standing: "If we (the people of Virginia) find it to our interest to be intimately connected with the other twelve states to establish one common government, and bind in one ligament the strength of thirteen states, we shall find it necessary to delegate powers proportionate to that end." [III. Ell. Deb. 298.]

In fine, as Pennsylvania and her sister republics created the federal government, and delegated its entire authority, our general system can but be a confederacy of absolute sovereigns, no authority on earth being above them collectively, or as they are equals — individually.

In the next two chapters I will treat of the social compact, as exhibited in the case of Pennsylvania, and show the absurdity of the modern idea, sophistically taught by Story, Webster, Curtis, and others, that the federal constitution had the effect of forming a nation, and of consolidating and degrading the states to provinces or counties, or rather dissolving them, and forming their elements into a new nation; for this is the practical result of the modern Massachusetts theory, which every word of the federal pact condemns, while no line of history or writing of the fathers supports it.

CHAPTER II.

THE REPUBLICAN SOCIAL COMPACT.

HE object of all society is the protection and welfare of the indidividual members. In a monarchy or hereditary aristocracy, society is preserved, and the members protected, without regard to their will — the man or class that rules keeping authority by force; while in a republican society the members are voluntarily associated, and the society governs itself. The so-called government, being composed solely of representatives, is necessarily an agency, and the sovereignty, or right of self-government of the community, is in no wise impaired by the imparting or delegating of power to the said so-called government.

A republic is founded on the principle of man's free moral agency. As God made him, and endowed him with the social instinct, both he and the society he forms are God's productions. As man is finally to account for his action here, he necessarily has the power of selfcontrol, the faculty of choosing between good and evil, the option to obey or disobey. His final accountability were unjust if he has no free will or volition as to government. It seems then, that, individually and collectively, man is capable of, and entitled to, selfgovernment, and that the only divine right of government on earth is self-government. May we not assume, then, that the republic is God's form of polity?

The difference, in political condition, between a man in a monarchy and one in a republic, is that in the former he is held by force to an indissoluble allegiance, while in the latter he is free to remain a member, or to expatriate himself.

The Social Compact of Pennsylvania. In the case of Pennsylvania, the citizens participated in, or consented to, the proceedings or declarations set forth in the preceding chapter on "the genesis of a state;" and as he was then, and ever afterwards, free to remain a part of the commonwealth, or to expatriate himself, he, by remaining, necessarily subjected himself to the social compact, and to the obligations thereof.

Was he thus free? Let Pennsylvania herself answer: "Emigration from this state shall not be prohibited." [See her const.] What says Vermont ? "That all people have a natural and inherent right to emigrate from one state to another that will receive them." [See her const.; also const. of La., and others.] However, such a declaration is supererogatory, for the principle is vital to a republic, as will be seen.

of the fathers on this subject, which no one, in those days, dared to controvert. These are for the double purpose of setting forth these first institutes of freedom, and for confronting the perverters with authorities they cannot deny, or sophisticate away.

Said Tench Coxe, of Pennsylvania, in one of his masterly papers in favor of the plan of the convention of 1787: "The principle on which free sovereignties ought to confederate is quite a new question. . . . Most of the states being in possession of free governments, some have looked for the same forms in a confederating instrument, which they have justly esteemed in their several social compacts." He distinguishes clearly between the formation of a society of people, i. e. a commonwealth, and a society of states, i. e. a confederacy. [See Am. Mus. for 1788.]

John Dickinson, who had been president of Pennsylvania and of Delaware, and was one of the ablest statesmen and political writers of that period, made, in his powerful arguments in favor of the new federal system, the same distinction that Coxe did between the constituted league of states, then being formed, and the social compact by which individuals formed the state. [II. Pol. Writings.]

Said Noah Webster, in his American Magazine for December, 1787, "The whole body of people in society is the sovereign power, or state, which is called the body-politic. Every man forms a part of this state, and so has a share in this sovereignty: at the same time, as an individual, he is a subject of the state."

