DECEMBER, 1806.

Amendment to the Constitution.

to be delegated to them! With a view to this object, I wish to submit this proposition, believing as I do, that under some general expressions, perhaps not sufficiently explicit-contained in the clause which I have read-a power has been exercised which was never intended to be vested in any department of this Government.

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scope, from the nature, from the design of it, we may trace this principle too plainly and too distinctly to be mistaken. It is stamped on the face of the Constitution in bright and shining colorsit is engraved on it in characters too strong and too splendid to be misunderstood.

I have taken this view of the Constitution, because this great principle was co-existent with the Constitution itself, and because the tenth amendment, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the General Government, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people respectively," did not create this principle; but is only a recognition of it, which has been deemed proper to be inserted, lest a spirit of innovation, indulging itself in regions of wild, fanciful, extravagant theory, might give a construction as to the quantum of powers delegated to the Federal Government by the Constitution, and as to the powers retained to the States, totally incompatible with the universal understanding of the American people thereon at the time of its adoption.

In submitting this proposition, sir, I solicit the indulgence and patience of the House, while I take a view of the nature, the powers, and genuine principles of the Federal Constitution, as I understand them to be; and of its relation to the States. In this view, I trust, those powers, those principles, and that relation, will be laid down not incompatibly with the general understanding of them by the American people. I believe I shall be strictly conformable to its essential principles when I say that this Constitution does not extend its authority to the utmost limits of civil jurisdiction-that it embraces not all the objects of civil rule or authority that it does not give to this Government a right to exercise every species of power existing under the Governments of these American States, Why, sir, did the framers of this Constitution so that it conveys not to it an authority to perform nicely construct its material parts? Why was it all the functions of sovereignty-that it restrains, drawn with such precision, such exactness in the it confines, it limits the authority of this Govern- limitation of its powers, and on such peculiar prinment to certain delineated objects-that it confers ciples? For this very manifest and important upon it certain particular powers, all which are reason-that as little danger as possible might redistinctly enumerated and specified-that these sult from constructive interpretation—to guard it powers, and these alone, it delegates to this Gov-in the most effectual manner discernable by huernment-that it does not assume the broad and man foresight against such constructions as would extensive principle that all powers are granted to give to it a consolidating tendency. But every this Government, which are not expressly reserved act of the Federal Legislature, which invades the to the States or to the people of the States-that independence of the States, whether it assumes directly the contrary principle constitutes its very jurisdiction over objects of the greatest importance, essence. This principle is, that all powers are re- or whether it assumes jurisdiction over objects of served, which are not expressly granted to the Fed- small consequence, will have that tendency; inaseral Government, or expressly prohibited to the much as both of these descriptions of acts are botStates. So far from leaving the States, or the peo- tomed on the same destructive principle-both ple of the States, in possession of no other powers gravitate towards the same centre-both have a or rights than those which are expressly reserved direct tendency to destroy the State institutions. to them, this Constitution contains no express re- The difference between them consists merely in servation at all, except in one single clause, which the degree of rapidity with which that work of reserves to the States the right of appointing the destruction would be wrought by measures of the officers of militia, and of training them according first description, and the degree of rapidity with to the discipline prescribed by Congress. This, which it would be compassed by those of the latconceive, was done, because such a right was deem-ter description. A bold and gigantic stride of ed proper to be retained to the States, and inasmuch usurpation might at once totter the State fabrics as it is a right incidental to that of providing for to their very bases, and soon level them with the organizing and disciplining the militia, which is face of the earth; whereas, encroachments comexpressly granted to the Federal Government, as mencing in smaller violations of State authority, means of enabling it to command the force of the and progressing step by step, would gradually and nation for the common defence of all the States; almost imperceptibly undermine and loosen their this right might be construed to pass over to the foundation. The operation in such instances, alGeneral Government along with the last mentioned though it would be slower, yet perhaps, might not power, were it not positively excluded from the be the less sure of finally producing their total degrant. It were, indeed, entirely needless, unless struction. Indeed, sir, every act, which assumes It should be for the purpose of guarding against a power not granted, is a step towards consolidaconstructions no way compatible with the genius tion. It wrests from the State Governments a of the Government, to make any such reservation. portion of that residuum of authority which reFor, sir, the specification of particular powers is mained to them when the Constitution was adoptitself an exclusion of all other powers-it is a pos- ed. Such encroachments cannot be made withitive limitation of the authority of this Govern-out extreme danger. For one assumption always ment to those particular specified powers. This principle manifestly appears from the organization of this Constitution. From the plan, from the

furnishes a precedent for another assumption; this again becomes ground for further infringements on State authority; thence ensues a regular pro

