SUFFRAGE A RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP.

Neither in the Declaration of Independence nor in the Federal Constitution were any new truths proclaimed concerning the political rights of man. Not only can these truths be traced to Rousseau, to Locke, Harrington and Sidney, but we can go back more than two thousand years, and find them announced by Plato, Aristotle and others. The natural rights of individuals had long been well understood.

What our forefathers undertook to do was, to frame a government based upon a recognition of these rights; one which should furnish scope for their exercise and provide means for their protection. Acting upon old and well established maxims, the founders of our government undertook so to adjust its powers as to render permanent the liberty of the individual.

Suffrage is the mode in which the citizen participates in the government. Has the citizen a right to participate in the government? If so, then suffrage is a right of citizenship. It is just as essential to the working of a republican form of government as the motive power of the steam engine is to the movement of the vessel which it propels. If it is a privilege merely, who has the right to grant it? And whence originated such right? If those now exercising the suffrage hold it as a mere privilege, then they may at any time be deprived of it. Suffrage is by some admitted to be a right of the people as a whole, while it is denied to be a right of the individual. But who are the people who are thus entitled? If the term does not include all classes of citizens, under no natural or criminal disability, then whom does it include? If it includes some one class, subject to such disabilities, and not

other classes subject to the same disabilities, then our government is not a republic but an aristocracy. What class of citizens has a right to exclude all other classes? And whence did the favored class obtain this right of exclusion?

Of course there must be some legislative rules and regulations for the exercise of the right, but these must not be carried so far as arbitrarily to deny the right itself to the citizen. What is an arbitrary denial? Let us see. In regulating the suffrage, it becomes necessary to declare certain disabilities, for reasons founded in the nature of things. For instance minority. It is necessary to fix a time when the incapacity for want of sufficient age may be considered at an end. But the remainder of the community retain the right of suffrage, and the privilege of exercising the right.

The right to exclude for crime is conceded, but this when examined, so far from being in conflict with the doctrine here contended for, will be found to be confirmatory of it. The criminal made war upon the community, and has practically withdrawn from the social compact. He has therefore forfeited his right to participate in the affairs of the community. His exclusion comes clearly within the definition of a "regulation." A regulation must have for its object the preservation of the right, and not its destruction or abridgment.

"All regulations of the elective franchise," says Judge Cooley, "must be reasonable, uniform and impartial; they must not have for their purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise; if they do they must be declared void."--Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 602.

And in reply to objections which had been made to certain registry-laws on the ground that they violated the foregoing rule, he says:

"The provision for a registry deprives no one of his right, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right may be exercised."—Ibid. p. 602.

The arbitrary exclusion of a whole class cannot in any just sense of the term be called a regulation.

The right to vote is not derived from the legislature. It was in the people before the legislature was elected; and had

been recognized and regulated by previous legislatures and Constitutional conventions. No legislative assembly or Constitutional convention in this country can be specified previous to which the right of suffrage did not exist. In fact it was by the exercise of that very right that such assembly or convention was called into existence.

If suffrage is a mere privilege, at the discretion of the legislature, then one legislature can deny it to one class of citizens, the next legislature to another, and so on, until our form of government shall have become completely subverted.

Madison declared that it was by a gradual abridgment of the right of suffrage that aristocracies had been built on the ruins of popular forms of government.-Elliott's Debates, vol. 5, p. 388.

The science of free government cannot be made an inductive one, in the sense of experimenting to find how many rights may be safely doled out to the people. Our government is founded upon the fundamental doctrine of human rights and human equality, and upon that doctrine it must stand or fall.

What is a citizen? In the Report of the Committee on Elections in the House of Representatives, made in 1824, in the case of John Bailey, which was adopted by a large majority in the House, the word "citizen" was defined as "a member of a political society."

In Wheaton's History of the Law of Nations, p. 751, a republican form of government is defined to be that form of government where the citizen participates by his representative in the exercise of legislative power. But how can the citizen thus participate by his representative, unless he has a right to vote for that representative? Jefferson defines a republic as "a government, by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally according to rules established by the majority;" and he declared every other government to be more or less republican in proportion as it had in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizens.-Letter to John Taylor of Caroline, Jefferson's Works, vol. 7, p. 605. The fathers of the Republic looked upon suffrage as a right. Madison called the right of suffrage one of the fundamental

articles of a republican government, and thought it ought not to be left to be regulated by the legislature.-Elliott's Debates, Vol. 5. p. 388. Jefferson said, "Let every man who fights or pays, exercise his just and equal rights in election." Payne said, "The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected."

Benjamin Franklin said:

"Liberty or freedom consists in having an actual share in the appointment of those who frame the laws." * * "They who have no voice nor vote in the electing of representatives do not enjoy liberty, but are absolutely enslaved to, those who have votes and to their representatives."Franklin's Works, vol. 2, p. 372.

Hamilton said:

"A sh e in the sovereignty of the State, which is exercised by the citizens at large in voting at elections, is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law. It is that right by which we exist as a free people."-Hamilton's Works, vol. 2, p. 315.

In more modern times the right has frequently been asserted in debate in Congress. "God gave the right" said Senator Wade in his seat, when the subject was under discussion. -Congressional Globe, 1st Sess. 39th Cong. p. 838.

Chas. Sumner said:

"I have no hesitation in saying that universal suffrage is a universal right, subject only to such regulations as the safety of society may require. These may concern (1) age, (2) character, (3) registration, (4) residence." -Cong. Globe, 1st Sess. 39th Cong. Pt. 1, p. 685.

The right of suffrage as an attribute of citizenship is recognized by the very wording of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.

The second section of the fourteenth amendment provides that when the "right to vote" is denied in any State to any of the male members of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced, etc. Here the right of a citizen of the United States to vote is spoken of as an attribute of citizenship, and a penalty is provided against the denial or abridgment of the right of certain classes of citizens. Will it be said that by implication the denial or abridgment

of the right of other classes of citizens, is permitted?

The answer is, that rights cannot be taken away by implication. This rule of construction is well settled.

Where the liberty of the individual is involved, statutes should be construed strictly.-U.S. Digest, 1st Series, vol. 12, "Statutes," p. 748, Par. 1002.

In the application of this principle, it has been held that the exclusion of the citizen from giving evidence is somewhat opposed to natural right, and ought not to be extended beyond the letter of the statute. Pelham v. Messenger 10 La. Ann.

99.

So also statutes disabling persons from making contracts are to be construed strictly.-Smith v. Spooner, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 229.

In construing the Constitution of the United States, when words used in it are susceptible of more meanings than one, they must be considered as used in the meaning least favorable to the delegation of power.-U. S. Digest, 1st Series, vol. 3, p. 376.

This rule of construction forbids us to consider the power to exclude other classes than the one named, from the suffrage, as having been granted to the States by the 14th amendment, unless such power of exclusion was necessary in order to enforce the penalty prescribed in that amendment. But such power was not necessary for that purpose; therefore it was not granted.

"Equality of rights, privileges and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still more so, and, as a rule of construction, are always to be leaned against as probably not contemplated or designed."-Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 393.

In applying these principles the author holds that constitutional provisions placing restrictions upon the elective franchise should be strictly construed.-Ibid. p. 394.