Christy v. Scott et al. WILLIAM CHRISTY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. WILLIAM T. SCOTT; WILLIAM CHRISTY v. JAMES D. FINLEY; WILLIAM CHRISTY v. WILLIAM YOUNG; WILLIAM CHRISTY v. HIRAM HENLY. In Texas, the technical forms of pleading, fixed by the common law, are dispensed with, but the principles which regulate the merits of a trial by ejectment and the substance of a plea of title to such an action, are preserved. Therefore, where the plaintiff filed a petition alleging that he was seised in his demesne as of fee of land from which the defendant had ejected him, and the defendant pleaded, that if the plaintiff had any paper title, it was under a certain grant which was not valid, this plea was bad. So also was a plea denying the right of the plaintiff to receive his title, because he was not then a citizen of Texas. These pleas would have been appropriate objections to the plaintiff's title when produced upon the trial. So also where, under a plea of the statute of limitations, the defendant claimed certain land by metes and bounds, and disclaimed all not included within them. There is nothing to show that the land so included was part of the land claimed by the plaintiff. So also where the plea was in substance that the plaintiff had no good title against Texas, no title in the defendant being shown. For the action may have been maintainable, although the true title was not in the plaintiff.1 THESE four cases were brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas. They all involved the same principles, and were covered by the decision in Scott's case. It is necessary, therefore, to set out the pleadings in that case. Christy filed his petition, alleging that he was seised in his demesne as of fee, in a certain tract or parcel of land, (which he described by metes and bounds,) from which Scott ejected him; and praying judgment for damages, and for the recovery of the lands. Scott filed the following answer: And now comes the said defendant, and answering the petition of the plaintiff, says, that he denies all and singular the allegations in the said petition, and prays that the plaintiff be held to strict proof of the same. 1 CITED. Carleton v. Darcy, 46 Superior (N. Y.), 493. Defendant in ejectment cannot rely on a title in a third person. Christy v. Findley, post, *296; Christy v. Young, post, #296; Christy v. Henley, post, #297. S. P. Brolaskey v. McClain, 61 Pa. St., 146; Ryan v. Tomlinson, 39 Cal., 639; Woods v. Hildebrand, 46 Mo., 284; Hardwick v. Jones, 65 Mo., 54; Illinois &c. R. R. Co. v. Cobb, 94 Ill., 55. Contra, Roe v. Doe d. Baxter, 33 Ga., 81; Roe v. Doe d. Sullivan, Id., 486; Humble v. Spears, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.), 156; Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 Ill., 331; Barrett v. Clary, 38 Mich., 223; Clements v. Pearce, 63 Ala., 284; Bear Val ley Coal Co. v. Dewart, 96 Pa. St., 72. Christy v. Scott et al. 2. And as to the trespasses and ejectments, or either or any of them, complained of by [the] plaintiff in his petition, the defendant says he is not guilty, and puts himself upon the country, &c. 3. And the defendant further says, that as to the pretended grant or title of the plaintiff to the land described in his petition (if any paper title he has), the same bears date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D., 1835, and the land described in said pretended grant or title, and in said petition, is, and was at the date of said grant, situated [*283 in the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United [States] line, and said pretended grant was made without the approbation or assent of the executive of the national government of Mexico. 4. And the said defendant further answers, and says, that if any such grant or title was made, as by said plaintiff is pretended, the same was made, (as by said plaintiff's pretended grant appears,) on, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D., 1835, and was not made by any public officer, commissioner, or authority, then, to wit, at the date of said pretended grant or title, existing in the State of Coahuila and Texas, competent to make the same. 5. And the said defendant further says, that the plaintiff claims the land sued for under and through a pretended grant from the government of the State of Coahuila and Texas, made to one Miguel Arceniega, as a Mexican and purchaser, and purporting to have been procured for the said. Arceniega by one William G. Logan, as his agent. And the defendant says, that the said pretended grant or title of the plaintiff to the land sued for is not valid in law, because the same was procured from the government of the State of Coahuila and Texas by fraud, in this, that the said Miguel Arceniega and the said William G. Logan combined and confederated together for the purpose of evading the law, then in force, allowing the sale of lands to Mexicans, and to them only; and falsely and fraudulently represented to the said government that the application by said Arceniega for the said grant of land was really and bona fide made for him by the said Logan, and that the said Arceniega was to be the real purchaser of said land, and to hold and enjoy the same as a Mexican citizen; while, in truth, the said Arceniega fraudulently permitted the said Logan to use his name, and in his name procure the said grant solely for the use and benefit of him, the said Logan, who was not, at the time of procuring said grant, a Mexican citizen; and who, by the false and fraudulent practices aforesaid, procured the said grant, Christy v. Scott et al. and appropriated the land granted to his (the said Logan's) own use and benefit. 6. And the said defendant says, that the plaintiff claims the premises described in his petition by a pretended grant, purporting to have been made by authority of the government of the State of Coahuila and Texas to Miguel Arceniega, bearing date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D., 1835; and that the said pretended grant was made upon the conditions that the said Arceniega, or the person or persons to whom he might alienate the land in said grant described, should cultivate the same within six years from the *284] acquisition thereof by said *pretended title, and pay for said land the price established by law. And the defendant says, that the said Arceniega, and those claiming said land under him, wholly failed to comply with said conditions. 7. And the said defendant says, that the said plaintiff claims the land described in his petition under and through a pretended grant purporting to have been made to one Miguel Arceniega by authority of the government of the State of Coahuila and Texas, bearing date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D., 1835, and under and through a pretended claim of transfers from said Arceniega to plaintiff; and that within six years from the date of said pretended grant, and before the annexation of Texas to the United States, the said pretended transfers were made to said plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was not, at the date of said pretended grant to him, and previous thereto had never been, a resident citizen of Texas or Mexico, but was then, and thence hitherto continued to be, a resident and citizen of the United States of America, owing and paying allegiance to the government thereof. 8. And the said defendant further answering says, that he is the owner of the following tracts or parcels of land, to wit: (setting out a tract of land by metes and bounds, but without saying whether or not it was the land claimed by the plaintiff) and the defendant says that his possession of the said land is by virtue of the authority and title of the said John Graves, and as claimant under said Graves; and the said defendant says, that he and the said Graves, under whom he claims as to the said last-mentioned tract of land, and that he, in his own right and those under whom he claims, as to the several parcels of land above described, have had peaceable adverse possession of said several tracts of land, claiming the same by virtue of the certificates and files aforesaid, and the surveys aforesaid, with chains of legal transfers from the Christy v. Scott et al. government down to this defendant, and to those under whom he claims, for more than three years next before the commencement of this suit; and the defendant disclaims ownership and possession of any portion of the land described in plaintiff's petition, not included in the metes and bounds of the several tracts and parcels above set forth. 9. Said defendant further says, that the land claimed by plaintiff in his petition is located within the territory designated at the twenty frontier leagues, bordering on the United States of the North, in the act of the Congress of the Republic of Texas, approved January 9th, 1841, and entitled "An act to quiet the land titles within the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United States of the North," and is claimed by plaintiff by virtue of said location made prior to the seventeenth day of March, A. D., 1836; and that said plaintiff, and those under whom he claims said laud. [*285 did not commence an action to try the validity of said claim within twelve months from the passage of the act aforesaid. And the defendant suggests to the court that he has had adverse possession in good faith of the said several tracts or parcels of land, for more than one year next before the commencement of this suit; and that, during said possession, he has made permanent and valuable improvements in the same, consisting of, to wit, one thousand acres, cleared and fenced, and divers good dwelling-houses, gin-houses, barns, corncribs, orchards, outhouses, &c., of great value, to wit, of the value of ten thousand dollars. The plaintiff then filed the following replications and de murrers: 2. And the plaintiff, by attorney, comes, and as to the plea by the defendant, secondly by him in his answer pleaded, whereof said defendant puts himself upon the country, he, said plaintiff, doth the like. Demurrer [to 3d plea]. And the said plaintiff, by attorney, comes and says, precludi non, by reason of any thing in the defendant's third plea, in his said answer pleaded; because he says the said plea, and the matters and things therein contained, are not sufficient in law to bar and preclude him from having and maintaining his action aforesaid, and this he is ready to verify; wherefore, he prays judgment, &c. And for cause of demurrer, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, the said plaintiff sets down and shows the following, to wit: VOL. XIV.-20 305 Christy v. Scott et al. 1. The said plea in bar of plaintiff's action attempts to set up the want of the approbation or assent of the executive of the national government of Mexico, to the issuance of a grant within the twenty border leagues, when the national colonization law, under which is sought the benefit of this bar, contains no prohibition to the issuance of said grant; but if, at the time of the issuance of said grant, there was any such prohibition, it only extended to making settlements within said border leagues. 2. The said plea in bar of plaintiff's action attempts to set up the issuance of a grant under which the plaintiff claims, dated 20th September, 1835, without the approbation of the supreme executive of Mexico, within the border leagues; but does not show the nature or kind of said grant, so as to enable the court to judge of its validity. *3. And the said plea is in other respects defective, *286] informal, and insufficient, &c. Replication [to 4th plea]. 4. And for replication to the fourth plea by the said defendant in his said answer pleaded, the said plaintiff says, precludi non, because he says the grant under which the plaintiff claims was issued by an authority, at the time of the issuance of the same, in the State of Coahuila and Texas, existing and competent to issue the same, and this, he prays, may be inquired of by the country. Replication [to 5th plea]. 5. And for replication to the fifth plea, by the said defendant in his said answer pleaded, the said plaintiff says, precludi non, because he says that the said grant, under which the said plaintiff claims, was not obtained or procured to be issued by fraudulent misrepresentations, as in the said plea alleged, and this, he prays, may be inquired of by the country. Demurrer [to 6th plea]. 6. And as to the sixth plea, by the said defendant in his said answer pleaded, the said plaintiff says, precludi non, because he says the said plea, and the matters and things therein contained, are not sufficient in law to bar and preclude said plaintiff from having and maintaining his action aforesaid, and this he is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment, &c. And for cause of demurrer, according to the form of the |