mitted by our Lord, in his commission to the ministers, and presbyters, and office-bearers of the ministry of the gospel. There can be no doubt that, according to the Word of God, as interpreted and adopted by the Church of Scotland, that authority is bestowed, and the members of the Church subjected to the discipline flowing from that authority.

We are not now discussing the right principles of church government, according to the Scriptures, neither are we to consider the extent of the authority over the members of a dissenting establishment flowing from the principles sanctioned among themselves, and submitted to by the act of joining the same. I avoid the question as to whether similar protection extends to their church courts, solely because that is not the case before us-but not from any doubt now entertained by me that they may claim the same. I take simply the fact that the Church of Scotland, as established by law, has adopted; and that statute has declared and proclaimed, that according to the Word of God, as interpreted by the Church of Scotland, its Church Courts are invested with the right and duty of discipline over its members; and that such right flows from the divine institution of the Christian ministry, and of the Presbyteries which the Church of Scotland holds to be, although not of Divine prescription, as the only form of church government, but as founded on and as agreeable to the Word of God.

No one need be, unless he chooses, a member of the Church of Scotland, or of any particular sect, in the constitution of which there are things to which he objects. If he joins the same-and, if I understand the statements here, the pursuer did so deliberately, after being employed in the teaching of youth, and therefore of mature years-then he must take its constitution as he finds it. He must be subjected to the authority and discipline of the Church, and he must be content to acknowledge the authority under which that discipline is exercised to be of divine institution, and bestowed by the great Head of the Church on the office-bearers of the church over him-if such shall be the view taken of his subjection to church discipline by the laws of the Church of Scotland.

No doubt all this is a very grave and weighty question-one of the most serious with which legislation or the arrangements of voluntary churches have to deal with. No doubt such views of the origin and character of the authority of the church over its members, whether an established or dissenting church, entrust much to the weakness and frailties of human nature. But if the church which the individual has joined, being the Church of Scotland, has proclaimed and announced its views of Scripture on this subject, and placed its members under the discipline of the church by reason and in respect of the authority bestowed

on the church acting through its office-bearers by Divine ordination and appointment; then, according to that very theocracy, so established, the member of the church must acknowledge and submit to the authority under which the discipline is exercised over him. In an establishment, he may have this advantage, that the grounds on which discipline can be exercised over him may be defined by, or must be consistent with law; and, whether some think this interferes with the spiritual liberty of the church, at least in this question it removes one great source of objection to the plea contended for by the defenders, and affords the members of the Established Church a protection which it may be-I only say it may be the constitutions of voluntary churches may not have given as clearly as they have established the subjection of their members to Ecclesiastical discipline.

Now I am not about to state theoretical views as the result of a theological inquiry as to the nature of the authority of a Christian church and its office-bearers over its members. The inquiry here is simply, What is the source, foundation, and character asserted by the law of the Church of Scotland for the authority of the Courts of that church over its members, and the extent of their duties and dominion, the exercise of such discipline, and of the character and kind of submission to that discipline, which the view taken by the church laws of its origin and high authority necessarily fixes down on those who have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the church?

We have to deal only with a party who has deliberately, by choice we must presume, and still more by the acceptance of an office, but still voluntarily, subjected himself to the discipline of the Church of Scotland, whatever that may be.

Clear it is to my mind that he can have no claim for reparation of alleged wrong, said to be committed in the exercise of that discipline, if that claim is utterly irreconcilable with the character of the authority over him which he has acknowledged, and with his subjection to that authority.

It will be of no avail to him to state as a general plea, "I aver I have been greatly injured: Your defence will arm the Church Court with powers which may exterminate and crush individuals-ruin characterand destroy peace of mind: It is tyranny over the mind, and over the character, not safe to enforce; and there is no form of it more hideous, more oppressive, more appalling, than that exercised under the power of Church discipline."

It may be so. Viewing such discipline as a likely source of abuse in the hands of man there may be some truth in the dogma. But in this case it is only a dogma, if the Church of Scotland, as by law established,

has settled the character of the authority which it exercises on discipline, and the nature of the subordination of its members to their office-bearers who exercise such authority. Now, then, what is the character in respect of which the office-bearers of the Church of Scotland exercise jurisdiction in proper matters of discipline falling within their competency, to the extent to which law has admitted their functions and jurisdiction, and what is the nature of the subjection which the members of the Church have acknowledged they owe to that authority? The subjection is of a nature peculiar-exclusive-distinct from all others, and that in respect of the source from which the authority is derived.

In the consideration of this matter I go no further than the Act 1690, establishing the Church in Scotland, and containing, as a statutory enactment, the Confession of Faith. That this statute may have been intended to apply to all the subjects may be true, from the hope that thereafter dissent could not exist. But at least its enactments are binding on all the members of the Church, and part of the statute is even broader.

Its object is declared to be "the government of Christ's Church within this nation, agreeable to the Word of God, and most conducive to the advancement of true piety and godliness." Then the statute "ratifies and establishes the Confession of Faith subjoined, as the public and avowed Confession of this Church." Further, it "ratifies, establishes, and confirms the Presbyterian Church government and discipline,"—that is to say, it revives the Act 1592, and describes the judicatories of the Church, Kirk-Sessions, and so forth. By that statute, 1592, the special jurisdiction of particular Sessions as to maintaining of discipline and diligent inquiry, "of naughty and ungodly persons," is very particularly set forth.

