suit at law or in equity for the recovery of any fee or reward, or disbursement, for or in respect of any business, matter, or thing done by him as an attorney or solicitor as aforesaid, whilst he shall have been without such certificate as aforesaid." Now, in point of fact and in truth the certificate was not in force during the time the solicitor was in practice. It appears otherwise, no doubt, upon the face of the certificate, but the matter is open to explanation. The certificate, therefore, does not afford the solicitor any protection. Pollock, C. B.-How could the officer have granted a certificate in 1849, for the year 1852?]

Henniker, in support of the rule, was not called upon.

POLLOCK, C. B.-This rule ought to be made absolute. At the time the business was done the certificate was not "in force."

PARKE, B., ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred.

1849.

In re DUKE OF BRUNSWICK

บ.

CROWL.

Rule absolute.

WALKER V. WALL.

BARSTOW had obtained a rule in this case, calling up

on the plaintiff to shew cause why a suggestion should not be entered upon the roll to deprive him of costs, under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. At the trial of the action, before the Under-sheriff of Middlesex, the plaintiff had obtained a verdict to the amount of 9l. 10s. 6d. It appeared that the action was brought for goods sold and delivered, some of which had been supplied in July, 1848. The affidavit of the defendant was silent as to the time of the accruing of the cause of action, but stated that the residence of the defendant and dwelling-house of the plaintiff were within the jurisdiction of the County Court of Surrey, within

VOL. IV.

K K

EXCH.

1849. WALKER

v.

WALL.

which the defendant resided at the time the action was brought; and that the cause of action arose wholly, or in some material point, within the jurisdiction.

Joyce now shewed cause.-There are several objections to this rule. It is no where stated in the affidavit when the action was commenced. It may therefore have been commenced before the Act in question was passed, and before the County Court had any jurisdiction: Parker v. Crouch (a). The affidavit, moreover, merely states the cause of action to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the County Court of Surrey. Now, by the 4th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, the ancient County Court is preserved; and a district County Court might not have been established. The affidavit therefore ought to have stated, that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the district County Court. There is nothing equivalent to a statement that any district court for the county of Surrey has been established.

Barstow, in support of the rule.-The affidavit is sufficient to entitle the defendant to enter a suggestion; it discloses a probable and reasonable ground for the defendant's application. It is not to be presumed, at this late period, that the new County Court for Surrey has not been established; the case would be different if this application were made at a time shortly after the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. The particulars of demand shew that the action was commenced after the passing of the Act, and the plaintiff does not attempt to deny that fact by affidavit.

POLLOCK, C. B.-I think that this rule ought to be made absolute to enter the suggestion. This is an application made under the 129th section of the statute in question.

(a) 1 Exch. 699.

It has been objected to the defendant's affidavit, that it does not state that any district court for the county of Surrey has been established. The plaintiff does not deny that fact; and the defendant has made this application on the assumption of its existence. The question is, whether sufficient ground of a reasonable and probable nature is disclosed by the affidavit, to satisfy the Court that the suggestion ought to be entered. I am of opinion that the affidavit is sufficient, and therefore that this application ought to be granted.

PARKE, B.-The defendant has made out a primâ facie case, and has disclosed reasonable grounds for a suggestion. The plaintiff may, if he please, traverse it.

ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred.

Rule absolute.

1849.

WALKER

V.

WALL.

HOWE v. PIKE and Another.

DEBT for work and materials, for goods sold and deli

Nov. 24.

The plaintiff,

an engineer,

was employed repair an en

to

gine in Dorset

the course of the

springs became necessary for

vered, and on an account stated.-The defendants pleaded, first, never indebted, upon which issue was joined; secondly, except as to 127. 8s., payment; and thirdly, payment of shire, and, in that sum into court. These latter pleas were traversed, work, some and issue was joined thereon. At the trial of the cause, before Parke, B., at the Middlesex Sittings in Trinity Term last, it appeared that the plaintiff was a working engineer, residing in London, and that the defendants were clay-merchants carrying on business at Wareham, in the county of Dorset, and the action was brought to recover the sum

of 321. 2s., for work and repairs done to a certain engine of the plaintiff's.

its completion; these springs were purchased in Middlesex,

and were sent from thence

the country.

The plaintiff having brought back the venue

from Dorsetshire into Middlesex

upon the usual

undertaking:-Held, that the purchase of the springs in Middlesex did not satisfy the undertaking to give material evidence in that county.

1849.

HOWE

V.

РІКЕ.

The venue had been brought back from Dorset to Middlesex, on the usual undertaking to give material evidence in the latter county. During the progress of the work, some springs became necessary for the repair of the engine, which were bought in the county of Middlesex by the plaintiff's order, and were sent down into the country. These springs were charged at the price of 8s. in the particulars of demand. This being the evidence offered in support of the plaintiff's undertaking, it was thereupon objected, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff had failed in giving any material evidence in the county of Middlesex, and of that opinion was the learned Judge; but, under his Lordship's direction, the plaintiff obtained a verdict for the amount claimed, leave being reserved to the defendant to move for a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit.

Wilkins, Serjt., having obtained a rule accordingly,

T. Atkinson now shewed cause.- -The evidence was sufficient. Crozier v. Hutchinson (a) was an action by shipbrokers for commission for procuring charters for the defendant's ships, including the amount of the stamp, and the plaintiffs were under an undertaking to give material evidence in the county of Middlesex; and this Court held, that the undertaking was satisfied by proof that the plaintiffs, within twenty-one days from the time of the execution of the charter party, caused it to be stamped at Somerset House. The venue would become important upon the question as to the value of these articles. [Pollock, C. B.-There is this difference between the case cited and the present: the plaintiffs there had a right to make a charge of that specific sum for the stamp. Alderson, B.There the broker was engaged to effect a charter party and to get it properly stamped, and the money so paid was

(a) 18 L. J., Exch. 316.

paid at that particular place to the defendant's use. Parke, B.-It was quite an immaterial fact, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, where the springs were obtained. If this evidence were held to be sufficient, a plaintiff might, as I suggested at the trial, bring his action in almost any county he pleased. If the plaintiff could have established it as a fact, that he was entitled to be paid for these springs as for so much money paid out of pocket, the case would be similar to that cited; but here the plaintiff could not make any demand for them until they had been affixed to the engine which he was engaged to repair.]

Wilkins, Serjt., and Hoggins, in support of the rule, were not heard.

PER CURIAM (a).—The rule must be absolute to enter a nonsuit.

Rule absolute.

(a) Pollock, C. B., Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Rolfe, B.

1849.

HOWE

v.

РІКЕ.

HORTON V. THE EARL OF DEVON and Others.

de

Nov. 24.

who were wharfingers, had cer

tain goods de

posited at their wharf by A. & Co., who transferred them to B. B. by order transferred them

MILWARD had, on the part of the defendants, ob- The defendants, tained a rule calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why an interpleader order should not be granted in this case. It appeared from the affidavits that the fendants were the trustees of the Duke of Bridgwater, and in that capacity were wharfingers and common carriers, and that certain iron had been consigned to the Coalbrook Dale Company, which, in April 1848, was landed time acquaintat one of the defendants' wharfs. This iron was, by an order of the Coalbrook Dale Company, to be delivered to one Ker, who transferred it to a Mr. Bowles, and he again

at the same

ing the defendants with that

fact. The de

fendants there

upon placed the

goods to the plaintiff's ac

count in their books, and informed him of their having done so. A. & Co. and other parties subsequently laid claim to the goods, on the ground that the transfer to the plaintiff was fraudulent:Held, that the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the Interpleader Act.