portunity to make the test, as obedience to the law was thereafter continued, and he might think it unnecessary to start an inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the company was thereafter obeying the law, several years might elapse before there was a final determination of the question, and if it should be determined that the law was invalid the property of the company would have been taken during that time without due process of law, and there would be no possibility of its recovery. gently pass upon the matter. Questions of the cost of transportation of passengers and freight, the net earnings of the road, the separation of the cost and earnings, within the State from those arising beyond its boundaries, all depending upon the testimony of experts and the examination of figures relating to these subjects, as well, possibly, as the expenses attending the building and proper cost of the road, would necessarily form the chief matter of inquiry, and intelligent answers could only be given after a careful and prolonged examination of the whole evidence, and thereon. All material evidence having been taken upon these issues, it has been held that it ought to be referred to the most competent and reliable master to make all needed "Another obstacle to making the test on the part of the company might be to find an agent or employé the making of calculations based who would disobey the law, with a possible fine and imprisonment staring him in the face if the act should be held valid. Take the passenger rate act, for instance: A sale of a single ticket above the price men- computations and to find therefrom tioned in that act might subject the the necessary facts upon which a ticket agent to a charge of felony, and judgment might be rendered that upon conviction to a fine of five might be reviewed by this court. thousand dollars and imprisonment Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Tompfor five years. It is true the company kins, 176 U. S. 167, 44 L. ed. 417, 20 might pay the fine, but the imprison- Sup. Ct. 336. From all these considment the agent would have to suffer erations it is plain that this is not a personally. It would not be wonder- proper suit for investigation by a ful, if under such circumstances, jury. Suits for penalties, or indictthere would not be a crowd of agents ment or other criminal proceedings offering to disobey the law. The for a violation of the act, would wonder would be that a single agent therefore furnish no reasonable or should be found ready to take the adequate opportunity for the presrisk. entation of a defense founded upon the assertion that the rates were too low and therefore the act invalid. "If, however, one should be found and the prosecutor should elect to proceed against him, the defense that the act was invalid, because the rates established by it were too low, would require a long and difficult examination of quite complicated facts upon which the validity of the act depended. Such investigation it would be almost impossible to make before a jury, as such body could not intelli "We do not say the company could not interpose this defense in an action to recover penalties or upon the trial of an indictment (St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. 484, 39 L. ed. 567), but the facility of proving it in either case falls so far below that which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is or by its Commission is by a bill in scarcely possible. chancery, asserting its unreasonable "To await proceedings against the character, and that until the decree of company in a state court grounded the court in such equity suit was obupon a disobedience of the act, and tained it was not competent for each then, if necessary, obtain a review in individual having dealings with a this court by writ of error to the high- carrier, or for the carrier in regard to est state court, would place the com- each individual who demands its pany in peril of large loss and its services, to raise a contest in the agents in great risk of fines and im- courts over the questions which prisonment if it should be finally de- ought to be settled in this general and termined that the act was valid. conclusive manner. This remedy by This risk the company ought not to bill in equity is referred to and apbe required to take. Over eleven proved by Mr. Justice Shiras, in dethousand millions of dollars, it is esti- livering the opinion of the court in mated, are invested in railroad prop- St. Louis, etc., Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. erty, owned by many thousands of 649, 659, 666, 15 Sup. Ct. 484, 39 people who are scattered over the L. ed. 567, although that question whole country from ocean to ocean, was not then directly before the and they are entitled to equal protec- court. Such remedy is undoubtedly tion from the laws and from the the most convenient, the most comcourts, with the owners of all other prehensive and the most orderly way kinds of property, no more, no less. The courts having jurisdiction, Federal or state, should at all times be open to them as well as to others, for the purpose of protecting their property and their legal rights. "All the objections to a remedy at law as being plainly inadequate are obviated by a suit in equity, making all who are directly interested parties to the suit, and enjoining the enforcement of the act until the decision of the court upon the legal question. "An act of the legislature fixing rates, either for passengers or freight, is to be regarded as prima facie valid, and the onus rests upon the company to prove its assertion to the contrary. Under such circumstances it was stated by Mr. Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion in Chicago, etc., Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 460, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 702, that the proper, if not the only, mode of judicial relief against the tariff of rates established by the legislature in which the rights of all parties can be properly, fairly and adequately passed upon. It cannot be to the real interest of anyone to injure or cripple the resources of the railroad companies of the country, because the prosperity of both the railroads and the country is most intimately connected. The question of sufficiency of rates is important and controlling, and being of a judicial nature it ought to be settled at the earliest moment by some court, and when a Federal court first obtains jurisdiction it ought, on general principles of jurisprudence, to be permitted to finish the inquiry and make a conclusive judgment to the exclusion of all other courts. This is all that is claimed, and this, we think, must be admitted. "Finally it is objected that the necessary result of upholding this suit in the Circuit Court will be to draw to the lower Federal courts a great flood of litigation of this char acter, where one Federal judge would tangible property, is about to comhave it in his power to enjoin pro- mence suits, which have for their obceedings by state officials to enforce ject the enforcement of an act which the legislative acts of the State, either violates the Federal Constitution, to by criminal or civil actions. To this the great and irreparable injury of it may be answered, in the first place, the complainants, he is seeking the that no injunction ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt. We think such rule is, and will be, followed by all the judges of the Federal courts. same justification from the authority of the State as in other cases. The sovereignty of the State is, in reality, no more involved in one case than in the other. The State cannot in either case impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 507, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. 164. "And, again, it must be remembered that jurisdiction of this general character has, in fact, been exercised by Federal courts from the time of Osborn v. United States Bank up to the present; the only difference in "This supreme authority, which regard to the case of Osborn and the arises from the specific provisions of case in hand being that in this case the Constitution itself, is nowhere the injury complained of is the more fully illustrated than in the threatened commencement of suits, series of decisions under the Federal civil or criminal, to enforce the act, habeas corpus statute (§ 753, Rev. instead of, as in the Osborn case, an Stat.), in some of which cases persons actual and direct trespass upon or in- in the custody of state officers for terference with tangible property. A alleged crimes against the State have bill filed to prevent the commence- been taken from that custody and ment of suits to enforce an uncon- discharged by a Federal court or stitutional act, under the circum- judge, because the imprisonment stances already mentioned, is no new invention, as we have already seen. The difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and the enjoining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature, and does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject-matter. In the case of the interference with property the person enjoined is assuming to act in his capacity as an official of the State, and justification for his interference is claimed by reason of his position as a state official. Such official cannot so justify when acting under an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature. So, where the state official, instead of directly interfering with was adjudged to be in violation of Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 502, 45 L. ed. 639, 21 Sup. Ct. 455; Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153, 23 Sup. Ct. 89, 47 L. ed. 116; United States v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 Sup. Ct. 229; In re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178, 26 Sup. Ct. 602, 50 L. ed. 984; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 51 L. ed. 760, 27 Sup. Ct. 459. "It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which, while admitting that the taking of such a person from the custody of the State by virtue of service of the writ on the state officer in whose custody he is found, is not a suit against the State, and yet service of a writ on the Attorney General to prevent his enforcing an unconstitutional enactment of a state legislature is a suit against the State. "There is nothing in the case before us that ought properly to breed hostility to the customary operation of Federal courts of justice in cases of this character. "The rule to show cause is discharged and the petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari is dismissed. So ordered." Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting. |