of slave; dissenting opinion in McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 73, in argument against recovery on promissory note given in 1864, for price of slaves, and in favor of validity of ordinance of constitutional convention making slave contracts void; Commonwealth v. Ames, 18 Pick. 211, where court refused to return to her owner slave voluntarily brought into Massachusetts; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 564, in discussion sustaining bequests for benefit of fugitive slaves, and applying same to benefit of freedmen after abolition of slavery. See also Sims' Case, 7 Cush. 314, 315, note to decision.

Governments abolishing slave trade are bound to recognize its existence, and rights growing out of it, of citizens of countries where it is not prohibited. Cited in Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 657, 661, 20 L. Ed. 694, 695, holding recovery could be had upon promissory note given in Arkansas for purchase of slave before secession; Dole v. Insurance Co., 2 Cliff. 419, 421, Fed. Cas. 3966, applying principle by analogy in holding that destruction of American vessel by Confederate cruiser was not an act of piracy, under international law; Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 569, holding fact of Great Britain having consented to legality of slave trade, did not make African slavery an English institution to which rules of common law were applicable; Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 211, to effect that Massachusetts courts should respect rights of citizens of other States, growing out of legal existence of slavery therein, so far as they could be respected under Massachusetts law; Sims' Case, 7 Cush. 314, 315, to point that courts of State where slavery is not recognized, should recognize its legal existence in other States and respect the rights growing out of the institution in such States; King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y. 32, 24 Am. Rep. 133, where, in suit in New York against special partner in limited partnership in Cuba, the contract of partnership was construed according to Spanish law.

Denied in Osborn v. Nicholson, 1 Dill. 224, Fed. Cas. 10,595, overruled in 13 Wall. 657, 20 L. Ed. 694, in argument that no recovery can be had on note given before secession for price of clave; dissenting opinion in McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 73, in argument against recovery on promissory note, given in 1864, for purchase price of slaves.

The courts of one country cannot execute the penal laws of another. Approved in Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 76, 49 L. Ed. 105, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, State v. Warner, 197 Mo. 658, 94 S. W. 964, and Casey v. St. Louis Transit Co., 116 Mo. App. 268, 91 S. W. 431, all arguendo; Carey v. Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 136, 119 S. W. 947, holding that where action was based on penal statute of sister State, appellate court had no jurisdiction; Mohr v. Sands, 44 Okl. 339, 133 Pac. 241, holding courts will not enforce penalty prescribed by laws of another State providing for triple damages against attorney guilty of fraud and deceit; Wisconsin v. Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 290, 32 L. Ed. 243, 8 Sup. Ct. 1374, denying Federal Supreme

Court's jurisdiction of suit brought by State on its domestic judgment for a State penalty against citizen of another State; In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 40, holding penal law of Nebraska, prohibiting sale of liquors, did not extend to, and was not enforceable in military reservation which had been ceded to the United States; Indiana v. Oil Co., 85 Fed. 873, denying jurisdiction of Federal court because suit brought to enforce penal statute of Indiana; State v. Kirkpatrick, 32 Ark. 120, holding State court had no jurisdiction to punish for perjury, one who had made false oath in violation of act of Congress; Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 991, 24 L. R. A. 842, 15 South. 469, holding law prohibiting marriage of persons divorced for adultery, penal, and has no extraterritorial effect; State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 189, dissenting opinion, arguing court had no jurisdiction to convict prisoner of larceny committed in New Brunswick, because portion of the goods brought to Maine; Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 479, 12 Am. Rep. 293, denying jurisdiction of State court of suit by assignee to set aside. fraudulent conveyance under Federal bankrupt act, because the law was in the nature of a penal enactment; State v. Barnett, 83 N. C. 616, denying jurisdiction of court to punish crime of bigamy committed in Tennessee; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 911, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822, 28 L. R. A. 59, 19 S. E. 602, denying jurisdiction of North Carolina courts of murder committed by persons in North Carolina shooting across State line and killing man in Tennessee.