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Amendment to the Constitution.

gression of encroachment after encroachment, until at length the States are stripped of every species of authority, which can deserve the name of Government. All these acts of Federal usurpation, while they are drawing into its vortex this great accession of power, are weaving around the State institutions the web of destruction. Although dreadful may be the struggle-dreadful may be the scenes exhibited on the theatre of the American world before this will be entirely drawn over the States-yet, sir, it may be done. After a continued series of such encroachments on their rights and authorities, from the state of insignificancy, into which they will then be sunk, they may be permitted to merge into the general mass. As institutions no longer worth the expenses requisite for their maintenance—as of too little consequence to merit any further support, they may be given up, suffered to lose all their energy, and at length their very existence, as waves, which appear for a while on the surface of the ocean, subside into its immense bosom, and disappear entirely.

DECEMBER, 1806.

nations completely unite in their own persons both of these characters. Sir, what appellation shall I give to a system like this? A system as truly preposterous in its nature as it is tortuous and wrongful in its operation; but to which, nevertheless, a vast portion of the human race have been blindly devoted from the earliest ages of society down to the present day. That very circumstance, however, contributes not a little to the appreciation of the American system. That it has been the peculiar felicity of the American people to understand their own rights-to institute governments better adapted to the important purpose of securing to themselves a permanent enjoyment of those rights than nations of the old world ever have done; and, moreover, to derive additional benefits from the happy combination of a Federal Government with those of the particular States, are all circumstances which eminently characterize this system, and distinguish it from every other political establishment. While, far from rejoicing, we deeply lament that the ancient darkness which had bound the world in chains Should this melancholy state of things ever for more than forty centuries, still covers an imarise, what will be its ultimate issue Heaven only mense portion of the globe, where everything exknows. Whether this great and flourishing coun- ists under the gloomy reign of despotism; the try, which, at this time, sheds its glories far, very republican principle, maintained in its genuine far, beyond the limits of its own territories, will spirit, like a rich gem placed in the midst of a then continue to be the fair nursery of liberty, or rude collection of worthless things, must shine whether it will become the frightful seat of politi- with augmented brilliancy, when viewed in concal slavery; whether, indeed, the very great, the trast with so many horrible systems containing beloved, the inestimable principle of representa- not a single trait which resembles the faintest outtion itself, the discovery of which has been of in-lines of liberty-not one of its dimmest featuresfinitely more importance to the political world than the art of navigation has been to the commercial world-of infinitely more importance than any art ever was to the human kind-a principle without which, under whatever form a Gov. ernment may exist, it is impossible that liberty should exist, except it be in a perfect democracy; every idea of whose existence under any other Government destitute of that principle is perfectly chimerical; every such Government, be its structure whatever it may, which pretends to main- Sir, while I express these sentiments, under a tain its existence, verily indeed exhibits one of the full persuasion that I shall not be contradicted as merest farces that ever appeared amongst the to their propriety, I cannot but believe that I may scenes of any political drama; whether, I say, this also affirm, without fear of being refuted in opinall-important principle will then continue to ac- ion by many, that, amongst the excellencies of tuate the Government of this country, or whether the Federal Government, there is none more imit will cease to maintain its just empire, lose its portant-there is none more valuable, than its energy, and even at length be spurned from the limited character as it respects the State authoriAmerican shores, in order to make way for the ties. Vested with powers duly proportioned to its introduction of a monstrous system, which re- own proper objects only, which are of a general verses the natural order of things-transfers the nature, and alike regard all the States, it leaves Sovereignty from the people, who alone are the them in full possession of their own sovereignty; natural, who alone can be the legitimate posses- while, on the other hand, amongst the powers sursors of it-places it in the hands of an individual-rendered up by the States to this Government, fixes a diadem on his head; and that bauble, according to the principle then brought into operation, communicates to him the whole majesty of the nation, which is transmitted as an inheritance through his family from generation to generation, whether the heir, on whom the inheritance should devolve at any time, be a knave or a fool; and by the history of mankind it is shown to us that very often these possessors of the sovereignty of

but exhibiting on every side vast multitudes in all the variety of wretchedness, who never tasted of any other than the bitter cup of slavery!

Oh! sir, how supremely valuable ought our happy institutions to be esteemed! What ardent zeal should animate our efforts to preserve them unimpaired-to cherish and cultivate their vital principles in their original purity and perfectionto transmit them down to posterity untainted by corruption, unassailed by violence!

there are very few but such as, if exercised by either of the States individually, might materially affect the interests, and in some instances endanger the safety of the other States. Thus each individual State participates in the benefits resulting from the united and combined energies of the whole; while it retains the right of sovereignty, and all the powers requisite for a complete administration of its own affairs. Here, then, is

DECEMBER, 1806.

