4. TH

law.

CHAPTER IX.

DEFENDING ONE'S STATE IS SELF-DEFENCE.

`HAT citizens, by defending the state, are defending themselves, as required by Nature's first and most imperative

Man, the natural being, is not more a creation of God, than is the civil being called the state; for the latter is formed by men, under the promptings of the nature created by the Deity. Self-preservation is the first law for both man and state; and, indeed, man was prompted to form society by this very instinct, society simply being men organized for self-preservation.

Republican society is necessarily a consensual arrangement of the people who compose it; for as every man has a right to expatriate himself, his staying therein, and being a part thereof, is by consent. The accountability of the members to God for proper conduct in all things, shows the self-ruling of society to involve the only divine right of government that can be vested in human beings. Such accountability were unjust, if such right were withheld or limited. To state it more amply, it is, 1st, the right to be a self-formed society; 2d, the right of the said society absolutely to govern itself; and 3d, the said society's unlimited right of self-defence. As to the last point — the others having been sufficiently treated of-the same God-given instinct of self-preservation which, as heretofore stated, prompted men to form society, must make self-preservation "the first law of nature" to it, just as surely as it is "the first law of nature" to each member thereof.

Hence, as an American state is the only political society of the people ever formed; as such state is "the people;" as it is recognized, throughout the federal pact, as the complete body that coacted with its peers in forming the federal constitution of self-government; as it " contains within itself" - to use the words of Hamilton-"all the powers of government;" as it declares all power [i. e. sovereignty] to be inherent in itself; and as the only powers parted with are delegated, — it follows necessarily that this moral person can at any mo

ment, with or without reason, and, à fortiori, for self-preservation, gather in all her entrusted or delegated powers, recall her citizens from federal offices, and say to them, and the rest of her sons, in case of federal menace or attack: "I am the state, and you collectively are myselfbone of my bone and flesh of my flesh.' Arm yourselves to defend my life, my integrity, and my sovereignty! The collective people, according to the social compact, have the right to govern and command the individual. By obeying and defending myself, my will, and my law, you defend your individual selves, and all you hold dear on earth."

The question here suggests itself for passing notice: Where is the right of ultimate judgment and decision on points vital to the republic the commonwealth the citadel of freedom, and the palladium of the people's rights and blessings? It were simply absurd to say: It is in the government, which is only derivative; and not in the collective people, who have, inalienably, the only original and inherent power of self-government. Did the people, in attempting to govern themselves, make a machine that has the right, if they resist, to grind them to powder? The matter is too plain for argument. [See Part IV. ch. XI.]

It is unquestionable, then, that, by defending the state, citizens are defending themselves, as required by nature's first and most imperative law. Q. E. D.

DEFENDING ONE'S STATE IS NOT TREASON.

5. That, as the citizens in organization are the integers and governing authority of the republic, a citizen cannot commit treason by obeying the will of the body, for this is precisely his obligation in the social compact, and, of course, his highest political duty.

This corollary is so important and vital, that I feel justified in repeating, that the Almighty, in making men free moral agents, designed them for self-government, and capacitated them for it; that it were Divine injustice to require them to answer for "the deeds done in the body," if they have not full choice in all matters of government; that, prompted by the social instinct, they form society to unite their strength, wisdom, and means for self-protection and self-rule; that thus is the society, called the commonwealth, formed; that it governs by Divine right, and acts in all things as a unit or moral person; that it is only in this collective form and way that men are capable of political self-government; that as individuals they are merged in the society, without the reservation of any political rights whatever, and are under voluntary engagement to be governed and bound by the action of the said state, as long as they remain

members thereof. Referring to Part IV., chapters I. and II., on the formation of a state, I will quote here, as sufficient nay, conclusive - what Massachusetts has declared from the beginning till now, viz.: that "the body politic is . . . a voluntary association of individuals ;" and that "the whole people covenant with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good;" that is to say, the collective members are to govern and control each individual one, for all the purposes of society.

Accordingly, she declares that "the people. . . do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other, to form themselves into a free, sovereign, and independent body-politic or state, by the name of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts." [See const. Mass.]

