VIII. 1776. Long Island. River. This position was well secured on the land side CHAPTER by a chain of intrenchments and redoubts, running along the high grounds from Wallabout Bay to Gowan's Cove; these works having been constructed under the eye of General Greene. It was defended on the water side by Defences on batteries at Red Hook, Governor's Island, and other points. Between Brooklyn, and the place where the enemy landed, was a range of hills covered with a thick wood, and crossed by three roads. The precaution had been taken to throw up breastworks at the principal passes on these hills, where three or four regiments were stationed. General Greene at first commanded on Long Island, but falling ill with a fever, he was succeeded for a short time by General Sullivan. The command at length devolved on General Putnam. Long Island. August 27. Lord Stir ling. The British army occupied the plain on the other side Battle of of the hills, extending in a line from the Narrows to Flatbush. General Grant commanded the left wing near the coast, De Heister the centre, composed of Hessians, and Clinton the right. About three o'clock in the morning, on the 27th of August, a report was brought to the camp, that the British were in motion on the road leading along the coast from the Narrows. A detachment under Lord Stirling was immediately ordered out to meet them. General Sullivan was sent to the heights above Flatbush, on the middle road. One regiment only was at this post; and a little to the north of it, on the Bedford road, were two others. Meantime General Clinton, with Earl Percy and Cornwallis, led the right wing of the British army by a circuit into the Jamaica road, which was not guarded, and gained the rear of the Americans under Sullivan. Before this was accomplished, reinforcements had been sent from the camp to support both Sullivan and Stirling. The attack was begun at an early hour by Grant and De Heister, but was kept up with little spirit, as they were not to advance till Clinton should reach the left flank or rear of the Americans. As soon as it was known, by the sound of the guns, that this was effected, they VIII. 1776. livan. CHAPTER pushed vigorously forward, and the action became general and warm in every part. The troops under Lord Stirling, consisting of the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware regiments, fought with signal bravery, contesting every foot of ground against a greatly superior force, till Lord Cornwallis, with a detachment from Clinton's division, came upon their rear, brought them between two fires, and compelled them to retreat within their lines General Sul- across a creek and marsh near Gowan's Cove. General Sullivan, with the regiments on the heights above Flatbush, being attacked by De Heister on one side and Clinton on the other, after making an obstinate resistance for three hours, was obliged to surrender. As the grounds were broken and covered with wood, the action in this part was conducted by a succession of skirmishes, and many of the troops forced their way through the enemy and returned to Brooklyn. After the battle was over, General Howe encamped his army in front of the American lines, intending to carry them by regular approaches with the coöperation of his fleet. Disastrous issue of the day. Retreat from August 30. The issue of the day was disastrous to the Americans. Their loss was between eleven and twelve hundred men, more than a thousand of whom were captured. General Sullivan and Lord Stirling were among the prisoners. The whole number engaged was about five thousand, who were opposed by at least fifteen thousand of the enemy, well provided with artillery. That so many escaped, was owing to the nature of the ground, and to the action having been fought in detached parties, some of which were several miles distant from each other. The courage and good conduct of the troops, particularly those under Lord Stirling, were universally acknowledged. During the action General Washington crossed over to Brooklyn. He is said to have witnessed the rout and slaughter of his troops with the keenest anguish, as it was impossible to detach others to their relief without exposing the camp to imminent danger. A heavy rain the next day kept the main body of the enemy in their tents. VIII. 1776. Light parties came out, and there was occasional skir- CHAPTER mishing near the lines. A strong head wind prevented the ships from ascending the harbor. The loss sustained in the late action, the injury which the arms and ammunition had received by the rains, the great force of the enemy, and the probability that the ships would take advantage of the first favorable wind, sail into the East River, and thus cut off the only channel of retreat, rendered it obvious, that any further attempt to maintain the post at Brooklyn would be hazardous in the extreme. It was known, also, that some of the British ships had passed round Long Island, and were now in Flushing Bay; and there were indications, that it was General Howe's design to transport a part of his army across the Sound, and form an encampment above Kingsbridge. This would put New York Island in jeopardy, and the forces at Brooklyn would be essential for its defence. A council of war was called. No time was lost in deliberation. It was resolved to withdraw the troops from Long Island. Boats were collected and other preparations were made without delay. On the morning of the 30th, the whole army, amounting to nine thousand men, the military stores, nearly all the provisions, and the artillery, except a few heavy cannon, were safely landed in New York. With such secrecy, silence, and order, was every thing conducted, that the last boat was crossing the river, before the retreat was discovered by the enemy, although parties were stationed within six hundred yards of the lines. This retreat, in its plan, execution, and success, has been regarded as one of the most remarkable military events in history, and as reflecting the highest credit on the talents and skill of the commander. So intense was the anxiety of Washington, so unceasing his exertions, that for fortyeight hours he did not close his eyes, and rarely dismounted from his horse. There have been various strictures on this battle, both in regard to the action itself, and to the policy of Washington in attempting to oppose the enemy at all on Long Remarks on the battle of Long Island. VIII. CHAPTER Island. The strange oversight in leaving the Jamaica road unguarded, and the neglect in procuring early and con1776. stant intelligence of the movements of the British army, were the immediate causes of the deplorable events of the day. These faults, however, such as they were, rested with the officers on the Island. General Washington had given express instructions, that the strictest vigilance should be observed in every part of the outer lines. It was unfortunate that the illness of General Greene deprived the commander on the spot of his counsel, he being thoroughly acquainted with the grounds and the roads; whereas General Putnam took the command only four days before the action, and of course had not been able from personal inspection to gain the requisite knowledge. The want of vedettes was another unfortunate circumstance. To communicate intelligence with sufficient celerity over so wide a space, without light-horse, was impracticable. At this time, however, not a single company of cavalry had been attached to the American army. As to the other point, the propriety of maintaining a stand on Long Island, it must be considered, that the enemy was to be met somewhere, that the works at Brooklyn offered a fair prospect of defence for a considerable time at least, that the abandonment of the Island would open a free passage to General Howe to the very borders of New York, separated only by the East River, and that to retreat, without even a show of resistance, as the first operation of the campaign, would be unsatisfactory to Congress, the country, and the army. Besides, it was not the purpose of Washington to entice the enemy to a general action, or allow himself to be drawn into one, if it could possibly be avoided. Such an experiment, with his raw troops and militia, against a force superior in numbers, and still more so in experience and discipline, aided by a powerful fleet, he well knew would be the height of rashness, and might end in the total ruin of the American cause. Wisdom and prudence dictated a different course. To wear away the campaign by keeping VIII. 1776. the enemy employed in small encounters, dividing their CHAPTER attention, and interposing obstacles to their progress, was all that could be done or undertaken with any reasonable hope of success. Such a system would diminish the resources of the enemy, habituate his own soldiers to the practices of war, give the country an opportunity to gather strength by union and time, and thus prepare the way for more decisive efforts at a future day. This policy, so sound in its principles, and so triumphant in its final results, was not relished by the shortsighted multitude, eager to hear of battles and victories, and ready to ascribe the disappointment of their wishes to the fault of the General. The murmurs and complaints of such persons, though so loudly and widely expressed that they might be taken as denoting the public sentiment, were borne with fortitude by Washington; nor did he suffer himself to be turned by them from what he believed to be his duty in watching over the vital interests of his country. recent defeat The recent defeat produced a most unfavorable im- Effect of the pression upon the army, which is described as follows on the army. in a letter from General Washington to the President of September 2 Congress. "Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds. with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but, when their example has infected another part of the army, when their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire |