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reconnoitre our situation, but in both at-
tempts they were disappointed by the
valour of the officers commanding the
skirmishing parties, who attacked them on
all sides, and prevented their approach.
At nine o'clock at night, of the same day,
I had information that the enemy was ad-
vancing upon Torrijos, and that his whole
army was in movement, but my advices
did not instruct me to which point the
greater part was proceeding. On hearing
this, I apprised the Generals, and dispatch-
ed an officer to General Wellesley. In
consequence of his determination and di-
rection, and on finding my vanguard.

the 26.h, by a very superior force, and
the enemy indicating a design of making
a general attack, I resolved to make a re-
trograde movement upon the Alberche, to
reunite with the English, which I effec ed
on the evening of the same day. The dis-
patches of Brigadier-General Don Josef
de Zayas, and of Lieutenant-General the
duke of Alburquerque, Nos. 2 and 3 (not
yet published) explun the particulars of the
action on the morning of that day, and in
which the corps there mentioned acquired
great credit for their firmness and valour,
&c. Thus the evening of the 26th con-
cluded; and after having conferred with
General Wellesley that night on our situa-
tion, I resolved to repass the Alberche on
the morning of the following day, when
we agreed that the right line should be
taken by the Spanish, and the left by the
English army. The English vanguard re-

my, who had again concentrated his forces in the district of Casalegas, and on the adjacent heights, preserving his vanguard supported by some pieces of artillery on the bridge and shores of the river Alberche, and which fired the greater part of the day on our skirmishing parties.-1 had agreed with the Generai in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's army, Sir Arthur Wellesley, as to the attack on the bridge and shores of the river before day break on the 24th, and to this purpose, i sent onward the 5th division of infantry under Marshal de Camp D. Luis de Bassecourt, in the evening of the 23d, in order, that after baving crossed at the ford of Car-powerfully attacked on the morning of del, three leagues from Talavera, they might march by the contiguous heights, so as by break of day on the 24th to fall on the rear-guard and right flank of the army of the enemy at Casalegas. At the same hour, I proposed to attack in person on the less flink, and a part of his front, while the Engosh army assailed the whole of his right The flight of the enemy during the night of the 23d disconcerted this plan, and when at dawn of the 24th, we saw the French camp abandoned, I thought it proper to follow them with my army alone (as the British army remained in Casalegas and the shores of the Alberche), with the hope of reaching his rear-guard, or some portion of it. The news which I acquired of his route, apprized me that he had proceeded in two columns by Santa Olalla and Cebolla, and in consequence, I divided my army so as to follow him in both directions. Not-mained during that night in Casalegas, and withstanding the forced march of my army, who made their day's progress without fatigue, we could not accomplish our object, as the enemy had early commenced his retreat, and had proceeded with great rapidity. On the 24th, having posted myself in Santa Olalla, I ordered the troops which had taken the road of Cebolla to join me, with the exception of the 5th corps, which I left there to watch the district, placing the vanguard in the neighbourhood of Alcabon, from whence the piquets of the enemy were dislodged, and pursued to Torrijos, where a considerable part of the army of the enemy was stationed.

The whole of the 25th was engaged in giving repose to the troops, and in apportioning the rations, which were extreinely deficient. Parties of the French during the day were employed either in endeavouring to dislodge us from our post, or to

on the heights near it, under LieutenantGeneral Sherbrooke, with orders to retire. to the opposite side of the river, which were obeyed on the morning of the 27th.—I must now observe, that at dawn on the 24th Marshal Victor had withdrawn from the post he occupied on the shores of the Alberche, in order to avoid the attack meditated on that day by the allied armies; and he afterwards united himsel', in the neighbourhood of Toledo, with the forces under General Sebastiani, and with 8,000 men composing the guard of the Royal Impostor, who took the command of the whole, thus congregated assisted by Marshals Jourdon and Victor, and by General Sebastiani.-It now appeared that the enemy wished to bring on a general action, by the frequent approach of his advanced guard, and by the occupation of Santa Olalla by the whole of his army on the evening of the 26th. His outposts

