VOL. XVI. No. 25.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1809. [Price 15. "I have never wished, my Lords, to conceal my opinion, with respect to the policy of sending a "British army to Spain. I would have assisted them with money; I would have assisted them with arms: but I assert that, during last summer, there was no prospect that ought to have induced any "reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending "fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant "state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages that might be of the most essential service."―LORD GRENVILLE'S Speech, Jan. 19, 1809. "My Lords, I do not say that assistance should have been wholly withheld; but we certainly should "not have sent an army where we had not the necessary means to afford supplies to that army, or "effectual assistance to those it was intended to protect: we ought rather to have given our assistance by money, by arms, and by the well-applied exertions of our naval force on the coast of Spain.”LORD GREY'S Speech, April 21, 1809. 961] -[969 to issue their edicts against the liberty of SUMMARY OF POLITICS. the press, and to put it under regulations SPAIN. The affairs of this country after the manner of those established at appear to be fast approaching to a crisis. Calcutta. From that time the spirit of It is, indeed, impossible, that things can resistance has, until of late, evidently been long continue in their present state; nor upon the decline; and, unless it be revived is it desirable that they should; for, it by the recent changes in the government, would be better for the country to be con- and the hopes excited by the promised quered by Buonaparté at once, than that meeting of the Cortez, there can, I think, it should any longer be an object of con- be very little doubt, that it will not require test between two masters. If Spain is not, many months to establish the throne of in case of successful resistance of the Joseph upon solid foundations.- -As to French, to be free, I have no hesitation in the recent defeat of the Spanish army at saying that I would prefer seeing it con-OCANA, though I believe it to have been red; because, nothing could possibly much more severe than the Spaniards rebe so bad as an event, which the enemies present it to have been, I do not think of freedom, here and every where else, much of it; nor should I think their cause would be able to cite as a proof of an en-desperate, if we were to hear of many such laced prople being able and willing to defend heir country against an invader. This would be, indeed, a most mischievous example; ind, were it to exist; were the people of pain, without any change in their system of overnment having previously taken place, to rive the Buonapartés out of their coun"y, we should soon hear the hirelings in England openly declaring, that despotism vas the only means of protection against powerful enemy; nor would it be long efore they would put into form their proositions for the "suspension of the constituion," a thing, which they have frequently nted at, within the last two years, in a nanner too unequivocal to leave their meaning doubtful. But, as far as we ave yet seen, the example of Spain afords no encouragement for the adoption of such measures. There the spirit of reistance to the invader was, at first, strong and active, because the hope of freedom ras strong. This spirit died away, as oon as the Supreme Central Junta began defeats. That our army, or rather the remnant of it, under my Lord of Talavera de la Reyna della Douro; that this remnant will be compelled to retreat into Portugal, and will be utterly unable to shew its head again in Spain, I have no doubt at all; but, from the first, I never did believe, that any force which we could send into the country, would be able to give much real assistance to the Spaniards. Look back into history, and you will find, that no nation, of any extent, was ever yet defended against an invader by the aid of foreign troops, unless the people themselves took the lead in the defence. When a people sees two foreign armies, hostile to each other, march into their country, they are very apt to fold up their arms and wait, with great composure, for the event; and this must necessarily be the case, when both armies are compelled to plunder the people. It was, and I always thought so, the worst possible thing for us to send an army into Spain. At best we could send but a an evil small numerical force. We could not send an army fit to meet that of Napoleon in the field. We could not make Spain the theatre of a war between us and France, except upon terms greatly disadvantageous to us. We could, in short, have no chance of final success in the field against Buonaparté single-handed; and, if our army acted in conjunction with that of the Spaniards, there was all the danger, from a thousand causes, of that disagreement between the Commanders, which has not failed to take place at and since the battle of Talavera, and from which disagreement the enemy has derived so much advantage. -There has been much disguise as to the conduct of the Spanish people towards our troops. The truth, however, is, that our troops have, all along, been looked upon by the Spanish people, with eye. And was not this natural? Is that man worthy of the name of statesman, who did not foresee that it would be so? The bigotry of the people of Spain may be matter of ridicule with the philosopher, but, not so with the statesman, especially when he is about to expose an army to