Britain devoted themselves to the cause of the Africans; and, by frequent appeals to the nation, in which the enormity of this commerce was unveiled and exposed to the public eye, the general sentiment was at length roused against it, and the feelings of justice and humanity, regaining their long lost ascendency, prevailed so far in the British Parliament as to obtain an act for its abolition. The utmost efforts of the British government, as well as of that of the United States, have since been assiduously employed *in its suppression. It has been de- [*116 not "effects," or "merchandise." To say that, they are so, is to beg the whole question in controversy. The opinions of the twelve judges of England, and of the law officers of the crown, in 1689, which have been cited to show that negroes were considered as merchandise, within the terms of the navigation act, only prove that they were so considered at that time with reference to the British colonies, into which their importation was then permitted. Even at that period, negroes in England were not considered as merchandise, or the objects of traffic, or liable to be held in servitude. Everything must depend upon the law prevail-nounced by both in terms of great severity, 114] ing at the time and place. By the law applicable to this case, these persons are free; they cannot, therefore, be considered as merchandise or effects within the treaty. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the case, proceeded as follows: In prosecuting this appeal, the United States assert no property in themselves. They appear in the character of guardians, or next friends, of these Africans, who are brought, without any act of their own, into the bosom of our country, insist on their right to freedom, and submit their claim to the laws of the land, and to the tribunals of the nation. The consuls of Spain and Portugal, respectively, demand these Africans as slaves, who have, in the regular course of legitimate commerce, been acquired as property by the subjects of their respective sovereigns, and claim their restitution under the laws of the United States. In examining claims of this momentous importance; claims in which the sacred rights of liberty and of property come in conflict with each other; which have drawn from the bar a degree of talent and of eloquence worthy of the questions that have been discussed; this court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, and must obey the mandate of the law. That the course of opinion on the slave trade should be unsettled, ought to excite no surprise. The Christian and civilized nations of 115*] the world, *with whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in it. However abhorrent this traffic may be to a mind whose original feelings are not blunted by familiarity with the practice, it has been sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all nations who possess distant colonies, each of whom has engaged in it as a common commer cial business which no other could rightfully interrupt. It has claimed all the sanction which could be derived from long usage, and general acquiescence. That trade could not be considered as contrary to the law of nations which was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial nations; the right to carry on which was claimed by each, and allowed by each. The course of unexamined opinion, which was founded on this inveterate usage, received its first check in America; and, as soon as these states acquired the right of self-government, the traffic was forbidden by most of them. In the beginning of this century, several humane and enlightened individuals of Great in and those concerned in it are subjected to the heaviest penalties which law can inflict. addition to these measures operating on their own people, they have used all their influence to bring other nations into the same system, and to interdict this trade by the consent of all. Public sentiment has, in both countries, kept pace with the measures of government; and the opinion is extensively, if not universally entertained, that. this unnatural traffic ought to be suppressed. While its illegality is asserted by some governments, but not admitted by all; while the detestation in which it is held is growing daily, and even those nations who tolerate it in fact, almost disavow their own conduct, and rather connive at, than legalize, the acts of their subjects; it is not wonderful that public feeling should march somewhat in advance of strict law, and that opposite opinions should be entertained on the precise cases in which our own laws may control and limit the practice of others. Indeed, we ought not to be surprised, if, on this novel series of cases, even courts of justice should, in some instances, have carried the principle of suppression farther than a more deliberate consideration of the subject would justify. The Amedie, 1 Acton's Rep. 240, which was an American vessel employed in the African trade, was captured by a British cruiser, and condemned in the Vice-Admiralty Court of Tortola. *An appeal was prayed; and [*117 Sir William Grant, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, that the trade being then declared unjust and unlawful by Great Britain, "a claimant could have no right, upon principles of universal law, to claim restitution in a prize court, of human beings carried as his slaves. He must show some right that has been violated by the capture, some property of which he has been dispossessed, and to which he ought to be restored. In this case, the laws of the claimant's country allow of no right of property such as he claims. There can, therefore, be no right of restitution. The consequence is, that the judgment must be affirmed." The Fortuna, 1 Dodson's Rep. 81, was condemned on the authority of The Amedie, and the same principle was again affirmed. The Diana, 1 Dodson's Rep. 95, was a Swedish vessel, captured with a cargo of slaves, by a British cruiser, and condemned in the Court of Vice-Admiralty at Sierra Leone. This sentence was reversed on appeal, and Sir William Scott, in pronouncing the sentence of reversal, said, "the condemnation also took place on a principle which this court cannot in any manner recognize, inasmuch as the sentence try." affirms, 'that the slave trade, from motives of, legal act done by your own subject, and leave humanity, hath been abolished by most the foreigner to the justice of his own councivilized nations, and is not, at the present time, legally authorized by any.' This appears to me to be an assertion by no means sustain able." The ship and cargo were restored, on the principle that the trade was allowed by the laws of Sweden. 