it fact under-sheriff, but was merely acting as bailiff. The evidence of his being under-sheriff was this:-[His Lordship stated the facts as to the signature, above set forth.] Now it appears to us, that certainly that was not evidence of his being under-sheriff, but quite the contrary, though may be evidence that he took upon himself to act as under-sheriff. Where a person does a particular act, saying at the time, "Although I append the word under-sheriff to my name, I am not under-sheriff, but Mr. Trail is, and I am merely acting as agent for him," that is not evidence. that he was under-sheriff. The other evidence was, that the defendant had described himself in an affidavit as under-sheriff, which in one sense he was, for he was the agent of the under-sheriff, and therefore acting for him, and might therefore in one sense be termed the acting undersheriff. It also appeared that he was described in the judge's order as "under-sheriff;" but that was no proof of the fact. Under these circumstances, we think that my Brother Platt was right in directing a nonsuit, and there will be no rule. 1849. WILLIAMS v. THOMAS. Rule refused. REGINA V. JOBLING. Nov. 23. A WRIT of extent, tested the 5th of June, 1849, and di- A Crown debtor, rected to the Sheriff of Northumberland, issued on behalf of the Commissioners of Greenwich Hospital against John Jobling, for the recovery of 16771. 6s. 2d. On the 2nd of June the defendant, who was a trader, had assigned all his property in trust for the benefit of his creditors, and on the 4th a fiat issued upon this act of bankruptcy, and assignees were appointed on the 5th. On the 15th an inquisition was taken, to which the sheriff returned, "that the said John Jobling had not, nor had any person or per before the teste of a writ of extent, assigned his property to trustees for the benefit of cre ditors, and that a fiat in bankruptcy issued against him. An in quisition having been taken, in which the she that the debtor riff returned had no goods, the Court directed a writ of melius inquirendum, in order that the facts of the assignment and bankruptcy might be found by the inquisition. 1849. REGINA v. JOBLING. sons to his use or in trust for him, on the said 5th day of June, in the 12th year of her said Majesty's reign, or at any time since, nor had the said John Jobling, or any person or persons to his use or in trust for him, on the day of taking the said inquisition, any lands or tenements, or any goods or chattels, debts, credits, or penalties, sum or sums of money in his bailiwick, to the knowledge of the said jurors, which could be extended, appraised, taken, or seized into her Majesty's hands, as by the said writ commanded." The Attorney-General had obtained a rule nisi for a writ of melius inquirendum, on the ground that the assignment was void as against the Crown, and ought to have been set out in the inquisition. Watson (Manisty with him) shewed cause, and argued, that as the assignment was made before the teste of the writ of extent, it was valid. The Attorney-General (Peacock with him) appeared to support the rule, but was not called upon. PARKE, B.-The effect of the assignment is to transfer the property of the Crown debtor to persons who have no title as against the Crown. Unless all the facts are found by the inquisition, there is no mode by which the Crown can try the question. The rule must be absolute. Rule absolute. 1849. LEVY U. ALEXANDER. Nov. 6. ASSUMPSIT by the plaintiff, as indorsee, against the In an action by ac defendant, as drawer, of a bill of exchange for 91. 5s., "Mr. Marks has this day left with me 10%., on account of the debt, interest, and costs in this action. "E. L. LEVY, (plaintiff in person). "June 21st, 1848." It was thereupon objected, on the part of the plaintiff, that the instrument was inadmissible in evidence without a receipt stamp. The learned Under-sheriff overruled the objection, and admitted the instrument. The defendant had a verdict. Hawkins now moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground that the document was improperly received. This document required a receipt stamp, as falling within the Stamp Act, 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, Sched. Part 1, which requires a stamp in the case of "any note or memorandum in writing whatsoever, given to any person for or upon the payment of money, whereby any sum, debt, or demand, or any part of any debt or demand therein specified, and amounting to 21. or upwards, shall be expressed or acknowledged to have been paid, settled, balanced, or otherwise discharged or satisfied," &c. PARKE, B.-The question is, whether this document the indorsee of change for defendant ment by the acceptor, and in support debt, interest, this action:" Held, that it was admissible in evidence ceipt stamp. without a re 1849. LEVY v. would of itself be sufficient to prove the receipt of the sum of 10l. The acceptor might have countermanded the ALEXANDER application of the money. The plaintiff does not here say that he has received the money on account of the debt. He may have returned it the next day. ALDERSON, B.-There must be other evidence in addition to this document, that the plaintiff received the money on account of the debt. POLLOCK, C. B., and ROLFE, B., concurred. Rule refused. Nov. 10. A Court of common law will not compel a plaintiff to give particulars of matters which he does not claim to recover in his declara tion. Thus, in an action for the value of goods supplied to a third party on the false repre sentation of the defendant, the Court would not compel the plaintiff to give a particular of goods supplied to, and bills of exchange, &c. given by, such third party, bills not being claimed by the terms of the declaration. LUCK and Others v. HANDLEY. THIS was an action on the case for false representa tion of the credit of one A. C. Handley, whereby the plaintiffs had been induced to trust the latter person with goods. The transactions between the plaintiffs and Handley had been very extensive. The plaintiffs had, under a judge's order, given the defendant particulars of certain of the goods which had been supplied to Handley, who had become bankrupt, but they had refused to give an account of other goods and sums alleged by the defendant to have been paid to them by Handley. Application was thereupon made to a learned Judge at Chambers to grant an order for particulars of these matters, but he refused to interfere, and referred the parties to the Court. Lush now moved for a rule calling on the plaintiffs to such goods and shew cause why they should not deliver to the defendant a particular in writing of the various sums of money received from A. C. Handley on account of his debt to the plaintiffs, together with the days when the same were received, and also a particular of the bills of exchange and promissory notes given by him to the plaintiffs on account of his debt with the plaintiffs, together with an account of the days when the same became due and were paid respectively. The present case differs from that where a specific statement of particulars of demand are sought by the debtor from his creditor. For, as the plaintiffs seek to fix the liability of the defendant by his statements merely, it is most important to him to know what the dealings were between the plaintiffs and Handley. PARKE, B.-We cannot grant the defendant an order for particulars with respect to such matters as are not claimed by the plaintiffs in their declaration. If the defendant seeks more than this, he must proceed in equity, by filing a bill of discovery. If we were to compel the plaintiffs to particularise other matters beyond such as are stated in their declaration, we should exceed our equitable jurisdiction. The only claim in the declaration is for goods supplied; and with the nature and amount you have been already made acquainted. POLLOCK, C. B., ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred. 1849. LUCK v. HANDLEY. Rule refused. BRAHAM V. JOYCE. Nov. 20. A warrant of execution issued out of the Pa lace Court is not" an action In this case a rule had been obtained, calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the defendant, who was in custody under an execution issued out of the Palace Court, should not be discharged out of custody. The warrant of commit- or suit" within the meaning of ment was made on the 21st of December, 1848, and di- the 12 & 13 rected that the defendant "should be committed for the Vict. c. 101, term of thirty-five days to the common gaol where debtors 8. 13, and is valid, although issued after the passing of that Act; and such a warrant is good, although it contains no date of the commencement of the party's imprisonment; but that period is to be reckoned from the time when the party was taken into custody. |