exchange, amounting to a large and sufficient sum, would not be enough to have made the plea valid by treating the sufficiency as adequate to discharge "not merely the debt in the declaration mentioned, but also the other things for on account of which they are alleged in the plea to have been given. Upon the whole, we think that the plea is bad in substance, and that the rule for entering the judgment for the plaintiff on the first issue non obstante veredicto must be made absolute."

When a creditor takes a bill of exchange, payable with interest, for a debt, it is conceived that the circumstances of interest being payable would render it impossible for the creditor to sue for the debt until the bill became due, as the transaction would amount to an agreement to give time in consideration of the payment of interest. The point has not, however, been decided.

Another important consideration from receiving a bill is, how far the creditor may prejudice his right to recover the debt where he has by any conduct lost his remedy on the bill. Where the creditor has taken the bill or note of a third person for the former debt, and, upon dishonor of the instrument, brings an action for such original debt, and the debtor shows at the trial that the bill or note was taken on account thereof, it is incumbent on the creditor to prove those circumstances which obviate the effect of taking the bill, and revive the original demand. See the statute of the 3 and 4 Anne, c. 9, s. 7. The circumstances which will prevent the dishonor of the bill from reviving the right to sue for the consideration, are the following:

1st. That reasonable diligence has not been used to obtain payment from the acceptor or maker. Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunton, 130.

2d. That no notice of dishonor has been given in those cases in which the law requires notice of dishonor.

3rd. That it is held by a third person.

Adolphus, 696.

4th. That it is upon a wrong stamp,

Cundy v. Marriott, 1 Barnewall and

5th. That the creditor altered the bill, or did any other act which in law would discharge the parties to it. Alderson v. Langdale, 3 Barnewall and Adolphus, 660.

In concluding these remarks, it should be stated that no laches can be imputed to the Crown; and, therefore, if a bill be seized under an extent before it is due, the neglect of the officer of the Crown to give notice of the dishonor will not discharge the drawer or indorsers.-West on Extents, 28.

MARINE INSURANCE-POLICIES ON FREIGHT-SHIP RUSSIA.

In the Fourth District Court (New Orleans,) before Judge Strawbridge Paradise, Lawrason, vs. The Sun Mutual Insurance Company, and others. (Consolidated Cases) :

On the trial of these cases the counsel for the defendants requested the court to charge the jury as follows:

1st. That the policies on freight of insurance sued on, were in terms policies on freight for the use and benefit of the plaintiff, Knapp, the owner of the ship. Refused.

2d. That Paradise Lawrason & Co., the nominal plaintiffs in these cases, had no insurance interest in the freight of the ship Russia, as freight; that they might have insured their interest on the advances made by them to Knapp, the owner, on the credit of the freight, but have not done so by the policies on freight sued on and given in evidence by plaintiffs, and that they have no legal interest in these suits. Refused.

3d. That freight upon the owner's goods, although insurable as and not under the denomination of freight, yet the amount of such freight is to be measured by the additional value given to such goods by the transportation of them from the port of departure to the port of destination, to be calculated on the va lue at the port of departure.

4th. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the shipment of plaintiffs' goods would have ended in a loss, that then no such amount of freight as is charged in the freight list given in evidence by the plaintiffs, is due to them, or recoverable under the policies sued on. Refused.

5th. That by the terms of the policies of insurauce, the defendants have not undertaken to insure against the barratry of the master, the insured being owners, that the plaintiff, Knapp, as owner, is the only person insured by said policies, and that if the jury believe from the testimony he was the sole owner, and that the loss happened by barratry of the master, then he cannot recover on the said policies. Refused as underscored; charged as to the rest.

6th. That the said policies are open policies, and in case of loss the defendants are only bound to indemnify for such loss, as interest may appear. That it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show by legal testimony the actual value or amount of interest he had at risk, and that he cannot recover for any amount beyond what he shall so prove he had fairly at risk. Charged.

7th. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Knapp, had any freight at risk, and sustained any loss for which he is entitled to recover; that having received $15,000 from the Tenessee Marine Insurance Co., under a prior policy to any of those sued on; that the amount so received by him is to be deducted from said loss; and if the jury believe that the amount so received is equal to the whole actual loss sustained by him, that then plaintiffs cannot recover anything upon the policies sued on. Charged.

8th. That in the law it does not require the same evidence to warrant a verdict for the defendants in these cases, as it would to find a verdict of guilty on an indictment against the captain of the ship for arson, but that the jury are at liberty to infer the barratry from such circumstances proved as shall satisfy their minds that it was committed. Charged.

Paradise & Lawrason vs. The Sun Mutual and other Companies. Gentlemen-I am required by the defendants to charge you on nine distinct questions as written down and read to you.

