"The majority of the convention seems opposed to the adoption of the new federal system." But he seems to count on the example of the states which have already acted, for he says in conclusion: "The decision of ten states can hardly be without its operation. . . . After New York shall have acted, then only one little state shall remain." Washington to John Jay, July 18, 1788: "The accession of ten states must operate forcibly with the opposition," etc.

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Washington to Madison (in congress), August 3, 1788: ". . . The several parts should submit to the inconveniences, for the benefits they derive from the conveniences of the compact. .. Toward New York we look for whatever is interesting, till the states begin to act under the new compact, which will be an important epoch in the annals of this country." Note that "the states' are "to act under

the new compact."

Washington to Sir Edward Newenham, July 20, 1788, speaks of our having formed "a confederated government, where due energy will not be incompatible with the inalienable rights of freemen.”

Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, October 26, 1788: "The constant report is that North Carolina will soon accede to the new union." He further says: "Whoever shall be found to enjoy the confidence of the states, so far as to be elected Vice-President, will be acceptable to me, should I be President."

We see from the above extracts that Washington constantly recognized the absolute states of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and others, as the high contracting powers then forming the federal (or, to coin an English synonym, the league-al) constitution. His idea was that the states were associating themselves, to act thenceforward as a union of states (as the constitution repeatedly calls the polity formed), or a "confederacy," which was his own name for the new system.

As the other fathers did, he often used the general phrase "the people," meaning all the people of the country; but it is equally true that he and they meant "the people " as organized. They (the said people) were organized only in states, and they had capacity for political action only as such. They were not organized as a nation, and they could not politically act as such, for they must act according to the law of their political being. Moreover, there is no record of any national action whatever in forming or adopting the constitution.

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CHAPTER XI.

WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL FAITH (CONTINUED).

HE foregoing views of the Father of his Country on the constitution were expressed before he became President. They may be styled his contemporaneous exposition of the polity then being established. His evidence is of the highest character.

The present chapter, which I equally value, but do not offer as testimony, consists of his expressions after becoming President, and is a most precious legacy of wisdom to his countrymen. In the process of administering the federal polity, he closely observed and deeply studied its character and workings; and in all he said and wrote, he treated of the system as a union of republics, the motives of which are amity and mutual interest, and the purposes of which are "the common defence," "the general welfare," and the security of "the blessings of liberty."

Moreover, he not only called the system "the new confederacy," and the states "the members of the union," but he regarded the constitution as establishing the only relations between the states, and the said states as the sole actors in the union, and the exclusive sources of political power. The truth is, Washington and the rest of the fathers thought that, as all the territory and all the people belonged exclusively to the states, any general constitution must be made by them, must belong to them, must provide for their union, and must be worked for their benefit and with their authority. The country was theirs, and the government their servant, just as much as his household belonged to him, and the domestics of it were under his control. He and they evidently assumed that all rights were state rights, all citizens state citizens, all sovereignty state sovereignty, all allegiance state allegiance, and all treason state treason!

These ideas may seem strange to some; but I believe Washington, so far as he thought of them, took them for granted, and never wrote an inconsistent word. But let us proceed with his record, remembering that, after the inauguration of the government, his testimony is from better insight, and against his interest and his possible love of power.

Washington to Jefferson, February 13, 1789, speaks of "the measures taken by the different states for carrying the new government into execution."

Washington to Innes, March 2, 1789, speaks severely of "those who, by sowing the seeds of disaffection, may attempt to separate any portion of the united states from the union."

Washington to Governor Johnston, of North Carolina, June 19, 1789, speaks of the probability of North Carolina "speedily acceding to the new general government," and of the "subject of the most momentous consequence to be dealt with by the North Carolina convention. "I mean," says he, "the political relation which is to subsist hereafter, between the state of North Carolina and the states now in union, under the new general government." Mark these last words.

Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 1789: ". . . The national government is organized; . . . opposition to it is no more, or hides its head; . . . it is hoped it will take strong root, and that the nonacceding states will soon become members of the union."

Washington to Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General, February 11, 1790, speaks of an act which must "be passed to extend the judicial power of the united states, to North Carolina."

Washington to Fenner, governor of Rhode Island, June 14, 1790, congratulates him on the "ratification of the constitution by the convention of Rhode Island," and continues: "Having now attained the desirable object of uniting, under one general government, all those states which were originally confederated," etc., he then says, bond of union is now complete, and we are once more as one family."

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Washington to Count De Segur, July 1, 1790: "The union of states is now complete, under the new government, by the late accession of Rhode Island to the constitution."

Washington, commissioning the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow money, August 28, 1790, authorizes him "to borrow on behalf of the united states, within said states or elsewhere," $14,000,000, “and to make such contracts as shall be necessary and for the interest of the said states."

