as it pleases. The Territories, as such, can have no rights but such as are conferred by Congress; and it is morally bound to adopt such measures as are best calculated to promote the permanent interests and security of these Territories, as well as to secure the future well-being of the Union. Without an enabling act of Congress, no Territory or portion of Territory belonging to the United States can be created into a State, or form a constitution of government, or become discharged of its Territorial obedience; and if Congress may grant to any of its Territories this privilege, it may also most clearly, as it seems to us, in its discretion, refuse it.

It is not obliged to admit it to become a State, if it be not satisfied that such admission will conduce as well to its own good as to the good of the Union. In this respect Congress stands, in relation to its Territories, like a State in relation to any portion of its own Territory, which requests to be separated and formed into a New State. No person has ever doubted that the question as to such separation was a question of expediency, resting in the sound discretion of the State; and that it may not be claimed as matter of right, unless in virtue of some compact, establishing such right. No person has ever doubted that any State, in acceding to a division of its Territory, and the formation of a New State, has always possessed the right to impose its own terms and conditions as a part of the grant. The ground of this right is the exclusive possession of sovereignty, with which the State is not compellable to part, and if it does part with it, it may annex all such conditions and rules as it deems fit for its own security and for the permanent good of the citizens of the divided Territory. Such was the case of Virginia, when she acceded to the separation of the District of Kentucky and allowed it to become an independent State. Such is the case of the recent separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts. In each of these cases a considerable number of fundamental conditions were offered to the Districts as the sole grounds, upon which the separation could be allowed; and not a doubt was ever entertained, that these conditions were within the legitimate exercise and authority of these States. These conditions were accepted by Kentucky, and have been accepted by Maine, and it was never imagined, that they in any respect prevented either from possessing all the proper attributes of State sovereignty. They have never been viewed in any other light than as just restrictions, not upon essential State rights, but upon an unlimited exercise of sovereignty, which may be injurious to rights already vested in the parent State, or its citizens. And if Virginia and Massachusetts may, by virtue of their sovereign rights, impose conditions upon their grants of their own Territorial jurisdiction, for the same reason, it would seem, that the United States may impose any like conditions, according to their own sound discretion. And a construction of this clause of the constitution of the United States, which should inhibit Congress from annexing conditions to the act enabling any Territory to form a State government, because it would impair the sovereignty of the State so formed, would equally affect the like conditions annexed by a State to a like act in favour of a portion of its own Territory. A construction, which would lead to such consequences, cannot be a sound one. It would lead to the most injurious results, and absolve all the New States, which have been admitted into the Union since the year 1791, from conditions, which have been hitherto held to be inviolably binding upon them. It would be also repugnant to the comprehensive language of this clause of the constitution, and to the uniform practice, which has prevailed under it from the earliest period of the formation of New States to the present time. No State has ever admitted a New State to be formed in its own bosom, without annexing conditions, and no act has passed Congress enabling any of its Territories to become States, which has not, in like man

ner, annexed important fundamental conditions to the act. And if conditions may be annexed, it depends solely upon the wisdom of Congress what such conditions shall be. They may embrace everything not incompatible with the possession of those federal rights, which an admission into the Union confers upon the New State. As to such rights, they must, by the nature of the case, be an implied exception. The remarks that have hitherto been made, have proceeded upon the supposition that Congress are not morally bound, either by the Treaty of Cession or by any compact with the inhabitants, to pass an act for the erection of the New State, without imposing conditions.

These observations, so far, have been confined to the Constitutional authority of Congress flowing directly from the clause which has been mentioned. Here then is the case of an express power given in plain terms; and by another clause of the Constitution, Congress have express authority "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution." But other clauses may well be called in aid of this construction, applicable to all cases whatsoever, in which a New State seeks to be admitted into the Union. The Constitution provides that New States may be admitted into the Union." The only parties to the Constitution, contemplated by it originally, were the thirteen confederated States. It was perceived that the Territory, already included within these States, might be beneficially divided and organized under separate governments, and that the Territories already belonging to the United States might, and in good faith ought, to participate in the privileges of the federal Union. It was therefore wisely provided that Congress, in which all the Old States were represented, should have authority to admit New States into the Union, whenever in its judgment such an act would be beneficial to the public interests. But it was at the same time provided that no New State should be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, etc., without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress. It is observable, that the language of the Constitution is, that New States may (not shall) be admitted into the Union. It is therefore a privilege which Congress may withhold or grant, according to its discretion. If it may give its consent; it may also refuse it, and no New State can have a right to compel Congress to do that, which in its judgment is not fit to be done. If Congress have authority to withhold its consent, it has also authority to give that consent either absolutely, or upon condition; for there is nothing in the Constitution which restricts the manner or the terms of that consent. It is observable, too, that where a New State is to be erected within the limits of an Old State, the consent of the State Legislature is as necessary as that of Congress. Now it will not, we suppose, be contended, that the State Legislature may not grant_its consent upon conditions; and if so, Congress must have the same right also, for the consent of the State Legislatures and of Congress is required by the same clause, and the construction which fixes the meaning of "consent the one, must, in order to maintain consistency, fix it as to the other. And here it might be again asked, if the conditions of Virginia, annexed to her consent that Kentucky should become a State, were not binding upon the latter, and upon Congress. It appears to the memorialists perfectly clear, that since Congress has a discretionary authority as to the admission of New States into the Union, it may impose whatever conditions it pleases as terms of that consent; and this clause, alone, which applies as well to New States formed from Old States, as to those formed from the territories of the Union, completely establishes the rights, for which the memorialists contend.

