1781. A military race now commenced between the pursuing British under lord Cornwallis and the fleeing Americans under gen. Greene. The latter retreated as expeditioufly as poffible, and croffed the Yadkin partly in flats and partly by fording, on the 2d and 3d of the month, and fecured the boats on the north fide. Though Cornwallis was fo clofe in the rear, as that a smart skirmish happened between a party of riflemen and his advance, yet a want of boats, and the rapid rifing of the river from preceding rains, made his croffing impoffible. This fecond hair-breadth efcape was confidered as a fresh evidence of their being favored by Heaven. They viewed it with pious gratitude; and frequently remarked, that if the rifing of the river had been a few hours fooner, Morgan's whole detachment would have been in the power of a greatly fuperior army; if a few hours later, that Cornwallis would have effected his paffage, fo as to have enabled him to get between the two divifions of the American army, which might have proved the deftruction of both. That the Americans fhould effect their paffage in two fucceffive instances, while the British (whofe advance was often in fight of the American rear) were providentially reftrained, affected the devout inhabitants of the neighbouring fettlements with lively thanks to the Moft High, and added fresh vigor to their exertions in behalf of their country.

Feb.

5.

On the 5th Greene wrote to Huger" I intend, if we can find a good pofition, to prepare to receive the enemy's attack. It is not improbable, from lord Cornwallis's pushing difpofition, and the contempt he has for our army, we may precipitate him into fome capital misfortune. If Cornwallis knows his true interest he will

purfue

pursue our army. If he can difperfe that, he completes 1781. the reduction of the state; and without it he will do nothing to effect." His lordship being obliged to march his troops about 25 miles to the miles to the upper fords, which are generally paffable, gave time for the junction of the two divifions of the American army on the 7th, near Guil- 7. ford court houfe; circumstances not having admitted of its being done either at Charlotte or Salisbury.

Lord Cornwallis's firft object, that of retorting the fatal blow given by Morgan at the Cowpens and of recovering the captives, being fruftrated; and the British army being without tents, and like the Americans, dependent for fubfiftence on what could be haftily picked up by detachments on a rapid march; it was doubted whether his lordship would profecute his enterprise further: fo that gen. Greene spent the 8th of February in refreshing all his regular forces at Guilford court house, which was much wanted. The light troops had not time, after the battle, to take care of the wounded or even breathe (furgeons were left on the field) and their retreat of 150 miles was effected under difficulties that haraffed them exceedingly. The retreat of the battalions from the Peedee under Huger, was conducted for 100 miles under circumftances requiring the utmost patience. The worst waggons, with the pooreft teams, and most useless part of the baggage, were early fent off by col. O. Williams to Hillsborough; but the best, and even the artillery, was an encumbrance in their fituation. They were fome times without meat, often without flour, and alway without fpirituous liquors. Notwithstanding the wintry season, and their having little clothing, they were daily reduced to the neceffity of fording deep

creeks,

1781. creeks, and of remaining wet without any change of

Feb.

9.

raiment, till the heat of their bodies and occafional fires in the woods, dried their tattered rags. Their route lay through a barren country, which scarcely afforded neceffaries for a few ftraggling inhabitants. They were retarded by heavy rains, broken bridges, bad roads and poor horfes. Many of them marched without fhoes over the frozen ground, and through flinty roads, which fo gafhed their feet, that the blood marked every step of their progress. All these hardships were endured without the lofs of a fingle sentinel by defertion. Lee's partizan legion had undergone extreme fervice, through their additional expedition to George Town, 75 miles diftant from the point where the retreat of the battalions commenced.

Though the toils and fufferings of the Americans exceeded, those of the royal army were far from trifling. The British had in common with the others bad roads, heavy rains, a want of cover, deep creeks and rivers through which to pafs in the depth of winter: but then they were well supplied in the articles of fhoes and clothes. The difficulties and evils arifing from lord Cornwallis's destroying the fuperfluous baggage and waggons were not fmall: but they were fubmitted to with the most general and cheerful acquiefcence, from his lordship's fetting the example.

On the 9th of February gen. Greene wrote to gen. Sumpter" I fhall avoid a general action if poffible: but I am afraid it will not be in my power. Our force is fo fmall and in fuch diftrefs, that I have little to hope, and every thing to fear." The troops prefent and fit for action were 1426, befide riflemen and others,

amounting

amounting to 397, and 176 cavalry, in all 1999. But 1781, they were greatly fatigued, and in general much dispirited. The forces under Cornwallis (as Greene then thought and faid in his letter to gen. Washington) confifted of between 2500 and 3000, including near 300 dragoons and their mounted infantry. These were well clothed, amply equipped, and confident of every advantage. In the morning a council of war was called; of which Greene fent the following account to governor Nash of North Carolina-" It was the unanimous opinion of a council of war this day, that it would be inevitable ruin to the army, and no lefs ruinous to the American cause, to hazard a general action: the council therefore advised to our croffing the Dan immediately.” The proper measures were instantly taken. A light army was formed out of col. Lee's legion, the regular battalion of infantry under col. Howard, the cavalry under col. Washington, and a small corps of Virginia riflemen under major Campbell, amounting to about 700 men, the flower of the fouthern American army. Gen. Morgan being rendered totally unfit for command, or even to march with his corps, by the great fatigue he had fuffered, and the torment he was in with the rheumatism, Greene was embarraffed in the appointment of an officer to fucceed him. He finally refolved to confer that honor upon the deputy adjutant general, col. Otho Holland Williams, who entered upon his command on the 10th; when Greene marched with the main army from Guilford court house toward the Dan, which forms the boundary between North Carolina and Virginia.

Lord Cornwallis well knowing the inferiority of the American army, conceived hopes of getting between

Greene

1781. Greene and Virginia, and of reducing him to the ne ceffity of either fighting or abandoning his communication with that state, and likewife of running the risk of being hemmed in between the great rivers in the west, the fea on the east, lord Rawdon in the fouth, and the main royal army in the north. To this end Cornwallis kept the upper country, (where only the rivers are fordable) as he supposed that the Americans could not make good their paffage in the deep water from the want of a fufficient number of flats. In cafe they attempted it, he expected to overtake and force them to an action before they could crofs. But the advantages refulting from the season of the year, and from the face of the country, interfected with rivers and creeks, were fo improved by Greene as completely to baffle his lordship. The better to avoid a rapid pursuit, the main and light army took different routes. The next day the latter had a rencounter with the van of the British army, in which an officer and half a dozen privates of Tarleton's legion were made prifoners, and feveral killed. Frequent fkirmishes, and the manoeuvres practifed to miflead Cornwallis, had the defired effect, and gave Greene time to fend forward his baggage. On the morning of the 13th, Greene wrote to Williams-" It is very evident the enemy intend to push us in croffing the river. The night before laft, as foon as I got your letter, I fent off the baggage and ftores, with orders to cross as faft as they got to the river. The North Carolina militia have all deferted us, except about 80 men. Majors and captains are among the deferters. You have the flower of the army, don't expofe the men too much, left our fituation fhould grow more critical. Finding