1846. CLIFT V. SCHWABE. mean merely shall intentionally kill himself," then the ruling was wrong. The word "suicide" is not, as it appears to me, a word of art, to which any legal meaning is to be affixed different from that which it is popularly understood to bear. The authorities referred to by the defendant in error, as shewing that suicide means the felonious taking away of a man's own life, do not at all bear out his proposition. Lord Hale, indeed, in the thirty-first chapter of his Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I. p. 411., certainly speaks of felo de se and suicide, as convertible terms, and defines both the one and the other as being, where a man of the age of discretion, and compos mentis, voluntarily kills himself. But it appears to me plain from the whole context of the passage in question, that Lord Hale did not understand that he was giving a definition of the term suicide, except as it was often used to mean the same thing as felo de se; and this seems manifest from the fact, that, what in the passage in question he calls suicide, he a few lines above designates as homicidium sui ipsius. Now, there can be no doubt but that a man who takes away the life of another, commits homicide, even though the act was justifiable, or may have happened entirely "per infortunium," and was, therefore, not criminal at all; see Hale P. C. c. 39. And, therefore, taking suicide as meaning the same thing as homicide of one's self, it seems to follow, that, in the opinion of Lord Hale, neither guilt nor moral responsibility is necessarily involved in its legal definition. The passage to which we were referred in 4 Bla. Com. 189., seems strongly to shew that suicide does not, in the opinion of that learned judge, necessarily include the notion of moral responsibility. The learned commentator, after stating that the party who destroys himself is not felo de se, unless he was in his senses, adds, that coroners' juries are apt to push this principle too far, and to hold that the very act of suicide is evidence of insanity. It is plain that the word suicide is there used as designating the mere act of self-destruction; otherwise, the passage would be insensible. The only other authority referred to, in which the word suicide occurs, is the recent case of Borradaile v. Hunter (a), which was an action, like this, on a policy of insurance, in which was a stipulation making it void, not, as in this case, if the party should commit suicide, but, if he should "die by his own hands." There, a majority of the court held that the assured, having intentionally destroyed himself, though he was at the time incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, the policy was void. Tindal, C. J., differed from the rest of the court; and, at p. 668 of his judgment, the following passage occurs: "The expression dying by his own hand, is in fact no more than the translation into English of the word of Latin origin "suicide:" but, if the exception had run in these terms-'shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel,' surely no doubt could have arisen that a felonious suicide was intended thereby." This, though it certainly shews that Tindal, C. J., would, from the context, have interpreted the word suicide in this policy as he did the words "die by his own hands," in Borradaile v. Hunter, as referring only to cases of self-destruction perpetrated by persons of sound mind, yet shews also that he did not think that to be the necessary or natural meaning of the word suicide, standing alone. The distinction between felonious suicide and suicide not felonious, taken and observed on by that learned judge, seems conclusively to shew, that, in his opinion, suicide did not necessarily, ex vi termini, import a criminal act, and therefore the (a) 5 M. & G. 639., 5 Scott, N. R. 418. 1846. CLIFT บ. SCHWABE. Rolfe, B. 1846. CLIFT SCHWABE. Rolfe, B. act of a responsible moral agent; and in the same case, near the bottom of page 688, Erskine, J., speaks of criminal suicide, shewing that he took the same view of the meaning of the word suicide as was taken by the lord chief justice. All these authorities seem to me to favour my interpretation of this word. But, after all, our decision must rest entirely on what is the ordinary meaning of the term. In my opinion, every act of self-destruction is, in common language, described by the word suicide, provided it be the intentional act of a party knowing the probable consequence of what he is about. This is, I think, the ordinary meaning of the word; and I see nothing in the context enabling me to give it any but its ordinary signification. For these reasons, I think that a venire de novo must be awarded. PATTESON, J. (a) The sole question is, what is the true meaning of the words "commit suicide," in the policy in question. It is argued, first, that these words have a technical meaning, and import a felony. No authority is cited for this position: no case in which the finding of a jury that A. had "committed suicide," has been held equivalent to a finding that A. had "murdered himself," or that A. was "a felon of himself." I apprehend that the word "murdravit" was as necessary in a case of felo de se, as in the case of the murder of another person; and, unless some records could be found, or some decisions of the courts, in which the word "suicide" has been held to have the same meaning as "self-murder," I am at a loss to know what ground there is for saying that the words "commit suicide" have any technical meaning. (a) Coleridge J., was absent. He had heard the argument, and concurred in opinion with the majority of the judges. It is argued, secondly, that the words, in their ordinary acceptation, import felony. Now, the word "suicide," literally translated, means only "killing himself or herself: " the circumstances attending the act manifestly cannot affect the literal meaning of the word. Reference is made to Hale's Pleas of the Crown (a), where Lord Hale, in speaking of the different kinds of murder, speaks of suicide-felo de se. No doubt, he does; but he is treating of criminal suicide only; and he no where intimates that the word "suicide" in itself imports criminal suicide. Johnson's dictionary, and Richardson's dictionary, are also referred to: but they are of very little weight when the court is considering what the parties to a contract mean by the words they have used. The word "commit" is said always to be used in a bad sense: be it so; but, how does that prove that it communicates the quality of felonious to the word "suicide?" No suicide is good or meritorious; it must always be spoken of in a bad sense, however pitiable, or, one may hope, excusable, the circumstances of it may be. But it is argued, thirdly — which is the true question -that a felonious suicide only is pointed at by this policy, and that this appears by the words themselves, and by the context. Now, the words themselves are large enough to embrace all self-destruction, as well as self-murder: not indeed, as was admitted in Borradaile v. Hunter, to embrace cases of mere accident, or of insanity extending to unconsciousness of the act done, or of its physical consequences; because such cases, although comprehended in the very words themselves, cannot be considered to have been in the contemplation of the con 1846. CLIFT V. SCHWABE Patteson, J. 1846. CLIFT V. SCHWABE. Patteson, J. tracting parties; but clearly embracing an act of self- (a) Vide suprà, 452 (e). |