of them are sure to be interested." (The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 303.)

Conclusions (a) It would seem from the current rules and opinion that 48 hours might under certain circumstances be a sufficient period and under present rules State X could properly limit the délai de faveur to a period of 48 hours.

(b) As the allowance of days of grace is a favor rather than obligatory under present rules, a favor may be withdrawn. Certainly a favor granted by one belligerent to the other ought not to be taken advantage of to the detriment of the belligerent granting the favor. In the situation under consideration State Y should certainly be allowed to shorten the period already proclaimed to

correspond with that granted by State X to the vessels of State Y.

(c) To withdraw all délai de faveur would involve the good faith of Y, as the vessels of State X had doubtless governed their action by the proclamation of State Y. To compel departure within 48 hours would be a hardship, but would still allow the vessels to depart and would be an adequate measure to meet the action of State X in limiting the délai de faveur to 48 hours and could be justified on the ground of retaliation.

To withdraw all délai de faveur after once announcing that délai would be allowed would closely approach perfidy, which is generally regarded as prohibited in war.

While it would be possible for a State to refrain from the grant of any specific délai de faveur, it would not be justifiable for a State to proclaim a délai and later withdraw all délai.

State Y has not the right under the conditions stated to withdraw all délai de faveur, but may in an extreme case allow the vessels to depart freely but "immediately."

SOLUTION.

(a) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a reasonable limit for délai de faveur.

(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should be allowed to shorten the period which it has already proclaimed to correspond with the period granted by State X.

(c) Under the conditions proposed in Situation III, and having regard to the preamble of the Hague Convention on this subject, State Y has not the right to withdraw all délai de faveur, though in an extreme case it may adopt the alternative of the Convention, which requires enemy vessels to depart "immediately."

SITUATION IV.

PURSUIT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNER.

(In this Situation it is granted that the Declaration of London is binding.)

There is war between the United States and State X. Great Britain is neutral. The Moon, a British merchant vessel, which has sailed from London with a cargo for port C of State X, before which the United States is maintaining an effective blockade, passes the blockading ships in the night and enters port C. When attempting to return the Moon is pursued by a cruiser of the blockading squadron. The Moon runs into a neutral port, D, near the blockaded port. The cruiser waits outside the three-mile limit. When the Moon comes out of port three days later, the cruiser captures her. The master of the Moon protests that the capture is not valid and that the pursuit was at an end when he entered the neutral port.

Is the master's protest valid? What should be done?

SOLUTION.

The pursuit by the cruiser was not abandoned. The protest of the master of the Moon is not valid. The captain of the cruiser should send the Moon into port for adjudication as prize. If for any reason she should be released by the court, the action of the captain could be justified.

NOTES.

Duration of penalty.-Kleen discusses the grounds of difference of the offense of carriage of contraband and of violation of blockade and argues for a difference in duration of penalty.

C'est ce caractère purement local qui distingue essentiellement les violations de blocus d'avec les autres transgressions de la neutralité. Dans un fait de contrebande, par exemple, le transport est délictueux n'importe où se trouve l'ennemi qui est le but final et à quelle distance de cet ennemi que soient les objets prohibés qui lui sont destinés.

Déjà l'acte de les apporter peut être poursuivi, à une étape quelconque dans le cours du voyage, alors que la destination interdite peut être démontrée comme telle; cela, parce que la signification du secours n'est pas attachée à telle ou telle localité, et que le secours lui-même ne consiste pas dans quelque obstacle mis à une opération liée intimement à une place. Au contraire, le blocus est une telle opération. Inséparable des lieux de son objet, ce n'est que là qu'il peut être violé. (1 La Neutralité, p. 630.)

Kleen maintains that

Un navire pris en flagrant délit de violation de blocus peut être saisi par la force bloquante et traduit devant le tribunal de prises pour être puni selon le paragraphe suivant.

Aucun acte n'est réprimable en dehors de la place et du moment du fait délictueux.

Un navire ne peut être saisi à moins d'être pris pendant son entrée même au port bloqué, ou dans le port, ou bien à son retour de celui-ci avant d'avoir atteint, soit un port ou une eau neutres, soit sans être poursuivi-la haute mer ou le port non bloqué d'un belligérant. Toutefois, une poursuite commencée sur les lieux du blocus peut être continuée dans la haute mer et dans les eaux des belligérants, si elle est une et non interrompue. (Ibid., p. 636.)

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Aussi ces publicistes s'accordent-ils à reconnaître que, de même » qu'un blocus ne peut être violé que sur ses lieux et qu'il ne peut pas l'être par le voyage, de même la violation ne peut être poursuivie qu'en flagrant délit, ni avant ni après. Avant, aucune mesure quelconque ne peut légalement être prise contre le navire suspect; et après, aucune mesure ne peut être prise autre que celles qui sont motivées par des circonstances et qui sont censées propres à prolonger la phase du fait, à savoir les saisies, soit dans le port même, soit sur la place à la sortie de là, soit enfin sur la haute mer et dans les eaux des belligérants à la seule condition que la poursuite ait commencé au moment du fait et sur la place, et que sa continuation aux dits lieux n'ait pas été interrompue mais puisse être considérée comme une simple suite de l'action dirigée contre le délit pris sur le fait. Au contraire, un navire déjà échappé dont l'action interdite n'a pas été empêchée ni attaquée sur la place du blocus, et qui n'a pas non plus été poursuivi immédiatement, ne peut pas être attaqué après coup et ailleurs, fût-ce pendant le même voyage. Et, une fois dans les ports ou les eaux neutres, il est pour toujours hors de portée de toute poursuite, indépendamment de la fin du voyage. (Ibid., p. 639.)

Other opinions are given in the Naval War College International Law Situations, 1908, pages 21-26. Under the situation there considered the precedents and attitude of various States are presented. From that discus

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