Decisive Testimony of Massachusetts.- Passing by the numerous evidences and recognitions of this theory in the constitutions and bills of rights of the other original states, let us quote Massachusetts herself, and let her refute the arguments and assertions of her sons. In the preamble to her constitution she says: "The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good;" and that government is instituted and administered "to secure the existence of the body-politic," and protect "the individuals who compose it," in "their natural rights,

and the blessings of life." Therefore, in the said organic law she declares as follows: "The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the Province of Massachusetts Bay, do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a free, sovereign and independent body-politic, or state, by the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." She further declares that she has "the sole and exclusive right of governing" herself as a sovereign; that she will forever exercise this right; that she can "institute," "reform," or "totally change" all government at will; that all citizens are her subjects; and that all functionaries of government are her "substitutes and agents."

Here is the deliberate and solemn statement of the members, that they have formed themselves into a body-politic a commonwealth a sovereign state. We cannot gainsay or go behind this declaration. They make repeated statements of their sovereignty. [See constitution of Massachusetts.] And all the states at the same time solemnly agreed, by treaty, that each "retains her sovereignty."

By "sovereignty," I do not mean government, but the right of absolute control in all things, including the right to establish governments, i. e. governmental agencies. It must be kept in mind that the word sovereignty has but one meaning-that of supreme and uncontrollable authority. [See Webster's dictionary, and all others.] Hence it cannot be predicated of the so-called government, or powers of government, in a republic, for these must always be subject to the organized people the commonwealth. As sovereignty in a republic necessarily includes the right to establish, amend, and abolish governments, it is simply absurd to say a government in a republic is sovereign.

It is certain, then, from the testimony of this and other states, that a sovereign commonwealth was formed and consummated by social compact; and that it existed and acted as such, in making the union or federal system.

The Rationale of Our Social Compact. It is obvious that if a man can change his membership from one commonwealth to another, he is, by remaining in the first, under the obligation of being a part of it; of being governed by it; and of performing all the various duties which its existence and welfare requires of him; the reciprocal obligations on the society's part being the protection of him in his life, liberty, and means of happiness. This mutual understanding, and the reciprocal obligations thereof, do exist, and are the actual conditions of the society's existence. They constitute all the elements of a compact, which, though only implied, form not the less the political and philosophical entity. By and through such social compact, the republic must exist.

The members are the community; and each of them is obviously merged in it, and entirely subject to its control. His political status is fixed, and his citizenship is an integral part of the community. From the nature of the case, he can reserve no political rights; so that the idea of his co-operating with the citizens of all the states, to form a nation by a second social compact, is too absurd for comment. The matter of organizing society had been completed. Each state had every possible characteristic of a nation, and, whether it federated or remained single, it could act as such, for it was a moral person, with all mental attributes, including will. In forming the union, then, the matter in hand was government, not organization of society. Government could but be delegative, and if society was not already completed, and capacitated for political action, it was incapable of doing the delegation. Preformed states did actually do such delegation, and they were named in the compact as the bodies to constitute, and carry on, the federal system of government. The states, then, being perfect political bodies, the citizens were merged completely therein and could, in no way, act again in forming society.

Aiming to make my argument of the best possible and, in the main, undisputed authorities, I quote the following: Vattel, in Book I., Chap. I., after describing the nation or state, proceeds: [§ 2] "By the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body, in everything that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member essentially belongs to the body politic or state."

In Chapter II., § 16, he says: "In the act of association, by virtue of which a multitude of men form together a state or nation, each individual has entered into engagements with all, to promote the general welfare, and all have entered into engagements with each individual, to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest that these reciprocal engagements can be no otherwise fulfilled than by maintaining the political association. The entire nation, then, is obliged to maintain that association; and as their preservation depends on its continuance, it thence follows that every nation is obliged to perform the duty of self-preservation." "This obligation," he further says, "is natural to each individual of God's creation, and is derived to nations from the agreement by which civil society is formed: . . . it supposes a human act, to wit, the social compact." See to the same effect, I. Blackstone, 47; also Lieber's view [Pol. Eth. Chap. VIII. § 917]. The above statement of Vattel is correct and philosophical, at least as far as the law of being of a republic is concerned. Further,