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then approached the allied army. Thus | Col. Donkins, the brigade of cavalry of circumstanced, at break of day on the General Anson, and their corps, supported 27th, the position agreed upon was taken; by General Payne, with four regiments of and Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered General cavalry, posted in the plain and olive Mackenzie, with a division of English in-grounds of Talavera, retired in most adfantry and a brigade of cavalry, to con- mirable order, but not without some loss tinue in the olive plantation on the right in the olive grounds, particularly two of side of the Alberche, where this party, the corps of this division. The regularity, composing the vanguard, might cover the steadiness, and fortitude of all these troops, right flank of the British army.-The as well as the military talents of General whole combined army occupied an ex- Mackenzie, were conspicuous in every tent of ground of above three miles; the movement, and this officer is deserving of right towards the Tagus, was covered by the highest praise and admiration for the our native troops reaching to the front of coolness and serenity with which he withTalavera. The ground on the left was oc- drew this division to the left of the British cupied by the English army, open to and army. The number of the enemy increased commanded, by an elevation, where was on the right bank of the Alberche as the day assembled in a second line a division of advanced, and every thing indicated his English infantry, under the orders of Gen. determination to give battle to the comHill. Between this height and a chain of bined forces.-As dusk approached, he mountains at some distance, there is an in- commenced a furious attack by a canclosure, which, in the first instance, Gen. nonade, and a charge by the whole of his Wellesley did not order to be defended, cavalry, on the right, occupied by the because it was commanded by the height, Spanish infantry, with the apparent design and because it was considered too distant of breaking through our ranks, posted as I to be useful in the approaching battle. have before described. This attack was The whole of the ground on which the received by an active fire perfectly well Spanish army was drawn up, was covered sustained, both of cannon and musketry, with olive plantations intersected by sinuo- which disconcerted the purpose of the enesities, inequalities, and cottages. The my and put him to flight at a quarter past great road towards the bridge of Alberche eight. During this time, a strong division was defended by a strong battery, served of the French advanced by the valley to by our infantry, in front of the Hermitage the left of the height occupied by the of Our Lady of the Prado. The other English General Hill, of which, with very avenues of the district were defended in a great loss, they obtained a momentary similar manner. Talavera was protected possession, but Hill returned to the charge by an appointed garrison, and the rest of presently with the bayonet, drove off the the Spanish infantry, forming two lines, enemy, and recovered his ground. In the was placed behind a village which is at night the French repeated their attack, the extremity of the district, and formed a but without succeeding, and with great line in continuation of the position taken loss. At break of day on the 28th they by the English army. In the centre, and returned with two divisions of infantry, between the two armies, there was a rising but they were repulsed by the brave Hill, ground, where the English had begun to who could not be intimidated by their reconstruct a strong redoubt, having in their peated attempts, or by the progressive acrear a small plain. At this point was sta- cumulation of the forces of the assailants. tioned the English General Campbell, who-General Wellesley, in consequence of commanded a division of infantry, supported by the brigade of dragoons of General Cotton, and by some squadrons of our cavalry. Our combined army being thus arranged, the enemy presented himself in considerable force to our view, manifest-vision of cavalry. The French, seeing ing, at first, an intention to attack the division of the vanguard under General Mackenzie. In point of fact, he fulfilled this design before that Officer was enabled to retire to his proper position, but these gallant and disciplined troops which composed the brigade of General Mackenzie, of

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these renewed exertions of the enemy by the valley, on the left side of the height, ordered thither two brigades of his cavalry, supported by Lieutenant General the Duke of Alburquerque, with the whole of his di

this movement, sent sharp-shooters into the chain of mountains to the left of the valley, who were attacked by the 5th division of my infantry under Marshal de Camp Bon Luis Bassecourt, who dislodged them with much loss. The general attack commenced by the advance of different co

of his Majesty.-I took under my particular orders the centre and the right, without neglecting, however, the superintendance of the rest, and with much satisfaction I noticed the conduct of the Generals of the 1st and 2nd division of the Marquis de Zayas, and Don Vicente Iglesias, as well as Don Juan Berhuy, and Lieutenant-General Don Juan Henestrosa, &c.-The loss of the enemy was very great. They left on the field of battle from four to five thousand men, and the number of their wounded is computed at 5,000 more. Two or three Generals were killed, several wounded, and at least 400 other officers. We have taken 19 pieces of artillery, and many waggons of ammunition, and the rout was one of the most complete, considering that we were acting on the defensive. The English have lost General Mackenzie, Brigadier-General Langworth, and other officers of distinguished rank and merit. The total of their officers, killed and wounded, is 260, and that of their rank and file 5,000. Our diminution is much less. Don Rafael Manglano was wounded, and 50 more of our officers were killed and wounded, and 1,150 rank and file. Our artillery was served with ability and fortitude, and the names of such officers, whose talents were most conspicuously displayed, are mentioned in the dispatches from the respective Generals.-I should be negli gent of my own duty, if I did not communicate to your Excellency, for the information of his Majesty, that the conduct of the British General in Chief, Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the Generals, subordinate Officers, and Soldiers under his command, is above all praise. I have seen the enthusiasm with which these faithful allies have in copious streams poured forth their blood in the defence of our liberty, and no language can adequately express the sentiments of gratitude with which our breasts are animated. With the highest satisfaction I have noticed my army hailing our companions for the victory obtained, and mingling with exclamations indicative of the warmest affection, the appellatives of our country, and Ferdinand, with those of our powerful and generous allies.