as to

The creation of a New State is, in effect, a compact between Congress and the inhabitants of the proposed State. Congress would not probably claim the

power of compelling the inhabitants of Missouri to form a constitution of their own, and come into the Union as a State. It is as plain, that the inhabitants of that Territory have no right of admission into the Union, as a State, without the consent of Congress. Neither party is bound to form this connection. It can be formed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents Congress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms? and if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not effectually bind both parties? Or if the inhabitants of the Territory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer to remain under a Territorial government, has Congress deprived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, which, in its discretion, it had not authority to do? If the admission of New States be not the discretionary exercise of a constitutional power, but, in all cases, an imperative duty, how is it to be performed? If the Constitution means that Congress shall admit New States, does it mean that Congress shall do this on every application, and under all circumstances? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must be conceded that Congress must, in some respects, exercise its discretion, on the admission of New States, how is it to be shown, that that discretion may not be exercised, in regard to this subject, as well as in regard to others ?

The Constitution declares, "that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year 1808.” It is most manifest that the Constitution does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, that Congress possess the authority to permit the migration or importation of Slaves; for it limits the exercise of this authority for a specific period of time, leaving it to its full operation ever afterwards. And this power seems necessarily included in the authority which belongs to Congress, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States." No person has ever doubted that the prohibition of the foreign Slave Trade was completely within the authority of Congress, since the year 1808. And why? Certainly, only because it is embraced in the regulation of foreign commerce; and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited, since that period, between the States. Commerce in Slaves, since the year 1808, being as much subject to the regulation of Congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to enact that no Slave should ever be sold from one State to another, it is not perceived how its Constitutional right to make such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too plain to be questioned, that Congress did possess the power, before the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation of Slaves into its Territories, (and in point of fact it exercised that power) as well as into any New States; and that its authority after that year, might be as fully exercised to prevent the migration or importation of Slaves into any of the Öld States. And if it may prohibit New States from importing Slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condition of the admission of such States into the Union, that they shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own Territories, Congress possess a more extensive authority and may, in various other ways, effect the same object. It might for example make it an express condition of its grants of the soil, that the owners shall never hold Slaves; and thus prevent the possession of Slaves from ever being connected with the ownership of the soil.

As corroborative of the views, which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of Congress to the history of the national legislation, under the Confederation as well as under the present Constitution, on this interesting subject. Unless the memorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation at every period of its legislation to have been, that the prohibition of Slavery was no infringement of any just

rights belonging to free States, and was not incompatible with the enjoyment of all the rights and immunities, which an admission into the Union was supposed

to confer.

