TO THE READER. THAT an absolute passive obedience ought not to be paid to any civil power: but that submission to government should be measured and limited by the public good of the society; and that therefore subjects may lawfully resist the supreme authority, in those cases where the public good shall plainly seem to require it: nay, that it is their duty to do so, inasmuch as they are all under an indispensable obligation to promote the common interest; these and the like notions, which I cannot help thinking pernicious to mankind and repugnant to right reason, having of late years been industriously cultivated, and set in the most advantageous lights by men of parts and learning, it seemed necessary to arm the youth of our university against them, and. take care they go into the world well principled; I do not mean obstinately prejudiced in favour of a party, but from an early acquaintance with their duty, and the clear rational grounds of it, determined to such practices as may speak them good Christians and loyal subjects. In this view, I made three discourses not many months since in the College-chapel,* which some who heard them thought it might be of use to make more public: and indeed, the false accounts that are gone abroad concerning them, have made it necessary. Accordingly I now send them into the world under the form of one entire discourse. To conclude; as in writing these thoughts it was my endeavour to preserve that cool and impartial temper which becomes every sincere inquirer after truth, so I heartily wish they may be read with the same disposition. * Trinity College, Dublin. PASSIVE OBEDIENCE, ETC. LIBRARY IVERSITY OF CT APE ROMANS XIII. 2. "Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." I. It is not my design to inquire into the particular nature of the government and constitution of these kingdoms; much less to pretend to determine concerning the merits of the different parties now reigning in the state. Those topics I profess to lie out of my sphere, and they will probably be thought by most men, improper to be treated of in an audience almost wholly made up of young persons, set apart from the business and noise of the world, for their more convenient instruction in learning and piety. But surely it is in no respect unsuitable to the circumstances of this place to inculcate and explain every branch of the law of nature; or those virtues and duties which are equally binding in every kingdom or society of men under heaven; and of this kind I take to be that Christian duty of not resisting the supreme power implied in my text. "Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." In treating on which words I shall observe the following method. II. First I shall endeavour to prove, that there is an absolute, unlimited non-resistance or passive obedience due to the supreme civil power, wherever placed in any nation. Secondly, I shall inquire into the grounds and reasons of the contrary opinion. Thirdly, I shall consider the objections drawn from the pretended consequences of non-resistance to the supreme power. In handling these points I intend not to build on the authority of holy scripture, but altogether on the principles of reason common to all mankind; and that, because there are some very rational and learned men, who being verily persuaded, an absolute passive subjection to any earthly power is repugnant to right reason, can never bring themselves to admit such an interpretation of holy scripture (however natural and obvious from the words) as shall make that a part of Christian religion, which seems to them in itself manifestly absurd, and destructive of the original inherent rights of human nature. III. I do not mean to treat of that submission which men are either in duty or prudence obliged to pay inferior or executive powers; neither shall I consider where or in what persons the supreme or legislative power is lodged in this or that government. Only thus much I shall take for granted, that there is in every civil community, somewhere or other, placed a supreme power of making laws, and enforcing the observation of them. The fulfilling of those laws, either by a punctual performance of what is enjoined in them, or, if that be inconsistent with reason or conscience, by a patient submission to whatever penalties the supreme power hath annexed to the neglect or transgression of them, is termed loyalty; as on the other hand, the making use of force and open violence, either to withstand the execution of the laws, or ward off the penalties appointed by the supreme power, is properly named rebellion. Now to make it evident, that every degree of rebellion is criminal in the subject; I shall in the first place endeavour to prove that loyalty is a natural or moral duty; and disloyalty or rebellion in the most strict and proper sense, a vice or breach of the law of nature. And secondly, I propose to show that the prohibitions of vice, or negative precepts of the law of nature, as, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, Thou shalt not resist the supreme power, and the like, ought to be taken in a most absolute, necessary, and immutable sense: insomuch that the attainment of the greatest good, or deliverance from the greatest evil, that can befall any man or number of men in this life, may not justify the least violation of them. First then I am to show that loyalty is a moral duty, and disloyalty or rebellion in the most strict and proper sense a vice, or breach of the law of nature. IV. Though it be a point agreed amongst all wise men, that there are certain moral rules or laws of nature, which carry with them an eternal and indispensable obligation; yet concerning the proper methods for discovering those laws, and distinguishing them from others dependent on the humour and discretion of men, there are various opinions; some direct us to look for them in the divine ideas, others in the natural inscriptions on the mind; some derive them from the authority of learned men, and the universal agreement and consent of nations. Lastly, others hold that they are only to be discovered by the deductions of reason. The three first methods must be acknowledged to labour under great difficulties, and the last has not, that I know, been any where distinctly explained, or treated of so fully as the importance of the subject doth deserve. I hope therefore it will be pardoned, if in a discourse of passive obedience, in order to lay the foundation of that duty the deeper, we make some inquiry into the origin, nature, and obligation of moral duties in general, and the criterions whereby they are to be known. |