tive states, and vote for a president; and that the first Wednesday in March next be the time, and the present seat of congress the place, for commencing proceedings under the said constitution." [Ibid. 333.] Conformably to this, their resolve, and to their provisions in their constitution [Art. II., § 1; Art. I., §§ 2, 3], the states proceeded to "appoint electors," and to elect their senators and representatives to congress. And, on the 4th of March, 1789, proceedings were commenced; and Washington having been unaminously elected president, "the congress, together with the president," did, as the convention advised, "proceed to execute" "the constitution of [i. e. belonging to] the united [or associated] states.” It is plain, then, that "the people of the united states," as commonwealths they being thus respectively organized by social compact did "ordain and establish," and "proceed to execute," "this constitution for the united states of America." Thus they have chosen to govern themselves in federal matters. And liberty is obviously at an end, if they, as self-organized, are not superior to the agency they, in self-government, create. The Massachusetts school seem to forget that the states were republics, and that, to remain so, they must retain the right of self-government-not in part, but wholly; and that this intact right of self-government is their sovereignty, and is the very thing that makes them states, and not provinces or municipalities. In their character as sovereign states they acted; and only a federation was possible, unless there had been self-extinction, or self-degradation to provinces or counties, of which American history gives no shadow of evidence. The "nation" of the Massachusetts school, as well as the second social compact forming such nation, are mere figments. It seems to be ignored by some of the members of that school, that the time is past, when intelligent men, and especially those who have investigated the history of the constitution, can innocently and creditably reaffirm the dogmas of Story and Webster on matters of constitutional or federal history and exposition, especially in regard to the nature and character of our general polity. CHAPTER XI. NORTH CAROLINA FEDERALIZES HERSELF. THE TWELFTH TO RATIFY - REJECTION, AUG. 1, 1788, BY 188 TO 88- HIS state, which rejected the constitution at first, but accepted of satisfactory amendments, most com pletely demonstrated the sovereign self-will of the American commonwealths, and the absurdity of the idea that any national controlling power existed. All these states (the people of which must have constituted the sovereign nation, if there was one) joined in declaring that the commonwealth called North Carolina "retained its sovereignty," and this solemn treaty-recognition of the great fact was in full force, and she acted up to it, in the time and deed of determining her will, as to ratifying or rejecting the new federal plan. No one in all the land pretended to question her right to reject, and remain forever as independent as Russia or France! The assertion, then, that a sovereign. nation existed, controlling the states into association, is obviously a sheer fabrication. Her Idea of the Union. - But as North Carolina only awaited amendments, and did, when she felt sure of them, ratify the constitution, we may profitably quote the explanations of her chief statesmen, to get her idea of the new system. JAMES IREDELL, a distinguished jurist and statesman, afterwards on the supreme bench of the union, said in opposition to the dogma that "a government is a compact between the rulers and the people: " "This is held to be the principle of some monarchial governments in Europe. Our government is founded on much nobler principles. The people are known with certainty to have originated it themselves. Those in power are their servants and agents; and the people, without their consent, may new model their government whenever they think proper, not merely because it is oppressively exercised, but because they think another form will be more conducive to their welfare. It is upon the footing of this very principle that we are now met to consider of the constitution before us." [IV. Ell. Deb. 9.] In refer ence to the federal senate, he said it was necessary to vest "this [the treaty-making] power in some body composed of representatives of states, where their voices should be equal; for, in this case, the sovereignty of the states is particularly concerned, and the great caution of giving the states an equality of suffrage in making treaties, was for the express purpose of taking care of that sovereignty, and attending to their interests, as political bodies, in foreign negotiations." [Ibid. 125.] He said, further, "the senate is placed there for a very valuable purpose as a guard against any attempt of consolidation," and "to preserve completely the sovereignty of the states." [Ibid. 133.] WILLIAM R. DAVIE, one of the ablest statesmen produced by North Carolina, a member of both federal and state conventions, and afterwards in several distinguished positions, said, in the state convention, "If there were any seeds in this constitution which might one day produce consolidation, it would, sir, with me, be an insuperable objection, I am so perfectly convinced that so extensive a country as this, can never be managed by one consolidated government. The federal committee were as well convinced as the members of this house, that the state governments were absolutely necessary to the existence of the federal government. They considered them as the great massy pillars on which this political fabric was to be extended and supported; and were fully persuaded that when they were removed, or should moulder down by time,. the general government must tumble into ruin." [Ibid. 58.] Further along in the debate, in reference to the proper lodgment of the treaty-making power, he said: "As the senate represents the sovereignty of the states, whatever might affect the states in their political capacity, ought to be left to them. This is the certain means of preventing a consolidation." [Ibid. 123.] In this connection he mentions the most important and instructive fact, "that the extreme jealousy of the little states, and between the commercial states and the non-importing states, produced [in the federal convention] the necessity of