It will be recollected that Congress, by a Resolve of the 10th of October, 1780, declared that the unappropriated lands that might be ceded to the United States, pursuant to a previous recommendation of Congress, should be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which should become members of the federal Union and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other States. This language is exceedingly strong, and guarantees to the New States the same rights of sovereignty as the Old States possessed. It was undoubtedly with this Resolve in view, that the Territory northwest of the Ohio was ultimately ceded to the United States by the several States claiming title to it; viz: by Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and Virginia. New York made a cession on the first of March, 1781, without annexing any conditions; Virginia, on the first of March, 1784, upon certain conditions; and, among others, a condition embracing the substance of the Resolve of the 10th October, 1780. Massachusetts made a cession on the 19th of April, 1785, stating no conditions, but expressly to the uses stated in the Resolve of 1780. And lastly Connecticut made a cession on the 13th of September, 1786, without any condition, but expressly for the common use and benefit of the United States. On the 13th of July, 1787, Congress passed an Ordinance for the government of the Territory so added, which has ever since continued in force, and has formed the basis of the Territorial governments of the United States. This Ordinance was passed by the unanimous voice of all the States present at its passage; viz: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. It contains six fundamental articles as a compact between the United States and the inhabitants, who might occupy that Territory, which are introduced by a preamble, declaring them to be "for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which forms the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions, are created; to fix and establish these principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in said Territory; to provide also for the establishment of States and a government therein, and for their admission into a share in the federal councils, on an equal footing with the original States, at as early a period as might be consistent with the general interest." The 6th article declares, that "there shall neither be Slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall become convicted." It is observable, that no objection occurred to this article, on the ground that it was incompatible with the equal sovereignty, freedom and independence with the original States, to which the New States, to be formed in the ceded Territory, were entitled by the Resolve of the 10th of October, 1780, and by the express reference to that Resolve, in the conditions of some of the cessions. It is observable, also, that by the preamble already recited, to which all the States present acceded, and among these were three of the ceding States, and a majority of the Slave-holding States, it was expressly admitted, that the restrictions of the 6th article would not deprive the New States, upon their admission into the federal councils, of their equal footing with the original States. This is a high, legislative construction, by independent States, acting in their sovereignty capacity, and entitled to the greater weight, because it was a subject of common interest; and to all it could not but be deemed a precedent, which would justly influence the subsequent measures of the general government. Since the adoption of the Constitution, three New States, forming a part of this Territory, viz; Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois have been admit

ted into the Union. In the acts enabling them to form State governments, and a State Constitution, Congress has, among other very important conditions, made it a fundamental condition, that their constitutions shall contain nothing repugnant to the Ordinance of 1787. These conditions were acceded to by these States, and have ever been deemed obligatory upon them and inviolable; and these States, notwithstanding these conditions, are universally considered as admitted into the Union upon the same footing as the original States, and as possessing, in respect to the Union the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other States, in the sense, in which those terms are used in the Resolve of 1780. During a period of thirty years, not a doubt has been suggested, that the provisions of this ordinance were perfectly compatible with the implied and express conditions of the cessions of this Territory; and that Congress might justly impose the conditions, which it contains, upon all the States formed within its limits.

In the year 1791, Vermont was admitted into the Union, without any conditions being annexed respecting Slavery. The reason was obvious. It had already formed a constitution, which excluded Slavery; and it may be also asserted, that, looking to its habits and feelings of its population, and the habits and feelings, and constitutional provisions of neighboring States, it was morally impossible that Slavery could be adopted in that State.

Kentucky was admitted into the Union in June, 1792. The State was formed from the State of Virginia, and the latter in granting its consent, imposed certain conditions, which have since been supposed to form a fundamental compact, which neither is at liberty to violate. Congress did not impose any restrictions as to Slavery on its admission, and for reasons which cannot escape the most careless observer. It would have been manifestly unjust, as well as impolitic.

Tennessee was admitted into the Union in June, 1796. It was ceded by North Carolina, more than six years before, as a Territory, upon certain conditions, and among them, that Congress should assume the government of the Territory, and govern it according to the Ordinance of 1787; with a proviso, however, "that no regulation made or to be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate Slaves." In good faith, therefore, Congress could not justly insist upon a prohibition of Slavery upon its admission into the Union.

Mississippi was admitted into the Union in December, 1817, upon conditions that its constitution should contain nothing repugnant to the Ordinance of 1787, so far as the same had been extended to the Territory by the agree ment of cession made between the United States and Georgia; and Alabama was authorized to become a State by the act of 2nd of March, 1819, upon a similar condition. Both of these States were ceded as one Territory to the United States by Georgia, in April, 1802, upon condition, among other things, that it should be admitted into the Union in the same manner as the Territory northwest of the Ohio might be under the Ordinance of 1787, “ which Ordinance (it is declared) shall extend to the Territory contained in the present act of cession, that article only excepted, which forbids Slavery." The prohibition of Slavery could not, therefore, without the grossest breach of faith, be applied to this Territory. And the very circumstances of this exception in this cession of Georgia, as well as in that of North Carolina, shows strongly the sense of those States that, without such an exception, Congress would possess the authority in question.

The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the state of the question of the right of Congress to prohibit Slavery in that part of the former Territory of Louisiana, which now forms the Missouri Territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the Treaty of the 30th of April, 1803. The third article of that Treaty is as fol