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Public Papers of George

Clinton.

MANUSCRIPT VOL. XV.

MANUSCRIPT VOL. XV.

[No. 4488.]

Robert R. Livingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Govern ors of the States, as to the persistence of the British Government in affirming that the people are very much divided and that our interests suffer seriously from the seeming support given to this statement in Europe by our not putting forth our strength and expelling the enemy from the country-with an act of Congress on the same subject.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia 2d May 1782. Sir, The enclosed Resolution of Congress will explain the cause of this letter-the information it refers to, is an assurance that Britain had absolutely declined any interference of the mediating Powers between them, and what they call their rebel Subjects. They persist on every occasion in representing us a divided People, who anxiously wish to return to our connection with England. In this they have two objects equally important to them: 1st They encourage England to continue a war, which they expect to see terminated by our own weariness and langor, and

2dly they put such a face upon their Affairs, as will entitle them on a negotiation to make demands at our expence, which they would not presume to think of, if the Mediators were acquainted with our firm Resolution never to return to our obedience to their Government. Besides which they cast a degree of Odium upon the conduct of France representing it as the support of a discontented faction, rather than as the generous Ally of an oppressed Nation-There is reason to apprehend that in order the

better to secure the advantages of this deceitful policy to themselves, they will make proffers to each of the United States, if any of them should listen to them-(which cannot, however, be presumed) they will urge that as a proof of their assertions-if they should even decline receiving their proposals and refer them to Congress, as from the nature of our Union they undoubtedly must -still as the result of the experiment cannot be known for some time in Europe, they will avail themselves in some measure of it if negotiations should open. This Artifice of the Enemy may be counteracted in two ways, both deserve the serious attention of your Legislature.

The first and most important is by making such exertions to procure a respectable Army early in season, that the Mediators casting their Eyes upon the Muster Rolls may there read a full refutation of all that British Artifice can suggest (I need not observe that this measure must go hand in hand with taxation, since an Army without the means of supporting them would only increase our evils).

The 2d is to anticipate the attempts of Great Britain by such Resolutions as the information contained in this letter suggests. Resolutions which strongly mark a spirited determination in the Legislature of each State to listen to no negotiations except thro' the intervention of Congress, which manifest their attachment to the Independance of their Country, and their inviolable regard to the faith they have pledged to each other and to their Allies. These may either prevent the attempt I apprehend, or arrive in time to counteract the effect which the false expectations built thereon might otherwise have in Europe.

I mention this to your Excellency without any express direction from Congress; it is more than probable that your judgment and

the zeal and wisdom of the Legislature may improve these loose hints to the general advantage of the United States. I have the pleasure of assuring your Excellency and the Legislature, that the fairest prospects are now before us of terminating the war by a single exertion, tho' I am not at liberty to say that the plan of the ensuing Campaign is absolutely determined on, yet I have great reason to believe that we shall receive such powerful military Aid, as with becoming vigor on our part will free every State in the union from the grasp of the Enemy-here, Sir, I might pause and suffer any imagination to dwell upon the animating prospect before us. But reasoning from the past to the future, I dare not indulge the pleasing idea-we have at no period been in a situation to second fully the endeavours of our Ally to serve us. We either neglected to assemble our Army in time, or to provide the means for supporting or moving them-a feather would have turned the ballance last year notwithstanding the powerful aid we received from abroad. Providence blinded our Adversary-to their temerity we owe our success. But, Sir, let me ask whether any State did then, or has even now done all in its power to enable our Generals to prosecute their Victory? or rather, let me turn to what is more within my line, by observing that the inferiority of our Army in point of numbers to that of our Ally while they acted at Yorktown has been considered in Europe as a proof of the assertions of Britain-has been urged as an argument of our weakness, our weariness of the war, or our internal divisions. A moment's reflection will shew the advantages that this affords our antagonist in a negotiation. How much it weakens the claims. we make, and how many important benefits may be lost forever by our appearing in Europe to receive our Independance rather as a gift than to have established it by our exertions. But, Sir,

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