Our rules of practice make the jury the exclusive judges of facts, and prohibit the judges from ever speaking of them, a rule which has its inconvenience, as I have, on some instances, found it difficult to make the jury comprehend the application of the law to the case, and which, I have reason to believe, has resulted in verdicts different from what would have been given had some latitude been allowed the judge in this respect. I am here, however, to observe and enforce the law, and must be bound by its provisions. You are not, therefore, to expect any assistance from the Court in the examination of the voluminous testimony laid before you,

I shall, therefore, refuse to charge you on several of the required charges, for the reasons that they require me to speak of the facts of the case, or of conclusions drawn from those facts; but my view of the charges will, I hope, be gathered and made satisfactory to the jury, by the views I shall express on the law alone.

The first, second, and third of these charges I shall consider together.

The counsel for the defense, in their argument, contended that, where the owner of the ship and cargo was the same, there could be no freights. Though I consider this objection as now abandoned, yet the third charge required renders it proper I should notice it. It requires little reflection to come to the conclusion that a man cannot contract with himself, even by the mediation of an agent. A man can no more charge himself with the freight in his own ship than he can charge himself for riding in his own carriage. He can have no lien or privilege on his own merchandise in his own ship, nor can he have a privilege on his own ship for non-delivery or damage to his own goods, because these are but accessions to a contract which requires two parties; such a contract is extinguished, or rather could never exact because of the confusion of debtor or creditor in one person.

This, however, advances us a little in the solution of the question. Every

merchant who bonds his own ships must necessarily keep two separate accounts -one for the cargo, another for the ship; without these it is impossible he should know the true state of his affairs. To the first he charges the cost and expenses of the cargo, and on the conclusion of the voyage it is balanced by crediting the proceeds of the merchandise, and completed by showing the profit or loss made. To the latter is charged all the disbursements of the ship, and is credited to the freight she earns. It is therefore manifest that if he allows the ship nothing for freight, her account must forever be a loosing one, and the account of the cargo will not show the gain or loss on its sale, but also the profits of the ship, and he never can tell in what degree either gains or loses. It is therefore necessary he should settle between the two, and charge the cargo, and credit the ship with freight, as though they were owned by distinct personsand this is, I believe, universally done-just as he would charge his plantation with the purchase of so many negroes, or so many barrels of pork, though he cannot be a creditor of his own plantation, more than of his own ship.

Now, this quasi freight is perfectly understood amongst merchants and insurers. Not an insurance office in this city but will insure it under the name of freight, nor one between this and Boston. The authorities cited by plaintiff show it is very usual, as an insurable interest, by the name of freight.

But the third charge requires me to say the value or interest depends on the profits in the foreign port. I cannot so charge the jury; it depends on the rate of freight at the port of departure, and the merchant in apportioning it is bound in fairness to fix it at that rate which was then the fair and market rate of freight at the time of loading of the cargo, for that I charge the jury is the measure of the interest which the ship owner had under the policy on freight.

2. Who had an insurable interest in the freight?

There are three several positions assumed.

1. The rights of a transferee of the freight list before the insurance. 2. That of a party to whom the freight and freight list has been pledged. 3. That of an agent who has made advances.

1. To the first, that of a transfer, I see no room whatever for doubt; he, by the transfer is complete owner of the freight for all lawful purposes; he may insure the freight for his own account, as the transferer might; he is not bound to explain his title to the insurers, but merely to describe the subject insured in the terms usually expressed, and show an interest to the amounts insured.

2. I consider the pledgee as standing in the same light: he is not bound to disclose his title to the insurer; by act 3,137, of the C. C., he may recover the amount of the debt pledged, and is bound to use measures to secure it.

3. In regard to the agent who has made advances without transfer of title or pledge, though he has an undoubted insurable interest, he is bound to describe it with covenient certainty, and I am of opinion the bare title of freight would not be a sufficient description by which to cover the millions of property shipped to factors who are under advances and have a privilege or lien on the property. Under our laws the insurer has a right to know what he is insuring; if it be freight he has a right of salvage to any pro rata freight earned; if it be an advance he has a right to be subrogated to the rights of the assured. The jury will consider in which of these three classes the plaintiff stands.

4. To the fourth charge required I have no difficulty in refusing to thus charge the jury. The insurer has nothing to do with the profits or loss; the loss he insures against is the peril of the sea; if the ship and cargo perish, it matters not whether the result of the voyage would have proved fortunate or disastrous -the jury will look to the interest put at stake by the perils of the sea.

5. If, under the charges as above given, the jury are of the opinion that the plaintiffs had, in their own right, an insurable interest and insured that interest on their own account, then I charge that they can recover-the clause concerning the barratry of the master, except only the case where the assured is owner of the subject insured. If Knapp was the person insured, the exception excludes him from recovering where the loss is occasioned by the barratry of the master.

8. To this charge I feel bound, whatever doubts I might have, to yield to the rule settled by the Supreme Court, and charge as desired.

9. To this charge I agree except to the part underscored, and that depends on the question previously discussed. If the plaintiffs had an insurable interest in their own right, and did so insure it, the barratry of the captain does not bar their recovery. If it was on Knapp, and the insurance made for his benefit, it does.