Amendment to the Constitution.

the true character of the Federal Government. The powers properly appertaining to it are limited to those which are purely of a federative nature, and to such as the States by this compact have consented to yield up to it for the common benefits of the Union. The former could not be communicated to, nor be exercised by, either of the States individually, without destroying the independence of the others. The latter, if not thus yielded up, might be exercised by any of them to the detriment of the rest. Thus it is that each particular State, by consenting to yield up to the Union those powers, and those alone, the retention of which might be injurious, provides for itself a security against injuries by the same act which divests itself of the power to injure either of its sister States; while the Federal Government derives from this cession no manner of right to trench upon those powers which have been deemed proper to be retained to the Statesno manner of right to diminish their sovereignty as distinct independent States.

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ling authority; and must ultimately operate a destruction of the State institutions. In what relation, therefore, to each other and to the Federal Government, which connects them together, can we view the members of this grand Confederacy, but in that of so many distinct independent communities? In this relation they all stand, as well to the Federal Government as to each other. In this relation alone can they be justly viewed. They are not only distinct from, and independent of, each other, though connected together in this Confederacy: equally are they distinct, from, and independent of, this General Government, though connected together by it. To cement this connexion between them, as so many distinct, independent communities, was indeed the original and primary object of this Government. From such connexion between independent States retaining their distinct separate governments, it has been rightly judged by the people of these States, that greater benefits might result to each and to all of them, than could be expected without What is the relation, therefore, which subsists any connexion at all-greater, too, than could be between this Federal Government and those of expected to flow from any connexion founded on the particular States? If its true character be different principles. Hence arose the institution such, as has been stated, (and this, I think, will not of the present system of Government. A system be denied, or, if denied, I would challenge the analogous to which the annals of man, either anmost subtle genius who ascribes to it more exten- cient or modern, scarcely presents us with the sive powers, to support such a position without smallest traces of any other. Such, then, being utterly demolishing the fundamental principles a leading principle of this Government, and the of the Confederacy) this Government cannot justly objects of it being special or particular, as before claim to itself the supremacy of a paramount observed, its limited character, as it respects the government with a right to restrain and control State authorities, must necessarily be one of its the States in the exercise of their own legitimate principal distinguishing properties, otherwise it powers; those powers which remained to them would not be conformable to that principle. It is when the Constitution was adopted. To exercise essential to the prosperity of the Union that such an authority over them would be to destroy this character be preserved-it is essential to the their independence; totally to annihilate their happiness of the American people. Let not this sovereignty as States. For one sovereignty can- Government, therefore, assume to itself any power, not exist under the dominion of another sover- in the exercise of which this character will be eignty. The subjection of one power to the con- changed-the true relation between this and the trol of another power, another separate overruling State Governments will be entirely destroyed. authority, supposes a state of subordination in Let not this Government, proud in the contemthe former power, and that all supremacy resides plation that the arm of its authority extends over in the latter. Should it be imagined, therefore, this great continent, disregard State rights, and by any one that such a sort of power over the take upon itself the exercise of powers which the States exists in this Government, and that, never- Constitution has withheld, wisely withheld from theless, they retain any portion of their original it, and retained in other hands. Let it not forget sovereignty, of a more complete absurdity it is its own true character; but always recollect that, not within the compass of the human intellect to although its authority extends to all the United conceive. It is, then, unquestionable that either States generally, yet it is not a general authority, this Goverernment possess no manner of control but an authority special, and limited to particular over the States, as such, or the States possess no objects. It should ever be remembered, also, that, manner of sovereignty as States; but that they between this Government and the States, mutual do possess ample rights of sovereignty, I believe and reciprocal duties and obligations have arisen will not be denied by any one. It follows then, from the compact, by which this Government was of course, that any attempt in this Government established. It is no less incumbent on the Fedto exercise such controlling authority over them, eral Government to confine itself within the sphere would be an attempt to destroy, and the actual of its own appropriate powers, than it is incumexercise of such authority would actually destroy bent on the States not to attempt the resumption. their sovereignty as States. So also, the assumption of any of the powers which they have surrenderof any powers properly appertaining to the States, ed up to this Government. The States are bound and not granted to this Government, is an inva- by the cessions they have made, and the Federal sion of their sovereignty. A series of such inva- Government is bound to claim no more nor greater sions in progression must have a fatal tendency powers than those which have been ceded and to produce the same effect, as a general control-granted to it. It is the duty of this Government

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DECEMBER, 1806.

which will take the alarm whenever these rights or authorities are invaded; in proportion to the extent of such invasion, it will be impassioned: and the dissatisfactions, which may be apprehended from such a state of public agitation, cannot be desirable to any real friend of the Union.