118*] *The principle common to these cases is, that the legality of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, depends on the law of the country to which the vessel belongs. If that law gives its sanction to the trade, restitution will be decreed; if that law prohibits it, the vessel and cargo will be condemned as good prize. This whole subject came on afterwards to be considered in The Louis, 2. Dodson's Rep. 238. The opinion of Sir William Scott, in that case, demonstrates the attention he had bestowed upon it, and gives full assurance that it may be considered as settling the law in the British courts of admiralty as far as it goes. The Louis was a French vessel, captured on a slaving voyage, before she had purchased any slaves, brought into Sierra Leone, and condemned by the Vice-Admiralty Court at that place. On an appeal to the Court of Admiralty in England, the sentence was reversed. In the very full and elaborate opinion given on this case, Sir William Scott, in explicit terms, lays down the broad principle that the right of search is confined to a state of war. It is a right strictly belligerent in its character, which can never be exercised by a nation at peace, except against professed pirates, who are the enemies of the human race. The act of trading in slaves, however detestable, was not, he said, "the act of freebooters, enemies of the human race, renouncing every country, and ravaging every country, in its coasts and vessels, indiscriminately." It was not piracy. 119*] *He also said that this trade could not be pronounced contrary to the law of tions. "A court, in the administration of law, cannot attribute criminality to an act where the law imputes none. It must look to the legal standard of morality; and, upon a ques tion of this nature, that standard must be found in the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general, and ancient, and admitted practice, by treaties, and by the general tenor of the laws and ordinances, and the formal transactions of civilized states; and, looking to those authorities, he found a difficulty in maintaining that the transaction was legally criminal." This reasoning goes far in support of the proposition that, in the British courts [*120 of admiralty, the vessel even of a nation which had forbidden the slave trade, but had not conceded the right of search, must, if wrongfully brought in, be restored to the original owner. But the judge goes farther, and shows that no evidence existed to prove that France had, by law, forbidden that trade. Consequently, for this reason, as well as for that previously assigned, the sentence of condemnation was reversed, and restitution awarded. In the United States, different opinions have been entertained in the different circuits and districts; and the subject is now, for the first time, before this court. The question whether the slave trade is prohibited by the law of nations has been seriously propounded, and both the affirmative and negative of the proposition have been maintained with equal earnestness. That it is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied. That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this admission. But from the earliest times war has existed, and war confers rights in which all have ac quiesced. Among the most enlightened nations of antiquity, one of these was, that the victor might enslave the vanquished. This, which was the usage of all, could not be pronounced repugnant to the law of nations, which is certainly to be tried by the test of general usage. That which has re- [*121 ceived the assent of all, must be the law of all. Slavery, then, has its origin in force; but as the world has agreed that it is a legitimate rena-sult of force, the state of things which is thus produced by general consent, cannot be pronounced unlawful. The right of visitation and search being strictly a belligerent right, and the slave trade being neither piratical nor contrary to the law of nations, the principle is asserted and maintained with great strength of reasoning, that it cannot be exercised on the vessels of a foreign power, unless permitted by treaty. France had refused to assent to the insertion of such an article in her treaty with Great Britain, and, consequently, the right could not be exercised on the high seas by a British cruiser on a French vessel. But Throughout Christendom, this harsh rule has been exploded, and war is no longer considered as giving a right to enslave captives. this triumph of humanity has not been universal. The parties to the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by force; and Africa has not yet adopted them. Throughout the whole extent of that immense continent, so far as we know its history, it is still the law of nations that prisoners are slaves. Can those who have themselves renounced this law, be permitted to participate in its effects by purchasing the beings who are its victims? Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist must search for its legal solution in those principles of action which are sanctioned by the usages, the national acts, and the general assent of that portion of the world of which he considers himself as a part, and to whose law the appeal is made. If we resort to this standard as the test of international law, the question, as has already "It is pressed as a difficulty," says the been observed, is decided in favor of the legalijudge, "what is to be done, if a French ship, ty of the trade. Both Europe and America emladen with slaves, is brought in? I answer, barked in it; and for nearly two centuries it without hesitation, restore the possession which was carried on without opposition, and withhas been unlawfully devested; rescind the il-out censure. A jurist could *not say [*122 that a practice thus supported was illegal, and her to be a pirate, or a vessel wishing to smugthat those engaged in it might be punished, gle slaves into the United States, Captain Jackeither personally, or by deprivation of proper-son, of the revenue cutter Dallas, went in quest ty. of her, and finding her laden with slaves, comIn this commerce, thus sanctioned by uni-manded by officers who were citizens of the versal assent, every nation had an equal right United States, with a crew who spoke English, to engage. How is this right to be lost? Each brought her in for adjudication. may renounce it for its own people; but can this renunciation affect others? No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all by the consent of all, can be devested only by consent; and this trade, in which all have participated, must remain law ful to those who cannot be induced to relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden it. If it is consistent with the law of nations, it cannot in itself be piracy. It can be made so only by statute; and the obligation of the statute cannot transcend the legislative power of the state which may enact it. If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is almost superfluous to say in this court that the right of bringing in for adjudication in time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has pro123*] hibited the trade, *cannot exist. The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another; and the course of the American government on the subject of visitation and search, would decide any case in which that right had been exercised by an American crusier, on the vessel of a foreign nation, not violating our municipal laws, against the captors. It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade, captured on the high seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in for adjudication, would be restored. The general question being disposed of, it remains to examine the circumstances of the particular case. The Antelope, a vessel unquestionably be longing to Spanish subjects, was captured while receiving a cargo of Africans on the coast of Africa, by the Arraganta, a privateer which was manned in Baltimore, and is said to have been then under the flag of the Oriental Republic. Some other vessels, said to be Portuguese, engaged in the same traffic, were previously plundered, and the slaves taken from them, as well as from another vessel then in the same port, were put on board the Antelope, of which vessel the Arraganta took possession, landed her crew, and put on board a prizemaster and prize crew. Both vessels proceeded to the coast of Brazil, where the Arraganta was wrecked, and her captain and crew either lost or made prisoners. The Antelope, whose name was changed to the General Ramirez, after an ineffectual at124*] tempt *to sell the Africans on board at Surinam, arrived off the coast of Florida, and was hovering on that coast, near that of the United States, for several days. Supposing She was libeled by the vice-consuls of Spain and Portugal, each of whom claim that portion of the slaves which were conjectured to belong to the subjects of their respective sovereigns; which claims are opposed by the United States on behalf of the Africans. In the argument, the question on whom the onus probandi is imposed, has been considered as of great importance, and the testimony adduced by the parties has been critically examined. It is contended that the Antelope, having been wrongfully dispossessed of her slaves by American citizens, and being now, together with her cargo, in the power of the United States, ought to be restored, without further inquiry, to those out of whose possession she was thus wrongfully taken. No proof of property, it is said, ought to be required. Possession is in such a case evidence of property. Conceding this as a general proposition, the counsel for the United States deny its application to this case. A distinction is taken between *men, who are generally free, [*125 and goods, which are always property. Although, with respect to the last, possession may constitute the only proof of property which is demandable, something more is necessary where men are claimed. Some proof should be exhibited that the possession was legally acquired. A distinction has been also drawn between Africans unlawfully taken from the subjects of a foreign power by persons acting under the authority of the United States, and Africans first captured by a belligerent privateer, or by a pirate, and then brought rightfully into the United States, under a reasonable apprehension that a violation of their laws was intended. Being rightfully in the possession of an American court, that court, it is contended, must be governed by the laws of its own country; and the condition of these Africans must depend on the laws of the United States, not on the laws of Spain and Portugal. Had the Arraganta been a regularly commissioned cruiser, which had committed no infrac tion of the neutrality of the United States, her capture of the Antelope must have been considered as lawful, and no question could have arisen respecting the rights of the original claimants. The question of prize or no prize belongs solely to the courts of the captor. But, having violated the neutrality of the United States, and having entered our ports, not voluntarily, but under coercion, some difficulty exists respecting the extent of the obligation to restore, on the mere *proof of former [*126 possession, which is imposed on this govern ment. If, as is charged in the libels of both the consuls, as well as of the United States, she was a pirate, hovering on the coast with intent to introduce slaves in violation of the laws of the United States, our treaty requires that property rescued from pirates shall be restored to the Spanish owner on his making proof of | 23d, when she was finally captured, we are his property. Whether the