Distinguished in Strait v. Yazoo etc. R. Co., 209 Fed. 161, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070, 126 C. C. A. 105, holding provision in Mississippi crossing statute for recovery of specified sum by county for violation of act was enforceable in another State; Interstate Savings etc. Co. v. Wyatt, 27 Colo. App. 218, 220, 147 Pac. 445, 446, holding that suit upon judgment of sister State for usurious interest founded upon statute, could be maintained, such statute not being penal; Great Western Mach. Co. v. Smith, 87 Kan. 333, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 243, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379, 124 Pac. 415, holding that as statute of sister State was not entirely penal and suit was brought for debt, plaintiff could recover; Kilton v. Providence Tool Co., 22 R. I. 614, 48 Atl. 1041, holding action to enforce stockholders' liability for debts of corporation, under Gen. Laws R. I., 1896, c. 180, § 22, is not to enforce penalty; Flash v. Connecticut, 109 U. S. 377, 27 L. Ed. 969, 3 Sup. Ct. 266, holding individual liability of stockholders under a New York law not penalty, and enforceable in another State; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 604, 36 L. Ed. 833, 12 Sup. Ct. 908, where Federal court sitting in Texas entertained jurisdiction of suit for damages for injury inflicted in Louisiana under Louisiana law; to the same effect also is Law v. Western Ry. of Ala., 91 Fed. 819; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 666, 36 L. Ed. 1127, 13 Sup. Ct. 227, holding New York statute making officers of a corporation who sign and record false certificate of the amount of its capital stock, liable for its debts, not penal; Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 198, 38 L. Ed. 961, 14 Sup. Ct. 981, holding adminis

trator could recover damages in Minnesota for death of his deceased in Montana, and Montana laws would govern; Tinker v. Van Dyke, 1 Flipp. 528, Fed. Cas. 14,058, holding certain clauses of bankrupt act not penal; dissenting opinion in Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md. 200, 14 Am. St. Rep. 350, 16 Atl. 654, arguing that New York statute making officers of a corporation, who sign and record false certificate of amount of its capital stock, liable for its debts, not penal within meaning of rule; Nelson v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 88 Va. 974, 15 L. R. A. 586, 14 S. E. 838, holding damages recoverable in Virginia for killing deceased in West Virginia, according to West Virginia law. See also Railroad Co. v. Mase, 63 Fed. 116, 27 U. S. App. 238, Railroad v. Ihlenberg, 75 Fed. 879, 43 U. S. App. 726, 34 L. R. A. 398, and Myers v. Railroad, 69 Minn. 478, 65 Am. St. Rep. 581, 72 N. W. 695, neglecting to note distinction, holding recovery could be had in one State for injuries inflicted in another, and laws of latter would govern.

Action in one State to enforce cause of action created by statute of another State. Note, 14 Am. St. Rep. 351.

Territorial extent of criminal jurisdiction. Note, 76 Am. Dec. 673.

Burden of proof is on claimant to slaves on board captured vessel, to show title in himself.

Cited in Gedney v. L'Amistad, 10 Fed. Cas. 148, 151, where negroes found on vessel seized off coast of Long Island, held entitled to be sent back to Africa, Spanish claimant having failed to prove title to them.

Distinguished in dissenting opinion in De Lacy v. Antoine, 7 Leigh, 449, arguing against release on habeas corpus of negroes claimed as slaves by Portuguese consul, who could show no evidence upon which he based his claim.

Supreme Court being equally divided in opinion, the decree of the lower court was affirmed.

Approved in Charlottesville etc. Ry. Co. v. Rubin, 107 Va. 752, 60 S. E. 101, right of divided court to affirm judgment of lower court rests not on statute but is rule of necessity; Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 424, 11 L. Ed. 663, holding affirmance of decree on former appeal, by divided court, precluded examination on subsequent appeal into question of jurisdiction on such former occasion; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 112, 19 L. Ed. 157, holding conclusive and binding upon the parties an affirmance by divided court, of decree of lower court; Ayres v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 633, holding equal division of State Supreme Court upon motion for rehearing was denial of motion; Kolb v. Swann, 68 Md. 521, 13 Atl. 380, holding judgment of affirmance by equally divided court as final and conclusive as if court were unanimous; Goddard v. Coffin, 2 Ware, 385, Fed. Cas. 5490, to effect that where Circuit Court divided in opinion on motion for judgment, ao affirmative order can be made.

II-14

Jurisdiction and powers of consuls. Note, 45 L. R. A. 496.

Duty of conquering with respect to obligations of conquered State.
Note, 5 B. R. C. 907.

Miscellaneous. Cited in The Antelope, 12 Wheat. 546, 6 L. Ed. 723, another decision in same cause; The Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason, 471, Fed. Cas. 14,054, as an instance of court inquiring into title to captured property; Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. 382, 13 L. Ed. 183, as instance of consuls acting in behalf of their countrymen.

10 Wheat. 133-146, 6 L. Ed. 284, THE PLATTSBURG.

It is sufficient to incur forfeiture of vessel under slave trade acts if any preparations for illegal voyage are made.

Cited in United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 473, 6 L. Ed. 697, holding it not to be necessary for conviction that vessel should be completely equipped in an American port, provided guilty intent accompanied the act; The Slavers, 2 Wall. 380, 17 L. Ed. 910, holding fact that cargo and equipment might have been intended for legal object not available for defense where there was evidence of guilty intent; The Wanderer, 1 Sprague, 519, Fed. Cas. 17,139, where held that circumstance that fitment was incomplete and no part of it exclusively adapted to slave trade would not prevent forfeiture where guilty intent present; Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1027, to effect that forfeiture attaches as soon as any preparation begun with intent to use vessel in slave trade.

Miscellaneous. Cited in The Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason, 471, Fed. Cas. 14,054, as instance of case where court inquired into true title to vessel.

10 Wheat. 146-152, 6 L. Ed. 287, THOMAS v. HARVEY'S HEIRS.

Court of equity will adopt period prescribed by statute of limitations for taking appeal, in prescribing time within which bill of review may be filed. Approved in Blythe Co. v. Hinckley, 111 Fed. 837, following rule; In re Brown, 213 Fed. 702, and Home St. Ry. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 162 Fed. 138, 89 C. C. A. 133, both holding that as bill was brought after time to appeal had expired, it was too late; In re Holmes, 142 Fed. 394, time within which petition for revision in matter of law under bankrupt act, § 24b, of appealable order, is limited by time fixed by bankruptcy law for appeal; Jorgensen v. Young, 136 Fed. 381, 69 C. C. A. 222, bill of review in court of equity not filed until two years after entry of judgment in original suit entered, and until after time for appeal had expired, is too late; Atlantic Trust Co. v. Dana, 128 Fed. 222, holding where corporation receiver required by order of appointment to defend suits seeking to establish liens against corporation's property, intervened in foreclosure against corporation and litigated claim of complainant therein under mortgage to fund due corporation, decree is binding on all parties to suit in which he was

appointed; Cocke v. Copenhaver, 126 Fed. 147, holding bill of review not for newly discovered evidence can only be maintained for errors of law appearing on face of record and must be filed within time allowed for appeal; Hendryx v. Perkins, 114 Fed. 804, holding no excuse being shown after nine years, neither a bill to vacate decree for fraud, nor a bill of review, can be maintained; Copeland v. Bruning, 104 Fed. 170, holding there being no statute fixing the time within which bills of review must be filed, Federal courts of equity will extend the provision limiting time to time allowed for taking an appeal; Halsted v. Forest Hill Co., 109 Fed. 823, holding Federal court cannot entertain petition in nature of bill of review which is filed after time for taking an appeal; Reed v. Stanley, 97 Fed. 522, holding where party to suit in equity in Circuit Court has no right to appeal to Supreme Court, a bill of review to Circuit Court may be filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, within time allowed to appeal to that court; Steen v. March, 132 Cal. 618, 64 Pac. 995, holding court of equity will not entertain bill of review for new trial on expiration of time for taking appeal; Watkinson v. Watkinson, 68 N. J. Eq. 641, 642, 60 Atl. 935, bill of review cannot be filed after lapse of three years from final decree; Williams v. Starkweather, 24 R. I. 513, 53 Atl. 870, holding bill of review in equity cannot be maintained when brought more than one year after entry of decree; Keith v. Alger, 124 Fed. 35, holding to maintain bill of review party must show that new evidence substantially affects party; Chamberlin v. Peoria etc. Ry. Co., 118 Fed. 33, holding where no certificate of jurisdictional question is certified by Circuit Court during term, as required by judiciary act March 3, 1891, § 5, the court cannot subsequently make certificate; dissenting opinion in Hendryx v. Perkins, 114 Fed. 826, majority holding bill to impeach prior decree for fraud is original bill and not bill of review; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168, 6 L. Ed. 294, holding lapse of twenty years barred title based upon elder grant and entry; Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 263, 12 L. Ed. 145, where court refused to go behind executor's final account after lapse of twenty years and death of parties; Boon v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 221, 9 L. Ed. 404, holding complainant's equitable right to have conveyance of legal title barred as to several defendants by lapse of time; Ricker v. Powell, 100 U. S. 109, 25 L. Ed. 529, affirming decree refusing leave to file bill of review based on errors of law, because petition filed too late; Clark v. Killian, 103 U. S. 769, 26 L. Ed. 608, holding bill of review filed before time for appeal passed was filed in time; Trust Co. v. Works, 135 U. S. 227, 34 L. Ed. 105, 10 Sup. Ct. 742, affirming order striking bills of review from the files because not filed until after expiration of time within which to appeal; Taylor v. Insurance Co., 3 McCrary, 486, 17 Fed. 567, where bill of review dismissed because not filed until after time within which writ of error could have been brought; Massie v. Graham, 3 McLean, 52, Fed. Cas. 9263, where leave to file bill denied on ground that due diligence in discovery of new matter rot shown, and more than thirty years had elapsed since decree; Baker v.