The declaration laid, as special damage, that one Palmer, who had been surety for the plaintiff for the rent of his farm, had, in consequence of the slander, withdrawn from his suretyship; and that, by means of the premises, the plaintiff's wife died, whereby the plaintiff had lost her comfort, assistance, and services (a); and the plaintiff fell sick and underwent great pain of body, &c. Plea, not guilty. At the trial of the cause before Gurney B., at the last Leicestershire assizes, it appeared that the plaintiff, who was a farmer, was the son-in-law of the defendant, a major-general on half-pay; and that the marriage had taken place without his consent. The words were proved as laid, but the proof of special damage wholly failed. It was contended, on the part of the defendant, that the words were not actionable per se; but the objection was overruled, and plaintiff recovered a verdict with 50%. damages; leave was, however, reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. Channell Serjt. now moved accordingly; but he admitted the authorities were against him. He referred to Com. Dig. tit. Action upon the case for defamation (D. 29.), and Carslake v. Mapledoram. (b) TINDAL C. J. This case falls within the principle of the old authorities. Per curiam ; 1844. BLOODWORTH บ. GRAY. (a) As to the effect of the death, see Higgin's case, Noy, Rep. 18. S. C. 2 Roll. Abr. 557. pl. 21.; Ib. 568. pl. 2, 3. ; Rule refused. Anon. cited 1 Keble, 847.; Fet- 1844. April 19. A., B., and C. were partowners of a WILLIAM CURLING and Others v. MARGARET DEBT, for work and materials; money paid; the use and occupation of a dock and premises, &c., ship, C. being whilst a certain ship or vessel of the defendant was the managing undergoing repair therein, and on an account stated. Plea, never indebted. owner. In June A., on his own ac count and as agent for B., contracted for the sale of their shares with C., on behalf of D. C. accepted a bill for part of the price. In August B. executed a bill of sale and A. to C. in bonâ fide pursuance of the former contract. C. after the At the trial before Tindal C. J., at the sittings for London after last term, the following facts appeared. The action was brought to recover 13987. 14s. for necessary repairs done by the plaintiffs, who were shipbuilders at Limehouse, to a ship called the Fergusson, between the 10th of July 1840, and the 5th of August following. Previously to the month of June 1840, the defendant, her brother (William Robertson), and one Bishop, were joint registered owners of the Fergusson. The defendfrom himself ant held 10 sixty-fourth shares, W. Robertson 22 sixtyfourths, and Bishop 32 sixty-fourths, (being one half of the whole vessel.) By an indorsement on the register it appeared that, on the 30th of March W. Robertson had transferred the ten shares to the defendant; that on the 9th of September, by a bill of sale, dated the 13th of July previous, he transferred his shares to one Virtue; and that, on the same 9th of September, the defendant, by a bill of sale, dated the 18th of August previous, transferred her shares to Bishop. About the beginning of June, W. Robertson, for himself and as the agent of the defendant, entered into a contract with Virtue, for the sale of his own and the defendant's interest in the ship, for 2200l. in cash, and a bill for 1000l. which was drawn by W. Robertson on Virtue, and accepted by original contract of sale, ordered some repairs to the ship, which were done before the bill of sale was xecu ted: Held, that B. was not liable for such repairs. 1844. CURLING v. Bishop for the honour of Virtue. This contract was negotiated by Bishop on behalf of Virtue, and there was a verbal understanding between them that Virtue's brother should have the option, when he became of age, of taking ROBERTSON. the ten shares. The bill of sale from W. Robertson to Virtue, and from the defendant to Bishop, corresponded with the indorsement on the register. The order for the repairs was given by Bishop, who acted as managing owner or ship's husband; and they were all undertaken and performed after W. Robertson had disposed of his own and the defendant's interest in the ship, but before the bills of sale. The repairs were done upon eighteen months' credit; and before that period expired Bishop became a bankrupt. The defendant was not known to the plaintiffs as a part-owner at the time of the repairs, nor had she ever interfered in the matter. The Lord Chief Justice left it to the jury to say, whether the defendant, at the time the repairs were