Hence each person is, as New York calls him, a "member of this state," or as Massachusetts expresses it, a "subject of this commonwealth," or as the federal and other constitutions declare, a "citizen of the state." Indeed, each person is an integral part of his own commonwealth, and no original relations can exist between him and any other political society. And as neither the federal constitution nor history hints at any other relation, or at even the slightest change in the bodies-politic, any one of them, as to subjectship and allegiance, must stand in the same relation to her people as does king, prince, or feudal lord to his; and be the only object of treason.

And here comes in with peculiar force the admission of Mr. Curtis, heretofore quoted, [see Part IV. chapter VII.]: "The relations of the individual to the political society, of which he is a member . . . came into existence as soon as a sovereign American state was formed out of a revolted British colony."

Our Federal Compact changed Neither States nor Citizens. — We must steadily and determinedly keep it in mind that the states, in making their constitution, were providing for government, and not constituting society. They themselves were societies, complete ones; and their citizens were the integers, making up the state in each instance, just as bricks and lumber make up the building. At that very time, New York called them "members" of herself; Massachusetts called them "subjects" of herself, as did Vermont; the states generally characterized them as "citizens" of themselves; and the federal compact repeatedly provided for all "THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES as CITIZENS OF different STATES."

It is certain, then, that each and every American citizen had, at the beginning, i. e. before as well as after the constitution was formed, the status of the citizen of a state; and it is equally certain that the doctrine of a national citizenship is an untruth - an absurdity. Surely so important an event as the change of the status of citizens of

states, so as to give them the status of citizens of an all-comprehending state or nation, would have a conspicuous history; but there is no evidence of it — not a word!

Having shown that no change was made in the status of citizens by the original compact, let me show that

No Change is made by the Late Amendments. Amendment XIV., the only one that could have such effect - provides that "all persons born or naturalized in the united states, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the united states, and of the states wherein they reside."

This

construed, as it must be, with the rest of the constitution, so as to make all parts effective, there being no inconsistency-leaves citizenship as a status precisely where it was the first idea in importance being that the people are "citizens of different states " just as they are all repeatedly described and provided for in the constitution; and the second idea is couched in the convenient generalization

"citizens of the united states," which can only mean "citizens of different states" who, in the compact of their sovereigns, are provided for as follows (italics mine): "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." [Art. IV. § 2.]

This is all that Amendment XIV. can, as to this subject, possibly mean except that within its description come the negroes, who are citizenized thereby, and made the equals of the former "citizens of different states" and "citizens of the united states." There is in the amendment no sign of any intent, 1st, to change previous citizens in their status; or 2d, to make unequal citizens, i. e., to place the new ones, in any respect, on any different footing from the old ones. I submit, then, these conclusions:

1. That there was in the original constitution no change of the status of "citizens of different states" who are "citizens of the united states."

2. That this status was not changed by Amendment XIV., but that the negroes had such status conferred on them by it.

3. That, with this exception, the late amendments merely extend federal civil jurisdiction.

4. That federal coercion is, as originally intended, on persons only, and is that of law, through the magistracy.

5. That the people are the state, and the state is the people; these entities, as named and provided for in "the supreme law," being in no wise changed.

The error of the expounders on this subject springs from forgetting that the commonwealth or republic is a society of people, purposed

and organized for self-government; and that hence self-government must be functional action, in no wise self-destructive, or, even self-injurious. The state is complete, and is perfectly formed and fitted to do all the acts of government, e. g., constitute governments, delegate powers, elect or appoint representatives, federate with other societies, &c., &c. These are all functional acts, to do which she has the machinery of intellect—including the judgment and will, which she has always acted with, whenever any question arose pertaining to her "defence" and "welfare." In her constitution of 1780, existent to-day, Massachusetts declares her "right to institute, reform, alter or totally change" the government "at pleasure." She has done so many times, notably when she united with her sisters and made a general government. This act wrought no change in her; and the

word "Massachusetts must mean to-day what it did in 1788, when that sovereign placed it, with her delegations, stipulations, and conditions, in the federal compact. She was not then melted into her elements, and poured into a national mould. She is now unchanged Massachusetts, and can do every functional act she ever could. She is composed exclusively of her members or subjects, and in governing herself she controls them.

Hence I repeat that, as the citizens in organization are the integers and governing authority of the republic, a citizen cannot commit treason by obeying the will of the body, for this is precisely his obligation in the social compact, and, of course, his highest political duty. Q. E. D.