the effects of that bigotry. From this cause has arisen a great part of the misfortunes and the miseries of our army. We had not the hearts of the people with us; and, our ministers ought to have known, that this would be the case. They are answerable for all the miseries which our poor unfortunate countrymen have undergone in Spain; because those miseries have proceeded from the want of wisdom in the employment of our armies. It is in vain, and, indeed, it is unjust, to throw the blame upon the people of Spain, or upon the Spanish government, for the coldness (to say the least of it) with which our army has been treated in Spain. It was in the nature of things that it should be so treated; and, the fault is solely in our mi-vading despotism. And, indeed, if this had nisters, who, it is now evident, wished to cut a figure in the field, and who, as I firmly believe, were the cause of a war being entered upon for a choice of musters, instead of suffering the thing to take its own course, in which case, it would have been a war of restored treedom against invading despotism. For these reasons, I do not think, that the retreat of our army ought to be looked upon as a thing at all unfavourable to the cause of Spain, while, I am very certain, that it ought to be looked upon as the best thing that can take place with regard to that ariny.We are very apt to speak of the fate of a nation in war, as we speak of the fate of a fortress; and to look upon the contest as at an end, when a great battle has been gained against the invaded. In the present case, we seem to forget that Spain contains ten or twelve millions of people, inhabiting one of the strongest countries in the world. Never was such a people, so situated, conquered against their own consent. What is the loss of a battle, or of ten battles, if all be sound a in the hearts and minds of ten or twelve millions of people, who have, and must have, all the resources of the country in their hands? Did the loss of a battle, or of ten battles, insure the subjugation of America or France? How often were we told that each of those nations were done for; that a few weeks would see them at our feet; and the like? They both triumphed in the end, and so will the Spaniards, if the cause become the cause of freedom, but they will fall, and to fall they ought, and I shall rejoice to see them fall, if they continue a contest for a mere choice of masters, and without any view to the restoration of that constitution, which their ancestors, for centuries, enjoyed. The assembling of the Cortes, that is to say, the calling together of the Representatives of the l'eople, a measure which now seems to be resolved on, and to be actually about to be put in execution; this measure promises fair. And here I cannot help repeating my opinion, my thorough persua sion, that, if the Spanish people, and the leaders of the people, had been left to follow their own opinions and feelings, they would, at the outset, have done what they now appear resolved to do. It always appeared very evident to me, that the aid, tendered them by our ministers, was accompanied with a condition that the struggle should be for king against king, and not for restored freedom, against in not been the case; or, at least, if our ministers had not been extremely anxious to prevent a war for freedom in Spain, why should they have sent an army thither? For, they could not doubt, that, if the war becaine a war for freedom, arms and not men, would be wanted in Spain.What losses; what disgrace; what miseries has not this policy, this bigoted, this inveterate policy created! The poor wretches of our army, who survived the battle of Talavera, having, at the end of that battle, been two days without provisions, had served out to them an allowance of wheat! Aye, of wheat; of raw wheat, just as it came out But, heard Spaniards distinctly aver, that they of the sheaf! I speak this upon the authority of those who had to partake of this fare; and I cannot, while putting the fact upon record, help remembering, that this war, that the war which has produced miseries like these, was first proclaimed to the people of England amidst the plaudits, amidst the hiccuping and belching shouts, of the Turtle Patriots, assembled at the London Tavern. Yes; it was from that scene of gormandizing; that scene of greediness of purse as well as of maw; it was thence that first issued the yell of war for a choice of masters in Spain? and, from that moment, the people of England became cold spectators of what was passing in the Southern Peninsula.After what has passed; after so many proofs of the folly of attempting to resist Buonaparté, unless the people of Spain be made parties deeply interested in such resistance, let us hope, that measures will be taken to make them parties in the contest. Without this, I am persuaded, that nothing at all is to be done; and that the struggle had better be given up at once. At any rate, we should not attempt to have an army in the heart of Spain. Flying squadrons round the coast, with detachments of foot-soldiers and artillery on board, alighting here and there as occasion might offer, and not sparing the coast of France at the same time these are what the Spaniards want to assist them; such is the assistance they have always wanted; and such is the assistance, that the most sensible part of their leaders have asked for. It is by no means necessary, that the commanders of these squadrons and detachments should be members of the Society for the Suppression of Vice; that they should have so much conjugal affection as to induce them to take their wives to sea, and, perchance, retain their squadrons in port for some weeks in order" to insure the attendance of an able accoucheur; that they should be so pious as to spend in prayer the time that might be devoted to watchings of a far different sort that they should be full of that kind of religious deference and humility which induces men to leave the enemy wholly to the chastisement of Divine Providence in cases where one's bacon would be in danger. No: I beg leave to repeat, that it is by no means necessary, that the commanders of such squadrons and detachments should belong to this tribe of warriors. I do not give this as my opinion: I have heard Spaniards say so. I have news "ARMS FOR THE SPANIARDS.