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sition at Petersburg. We consider this step as one, which, more decidedly than any other, tended by its consequences to produce the termination of the contest between Great Britain' and the United States. It led directly, as is well known, to the most splendid achievement which honored the American arms during the war-the capture of his whole army; and this was most effectual toward convincing the British of the vanity of continuing their attempts for our subjugation. The reasons which influenced Cornwallis to this momentous proceeding, we will give in his own words, as they are found in his answer to the narrative of sir Henry Clinton. He is speak ing of the failure of the reinforcements, which he expected from the royalists in Carolina after his victory at Guilford.→ "This disappointment, and the wants and distresses of the army, compelled me to move to Cross Creek; but meeting there with no material part of the promised assistance and supplies, I was obliged to continue my march to Wilming ton, where hospitals and stores were ready for us. Of this move I sent information by several expresses to lord Rawdon; but unfortunately they all failed. My intention then was, as soon as I should have equipped my own corps, and received a part of the expected reinforcements from Ireland, to return to the upper country; in hopes of giving some protection to South Carolina, and of preserving the health of the troops, until new measures could be concerted with the commander in chief. The march of general Greene into South Carolina, and lord Rawdon's danger, made my situation very critical. Having heard of the arrival of a pacquet from Europe, without any certain accounts of the sailing of the reinforcement, I thought it too hazardous to remain inactive; and, as it was impossible to receive in time any orders or opinions from sir Henry Clinton to direct me, it became my duty to act from my own judgment and experience. I there, fore, upon mature deliberation, decided to march into Virgin.

ia, as the safest and most effectual means of employing the small corps under my command, in contributing towards the general success of the war. I came to this resolution principally for the following reasons-I could not remain at Wilmington, lest general Greene should succeed against lord Rawdon, and, by returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry and every horse in the army :-) -From the shortness of lord Rawdon's stock of provisions, and the great distance from Wilmington to Cambden, it appeared impossible that any direct move of mine could afford him the least prospect of relief: in the attempt, in case of a misfortune to him, the safety of my own corps might have been endangered; or, if he extricated himself, the force in South Carolina, when assembled, was in my opinion sufficient to secure what was valuable to us, and capable of defence in that province. I was likewise influenced by having just received an account from Charles-town, of the arrival of a frigate with despatches from the commander in chief, the substance of which, then transmitted to me, was, that general Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak, and put under my orders, which induced me to hope, that solid operations might be adopted in that quarter :-and I was most firmly persuaded that until Virginia was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces, and that after its reduction, they would fall without much resistance, and be retained without much difficulty."*

General Lee has devoted a chapter to an account of the invasions of Virginia by Arnold and Phillips. The only object of these seemed to be, to depress the spirits of the inhabitants by desolating and laying waste the country; and the most shameful ravages were committed upon private property. No force adequate to its defence being in the state, there was little oppo

* Introduction to Cornwallis' Reply, 1783, pp. v-viii.

sition made to this war of depredation. But indications ap pearing of an intention to make a permanent establishment of the British force in Virginia, the Marquis de la Fayette was detached from Washington's army to its protection. His force, which was not equal to that under general Phillips, and a number of troops collected under the Baron Steuben, who were intended as a reinforcement for general Greene, were all that appeared to oppose Cornwallis when he arrived at Petersburg; but La Fayette was in momentary expectation of reinforcements from the main army under general Wayne. To prevent the junction of these forces, Cornwallis made an ineffectual attempt to overtake La Fayette. Had he acted with his former spirit, he would easily have done it. But we are no longer to look upon Cornwallis as the same character, when we view him in his operations in Virginia, as that in which he appeared to us in the Carolinas. From causes, not entirely understood either disagreement with sir Henry Clinton, or disappointment as to his own plans, or disgust at a service which he now saw promised no successful issue-he discovered in the new situation which he had chosen, no portion of those talents which had kept the southern states in agitation, and had almost subjected them again to the British power. Two expeditions* were executed by his light troops, which were of no great moment; when Wayne having reached La Fayette, they moved toward the British commander. Neglecting opportunities of striking his still inferior foe, Cornwallis retired upon the approach of La Fayette; and, in conformity to the wishes of Clinton, now directed his attention to the establishment of a post, where a harbour could be provided for ships of the line