General Ramirez, originally the Antelope, is to be considered as the prize of a commissioned belligerent ship of war unlawfully equipped in the United States, or as a pirate, it seems proper to make some inquiry into the title of the claimants. In support of the Spanish claim, testimony is produced, showing the documents under which the Antelope sailed from the Havana on the voyage on which she was captured; that she was owned by a Spanish house of trade in that place; that she was employed in the business of purchasing slaves, and had purchased and taken on board a considerable number, when she was seized as prize by the Arraganta. Whether, on this proof, Africans brought into the United States, under the various circumstances belonging to this case, ought to be restored or not, is a question on which much difficulty has been felt. It is unnecessary to state the reasons in support of the affirmative or negative answer to it, because the court is divided on it, and, consequently, no principle is settled. So much of the decree of the Cir127*] cuit Court as directs *restitution to the Spanish claimant of the Africans found on board the Antelope when she was captured by the Arraganta, is affirmed. There is some difficulty in ascertaining their number. The libel claims one hundred and fifty as belonging to Spanish subjects, and charges that one hundred or more of these were on board the Antelope. Grondona and Ximenes, Spanish officers of the Antelope before her capture, both depose positively to the number of one hundred and sixty-six. Some deduction, however, is to be made from the weight of Grondona's testimony, because, he says, in one of his depositions, that he did not count the slaves on the last day when some were brought on board, and adds, that he had lost his papers, and spoke from memory, and from the information he had received from others of the crew, after his arrival in the Havana. Such of the crew as were examined, concur with Grondona and Ximenes as to numbers. The depositions of the Spanish witnesses on this point, are opposed by those of John Smith, the captain of the General Ramirez, and William Brunton, one of the crew of the Arraganta, who was transferred to the Antelope. John Smith deposes that ninety-three Africans were found on board the Antelope when captured, which he believes to have been Spanish property. He also says, that one hundred and eight-three were taken out of Portuguese vessels. William Brunton deposes that more slaves 128*] *were taken out of the Portuguese ship than were in any other, and that ninety odd were represented by the crew to have been on board the Antelope when she was captured. If, to the positive testimony of these witnesses, we add the inference to be drawn from the statement of the libel, and the improbability that so large a number of Africans as are claimed could have been procured, under the circumstances in which the Antelope was placed, between the 13th, when she was liberated by the first pirate who seized her, and the rather disposed to think the weight of testimony is in favor of the smaller number. But supposing perfect equality in this respect, the decision ought, we think, to be against the claimant. Whatever doubts may attend the question whether the Spanish claimants are entitled to restitution of all the Africans taken out of their possession with the Antelope, we cannot doubt the propriety of demanding ample proof of the extent of that possession. Every legal principle which requires the plaintiff to prove his claim in any case, applies with full force to this point; and no countervailing consideration exists. The onus probandi, as to the number of Africans which were on board when the vessel was captured, unquestionably lies on the Spanish libelants. Their proof is not satisfactory beyond ninety-three. The individuals who compose this number must be designated to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court. *We proceed next to consider the libel [*129 of the vice-consul of Portugal. It claims one hundred and thirty slaves, or more, "all of whom, as the libelant is informed and believes," are the property of a subject or subjects of His Most Faithful Majesty; and although "the rightful owners of such slaves be not at this time individually and certainly known to the libelant, he hopes and expects soon to discover them." John Smith and William Brunton, whose depositions have already been noticed, both state that several Africans were taken out of Portuguese vessels; but neither of them state the means by which they ascertained the national character of the vessels they had plundered. It does not appear that their opinions were founded on any other fact than the flag under which the vessel sailed. Grondona, also, states the plunder of a Portuguese vessel, lying in the same port, and engaged in the same traffic with the Antelope when she was captured; but his testimony is entirely destitute of all those circumstances which would enable us to say that he had any knowledge of the real character of the vessel, other than was derived from her flag. The cause furnishes no testimony of any description, other than these general declarations, that the proprietors of the Africans now claimed by the vice-consul of Portugal were the subjects of his King; nor is there any allusion to the individuals to whom they belong. These vessels were plundered in March, 1820, and the libel was filed in August of the same year. From that [*130 time to this, a period of more than five years, no subject of the crown of Portugal has appeared to assert his title to this property, no individual has been designated as its probable owner. This inattention to a subject of so much real interest, this total disregard of a valuable property, is so contrary to the common course of human action as to justify serious suspicion that the real owner dares not avow himself. That Americans, and others, who cannot use the flag of their own nation, carry on this criminal and inhuman traffic under the flags of other countries, is a fact of such general notoriety, that courts of admiralty may act upon it. It cannot be necessary