(3). Agreement under 201. The plaintiff agreed in writing with the defendant to do the brickwork of a certain building for the sum of 17. 148. per rod, the defendant to find all materials:-Held, that the agreement did not require a stamp, it not appearing at the time of making it that its value amounted to 20%., though the work doneultimately exceeded that 816 amount. Liddiard v. Gale, (4). Deed, An indenture, whereby several persons jointly convey their separate interests in certain shares in an incorporated Company, does not require several stamps, but one ad valorem stamp 193 is sufficient. Wills v. Bridge, (5). Transfer Stamp. a In an action against the defendant as a shareholder in a mining adventure, for articles supplied to the mine, it appeared that the persons whose names were entered in a book, were alone entitled to be shareholders, and that the defendant had been registered by the purser of the mine, in consequence of document sent to him by the defendant, which was to the effect that one L., for the consideration expressed in a certain deed of transfer, did certify that he had assigned, sold, and transferred to the defendant certain shares in the said mine, with the like parts of and shares in all engines, tools, &c., together with the dividends to be paid in respect of the said shares of the said L., subject to the rules, &c.; to this there was added a statement, that the defendant did thereby agree to accept the same:-Held, that this document did not require a transfer stamp under the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, 230 Toll v. Lee, Sched. Part 1. (6). Receipt. In an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange for 97. 58. against the drawer, the defendant pleaded payment by the acceptor, and in support of that plea, offered in evidence the following document, without a receipt stamp, signed by the plaintiff:-"Myself v. Marks. Mr. Marks has this day left with me 107., on account of the debt, interest, and costs in this action :”Held, that it was admissible in evidence without a receipt stamp. Levy v. Alexander, 485 (7). Stamp Acts-Lease-Consideration-Settlement of Accounts-Set-off. The plaintiff granted a lease to the defendant, in consideration of a premium of 40%., and, being indebted to the defendant in that amount for work done, a settlement of accounts took place between them, when the defendant was allowed the 407. in account, but no monies in fact passed. The plaintiff having afterwards sued the defendant for 371. 48., for rent, and goods sold, the defendant claimed to set off the 40l. as money received for his use, on the ground that it was not expressed in the lease, and therefore he was entitled, under the 48 Geo. 3, c. 149, s. 24, and 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, to recover it:-Held, first, that the effect of those statutes is to put leases for a premium on the same footing as conveyances upon a sale, so that in all cases where the consideration is not expressed in the lease, the amount paid may be recovered back; secondly, that the settlement of accounts amounted to payment; and, thirdly, that, as the defendant might recover back the premium as money received for his use, he was entitled to set it off as a debt. 720 Gingell v. Purkins, (8). Policy of Insurance-Penalty. A policy of insurance on the lives of cattle is an insurance on lives within the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and is liable to duty. But such an instrument is only liable to a 57. penalty for want of (9). Document not requiring Stamp. The following document was held not to require an agreement stamp: "I, N. F., do hereby request S. B., bailiff to my landlord, who, on the 4th of November, 1848, having distrained my goods on the premises which I now hold, situate at &c., for the sum of 1007. as rent due to S. B.; and I request him to forbear the sale thereof until the 2nd of February, 1849, to enable me to discharge the said rent; and I do hereby request, agree, and consent that the goods so distrained shall remain at my proper cost in his possession upon the premises until the 2nd of February, 1849; and I undertake to give up the same goods, and not to replevy the same, and that this distress shall remain in full force during that time; and I do hereby undertake to give up peaceable possession of the premises and effects distrained on the 2nd of February, 1849, and pay all costs and charges attending this distress." Fishwick v. Milnes, 825 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See GUARANTIE. (1). Acceptance under. The defendant verbally agreed to buy some sheep, which he selected from the plaintiff's flock, and directed them to be sent to a field of his, which was accordingly done. Two days afterwards he sent his man to remove the sheep from the field to his farm, which was some miles distant, and on their arrival he counted them over, and said, "It is all right:"-Held, that this was evidence for the jury of his accept ance of the sheep, so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, notwithstanding he afterwards repudiated the purchase, and sent the sheep back to the plaintiff. Quære, whether, under the statute, there can be an acceptance before delivery. Saunders v. Topp, 