done, had parted with her beneficial interest in the ship, and whether the bill of sale from the defendant to Bishop was a bonâ fide carrying out of the previous contract; and that, if they found in the affirmative on both points, they ought to return a verdict for the defendant. They returned a verdict for the defendant; leave being reserved to the plaintiffs, to move to enter a verdict for them, for the amount claimed. Channell Serjt. now moved accordingly. Between the months of March and September, during which period the repairs were done, the defendant was a registered owner of the ship. Admitting that the mere fact o. the defendant being a registered owner will not make her liable, unless credit was given to her, it was shewn that the repairs were necessary, and credit therefore would, primâ facie, be given to the owners generally; 1844, CURLING v. ROBERTSON. - Thompson v. Finden. (a) Notwithstanding the contract in June the legal ownership was not divested from the defendant till the execution of the bill of sale. [Tindal C.J. The money was paid before.] There was nothing to shew that the bill of sale was executed in completion of the original contract. [Coltman J. Was not the result of the finding of the jury that the bill of sale was the completion of the contract?] The defendant was not bound to execute the bill of sale- she did so voluntarily. Undoubtedly where a charterer orders repairs, he is liable for them; so in the case of a mortgagee of a ship: but in those cases there is an express contract; where there is not, the owner is liable for all necessary repairs. [Cresswell J. Does not the question come back to this, had Bishop, who ordered the repairs, any authority, express or implied, to pledge the defendant's credit, and did he in fact pledge it?] A managing owner has an implied authority to pledge the credit of his co-owner. In Dowson v. Leake (b), where there were two joint owners of a ship, and one, by private agreement, parted with all his interest in his share to the other, to be paid for by bills at different dates, but kept his name on the register by way of collateral security for the payment of the bills, it was held that he was liable for repairs done to the ship subsequently to the agreement, although he had never afterwards interfered in the concerns or management of the ship. [Tindal C. J. Probably in that case, there was no conveyance to carry out the contract. Cresswell J. There was a time when it was thought that the insertion of a party's name in the register as owner, made him liable, in all cases, for repairs (c); but that doctrine has been repudiated. (d) ] (a) 4 C. & P. 158. (b) D. & R. N. P. C. 52. (d) See M'Iver v. Humble, 16 East, 169.; Baker v. Buckle, 7 J. B. Moore, 349. 1844. CURLING v. Jennings v. Griffiths (a) is certainly an authority which tends that way. (6) In that case, Dowson v. Long ford was referred to, which is probably the same case as Dowson v. Leake. It must be admitted that if the ROBERTSON. owner parts with his equitable interest in the ship, and the purchaser of such interest orders repairs, the owner is not liable; but here, no credit was given to any one but the owners. [Cresswell J. The order was given by Bishop. But has a managing owner authority to bind an unwilling co-owner?] Not in the case of express dissent. But he would have a general authority as agent. [Cresswell J. How can Bishop be considered as agent for the defendant, when he had accepted a bill for the price of her shares ?] It does not appear when the defendant got that bill. [Coltman J. In Young v. Brander (c), where the purchaser of a ship, in the interval between the inception and completion of his conveyance, ordered the master to take her to a shipwright to be repaired, which was done accordingly, the seller, although deemed to be the legal owner at the time, was held not to be answerable to the shipwright.] Here, the repairs are ordered by the ship's husband; and he is authorized to order them on the credit of the legal owners; a tradesman in such a case is not estopped from his remedy against the owners, upon the ground that he has given express credit to the party who gave the orders for the repairs. TINDAL C. J. I think this falls within that class of cases, in which the legal owner of a ship having parted with his beneficial interest, the question arises whether the party giving an order for repairs, had any authority to do so from such owner. In this case there is no evi (a) Ry. & M. 42. (b) See also Harrington v. Fry, 1 C. & P. 289. (c) 8 East, 10. |