-Having entered into engagements for the Supply "of Arms for the use of the SUPREME JUNTA of SPAIN; and this being a time "when the supply may be of most essen"tial service to that gallant People, this is "to give Notice, That any person or per"sons having a quantity of good Proof "Musquets, whether that quantity be << large or small, will, upon an applica"tion to JOHN TUNNO, Esq. of Old Broad"street, receive his proposals for the pur"chase of the same on my account; and upon furnishing the Arms will receive payment in Cash. "Portsmouth, Dec. 18, 1809. "A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE." ing the Spaniards arms, wherewith to drive out their devourers, have always been sending troops, who, though, under proper orders, they might have aided them, must necessarily assist to eat them up. -It is a poor excuse to say, that the arms, which our ministers have sent out, have not been safely delivered; for, why have they not? Had we not a fleet to send them out by? Has it cost us no hundreds and hundreds of thousands of pounds for government agents in Spain? Has expence been wanting? But, whatever has been, I repeat, that Mr. Johnstone's offer removes all risk, other than that of the sea, from which nothing in such a case can be exempt; and, really, if he be not permitted to send or to carry out arms, upon the conditions offered by him, there will be (unless better reasons for a refusal be offered than I have yet heard of) but too much reason to suspect, that the measure of assembling the Cortes, and the consequent prospect of a struggle for freedom in Spain, has produced, in the minds of our ministers a change by no means favourable to the Spanish cause. It was, I believe, about six months since | matter, the opinion of every man of sense, Mr. Johnstone entered into these engage- with whom I ever conversed upon the subments, which, not only from considera-ject: But, our ministers, instead of sendtions of rectitude, but from motives of sincere attachment to the cause of Spain, I know him to be most anxious to fulfil. Here are no loose professions, on his part; but a real offer to purchase armis, for the doing of which he holds the means, which means belong to the Spanish Government.It is said, that our government have always had objections to leave this business of supplying arms to any individuals, having themselves found it so difficult to insure the delivery of them into the proper hands. But, in this case, they may have the best security; for, not only is Mr. Johnstone ready to purchase the arms and pay for them; but to go out to Spain with them in person, to deliver them to the Junta, and to bring back a certificate from the Junta, that he has made such delivery. He, indeed, has already actually purchased a considerable quantity of arms; he has them ready to ship off; he is ready to enter, if required, into a bond for their being sent to the Junta ; and, under these circumstances, there can, I should suppose, be no doubt of his obtaining the necessary permission from our own government. In short, it really appears to me, that our conduct in this case will be to the Spanish Government and the people of Spain a very good criterion of our sincerity; for, what must that government and people think of us, what must they think of our regard for their cause, if, when it is notorious that they have not a musket amongst ten thousand men, we will not suffer Mr. Johnstone to send to them, or to carry to them, under Lord Grenville was, of course, duly elected, all possible security for safe delivery, a after a struggle unparalleled in the hisquantity of muskets, purchased with their tory of the University.Looking, as I own money? If we will not suffer this, do, upon these schools for full grown boys what must be thought of us by the go-to be of no use whatever; having seen so vernment and the people of Spain? Mr. Johnstone is authorized to purchase, on account of the Spanish Government, a hundred and fifty thousand stand of arms; and if the government here has that quantity, or any part of it, to spare, he is ready to pay for them. No difficulty, therefore, can possibly exist, if there be arms to be had in this country; and, would it not be scandalous, if, under such circumstances, arms were not permitted to be sent out? I have taken for my motto to this sheet, two passages from the speeches of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, upon this subject. Certainly theirs was, as to this OXFORD CHANCELLORSHIP.