390 (2). To be performed within a Year. The plaintiff by indenture assigned letters patent to the defendants H. & N., who covenanted to pay the plaintiff a certain sum by instalments, extending over several years; provided, that if, at the expiration of twelve months from the date of the indenture, the defendants should not approve of the patent, and should give notice of their disapprobation, and of their intention to sell the patent, then the payment of the first instalment should be suspended; and if, having given such notice, the defendants should within six months sell the patent, the covenant should cease. The deed was executed by N., but there was no signature of H., but only a seal for him in the usual way. H. & N. attempted to work the patent, but, being dissatisfied with it, sent the plaintiff a notice, signed by both, referring to the deed, and in the terms of the proviso: -Held, that the contract having been performed on one side within a year, the case was not within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, inasmuch as that enactment applies only to contracts not to be performed on either side within the year. Semble, that an agreement by deed is not within that statute. Semble, also, that, if the case were within the statute, the notice was a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy its provisions. (3). Agreement to answer for Debt of 940 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. was a shipbroker, and that he was employed by the owners of a ship to procure for them a charter of that ship, upon the terms that he should be entitled to receive the freight, and so thereout to satisfy himself his commission; and that he did accordingly procure a charter-party on certain terms; that the ship sailed and performed her voyage, and returned to England; that a change of ownership in some of the shares of the ship had accrued before her return; that, after her return, the plaintiff was about to collect, and would have collected, the freight, so as thereout to satisfy himself his commission; that the defendants were the brokers for the new owners, and it became desirable for them to obtain immediate possession of the ship, and they were therefore anxious that plaintiff should abandon his right of receiving the freight; that, in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff would relinquish his right to collect the freight, the defendants promised him his commission; that plaintiff did relinquish his said right, but that defendants would not pay him his said commission:-Held, that this was an agreement by the defendants to pay, in consideration of the plaintiff abandoning his rights, arising from several matters stated by way of inducement, the inducement, as stated, being material; and that the declaration was not supported by proof of an agreement, in consideration of the plaintiff not asserting any lien on the freight, without its appearing whether or not he was entitled to such lien. Held, also, that, in such case, no amendment was allowable at Nisi Prius to cure the variance. A written agreement, signed by the defendants, the plaintiff, and the charterers, after reciting that the ship had arrived in port, and a stop had been put on the freight by the owners, and that a difficulty had arisen as to the settlement of the charterers' accounts, stated that the stop was to STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. be immediately taken off, and that the commission on the charter-party, payable to the plaintiff, was to be paid by the defendants, and that no person signing that agreement was to put any stop on the freight:-Held, that this was an agreement to answer for the debt of another, within the Statute of Frauds. Gull v. Lindsay, 45 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Indorsement-To save. In order to save the Statute of Limitations, a second or subsequent writ of summons must, at the time a copy is served, contain the indorsement required by the 2 Will. 4, c. 39, s. 10, and such indorsement must have been made by the plaintiff or his attorney; and the roll is no evidence of these facts. Walker v. Collick, 171 STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Ratification of Stoppage. C. & T., merchants at Liverpool, sent orders to I., a merchant at New York, to purchase for them certain goods; which were accordingly shipped by I. in five vessels bound to Liverpool, and consigned to C. & T., who, after the receipt of the goods by one of the vessels, stopped payment on the 7th of April, 1846. I. had drawn bills for the goods, partly on C. & T., and partly on R. & Co., with whom C. & T. had dealings. B. & Co., who were merchants at Liverpool, and who also had a house of business at New York, purchased there several of the bills, which were drawn at sixty days' sight, and were dated, some on the 28th of March, and the rest on the 30th. On the 8th of May a fiat in bankruptcy issued against C. & T. The four other vessels arrived at Liverpool respectively on the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 9th of May; and immediately on the arrival of each, and whilst the transitus of the goods on board co tinued, B. & Co., on behalf of I., gave notice to the master and consignees