lumns of the enemy's infantry with the intention of attacking the height occupied by General Hill. These columns were charged by two parties of English dragoons, under the command of General Anson, led by Lieutenant-General Payne, and supported by the brigade of cavalry of the line of General Tanne. One of these regiments of English dragoons suffered very much; but this spirited charge had the effect of disconcerting the designs of the enemy, who sustained a very great foss. At the same time, the French attacked the centre of the army, where the English General Campbell was stationed, having on his right Lieut. General Don Francisco de Eguia, the enemy was driven back by both these Generals, who had their infantry supported by the King's regiment of cavalry, and by the division of Lieutenant-General Don Juan de Henestrosa. This corps covered itself with glory in the charge that it made on the infantry of the enemy, during which it turned the column by which it was assailed; under which advantage, the English infantry, protected by the Spanish, possessed themselves of the artillery of the enemy. At the same time with these proceedings, the French attacked with fury the centre of the English army, commanded by General Sherbrooke. foes were received with extraordinary courage, and were driven back by the whole English division, with charged bayonets. But the English brigade of guard, which was carried onward precipitately in the ardour of battle, advanced too far, and was in consequence obliged to withdraw under the fire of the second line, composed of the brigade of cavalry of General Cotton, and of a battalion of infantry detached from the height by Gen. Wellesley, as soon as he observed the remote situation of the guards. General Howorth, who commanded the English artillery, was distinguished for his extraordinary courage, and performed the most important services. Lieutenant-General Don Francisco de Eguia, my second in command, was posted on my left, with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, under Generals the Marquis de Portago, Don Rafael [This liberal and spirited eulogy is sucManglano, and Don Louis Alexandro Bas-ceeded by a list of the Officers and others secourt, but the latter was ordered to support the division of cavalry of LieutenantGeneral the Duke of Alburquerque, which was detached to reinforce the British army. The dispatches No. 4, 5, and 6, from these Generals, are inclosed for the information

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of the Spanish army, who deserved the high reward of the approbation of their Commander, among whom is distinguished a lad of 16 years of age who killed four Frenchmen with his own hand. We are sorry our limits do not allow our inserting

the catalogue of the names of these brave | champions of Spanish independence.]

Signed, GREGORIO DE LA CUESTA. To his Excellency Don Antonio Cornel.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.-From the French

Official Paper, the Moniteur.

The Moniteur of September 28, contains the following observations, in the form of Notes on the London Gazette of Saturday, Sept. 2, containing the dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1:09:—

When I entered Spain, I had a com.nunication with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Banos, and the Puerto de Perales.'-(London Gazette.) Note of the Moniteur.-We wish Lord Wellesley to command the English armies. With his character, he will risk great catastrophes. It appears that he has neither spies nor any accurate information; which is astonishing, in a country where England has so many partizans.

I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually.'

We are willing to believe that these dispositions were made; for we see in one of his dispatches that he thought he had only to do with 10 or 12,000 French; and it was possible that he might march, with 20,000 men, against a corps, which in his opinion, consisted only of 10 or 12,000 but he should have gained better information on his march, and he would have learned that this corps of 12,000 men amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in order to escape, into impracticable roads. General Wellesley is inexcusable for not having known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, Elchingen, and Treviso, amounted to 70,000 men; and for having thought that he could cover his left flank against this formidable army, by leaving two battalions at Puerto Banos.-What ignorance!

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Tagus; he lost them; and this post, which was the rearr-guard, was a post of honour. General Wellesley ought to have occupied it. It is acknowledged in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear-guard, according to the operations, is the post most import ant to defend. But General Wellesley had taken the lead; and, according to the laudable practice of his nation, had left t● his allies the post of danger.

The enemy stated to be 30,000 'strong, but at all events consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney.'