giving an equality of suffrage to the senate. The same causes made it indispensable to give to the senators, as representatives of states, the power of making, or, rather, ratifying, treaties; . . . the small states would not consent to confederate without an equal voice in the formation of treaties. . . . Every man was convinced of the inflexibility of the little states on this point. It, therefore, became necessary to give them an absolute equality in making treaties." [Ibid. 120.] This is like the statement that Charles Pinckney made in the convention of South Carolina. He said the smaller states, in the federal convention, declared that "they formerly confederated" as equal "political associations," and that "no inducement whatsoever should tempt them to unite upon other terms." [Ibid. 256.] Mr. Davie further said that North Carolina's insisting upon amendments before ratification, was an "attempt to dictate to one of the most powerful confederacies in the world” while “we” are "no part of that confederacy." "Four of the most respectable states," continued he, "have adopted that constitution, and recommended amendments. New York [if she refuses to adopt], Rhode Island and North Carolina will be the only states out of the union. But if these three were added, they would compose a majority in favor of amendments. . . . Two-thirds of the legislatures of the states in the confederacy, may require congress to call a convention to propose amendments. . . . Without adoption, we are not a member of the confederacy, and, possessing no federal rights, can neither make any proposition, nor require congress to call a convention." [Ibid. 236.] ARCHIBALD MACLAINE, one of the ablest advocates of the federal system, said, in the same convention, in reference to the general and local governments being alike subordinate to the same people, that "the members of the general government, and those of the state legislature, are both chosen by the people - both from among the people, and are in the same situation." [Ibid. 68.] In reference to the phrase, "we, the people," he said: "The constitution is only a mere proposal. . . . We might adopt it, if we thought it a proper system, and then it would become our act. . . . It is no more than a blank, till it be adopted by the people. When that is done here, is it not the people of the state of North Carolina that do it, joined with the people of the other states, who have adopted it? The expression, then, is right." [Ibid. 25.] ... SAMUEL JOHNSTON, who was at the same time governor of the state, and the president of the convention, said, on the same occasion: "We are not to form a constitution, but to say whether we shall adopt a constitution to which ten states have already acceded. If we think it bad, we can reject it. If proper for our adoption, we may adopt it." [Ibid. 15.] Speaking of the several sacred rights of the people and states, which some feared the new plan endangered, he said: "If I thought any thing in this constitution tended to abridge these rights, I would not agree to it." As to amendments to secure the integrity of the states, and the subordination of the government to them, he said: "It will be adopted by a very great majority of the states. For states who have been as jealous of their liberties as any in the world, have adopted it; and they were some of the most powerful states. We shall have the assent of all the states in getting amendments. [Ibid. 57.] RICHARD D. SPAIGHT, a member of both the federal and state conventions, said in the latter: "The gentleman says we exceeded our powers. I deny the charge. We were sent with a full power to amend the existing system. This involved every power to make every alteration necessary to meliorate and render it perfect. . . . What the convention has done is a mere proposal. It was found impossible to improve the old system without changing its very form; for by that system the three great branches of government are blended together. . . . The proposing a new system, to be established by the assent and ratification of nine states, arose from the necessity of the case." new system he shows to be a federal government, with the legislative, executive, and judicial functions divided and independent. But was there, as Webster has since asserted, a change from a confederation to "another system?" Let Mr. Spaight answer: "If we do not adopt first, we are no more a part of the union than any foreign power. This If we adopt first, our representatives will have a proportionable weight in bringing about amendments. . . . It is adopted by ten states already. The question, then, is not whether the constitution be good, but whether we will, or will not, confederate with the other states." [Ibid. 206-8.] ... The Sovereign rejects the League. But I have quoted enough. The friends and foes of the new plan were, in this convention, as they were in every other, opposed to consolidation, and in favor of preserving the integrity of the state, and her sovereign will over her interests and destiny. That this statehood was endangered by the unamended constitution, was the opinion of North Carolina, for she refused to adopt, by a majority of 188 to 88, but simultaneously made the following record: "In convention, August 1, 1788: Resolved, that a declaration of rights, . . . together with amendments, ought to be laid before congress, and the convention of states, that shall or may be called, previous to the ratification of the constitution aforesaid, on the part of the state of North Carolina." [Ibid. 242.] And she proceeded then and there to make such declaration [Ibid. 243], and to join Massachusetts in demanding further safeguards for state integrity. Her version of the then prospective Tenth Amendment is as follows: "That each state in the union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this constitution delegated to the congress of the united states or to the departments of the federal government." [Ibid. 244.] The Sovereign ratifies the League. Having, like a sovereign, rejected, she subsequently, in her own time and manner, and on her own terms, like a sovereign, ratified the constitutionno power or influence exhibiting itself, in any quarter, to operate upon her win. On the 13th of September, 1788, as we have seen, the congress of the states resolved to put the new government in operation, which was |