--On Thursday, the 14th instant, the election of a Chancellor for the University of Oxford, in the room of the Duke of Portland, deceased, took place; and, upon the close of the poll, the following were the numbers: For Lord Grenville Lord Eldon Duke of Beaufort 406 393 238 many of the big fellows coming from these schools with such very empty heads; having, in short, no sort of respect for any part of the huge establishment, which I regard as detrimental to morality as well as to genius, and more especially to that independence of mind in political matters, which is now so necessary to the very existence of the country: this being my opinion of the University, regarding it as the mortal enemy of youth, the great destroyer of time and of talent, I should have taken no more notice of an election of a Chancellor of the University, than I should of that of a parish beadle, had it and, indeed, I have proved, that sound policy does not oppose it. But this question the hypocritical hirelings save us the trouble of discussing, by pretending that there exists an obstacle in the scruples of the king's conscience. In this case, however, as in all others, where they have an opportunity, the pretended friends of the king shew themselves to be, in reality, his very worst enemies; the worst enemies he or his family can have, by pushing. him forward, by using his name, by exposing him to bear whatever they think would fall with dangerous weight upon themselves.I do wish, that His Ma not, accidentally, been closely and obvi- | which it is, in my mind, impossible to form ously connected with a most interesting an idea of any thing more base, or more and most important question in politics; really disloyal, more directly tending to namely, the question (agitated a fortnight throw odium upon the character of the ago in the Register) relative to the Roman king. I have, in the article of the 9th inCatholics of this kingdom, in which ques- stant, observed, that the king has given tion, agreeably to my opinion then ex- his consent freely to the granting of those pressed, is involved the nation's safety. privileges to foreign Catholics in his ser-The triumph of Lord Grenville must vice, which it is asked to grant to his Cabe pleasing to every just mind, because it tholic subjects. How, then, can conscience is the triumph of reason and truth over the oppose itself to the latter? Policy possi senseless and hypocritical cry of " No Po-bly may oppose it. I am ready to prove, pery; the "miscreant" cry of no-popery; that howl of bigotry; that most scandalous, malicious, and seditious yell, for which there can be no pardon in this world. I remember, at the canvas of 1807, telling the late Sir Harry Mildmay, that I looked upon the cry of No-Popery to contain the most wicked sentiment that ever issued from the lips of man; and, I must do him the justice to say, that he did openly disclaim it, though it was trumpeted about the streets of Winchester. Every man of any principle was ashamed of it. Its propagation was left to those only, who were lost to all sense of shame as well as all feelings of conscience.It is, I see, at-jesty could be prevailed upon to read, in tempted to be maintained, that the election the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. IV, of Lord Grenville is no proof of the triumph | page 1268, MR. BOOTH's Speech upon the of tolerant principles with regard to the subject of "court favourites." He would Roman Catholics. This is the sort of rea- here see what were the sentiments of soning employed for this purpose:-Lord English Gentlemen, in the reign of Charles Eldon's and the Duke of Beaufort's princi- the Second, as to that description of perples, as to the question of the Catholics, are sons, who then took to themselves the exthe same; and, therefore, the poll presents clusive appellation of " King's Friends;" 631 for no-popery, and only 406 against and who then had the impudence to ather. But, this is fallacious; for, it is very tempt to ride off upon the shoulders of evident, that the votes for the Duke of their master. His Majesty would there Beaufort, were those which it was impossible to see what sort of men those were, who, get for Lord Eldon; the votes of those persons while they affected to brand all those with who could not be prevailed upon to side disloyalty who were not of their own facopenly with no-popery. The Duke being tion, were laying the sure foundations of decidedly of the same political party with the expulsion of the family of Stuart. Lord Eldon, it is not, for one moment, to There can, in my opinion, be nothing so be believed, that one or the other of them injurious to the king as this plea, made would not have given up his votes, in use of by his pretended "friends," of his order to beat Lord Grenville, if that had scruples of conscience. When we alledge, been practicable; but, the fact is, that that the measure of Catholic claims is just, the Duke was set up for the purpose of that it is not only just but expedient, that it drawing off votes from Lord Grenville; for is necessary to the happiness of his people, the purpose of furnishing a candidate for and to the safety of his dominions against those who could not be prevailed upon to vote the meditated attacks of a most powerful for Lord Eldon. So that, when viewed in enemy; when we make these allegations the true light, the triumph of tolerant and produce arguments in support of them, principles over hypocrisy and bigotry what is the answer of these pretended is much greater than, at first sight, it would "king's friends"? Why, that the king is appear to be.The hirelings are begin- very aged, and that we ought not to war ning their former cant about "troubling the against his scruples of conscience. Can any " conscience of the king in his old age," than thing be more base than this? Can any |