Then the Confession of Faith, the law of the Church by statute, treats separately, and with great discrimination, doctrinal or spiritual matters, and ecclesiastical matters. As to doctrinal matters, it distinctly subjects all false doctrines to the censures of the Church. And, in considering the question now before us, we must remember, that if an action will lie in a case of discipline such as the present, it must equally lie in a case where the Church Courts, acting within their competency as to the proper doctrines of the Established Church-adding nothing thereto as requirements from its members—have judged of heresy, and suspended or deprived a minister in respect of false doctrines; a notion utterly repugnant, surely, to any conception which can be taken of the authority of the Church Courts in the Church of Scotland, as developed in the Westminster Confession of Faith. They may be limited in their powers as to what shall be the doctrines of the Church; but I am treating at present of an inquiry into their motives, when the matters are within

their competency, and when they are dealing with the recognised doctrines of the Church. The Confession then, in chapter 30, comes to the title of Church Censures the title is short, and I shall read it all. [Reads.]

Now, the first section announces a great truth of the Church-liable to misapprehension, doubtless, but a doctrine which is the foundation of the whole authority and government of the Church over its members— that is, that in the matter of discipline, whether as to doctrine or evil practices, or non-observance of Church ordinances, the Church is exercising a government through its Church officers, appointed by the Lord Jesus, distinct from the civil magistrate.

Whatever questions have been raised as to the wider effect of this declaration, to which I need not now advert, this is undeniable, that in regard to discipline, the authority of the Church, as a distinct and separate government, is so derived from that source. To that declaration, as the foundation of the exercise of Church censure over the members of the Church, I think courts of law must give full effect, as much as to any other statutory enactment. It is not our place to consider the truth of this declaration; if it were, I should be prepared to defend it. Neither are we to consider whether it will arm men with alarming power, capable of producing great mischief. The statute has given the remedy in the courts which it trusted-in the appeals competent to the superior Church Courts. But the matter of discipline it has vested in the Church officers.

I need not pursue this point farther, for, in the view I take of the case, the Church, in exercising discipline on its members, is thus exercising that separate government for the Church, the authority and source of which is declared to be divine appointment.

From this, I think it necessarily follows that in matters clearly within the cognisance of Church officers or Courts, as subject of Church censures (I keep to the exact case before us, and the law within the statute), when the Church judicatory is thus exercising the government so entrusted to it, its judicatories and officers are not amenable to the civil courts of the country in damages for alleged wrong. They have been trusted as a separate government. The declaration of the authority under which they act assumes that it must be separately administered-free from control -free from subjection or subordination to civil tribunals.

The inquiry into their motives-which is the very essence of the pursuer's case-by other civil courts-it may be by men not even of the Church-is absolutely repugnant to the freedom which must belong to a Church in matters of discipline.

To any party alleging wrong by such courts, the answer, then, is plain -if these courts were acting wholly within the matter committed to them, they are distinct and supreme-and the authority under which

they sit, excludes any inquiry into their motives by civil courts. But hardship, in truth, there is not, whatever the party may feel, for he has chosen to subject himself, in all matters which can come within the discipline of the Church, to the Church of Scotland as established by law; and the authority of that Church in cases falling within discipline, has been announced and fixed.

The view that may be taken of this matter by independent religious bodies, unless their constitution is very express, may go much further; and it may be that their Church Courts may have, as against their own ministers, the sole right to decide what is competent matter for Church discipline and ecclesiastical government. And such bodies may consider it an objection to the purity and independence of the Established Church that it does not possess such power uncontrolled. But to the members of the Establishment there is, on the other hand, the benefit of the protection which the establishment of a Church by statute implies-viz., that the Church Courts must act within the limits assigned to them. Now the opinion I give applies solely to a case in which, as here, it is distinctly admitted, or plainly appears, that the Church censures were enforced in respect of matters clearly falling within the discipline competent to the Church, and of which the Church Court had entire cognisance.

This view will not surround these Courts with protection if they exceed their jurisdiction-e.g., to take a case I stated many years ago :— If a Kirk-Session, on grounds of discipline within their cognisance, refuse a member of the Church admission to the Lord's Table-not rejecting his application without inquiry, but judging of his case, and on such grounds refusing to admit him-they are not subject to be compelled to receive him by the Civil Courts, nor can he call on the Civil Courts to inquire into their motives. But if they refuse to receive him, because he will not subscribe a covenant to extirpate Episcopacy in England, or to expel the Bishops from the House of Lords, or to assert the entire independence of the Established Church from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts as to the extent of its forms, or on any ground palpably not within the subject of the separate government of the Church by its officers which the statute acknowledges, then they have not the same complete protection; so, also, if Church Courts refuse to perform a duty imposed on them by statutes, as a part of the ecclesiastical constitution of the Church.

I am not afraid, then, of any hazardous results from the protection which I think the Church Courts possess, from any inquiry into their motives when exercising, in the matters falling within Church discipline, that separate government recognised in the Church as of divine appointment; for the limit of their protection is, I think, clearly defined, and is