1849. BRAHAM v. JOYCE. under judgment and in execution of the superior Courts of justice may be confined within the county of Middlesex. Corrie now shewed cause. The first objection which it is presumed will be made by the defendant to this warrant is, that the Palace Court had no power to issue the warrant. By the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 101, s. 13, it is enacted, that, "from and after the passing of this Act no action or suit shall be commenced in any of the said Courts," of which the Palace Court is one; and by the 14th section of the same Act, the powers of those Courts are to cease and determine on the 31st of December, 1849. It cannot be contended, that an execution is "an action or suit." [Parke, B.-That objection is not well founded. The Palace Court is kept alive for the disposal of old matters which had been previously commenced.] The next objection will be, that the warrant does not give any date from which the period of the defendant's imprisonment was to commence; but the case of Ex parte Foulkes (a) shews, that where the warrant does not contain a date, the term is to be counted from the commencement of the party's impri sonment. PARKE, B.-The case of In re Bowdler (b) is precisely in point. It was there held that the warrant was good without a date, and that it was a mere matter of evidence at what time the party was taken into custody, and the period of imprisonment was to be calculated from that time. The defendant must therefore be remanded. POLLOCK, C. B., ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B. concurred. Rule discharged. The defendant appeared in person to support the rule. (a) 15 M. & W. 612. (b) 17 L. J., Q. B., 243. 1849. HUNTER v. WILSON. THIS was an action by the plaintiff, as indorsee of a bill of exchange, against the defendant, as acceptor. The defendant pleaded (in substance), that the bill of exchange was drawn by one M'Lean, at the request and for the accommodation of the defendant, and without any consideration or value whatever, and that the bill was indorsed by the said M'Lean without any consideration or value given by the plaintiff for such indorsement, to the defendant, or to the said M'Lean, or to any other person whomsoever. The plaintiff had signed interlocutory judgment upon this plea, the defendant being under terms of pleading issuably. A rule nisi was subsequently obtained, on the part of the fendant, to set this judgment aside, but without any affi davit of merits. de It Willes now shewed cause.-The plaintiff was clearly entitled to sign judgment, for the plea is not issuable. is quite consistent with the plea that there was a good or value what ever; and that the bill was in dorsed by the given by the the defendant whomsoever: Held, that the plaintiff was enjudgment. titled to sign consideration given for the bill. It may have passed other person through many hands, each party having given consideration. [Rolfe, B.—It may have been indorsed to A. B., who made a present of it to the plaintiff.] Or the defendant may have owed a debt to some third party. The allegation that the bill was drawn for the accommodation of the defendant is absurd. [Rolfe, B.-The plaintiff may be the executor of a person who gave full value for it.]—He was then stopped by the Court, who called upon Barnard, in support of the rule, who contended that the plea was good upon general demurrer. PARKE, B.-The plea is clearly not issuable, and the plaintiff was entitled to sign judgment. There is not even an allegation in the plea, that none of the previous 1849. HUNTER V. WILSON. parties to the bill had given value for the indorsement. POLLOCK, C. B., ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred. Nov. 22. Where a plea is false and sham, and cal culated to em barrass the plaintiff, the Court will set it aside upon an affidavit of its being a false and sham plea. NUTT v. RUSH. IN this case a rule had been obtained on the part of the plaintiff, calling upon the defendant to shew cause why a plea, pleaded by him in this action, should not be set aside, on the ground of its being false and sham. This was an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, to which the defendant pleaded, that the plaintiff was and still is indebted to the defendant in 1577. 10s., upon a judgment recovered in the Court of Queen's Bench, as by the record and proceedings thereof remaining in the said Court more fully appears, and which the defendant is ready to verify by the said record; and in 1601. for goods sold and delivered, against which said sums of money the defendant is ready to set off, &c., the lastmentioned damages. The plaintiff's affidavits stated the above plea to be false; but there was no affidavit on the part of the defendant. Hannen now shewed cause.-The merits of the plea ought not to be tried upon affidavits. The plaintiff might have traversed it. [Parke, B.-There is this difficulty raised by the plea: the subject-matter of the set-off is partly a matter of fact and partly a matter of record, and consequently the plaintiff might find it a difficult matter to frame a proper replication to it.] It would appear by the case of Fairthorne v. Donald (a), that there would not be any difficulty in replying to this plea. In La Forest v. Langan (b), Tindal, C. J. expressed an opinion that it was improper to try a cause upon affidavit, where a distinct issue might be taken upon a plea. [Parke, B.-It is not simply a false plea, but it also casts upon the plaintiff the difficulty I have adverted to. Now the plaintiff in such a case ought not to be subjected to the inconvenience of having to consult his counsel as to the proper method of replying. In Bartley v. Godslake (c), it was held, that where a sham plea is such as to make it necessary for the plaintiff's attorney to consult counsel, and thereby to cause delay and expense, the plaintiff was entitled to sign judgment. That case is precisely in point. Pollock, C. B.—The judgment of Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., in the case of Milley v. Walls (d), is precisely to the same effect.] Manisty, in support of the rule, was not heard. PER CURIAM (e).—The rule must be absolute. (a) 13 M. & W. 424. (b) 4 Dowl. P. C. 642. (c) 2 B. & Ald. 199. Rule absolute. (d) 2 L. J., Exch., 170. (e) Pollock, C. B., Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Rolfe, B. 1849. NUTT V. RUSH. 1849. Nov. 22. Under 6 & 7 8. 26, a solicitor or attorney can not recover for business done by him in that character, unless he have obtained a certifi cate which was in force for the period the work was done. Where a soli In re THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, and the Sureties of CROWL and Another. IN this case a rule had been obtained by the Duke of Brunswick to proceed against the sureties of Crowl under the statute, and that rule was discharged with costs in Easter Term last (a). Upon the case coming before the Queen's Remembrancer for the taxation of the costs, it was objected, that the solicitor who had acted for the defendants upon that occasion was not entitled to costs, on the ground that he had not a certificate during the time that the business had been done. A certificate was therecitor applied for upon produced by the solicitor, permitting him to practise as such during the interval between the 17th of October, 1848, and the 15th of November, 1849, (the time during which the business had been done); but it appeared that he had applied at the Stamp-office, and had paid for, a certificate to practise for the period between the 17th of October, 1847, and the 15th of November, 1848, and that the officer had inserted the wrong dates by mistake. The Remembrancer, however, having taxed the costs, and paid for a certificate for the period be tween October, 1847, and No vember, 1848, and the officer, by mistake, dated it Octo ber, 1848, and November, 1849-Held, that the solici tor was not en tiled to recover for business done in 1849. Henniker obtained a rule to set aside this taxation. Knowles now shewed cause.-The alleged objection to the allowance of these costs is, that the solicitor was uncertificated at the time the business was performed; but he had in reality a certificate. [Parke, B.-He relies upon the certificate, which, when looked at by itself, is for the period when the work was done. But the 26th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, enacts, that " no person who as an attorney or solicitor shall sue, prosecute, defend, or carry on any action or suit, or any proceedings, &c., without having previously obtained a stamped certificate which shall then be in force, shall be capable of maintaining any action or (a) 3 Exch. 829. |