The place where he landed was about two leagues from 1781. the town and fort: the way to thefe was not only extremely difficult, but interfected by a defile in which a handful of men could have ftopped an army. The troops that had been landed, were compofed principally of count Dillon's regiment, a part of the Irish brigade in the French fervice. A divifion of the garrifon was going through its exercife in a field at fome distance from the fort. It miftook the enemy, as their red uniform was the fame with the English; and did not retreat till it had received a close discharge of small arms, which killed and wounded several. Upon the alarm occafioned by the volley, those of the garrison who were in quarters hurried to the fort, and clogged the drawbridge in fuch a manner, that it could not be raised, until the enemy entered pell mell along with them. Lieut. col. Cockburne, the governor, who had been taking an early ride, returned at the instant of furprise, and was made prisoner on horfeback. He was "guilty of culpable neglect, in not taking the neceffary precautions for the defence of the island, notwithstanding he had received the fulleft intelligence of an intended attack *.” Thus was Statia, with the dependent islands of St. Martin and Saba, reduced in a few minutes on the 26th of Nov. 26. November, with the lofs to the French of no more than ten foldiers killed and wounded. The British garrifon confifted of 677 men; and the artillery of 68 pieces of cannon. The marquis de Bouille behaved with his ufual magnanimity, and admitted the claims of the original proprietors to various articles on the island. A confider * The sentence of the court martial. able 1781. able fum of money which lieut. col. Cockburne declared to be his, was with the generous confent of the French officers restored to him. But a very large fum, the remainder of the produce of the late fales, and faid to be the property of adm. Rodney and gen. Vaughan, became a prize to the victors. Their whole spoil has been estimated at two millions of livres. . When count de Guichen returned from his cruise, the utmost expedition was used at Breft in refitting the French fleet for the fea, notwithstanding the lateness of the season. The reinforcing of count de Graffe in the West Indies with troops and fhips of war, was indifpenfably requifite; and it was forefeen, that he would want on that station almost every article of provisions and neceffary of life, befide an immenfe fupply of mili tary and naval ftores of every kind, after the fervice on the North American coafts. The French concluded also upon fending a reinforcement of troops and fhips to Monf. de Suffrein in the Eaft Indies, where the demand for naval and military ftores was alfo urgent. A numerous convoy of transports, ftore fhips and provision veffels, were accordingly gotten in readiness with the fame diligence as the fleet. It was needful to guard against the designs of the British, the preparation was therefore extended to fuch a number of men of war, as was thought equal to the protection of the whole, till they were at a fafe diftance. Count de Guichen was appointed to the command of all, while he remained in company with them. The fquadron and fleet destined for the West Indies, was intrufted with the rnarquis de Vaudreuil, who carried out a confiderable body of land forces, with a full confidence, on the fide of both France. and Spain, of now perfecting their plan for the reduc- 1781. tion of Jamaica. The intelligence of this preparation, and in a meafure of its object, being received in Britain, adm. Kempenfelt was dispatched in the beginning of December, with 12 fail of the line, a 50 gun fhip, four frigates, and a fireship, to intercept the French squadron and convoy. But for want of better information or from fome other cause, the French fleet was fo much fuperior to what had been conceived, and to Kempenfelt's force, that the real danger lay on the fide of the latter. Count de Guichen had no lefs than 19 fail of heavy line of battle fhips, befide two more armed en flute, as the French call it, when the lower deck guns are placed in the hold to make room for the conveyance of a moderate cargo. 12. The British admiral, expecting that his enemy had only an equal force at the moft, fortunately fell in with Dec. the French in a hard gale of wind, when both the fleet and convoy were much difperfed, and the latter confiderably aftern. Kempenfelt concluded upon profiting from the prefent fituation, by endeavouring to cut off the convoy in the first inftance, and fighting the enemy afterward. He fucceeded in part. A great number of prizes were taken. About twenty arrived fafe in British ports; while feveral that ftruck escaped in the night. Two or three ships are said to have been funk. A number muft undoubtedly have loft their voyage, through the great difperfion of the convoy which neceffarily exifted. The French commanders were in the mean time collecting their fleet, and forming the line of battle. Kempenfelt also having collected his fhips in the even 1781. ing, and being ftill ignorant of the enemy's force, got upon the fame tack with them, under a full determination of engaging them the next morning. At day light perceiving them to leeward, he formed the line; but discovering their force on a nearer approach, he did not think it advisable to hazard an action. He arrived at Portsmouth on the 20th of December: but had taken the precaution of dispatching the Agamemnon to pick up any ftragglers from the Brest fleet. The Agamem non fortunately fell in with four large fhips and a snow from Bourdeaux to Martinico, meant to join de Guichen, and captured them on the 25th. Near 1100 land forces, and between 6 and 700 feamen, were taken in the prizes captured by the admiral, which were mostly freighted on the French king's account. They were laden chiefly with brafs and iron ordnance, gunpowder, fmall arms, flints, bomb-fhells, cannon balls, grenades in a prodigious quantity, iron bars, sheet lead, travelling forges, all kinds of ordnance stores, tents, camp equipage, foldiers clothing and accoutrements, woollen and linen goods for the land and fea fervice, great cables, fail-cloth and cordage, with every fupply for fhipping in a great amount, wine, oil, brandy, rum, flour, bifcuit and falted provifions, all in large and the most neceffary in prodigious quantities. The capture was valuable and important; but served to excite the diffatisfaction of the public, who fuppofed that it was through neglect, that Kempenfelt had not been supplied with a force which would have enabled him to take or destroy the whole French fleet and convoy. A great clamor was raised; which was probably increased by the attempts made in both houses of parliament, 7. liament, after the Christmas recefs, to render this bufi- 1782. nefs a ground of complaint and charge against the first lord of the admiralty. Mr. Fox moved, on the 7th of Feb. February, the following refolution in the committee, "That it appears to this committee, that there was grofs mifmanagement in the adminiftration of naval affairs in the year 1781." He faid in his fpeech upon the occafion—“ It appears from the papers on the table, 'that for feveral weeks before the failing of the French fleet, the admiralty had been in the courfe of receiving regular intelligence of its equipment; and that it was evident, that 18 or 20 fail of the line were in readiness to put to fea." Lord Howe on the fame day declared it to be his opinion, that the early intelligence ministry had received of the defigns of the enemy, left them without excufe, for not having prepared a force fufficient to attack them. He afked-" Why was not Sir George Rodney fent out with adm. Kempenfelt? His fquadron is allowed to have been fit for fervice." Mr. Fox's motion was rejected by a very great majority, after long and warm debates. What Kempenfelt could not effect for want of more fhips, was in a great degree accomplished in another way. Count de Guichen's fleet and convoy, after Kempenfelt's fuccefsful attack on the latter, were fo fhattered and disabled, by a continual fucceffion of tempefts and foul weather, that only two of the men of war and a few of the convoy, could hold on their courfe to join de Graffe. The remainder wereobliged to return in very bad condition to France. Since then, a fecond convoy from Breft failed on the 11th of February, in order to supply the failure of the other. VOL. IV. The |