We see, that even at the time when he wrote, the English General did not know the force of the French. He speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Elchingen, and appears to have no knowledge of the corps of the Duke of Treviso, twenty-five battalions strong, and which, since their entrance into Spain, have not been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he may one day pay dearly for them.

We had reason to expect the ad. vance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as 'soon as General Cuesta's march should be known; and after leaving 12,000 'men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000.'

This is a singular calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the first and fourth corps and the reserve. The first corps is composed of 36 battalions, the fourth of 30; the reserve of 20 battalions, and the cavalry of 40 squadrons. Lord Wellesley had therefore around him 170 battalions, and 80 or 90 squadrons, and he expected to conquer Madrid with 20,000 men! We do not speak of the Spaniards; they may be reckoned as of consequence for plundering isolated per sons, or for defending themselves behind a wall, but very little account can be made of them in a regular battle, as the English may have been convinced. If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his 20,000 men, the whole army of Lord Chatham, which went to bury itself in the marshes of the Isle of Walcheren, he could have derived nothing from his expedition but disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the English mean to dispute Spain with France, they must land an army, if not equal to the French army, at least two-thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 150,000 men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckoned

for more than one-third in a regular bat- | of Dalmatia, with still more considerable tle.-Nothing can be more advantageous forces than those of the King, marched to France than to have the English engage upon their rear. Lord Wellesley could in land-wars; for then, instead of con- not extricate himself but by beating, sequering England by sea, we shall conquer parately, the two armies. The first and her on the continent. Such a contest fourth corps presented him with an opporshews to admiration what those are who tunity, since they attacked, without waitdirect the Cabinet of London.-Themisto- ing for the three corps commanded by the cles advised the Athenians to abandon Duke of Dalmatia. The English fought, their citadels, and take refuge on board well; the battle of Talavera was doubttheir ships. It is to be wished that the ful; though the lost of the English British Cabinet may persist, as it has be- was much more considerable than ours, gun, in the plan of deserting its ships and for the French artillery was more numer throwing itself on the continent. We ous. It appears that, by a serious of mulhave predicted the humiliation of England, tiplied faults, the French could not take and peace, before a year elapses --Before the position on the left; but the English a year shall have expired, the English, were beaten back every time they attemptwhatever efforts they may make, will be ed to advance upon the French. When driven out of the peninsula, and the impe- the 70,000 men commanded by the Duke rial eagle will fly on the fortresses of Lis- of Dalmatia were at Plasencia, Lord Welbon. lesley believed there were not more than 10,000 men there, and formed the most ridiculous combinations. He perceived, however, the folly of his calculations, his extreme imprudence, and was sufficiently fortunate to escape into Portugal with his infantry. What would have been the case, if, manoeuvring according to the principles of war, the French army had not, given battle until all united? Lord Wellesley says, that the want of the means of conreyance prevented him from marching to Madrid.

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We had reason to expect, that, as the Marquis de la Reyna would not remove the boats from the river Almarez, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge of Arzo Bispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge, while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource. We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, from Talavera, by Calera; and after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion that it was advisable to ' retire to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus.'

We shall not continue these Notes; it would be an insult to our readers. The falsehood of the report of Lord Wellesley must be evident to every one.

Conclusion. Lord Wellesley, without knowing the force of the enemy with whom he had to contend, without being furnished with that which constitutes an army, advanced to Talavera. The idea of entering Madrid turned his brain. He took the French army for an army of Sepoys. He arrived at Talavera with 25 or 26,000 men. He was there joined by 30,000 Spaniards, and, with these two armies united, he intended to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of Belluno manoeuvred skilfully to draw him on, and formed a junction with the fourth corps and the reserve, and, with the King at their head, marched against the enemy. The Duke

What would have been the consequence, if he had marched to Madrid, and the Duke of Dalmatia had placed himself between him and the Tagus? He would have come with his army to France. He has sacrificed brave men through presumption, and ignorance of that of which a General ought not to be ignorant. This expedition greatly resembles that of General Moore in the month of November last. But General Moore was more prudent, and saved himself sooner; and, though he suffered enormous losses, the half of his army returned to England, without their baggage, &c. Like General Moore, General Wellesley abandoned his hospitals, his baggage, his artillery, and arrived in Portugal with the half of his army. At this moment he has not 18,000 men under arms, out of the 40,000 which left the ports of England.

The Moniteur of 30th Sept. after giving the following intelligence from an English Paper

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The whole British army has quitted Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley has his head-quarters at Elvas (1).-It is said

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