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X.

1777.

disapproves

March 1.

They decreed, that Colonel Campbell, a British prisoner CHAPTER in Massachusetts, and five Hessian field-officers taken at Trenton, should be subjected to precisely the same treatment as General Lee. The consequence was, that Colonel Campbell was confined in a common jail, and the Hessian officers, who had been sent to Virginia, were deprived of the privileges usually granted to prisoners of war. General Washington at once saw the injurious tendency Washington of this hasty and premature act of retaliation, and remon- retaliation. strated strenuously against it. "In point of policy," said he, in a letter to the President of Congress, "under the present situation of our affairs, this doctrine cannot be supported. The balance of prisoners is greatly against us; and a general regard to the happiness of the whole should mark our conduct. Can we imagine, that our enemies will not mete the same punishments, the same indignities, the same cruelties, to those belonging to us, in their possession, that we impose on theirs in our power? Why should we suppose them to possess more humanity than we have ourselves? Or why should an ineffectual attempt to relieve the distresses of one brave, unfortunate man, involve many more in the same calamities? However disagreeable the fact may be, the enemy at this time have in their power, and subject to their call, near three hundred officers belonging to the army of the United States. In this number there are some of high rank; and most of them are men of bravery and merit. The quota of theirs in our hands bears no proportion, being not more than fifty at most. Under these circumstances, we should certainly do no act to draw upon the gentlemen belonging to us, and who have already suffered a long captivity, greater punishments than they have experienced and now experience. If we should, what will their feelings be, and those of their numerous and extensive connexions? Suppose the treatment prescribed for the Hessians should be pursued, will it not establish what the enemy have been aiming to effect by every artifice and the grossest misrepresentations, I mean, an opinion of our enmity

CHAPTER towards them, and of the cruel conduct they experience

X.

1777.

Sufferings of the prisoners in New York.

Letter to
General

when they fall into our hands, a prejudice which we on our part have heretofore thought it politic to suppress, and to root out by every act of lenity and kindness? It certainly will. The Hessians would hear of the punishment with all the circumstances of heightened exaggeration, would feel the injury, without investigating the cause, or reasoning upon the justice or necessity of it. The mischiefs, which may and must inevitably flow from the execution of the resolves, appear to be endless and innumerable."

On the other hand the American prisoners, who had been taken at Fort Washington and confined in New York during the winter, had endured such sufferings as to excite universal indignation, and reflect reproach on the British commander. This is not the place to investigate the causes; but the fact is indisputable. A large proportion of them sunk under their sufferings and died; and, when others were sent out for exchange in the spring, they were so much emaciated and broken down, so totally unfit for service, that General Washington refused to return for them an equal number of healthy British or Hessian prisoners. Sir William Howe said this refusal was a violation of the rule for exchange, which had been agreed upon between them; and, although he could not deny the facts, yet he declared the prisoners had been treated as well as his circumstances would permit, and been provided with every thing necessary for their comfort. General Washington replied;

"You must be sensible, that our engagement, as well Howe on the as all others of the kind, though in the letter it expresses prisoners. only an equality of rank and number, as the rule of ex

treatment of

April 9.

This

change, yet necessarily implies a regard to the general
principles of mutual compensation and advantage.
is inherent in its nature, is the voice of reason; and no
stipulation, as to the condition in which prisoners should
be returned, was requisite. Humanity dictated, that their
treatment should be such, as their health and comfort

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1777.

demanded; and, where her laws have been duly re- CHAPTER spected, their condition has been generally good. Nor is this the language of humanity alone; justice declares the same. The object of every cartel, or similar agreement, is the benefit of the prisoners themselves, and that of the contending powers. On this footing, it equally exacts, that they should be well treated, as well as that they should be exchanged. The reverse is, therefore, an evident infraction, and ought to subject the party, on whom it is chargeable, to all the damage and ill consequences resulting from it. Nor can it be expected, that those unfitted for future service by acts of severity, in direct violation of a compact, are proper subjects for an exchange. In such case, to return others not in the same predicament, would be to give without receiving an equivalent; and would afford the greatest encouragement to cruelty and inhumanity. The argument, drawn from the mere circumstance of the prisoners having been received, is of no validity. Though, from their wretched situation, they could not, at that time, be deemed proper for an exchange, yet our humanity required, that they should be permitted to return among us.