Sir, this jealousy is not merely attentive to the preservation of the existing State authorities from unconstitutional encroachments by the General Government; it is also averse to any Constitutional diminution of those authorities. It considers the powers already vested in the Federal Government, as fully adequate to all the purposes of its institution. I confess, sir, I am one of those who entertain this sort of jealousy; who have no wish that a single item should be added to the catalogue of powers already vested in the Federal Government; who believe that such a step would be dangerous; that the process, once commenced, might lead to more and more grants, until all real, efficient power would be accumulated together in the hands of the Federal Government, and the States be rendered perfectly contemptible. I confess, too, that I feel no satisfaction in seeing a committee raised on the idea of an addition to the existing powers of the Federal Government; and whatever may have occasioned this step, I cannot refrain from expressing my repugnance to it; on the contrary, I am induced by it to bring forward this proposition thus early in the session, and to declare these sentiments on the occasion.

to regulate its proceedings according to the measure of powers assigned to it under the Constitution; and it is the duty of the States to direct their operations to those objects only which peculiarly belong to them as distinct communities; equally is it the duty of each to move in its own Constitutional orbit. If either of them wanders from this course, the harmony of the whole system will be interrupted; and such interruptions must have a tendency to defeat the principal ends of its institution. I do not imagine, however, there is ground for apprehension that either of the States will attempt to invade the authority of this Government, or to resume any of the powers which they have surrendered up to it. This opinion, I think, will appear to be a rational one, when we consider the nature of the powers vested in the General Government-that they are of two descriptions, (as before observed,) some of them being of a nature purely federative, which never did appertain to the States, and cannot be exercised by either of them in its individual capacity; when we consider those of the other description, which originally did appertain to the States, and have by them been surrendered up to this Government; when we consider that the inducements to make the surrender arose from a conviction that the safety of each particular State was involved in the establishment of a firm union and connexion between all of them; that, to insure the attainment of this object, it was necessary to vest the Federal Government with those particu- Important, sir, was the epoch when this Conlar powers, thereby enabling it to combine the stitution was proposed to the people of the several general interests of all the States as a means of States for their consideration and adoption, if ap cementing this political connexion between them, proved of. The world never witnessed a more which otherwise could not be expected to be of august scene than what America then exhibited. any long duration. To suppose, therefore, that Thirteen free and independent States engaged in either of the States will attempt to make encroach- the solemn act of deliberating on a system of ments on the known established powers of the General Government, which should draw around Federal Government, thus solemnly assigned to it them a band of political union; which should ren under the Constitution, would be to suppose the der this a firm and durable band, and yet so as existence of a very great degree of capriciousness not to impair the individual sovereignty of the in that State. Extreme, indeed, would be its folly States, presented indeed a sublime spectacle. To and rashness in thus arraying itself against the investigate the principles of a system so new, so Union, by endeavoring to repossess itself of pow-unprecedented, so peculiar in its nature, the strongers so solemnly granted to this Government, with est energies of the American mind were brought its own consent, and that of the other States, for into action. It was an object of the most anxious the great purpose of securing its independence, inquiry whether this system, by providing, in the and of promoting those general interests which manner it does, for the great purposes of the appertain to itself, in common with all the other Union, to which the then existing Confederation States. Scarcely can it be presumable that such had been found inadequate, would not impair and a step, the evident tendency of which would be ultimately destroy the sovereignty of the individ to contravene these purposes, will ever be taken ual States. While the imbecility and inefficacy by either of the States. Nor should it be pre- of that Confederation became a theme of univer sumed that the Federal Government will pursue sal lamentation, and produced a general wish that an eligible course for effecting these purposes, by the ties of union between the States might be endeavoring to enlarge the sphere of its own pow-strengthened, every American heart felt itself ers, and to contract those of the States. The deeply interested in preserving the State authorpowers assigned to it under the Constitution are ities; every heart glowed with ardor for the peramply sufficient for all these purposes; and mis-petuation of that species of political institution taken, indeed, is that zeal for the Federal Gov- under which the people of the several States had ernment, which would stretch its authority or ex-maintained their civil polity during their arduous tend its operations beyond its Constitutional lim- contest for independence. This great, this units; for there exists in the American people a precedented act of sovereignty, therefore, which jealousy for State rights and authorities. There gave existence to this system, was not performed is, sir, a jealousy, strong and vigilant-a jealousy without a pause-solemn pause-an awful appre

DECEMBER, 1806.

Amendment to the Constitution.