10. The foreman of the jury requests a charge about circumstantial evidence. This is not to be disregarded in all cases; it is admitted even in cases of capital punishment. Where fraud is charged it would often be impossible to reach the ends of justice if it were otherwise. Men who commit fraud or crime do not call in witnesses or put their intentions into notarial acts; they cover them in secresy and avoid all means of proof; but the jury, in weighing the circumstances will consider carefully their rights, combine them together and come to such reasonable conclusions as the law and good sense justify, and which that law refers exclusively to their discretion.

The jury will observe there are three separate suits; the verdict must be separate and endorsed on the several petitions.

The jury, after a few minutes consultation returned a verdict for plaintiffs for the sums claimed in the three Policies, $37,000.

COLLISION AT SEA-THE FANCHON AND THE BONANZA.

In the Admiralty Court, (British,) July 1850. Dr. Lushington on the Bench. The Bonanza, bound from Liverpool to Manilla, with a cargo of general merchandise, and the Fanchon, of the burthen of 969 tons, proceeding from Liverpool to Boston, came into collision with each other, about six P. M., on the 4th of February last, about thirty miles S. E. of Cork. According to the statement of the Bonanza, the wind was blowing a gale from the N. W., and while she was heading W. S. W., close hauled on the starboard tack, she perceived the Fanchon approaching her half a mile distant on her weather beam. She immediately hoisted a light and kept her course, expecting that, as the Fanchon was on the larboard tack, and sailing free, she would give way, instead of which she also kept her course. The master of the Bonanza seeing a collision to be inevitable, in order to ease the blow, ordered the maintopsail to be shivered and the helm to be put up; but she had only just begun to pay off when the Fanchon struck her on the starboard quarter, and cut her down nearly to the cabin deck. The Fonchon receded, again returned, and struck her a second blow. She imputed the collision to the Fanchon endeavoring to cross her bows instead of going astern. On the part of the Fanchon it was alleged that she descried the Bonanza six points on her weather bow, and immediately put her helm hard aport, but in two or three minutes was struck by the Bonanza on her larboard bow with great violence. She attributed the collision to the Bonanza not starboarding her helm at an earlier period. The joint damage was estimated £10,000.Cross actions were entered by the respective parties. The Elder Brethren of the Trinity were of opinion that the blame was imputable solely to the Fanchon. The Court therefore pronounced against her.

RAILWAY LAW CASE-TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURY.

An action was recently brought by Earnest Schofman vs. the Boston and Worcester Railroad, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the alleged negligence of the defendant corporation in allowing their railroad track to be so out of order, as to throw off the car in which the plaintiff and his wife were riding, and to fracture her back, and ultimately cause her death. The damages contended for, were laid at $25,000.

Bigelow, Jr., who presided, rnled that the defendants were liable to the highest degree of care; but that misrepresentation and concealment on the part of the plaintiff or his wife, ought to make a substantial difference in the estimate put by the jury upon the compensation recoverable for her injuries.

The Jury, after a long and protracted session, returned a verdict for the complainants and assessed damages to the amount of $4,000.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY-IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NEW YORK IN 1847-50-INCREASE OF EXPORT TRADE-VALUE OF PRODUCE RECEIVED, VIA CANALS, ON THE HUDSON, AND AT NEW ORLEANS, VIA MISSISSIPPI, WITH UNITED STATES EXPORTS FOR LAST NINE YEARS--COTTON CONSUMED-POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES-CONSUMPTION OF COTTON IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES COMPARED-IMPORTS OF DRY GOODS INTO UNITED STATES-IMPORTS OF DRY GOODS AND SPECIE INTO NEW YORK FOR LAST YEAR-EXCHANGE MARKET RATES OF BILLS IN NEW YORK-RISE IN THE PRICE OF SILVER-THE IMPORTANCE OF A MINT IN NEW YORK-SECURITIES FOR FREE CIRCULATION HELD BY THE CONTROLLER OF NEW YORK STATE-PROGRESS OF THE FREE, AND THE SAFETY FUND BANKING SYSTEM.

THE year 1851 commenced with a high degree of prosperity in almost all departments of business, with great abundance of money, and with every manifes tation of rapidly increasing credits. The importations and exportations of the country for the year 1850, as indicated in the operations of the port of New York, showed a very considerable increase over those of the former year. Thus the imports and exports of New York reached together $186,034,435, against $133,007,846 for the year 1849, being an increase of over $53,000,000, of which $16,000,000 was specie, and the remainder goods and produce. This was proportional for both imports and exports. For a number of years the aggregates have been as follows:

The increase in the export of domestic produce is greater than the import of dutiable foreign goods. It, however, would seem to be the case that notwithstanding this increased export of domestic produce, that the consumption of that produce on the Atlantic border has greatly increased. In order to observe this, we may make a table of the receipts of produce on the Hudson River at tide water, via New York Canals; and at New Orleans, via the Mississippi, and compare them with the United States exports for corresponding years.

VALUE OF PRODUCE RECEIVED VIA CANALS ON THE HUDSON, AND AT NEW ORLEANS, VIA THE MISSISSIPPI, WITH UNITED STATES EXPORTS.