of each ship, claiming to stop the goods in transitu. B. & Co. were not the general agents of I., nor had they received from him any authority to make this stoppage. On the 11th of May, the assignees of C. & T. made a formal demand of the goods from the master and consignees of each of the four ships, at the same time tendering the freight; but they refused to deliver them, and on the same day delivered the whole to B. & Co. On the next day, the assignees made a formal demand of the goods from B. and Co., but they refused to deliver them up, claiming title under the stoppage in transitu. On the 28th of April, I. heard at New York that C. & T. had stopped payment; and on the next day, he executed a power of attorney to H. of Liverpool, authorising him to stop the goods in transitu. This was received by H. on the 13th of May, and he on that day adopted and confirmed the previous stoppage by B. & Co. I. afterwards adopted and ratified all that had been done both by H. and B. & Co. In trover by the assignees of C. & T. against B. & Co.Held, first, that there could be no valid stoppage in transitu after the formal demand of the goods by the assignees on the 11th of May, and the subsequent delivery of them to the defendants; secondly, that the ratification of the stoppages by I., after the conversion by the defendants, had not the effect of altering retrospectively the ownership of the goods, which had already vested in the plaintiffs. Bird v. Brown, 786 SUGGESTION. (1). Under the County Courts Act. Under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, if the defendant makes out a primâ facie case, bringing the matter within the (4). Under 43 Geo. c. 46, s. 3. A defendant having obtained a rule nisi on a motion to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, under the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 46, s. 3, the Court intimated their opinion to be in favour of the plaintiff, and delivered judgment to the effect that the rule ought to be discharged; but, at the same time, directed a suggestion to be entered on the record, to enable the parties to raise the question for a Court of error: -Held, that so much of the rule as related to the entry of the suggestion was incorrect, as being inconsistent with the expressed opinion and judgment of the Court, which was in the plaintiff's favour; and the Court amended the rule by striking out the objectionable part. Ricketts v. Noble, 260 SURVEY. See CUSTOM. 942 "TRADE OR NAVIGATION." TAXES. Covenant to Pay. See COVENANT, (3). TENANT. Entry by-Evidence of See STAMP, (2). TITHE COMMUTATION ACT. Rent-charge-Distress-Judge's Order. Under the Tithe Commutation Act, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 82, where the half-yearly payment of rent-charge on land shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of forty days, and there shall be no sufficient distress upon the premises liable to the payment thereof, it shall be lawful for any Judge of her Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, upon an affidavit of the facts, to order a writ to issue to the sheriff, requiring him to summon a jury to assess the arrears of the rent-charge remaining unpaid, and to return the inquisition thereupon taken to some one of the superior courts, &c. :-Held, (per Pollock, C. B., Alderson, B., and Platt, B., dissentiente Parke, B.), that such order could be made on an ex parte application to the Judge. Hammersmith Rent-charge, TITLE. Slander of. See SLANDER OF TITLE. TOLL TRAVERSE. See CUSTOM. In re "TRADE OR NAVIGATION." Relating thereto. See MERCHANT SEAMEN'S ACT. 87 TRESPASS. TRESPASS. (1). When it does not lie against Master. A master is not liable in trespass for an injury done without his knowledge by his servant, though in the course of his employ. Therefore, where the defendant, a contractor for certain works, employed a sub-contractor, whose men, in the performance of the works, but without the authority of the contractor, used the plaintiff's crane, and broke it :-Held, that the defendant was not liable for this injury in an action of trespass. Gordon v. Rolt, 365 (2). When not against Railway Com pany. The plaintiff's sheep got upon the defendants' railway, through defect of fences, and were run over by a locomotive engine driven by a servant who had directions from the Railway Company to drive at a certain rate per hour:-Held, that trespass would not lie against the Company, and that, if the cattle had a right to be on the railway, the plaintiff's remedy was by action on the case for causing the engine to be driven in such a way as to injure that right. If the cattle were altogether wrong-doers, there was no neglect or misconduct for which the Company were responsible. If the cattle escaped through defect of fences which the Company should have kept up, their damage was consequent on that wrong, and recoverable in action on the case against the Company, for letting their fences be incomplete or out of repair. Sharrod v. The London and North Western Railway Company, 580 (3). Secretary of State-Refusal of Insolvent to file Schedule-Evidence of Trespass-Attachment-Committal -Plea in bar of Matter arising after Action commenced Judge's Certificate. The removal of a person from one |