H. of R.

it, not a trace of those federal principles would be left. The States would become States in name only, and all the properties of a consolidated Government would spring into existence.

hension that possibly the powers to be delegated should have any sort of relation to, or any manto the Federal Government by the proposed Con- ner of connexion with any of these powers, or vention, might have a tendency to shake the not? Such, sir, was the construction given to foundation of the State governments, and finally that clause in those cases-a construction involvproduce a consolidation of all the States into one ing a principle of the utmost latitude admissible extended empire. Hope and fear alternately af- in a government of the most unlimited extent of fected the public mind during this important jurisdiction. Admit this principle, sir, admit that crisis; hope that the system would operate the the Congress should possess such a latitude of desired effect for the joint benefit of the Union power, and what then would remain to the States? and of the States; fear that it might absorb all Would there be left to them any real, substantial State authority, and eventually defeat the best power? No, sir. All might be grasped by the ends of its institution. Its peculiar organization, General Government. The plea of necessity and its leading essential attributes, cautiously exam-expediency might be extended to any lengths ined, deliberately and solemnly traced, recom- whatsoever, and applied to every possible subject mended its adoption. From its structure and its of legislation; while nothing but the name, and principles arose the prospect of its utlity, and on hardly the name, of any power would remain to these the American people rested their hopes that the States. Sir, can a construction, which exthe system would promote the general interests of pands the federal jurisdiction to such an amazing the Union without abridging the independence or extent, be reconcilable to the true principles of sovereignty of the States. May these hopes never the Confederacy? Can a construction thus transbe disappointed; may they be constantly realized! forming the Federal Government from a system That jealous affection for State rights and au- of limited special powers into that sort which exthorities, which I have mentioned, Mr. Speaker, ercises every species of civil and political authorhas always existed. It is coeval in existence with ity, be reconcilable to those principles? Sir, it the States themselves. It is a laudable jealousy. would be the very height of absurdity to say that It is founded in reason and in nature. It is a jeal- such contrarieties could be reconcilable; and ousy resulting from fixed attachment to a great should such construction of the clause I have and acknowledged principle. That small Repub-mentioned, become the established construction of lics are most propitious to liberty, better adapted for its preservation, at the same time that greater security for good order in society is afforded than in those which govern the inhabitants of very extensive territories, is an impressive maxim, strongly inculcated on the American mind. The people of the several States, therefore, see in their State governments safe depositories of their civil rights and immunities; strong barriers against licentious interruptions of social order; convenient and easy modes of administering justice among themselves, and, indeed, of managing all their local affairs. Hence their fond, their invincible attachment to that species of government. Hence that jealous sensibility, which will ever be alarmed when this Government makes any encroachment on their rights or authorities. Hence, too, those struggles, those melancholy scenes, which may be apprehended before the people of the several States would submit to a dissolution of the State institutions, or acquiesce in a series of measures tending to deprive them of their appropriate powers, should so fatal a policy ever direct the councils of the Union. Should as fatal a policy ever direct the councils of the Union, did I say? Would to God that such a sort of policy had not already mingled with its councils. Could not such a sort of policy be traced in the doctrine deduced from the last clause in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution (which I have read,) when by the construction given to that clause in the cases which have been alluded to, it was contended that the Federal Legislature possessed a right to pass any laws whatsoever, which they should deem expedient for carrying into execution the powers enumerated in that section, and all other powers vested in any department or officer of the Government, whether such laws

Many, sir, and truly deserved, are the eulogiums which have been bestowed upon the Federal Government. Beautiful is its structure; admirable are its component parts; justly may it be likened in its symmetry to whatever partakes of wisdom, to whatever is excellent in the contrivances of man; and if, among other objects of admiration to which it may be rightly compared, it may be said that this Government and those of the particular States, taken in conjunction, form a system in the political hemisphere not unlike that which in the natural hemisphere is exhibited by a grand primary planet, and its surrounding satellites; this comparison should nevertheless be drawn with some exception. For these States do not, like those satellites, shine with borrowed, reflected light, emanating from a great central planet. No, sir, they display a radiance solely their own. Their splendors issue from their own bodies. They are so many original sources of light and heat to the spheres within which they respectively act, illuminating and vivifying every thing therein; whilst the Federal Government by its influences duly dispensed unites the mem→ bers of this constellation together in harmonious intercourse, and produces to the system the benefits of their collective energies. But suppose the Federal Government should extinguish the essence of the individual members to make up one entire body, it cannot impart their natural qualities to that single immense body. Their light, their heat-the glories, the excellencies of the whole system, I fear, would be forever gone! Indeed, sir, to my mind the very idea of consolidation is