to take particular depositions, to prove a fact which is matter of general and public history. This long, and otherwise unaccountable absence, of any Portuguese claimant, furnishes irresistible testimony that no such claimant exists, and that the real owner belongs to some other nation, and feels the necessity of concealment. An attempt has been made to supply this defect of testimony, by adducing a letter from the secretary to whose department the foreign relations of Portugal are supposed to be intrusted, suggesting the means of transporting to Portugal those slaves which may be in the possession of the vice-consul, as the property of his fellow-subjects. Allow to this document all the effect which can be claimed for it, and it can do no more than supply the want of 131*] an express power *from the owners of the slaves to receive them. It cannot be considered as ascertaining the owners, or as proving their property. The difficulty, then, is not diminished by this paper. These Africans still remain unclaimed by the owner, or by any person professing to know the owner. They are rightfully taken from American citizens, and placed in possession of the law. No property whatever in them is shown. It is said, that possession, in a case of this description, is equivalent to property. Could this be conceded, who had the possession? From whom were they taken by the Arraganta? It is not alleged that they are the property of the crown, but of some individual. Who is that individual? No such person is shown to exist, and his existence, after such a lapse of time, cannot be presumed. The libel, which claims them for persons entirely unknown, alleges a state of things which is prima facie evidence of an intent to violate the laws of the United States, by the commission of an act which, according to those laws, entitles these men to freedom. Nothing whatever can interpose to arrest the course of the law, but the title of the real proprietor. No such title appears, and every presumption is against its existence. We think, then, that all the Africans, now in possession of the marshal of the district of Georgia, and under the control of the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, which were brought in with the Antelope, 132*] otherwise called the General Ramirez, except those which may be designated as the property of the Spanish claimants, ought to be delivered up to the United States, to be disposed of according to law. So much of the sentence of the Circuit Court as is contrary to this opinion, is to be reversed, and the residue affirmed. Decree. This cause came on to be heard, etc. On consideration whereof, this court is of opinion that there is error in so much of the sentence and decree of the said Circuit Court, as directs the restitution to the Spanish claim ant of the Africans in the proceedings mentioned, in the ratio which one hundred and sixty-six bears to the whole number of those which remained alive at the time of pronouncing the said decree; and also in so much thereof as directs restitution to the Portuguese claimant; and that so much of the said decree ought to be reversed, and it is hereby reversed and annulled. And this court, proceeding to give such decree as the said Circuit Court ought to have given, doth direct and order that the restitution to be made to the Spanish claimant, shall be according to the ratio which ninetythree (instead of one hundred and sixty-six) bears to the whole number, comprehending as well those originally on board the Antelope as those which were put on board that vessel by the captain of the Arraganta. After making the apportionment according to this ratio, and deducting from the number the ratable loss which must fall on the slaves to which the Spanish claimants were originally entitled, the residue of the said ninety-three are [*133 to be delivered to the Spanish claimant, on the terms in the said decree mentioned; and all the remaining Africans are to be delivered to the United States, to be disposed of according to law; and the said decree of the said Circuit Court is, in all things not contrary to this decree, affirmed. A question of fact under the slave trade acts, as to a vessel claimed by a Spanish subject, as having been engaged in the trade under the laws of his own country, but proved to have been originally equipped in the United States for the voyage in question. Under the slave trade act of 1794, c. 11, the forfeiture attaches where the original voyage is commenced in the United States; whether the vessel act is done suo jure, or by an agent for the benefit belong to citizens or foreigners, and whether the of another person who is not a citizen or resident of the United States. ish subject, and the commencement of a new voyCircumstances of a pretended transfer to a Spanage in a Spanish port, held not to be sufficient to break the continuity of the original adventure, and to avoid the forfeiture. It is not necessary, to incur the forfeiture under the slave trade acts, that the equipments for the voyage should be completed. It is sufficient if any preparations are made for the unlawful purpose. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. This was a seizure of the schooner Platts burgh, otherwise called the Maria Gertrudes, States ship of war, the Cyane, in the year 1820. on the coast of Africa, made by the United The vessel was brought into the port [*134 of New York for adjudication, and a libel of information was filed in the District Court, under the acts of Congress of 1794, c. 11, and of 1800, c. 205, prohibiting the slave trade. A claim was given in on behalf of Juan Marino, a Spanish subject, and a resident merchant of St. Jago de Cuba. Upon the proofs taken, a decree of condemnation was nounced in the District Court, which was affirmed in the Circuit Court pro forma, and the cause was brought by appeal to this court. pro The cause was argued by Mr. Jones and Mr. Mayer' for the appellants, and by the Attorney NOTE. As to what constitutes a violation of the laws against the slave trade, see note ante, 268. 1. They cited The Diana, 1 Dodson's Rep. 95; The Louis, 2 Dodson's Rep. 228. |