* One of these, under colonel Simcoe, was for the purpose of destroying the stores at the point of Fork, and was successful. The other, under colonel Tarleton, was sent to seize the governor, (Jefferson,) and the members of the assembly, convened at Charlotteville. Only a few of the members were captured; and the governor "very readily saved himself by taking shelter in an adjacent spur of the mountains."

during the winter. Moving to Jamestown, he commenced the passage of the river at that place on his way to Portsmouth. La Fayette, having been joined by Steuben, determined to strike a blow upon his enemy when the greater part of his troops should have passed the river. He advanced with this intention to within a short distance of the British army, and conceiving the proper moment to be at hand, he made his attack. But he had been deceived in the information which had been given him, and to his surprise found that the greatest part of Cornwallis' army had not yet crossed the river. He was obliged rapidly to retreat with considerable loss;* but although he had placed himself entirely in the power of the enemy, he was not pursued by the once enterprizing Cornwallis. Of the character of La Fayette, and of his conduct when formerly compelled to fly before the British commander, general Lee thus speaks:

"In this period of gloom, of disorder, and of peril, La Fay "ette was collected and undismayed. With zeal, with cour❝age, and with sagacity, he discharged his arduous duties; " and throughout his difficult retreat was never brought even "to array but once in order for battle-Invigorating our coun"sels by his precepts; dispelling our despondency by his ex"ample; and encouraging his troops to submit to their ma"ny privations, by the cheerfulness with which he participated " in their wants; he imparted the energy of his own mind to "the country, and infused his high toned spirit into his ar"my."t

*

Judge Marshall implies that the action on this occasion was be. gun before the orders had been given by the commander; and that he, having discovered his mistake, would have avoided one, except for its accidental commencement. General Lee however informs us, that Fayette trusted to the report of his observers, and did not know his error till the engagement began.

Vol. ii. p. 233.

Cornwallis, pursuing the designs of his commander in chief, determined upon the occupation of Yorktown, and of Gloucester on the opposite side of the river, for the security of the shipping; and accordingly employed himself in fortifying these posts. Meanwhile the position of the American troops was taken with the design of preventing his return to Carolina, had he determined on such a movement.* The events which followed the occupation of York, until its surrender to the united force of France and America, must be too familiar to allow us to recapitulate them; especially as our limits would

General Lee has occupied several pages with remarks upon the probable causes, of what may without hesitation be called the misconduct of lord Cornwallis; and he has discovered a partiality, toward him, which, although it has not led him to attempt his entire exculpation, has, we think, caused him to represent sir Henry Clinton too much as the cause of what was wrong. We have before expressed our opinion upon the results of the publications of these two officers. With respect to the selection of Yorktown, we may further observe, that this place was not originally proposed by Clinton, but that he relinquished his design of having some other places fortified, and acceded to the proposal for occupying this, in consequence of the representations of Cornwallis. "At present," says the latter in a letter to Clinton of the twenty sixth of May, 1781, "I am inclined to think well of York. My objections to Portsmouth are," &c. nor did he express any dissatisfaction with this post, until he had surrendered it, when he wrote again to his commander in chief, giving information of his loss. In this letter of the twentieth of October he says of the place which he had surrendered, "I never saw this post in a very favorable light." The best excuse which can be made for the marquis on this occasion is, that he was suffering from the mortification which his misfortune must have produced; and we think that his whole conduct in Virginia may be best explained by 'supposing him to have yielded to the influence of some cause of irritation and vexation, which carried him from his duty. We do not mean however to imply by any thing which we have said, that we think sir Henry Clinton's conduct. indicated consummate generalship, or even that it did not deserve much blame.

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