"It may, perhaps, be fairly doubted, whether an apprehension of their death, or that of a great part of them, did not contribute somewhat to their being sent out when they were. Such an event, whilst they remained with you, would have been truly interesting; because it would have destroyed every shadow of claim for a return of the prisoners in our hands; and therefore policy, concurring with humanity, dictated that the measure should be adopted. Happy had it been, if the expedient had been thought of before these ill-fated men were reduced to such extremity. It is confessed, however, on all sides, that, after their delivery, they still continued your prisoners, and would be so till regularly exchanged.

"I acknowledge, that I should, and I have been always willing, notwithstanding this concession, to account for every man, who was in a proper condition and fit

X.

1777.

CHAPTER to be exchanged at the time he came out, so far as the proportion of prisoners with us would extend. With what propriety, or upon what foundation of justice, can more be demanded? This has been proposed, or, what is the same, was most clearly implied in the first article or objection made by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, and illiberally rejected since, as inconsistent with any degree of reason or common sense.' Painful as it is, I am compelled to consider it as a fact not to be questioned, that the usage of our prisoners, whilst in your possession, of the privates at least, was such as could not be justified. This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out; their appearance sanctioned the assertion; and melancholy experience, in the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible certainty."

Conduct of
General
Howe.

These difficulties interrupted for some time the exchange of prisoners. It should nevertheless be said, to the credit of Sir William Howe, that the retaliatory act of Congress did not influence his conduct towards the American prisoners; and it should also be added, that a want of humanity was never alleged to be a trait of his character. The sufferings of the unfortunate men in New York were probably to be attributed more to his inattention, than to any direct order; but this apology, if indeed it can be called an apology, is far from amounting to a justification. He wrote a state of the affair to the British government, particularly respecting General Lee; and the ministry decided that he should thenceforward be retained as a prisoner of war, although they had previously transmitted an order requiring him to be sent to England. This change of purpose was dictated by policy, General Howe having intimated that any evil, which might befall the Hessian officers in consequence of the detention of General Lee, would have a bad effect on the troops of that nation serving in America.

The winter passed away, and the spring was far advanced before the British commander gave any indications of his designs for the campaign. His reinforcements from

CHAPTER
X.

1777.

stores at

destroyed.

April 26.

Europe arrived later, and in smaller numbers, than he anticipated; and he was obliged to curtail the plans, which he had suggested to the ministry the preceding autumn. That he might not seem to be idle, he sent up the Military Sound a detachment of two thousand men under Gover- Danbury nor Tryon, who landed in Connecticut, marched into the country, and destroyed the public stores at Danbury. They were bravely met by the militia and a few Continental troops, who harassed them on their march, and pursued them back to their boats. In the rencounters with the enemy on their retreat, General Wooster and General Arnold were wounded. The former died of his wounds.

At length General Howe enlarged his force at Brunswic, and began to build a bridge there, so constructed as to be laid on flat-boats, which it was supposed he intended to transport over land to the Delaware, and use in crossing that river. Meantime General Washington collected at Morristown the troops, which had been enlisted into the new army in Virginia and the middle States, and ordered those from the eastward to assemble at Peekskill on the Hudson. The want of arms, hitherto severely felt, was opportunely supplied by the arrival of two vessels from France, containing twenty-four thousand muskets.

Near the end of May he drew his main army to a very strong position at Middlebrook, only nine miles from Brunswic, and prepared to contest the passage of the enemy, should they attempt to move towards the Delaware. On the 13th of June, the British army marched from Brunswic, commanded by Sir William Howe in person, and stretched itself several miles into the country, well fortified on the right at Brunswic, and secured in front by the Rariton, and on the left by the Millstone. This position was occupied six days. The object of this manœuvre was to bring on a general action. Washington was too cautious, however, to be tempted into such a snare at a great disadvantage with his raw troops, but he determined to defend his ground in any event. Not

British force

increased in

New Jersey.

skirmishing two armies.

between the

June.

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