Boyden v. Burke. But the letter written by plaintiff to defendant, on the 14th December, 1847, was not evidence in mitigation of his refusal on the 22d December, 1847, or on the 2d January, 1848; and it could have been admissible for no other purpose. That letter would have reached here on the 18th December, *1847, at furthest, by due course of mail, and the *582] defendant had abundant time to get cool before the 22d of that month. The refusals were both given deliberately, wilfully, with the intent to punish, that is, to injure the plaintiff, and the malice is so much the greater. Mr. Coxe, for the defendant in error, made the following points: 1. That the Circuit Court ruled according to law on all the points raised in the bills of exception. 2. That the action is founded upon a misconception of the 4th section of the act of Congress of July 4th, 1836. 3. That if the plaintiff's case is embraced by that section, the evidence in the record furnishes a complete justification of the acts of defendant. 4. That the declaration sets forth no legal cause of action. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The bills of exception, taken by the plaintiff to the rejection and admission of testimony on the trial, have not been supported. The declaration charges, that the defendant, Burke, was Commissioner of Patents, and as such was bound to grant to applicants therefor, copies of patents, &c., on payment of fees. That the plaintiff tendered the customary fees and demanded copies of certain patents, which defendant refused to give him, to the damage of plaintiff, $10,000, &c. As no special damage is alleged, the court very properly, refuse to receive evidence tending to prove it. A demand for certian copies was made through the agency of Mr. Greenough, but accompanied with a letter from plaintiff to defendant, requesting him to deliver the copies to Mr. Greenough. This letter, with the answer of defendant thereto, was properly received as part of the res gestæ, or as a conversation between the parties, reduced to writing. A bill of exceptions was also taken to the charge of the court, who instructed the jury, "that, upon the evidence before them, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover." As the plaintiff had shown a demand of the copies, with tender of fees, and a refusal of defendant, he had made out Boyden v. Burke his case as laid in his declaration, and was entitled to a verdict for nominal damages, unless by law he was not entitled to demand such copies, or defendant had shown a sufficient excuse for refusing them. Patents are public records. All persons are bound to take notice of their contents, and consequently should have a right to obtain copies of them. The patent law of 1836, § 4, enacts that "any person making application therefor may have certified copies," &c. These records being in the care and custody of the [*583 Commissioner of Patents, it is his duty to give authenticated copies to any person who shall demand the same, as soon as he conveniently can, on payment of the legal fees. Where there is a right on the one side, and a corresponding duty imposed on the other, a refusal to perform such duty, on the reasonable request of the party entitled to demand it, will subject the officer to an action. But the party entitled to such services must request it in a proper manner. He has no right to accompany his demand with personal insult, or vulgar abuse of the officer. Those to whom the people have committed high trusts, are entitled at least to common courtesy, and are not bound to submit to the insolence or ill temper of those who disregard the decencies of social intercourse. A demand, accompanied with rudeness and insult, is not a legal demand. The letter, accompanying the plaintiff's demand in this case, was taunting, insulting, and libellous, indicating a want of taste and temper. And if the case had rested here, we could have found no fault with the instruction of the court. But the plaintiff showed another demand, some two weeks after the first, by his agent, which was made in a proper manner, and unaccompanied with any insulting missive. The defendant was not justified in refusing this demand on account of the former misconduct of the plaintiff, or to enforce an apology by withholding his rights. Îll manners or bad temper do not work a forfeiture of men's civil rights. While the want of an apology for his previous rudeness and insult might well justify the defendant in refusing all social intercourse with the plaintiff, yet it could not release him from the obligations imposed upon him by his official station, or entitle him to disregard the rights guaranteed to the plaintiff by the laws of the land. The court below erred, therefore, in not instructing the jury, that if they believed the testimony, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for nominal damages. The judgment is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. Walker et al. v. Robbins et al. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged, by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court, in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. *WILLIAM F. WALKER AND SAMUEL M. PUCKETT, *584] APPELLANTS, v. GEORGE S. ROBBINS, LLOYD W. WELLS, ABIJAH FISHER, AND ROBERT H. MCCURDY. A bill in chancery will not lie for the purpose of perpetually enjoining a judg ment, upon the ground that there was a false return in serving process upon one of the defendants. Redress must be sought in the court which gave the judgment, or in an action against the marshal. Moreover, the defendant in this case, by his actions, waived all benefit which he might have derived from the false return; and no defence was made on the trial at law, impeaching the correctness of the cause of action sued on, and in such a case, resort cannot be had to equity to supply the omission.1 THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting as a Court of Equity. The facts in the case are set forth in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Freeman, for the appellants, and Mr. Crittenden, (Attorney-General,) for the appellees. Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court. William F. Walker, Samuel M. Puckett, and John Lang, filed their bill against Robbins and others, praying a perpetual injunction against a judgment at law recovered in the Circuit Court of the Mississippi District, alleging, among other grounds of relief, that William F. Walker, one of the 1 CITED. Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How., 445; Crim v. Handley, 4 Otto, 658; Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 5 Id., 161; Embry v. Palmer, 17 Id, 11; Masterson v. Ashcom, 54 Tex., 328. See note to Creath v. Sims, 5 How., 204. Walker et al. v. Robbins et al. complainants, was not served with notice to appear and defend the suit at law. The deputy marshal returned the original writ, “Executed on William F. Walker, 6th of April, 1840, personally." More than ten years afterwards the deposition of the deputy (Cook) was taken in Texas, when he testified that his return was false; that he did not notify Walker, but indorsed the writ executed, intending to execute it after the indorsement was made, and therefore he let it stand, although he never did notify Walker. Assuming the fact to be that Walker was not served with process, and that the marshal's return is false, can the bill, in this event, be maintained? The respondents did no act that can connect them with the false return; it was the sole act of the marshal, through his deputy, for which he was responsible to the complainant, Walker, for any damages that were sustained by him in consequence of the false return. This is free from controversy; still the marshal's responsibility does not settle the question made by the bill, which is, in general terms, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction to regulate proceedings, and to afford relief at law, where there has been abuse, in the various details arising on execution of process, original, *mesne, and final. If a court of chancery can be called on to correct one abuse, so it may be to cor[*585 rect another; and in effect, to vacate judgments, where the tribunal rendering the same would refuse relief, either on motion, or on a proceeding by audita querela, where this mode of redress is in use. In cases of false returns affecting the defendant, where the plaintiff at law is not in fault, redress can only be had in the court of law where the record was made, and if relief cannot be had there, the party injured must seek his remedy against the marshal. We are of the opinion, however, that the return was not false; but if it was, that Walker waived the want of notice by pleading to the action. The suit was against Walker, Puckett and Lang. The latter employed David Shelton as his attorney to defend the suit. Lang told Shelton to put in pleas for all the defendants who had been served with process. Upon examination, Shelton found that process had been served on Walker, Lang, and Puckett, and he put in a joint plea for them. Afterwards, Shelton, the attorney, met both Walker and Lang in Jackson, where the court sat, and spoke to them in each other's presence, about the defence of the case; and a conversation was held with them, in which they promised Mr. Shelton that another attorney, William VOL. XIV.-40 625 Walker et al. v. Robbins et al. Seiger, should be associated with him in defending_the_suit. The questions likely to arise in the case were stated by Lang and Walker, and they were especially anxious to know from Shelton whether Mr. Shields, the principal to the note sued on, would be competent as a witness on their behalf. The cause was tried at a subsequent term, on the issue made by the plea put in by Shelton, and a verdict and judgment rendered. No defence was made on the trial at law, impeaching the consideration of the note sued on, either on the ground that Green had not delivered the bank-notes, as stipulated by him; nor on the ground that usury entered into the transaction because the notes were at a discount of from forty to fifty per cent. Neither was any proof introduced on the hearing of this chancery suit in the Circuit Court, tending to show that Green failed to deliver the bank-notes, although the respondents put the fact in issue; and as the face of the note imported a consideration, no further evidence to sustain it was required from the respondents. They admit that the bank-notes were at the rate of discount stated in the bill, but insisted they were of equal value to Shields as if they had been at par; and this the bill admits would have been the case, had Shields received them according to his agreement with Green; and there being no proof *586] to the contrary, we *must assume that they were duly received. But whether they were duly delivered or not, is immaterial. The defendants in the suit at law had an opportunity to make their defence there, and having failed to make it, cannot be heard in a Court of Equity. By way of authority, we need only repeat, as the settled rule, what was adjudged in the case of Creath v. Sims, (5 How., 204,) that whenever a competent defence shall have existed at law, the party who may have neglected to use it, will never be permitted to supply the omission and set it up by bill in chancery. This court has never departed from the foregoing rule, nor allowed the circuit courts to depart from it in cases brought here. Nor can we do so without violating the sixteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in its true sense. Apparent aberrations may be found, but they are only apparent. We order that the decree below be affirmed. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. |