Dr. David Stuart writes to Washington, March 10, 1792 :
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"A spirit of jealousy, which may become dangerous to the union, toward the Eastern states, seems to be growing fast. It is represented that the northern phalanx is so firmly united as to bear down all opposition, while Virginia is unsupported, even by those whose interests are similar to hers."

Washington replied, March 20, 1792: "I am sorry such jealousies as you speak of should be gaining ground and poisoning the minds

of the Southern people." He then goes on to speak of diversities of interests and feelings between sections and parts of states and even counties. "Yet," said he, "it did not follow that separation was to result from the disagreement. To constitute a dispute, there must be two parties. To understand it well, both parties and all the circumstances must be fully heard; and to accommodate differences, temper and mutual forbearance are requisite. Common danger brought the states into confederacy, and on their union our safety aud importance depend. A spirit of accommodation was the basis of the present constitution. Can it be expected, then, that the Southern or Eastern parts of the empire will succeed in all their measures?" He then speaks of the unity or concert of Eastern states being likely to make them generally successful, and asks the question, "If the Eastern and Northern states are dangerous in union [italics his own], will they be less so in separation? If self-interest is their governing principle, will it forsake them, or be governed by such an event? . . . Then, independently of other considerations, what could Virginia, and such other states as might be inclined to join her, gain by a separation?"

Washington to Hamilton, July 29, 1792:

He enumerates the objections taken to the policy of the government and the interpretations of the constitution, one of which is characterized as a disposition evinced by a certain faction to disregard the "limitations imposed by the constitution on the general legislature, -limitations on the faith of which the states acceded to that instrument."

Washington to Hamilton, August 26, 1792: He counsels mutual forbearance, conciliation, accommodation, "and such healing measures as may restore harmony to the discordant members of the union, and the governing powers of it." "Without these, I do not see how the union of the states can much longer be preserved."

Washington to Gouverneur Morris, October 20, 1792:

Speaks of the Indians being under "an influence [British] which is hostile to the rising greatness of these states."

And his letter to the Earl of Buchan, of April 22, 1793, heretofore quoted, shows how completely he was governed by the idea of distinct and sovereign political bodies self-united: "I send you the plan of a new city about the centre of the union of these states."

To any reflecting mind, the last five letters, as well as numerous other expressions, show that Washington not only regarded the union of states as purely voluntary, and motived by a community of political faith and sentiment, by amity, and by the mutual interest of safety, economy, and means of wealth and power, but that he thought the

constitution defective, experimental, and dissoluble. [See his letters to Gen. Knox and Gen. Lafayette, in August and September, 1787; also the above quoted one of September 24, 1787, to Patrick Henry, and others. Nay, more, he recognized motives or causes tending to separation as likely to arise, and he adjured "the people of these states," who, as commonwealths, had formed "the confederacy," as he called it, to be conciliatory and compromising, and to frown down all attempts to cause a separation of the states.

The following letters and extracts, from the Farewell Address, show that he considered good will and mutual interest as the only ties binding the states, and moral suasion as the only force to be relied on to prevent the sundering of those ties. This must be so, for the convention of 1787, including him, unanimously spurned the idea of coercion of states; and subsequently the states, nem. con., amended the constitution to prevent even judicial coercion of states. [See Amendment XI.] The fathers all thought the states only bound by virtue of voluntary engagements; and, to use the language of Webster at the close of his life, that "the constitution is the only bond of the union of these states."

Washington to R. H. Lee, August 22, 1785:

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"There is nothing which binds one country or state to another but interest. Without this cement, the Western inhabitants can have no predilection for us, and a commercial connection is the only tie we can have upon them." He was speaking of the people of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys.

Washington to R. H. Lee, July 19, 1787:

"Till you get low down the Ohio, I conceive that it would be the interest of the inhabitants thereof to bring their produce to our ports; and sure I am there is no other tie by which they will long form link in the chain of federal union."

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Extracts from Washington's Farewell Address, with explanations. It is well to remark at the outset that there is no inconsistency between the address and the extracts heretofore given. To promote "the happiness of the people of these states," is the professed object he has in view; and he regards the motives of amity, fraternal feeling, and mutual interest "as the sacred ties which bind together the various parts." And the presumption is inevitable that, if he had foreseen that fraternal feeling would give place to mutual dislike, and amity to enmity, he would have recommended separation as preferable to bitter contentions, and the unrepublican disposition to settle disputes by arms; and he would have advised resort to the divine idea of secession, as expressed by Abraham to Lot; and surely that could not have been so bad as the great American civil war, - the curse of the