increase of capital. It acted as such, and the Cited-105 U. S., 149; 5 Sawy., 91; 7 Sawy., 31; 18 defendant, by receiving his certificate of stock, Bk. Reg., 184; 95 N. Y., 310. entered into engagements with it as such. If it be conceded that its increased stock was but v. de facto, and that it could have been annulled THADDEUS C. POUND ET AL, Piffs. in Err., or suppressed by the action of the AttorneyGeneral as acting under an irregular organization, the defendant derives no aid from the admission. The cases cited are clear to the point that he cannot make the objection, but must perform the engagements he has made. The last offer of the defendant was intended to present this question in its most formidable shape. It was to show that the original capi. JAMES B. TURCK AND JOHN C. BORLAND, Assignees of the Estate, etc., of JOHN O. FRENCH, JACOB G. LEONARD, AND THEODORE D. GIDDINGS, Bankrupts. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 459-465.) -damage. tal of $100,000 was fully subscribed; that the State right to erect a dam across navigable stream holders of this stock never increased the capital nor authorized its increase; that this Company ceased to do business prior to 1868; that 1. A State may, until legislation on the subject by the $100,000 was not transferred to the Com- Congress, authorize the erection of a dam across a pany claiming to have organized on the in-navigable stream within the State. Until action creased capital; and that there was no valid is not repugnant to the power to regulate comhas been taken by Congress, such Act of the State transfer of the original stock or charter. All this does not alter the fact that there was an attempted alteration of the Company under the forms of law, approved by the AttorneyGeneral, with an increased capital, in the organization and management of which the defendant took part; that he paid his money, received his certificate of stock, attended meetings, voted, acted as an officer and, so far as the record shows, never repudiated his position at any time, even to the time of the trial. If successful, he would have shared in its profits. He may have been the dupe and victim of the action of others. He may have been an accomplice. At all events, he was so far an actor in the affair that he cannot escape the consequences of his position. Another series of objections is to the admission of various pieces of evidence introduced to show that the defendant was a stockholder. The original stock-ledger had been destroyed by fire, and the plaintiff supplied its place by the introduction of sundry other kinds of evidence tending to prove who were the stock holders, and that the defendant was one of them. The importance of this evidence was at an end when the certificate of shares was afterwards given in proof, and when it was expressly admitted by the defendant that he held the same; that he made payments thereon, and acted as a holder of shares in the Company. It is not necessary, therefore, to inquire whether or not the evidence was properly admitted. At the time this writ of error was taken, the decisions of this court in Upton v. Tribilcock, Sanger v. Upton, and Webster v. Upton [supra], had not been made. They contain a clear statement of the views of the court upon all the material questions here to be considered, and we suppose that this writ of error would not have been brought had they then been before the party and his counsel. The careful examination given in those cases to the several questions here involved render unnecessary a detailed review of the cases. We think there is nothing in the record before us that would justify us in disturbing the verdict and judgment rendered in the Circuit Court. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. merce. thority of the State, is not liable for damages for 2. A person who erects such a dam under such auan injury caused by it. [No. 125.] Argued Dec. 4, 1877. Decided Jan. 7, 1878. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit consin. The case is stated by the court. Mr. M. H. Carpenter and H. S. Orton, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. W. F. Vilas, for defendant in error Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: This suit, brought by assignees in bankruptcy, is founded upon allegations that the bankrupts, being lumbermen engaged in that business on the Chippewa River in Wisconsin, were seriously damaged by the delay of a raft of lumber, shingles and pickets, in said river, and by the breaking of the raft; all of which was attributable to obstructions placed in said river, by the plaintiffs in error, who were defendants below. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and a verdict was rendered against them, on which the judgment was founded to which this writ of error is taken. The bill of exceptions is a very imperfect one; and two exceptions in regard to the admission of evidence are so unimportant that we do not think it necessary to notice them further than to say that we see no error in them. The bill of exceptions shows, however, that there was evidence tending to prove that the dam and boom which constituted the principal obstruction in the river, to which the loss of plaintiffs' assignees was due, were built under authority of an Act of the Wisconsin Legislature, to wit: ch. 235, Session Laws of 1857, approved March 5th of that year. This statute is by its last section declared to be a public Act, which shall be favorably construed in all courts. Section 7 of the Act authorizes The erection of one or more dams at a given point across said river, and the building and maintaining of a boom or booms, with sufficient NOTE.-Navigable waters; what are, in U. S.; streams and inland waters as highways. See note to U. S. v. The Montello, 87 U. S., XXII., 391. piers, and in such manner and form, and with such strength, as will stop and hold all logs and other things which may float in said river, which boom or booms shall be so arranged as to permit the passage of boats at all times; and at times of running lumber, a sufficient space shall be kept open in some convenient place for the passage of rafts, and the said dam or dams shall be built with suitable slides for the running of lumber in rafts over the same, and the said dam or dams and boom or booms shall be so constructed as not to obstruct the running of lumber rafts in said river." Private L. Wis. 1857, p. 538. The counsel for defendants seem to have made an attempt to secure from the court an instruction, that, if the injury to plaintiffs' raft was caused by the boom or dam built under this statute, they were not liable if they constructed it in compliance with its demands; but the language of the prayer alone is too vague to predicate error of its refusal. But the bill of exceptions proceeds to say, that, having refused these prayers, the court instructed the jury upon those points as follows: 1. That the defendants are not liable to private action for injury to navigation while act ing under legislative authority, provided that they have kept within the authority granted, and have been guilty of no negligence, unless their works materially obstruct the navigation of the river. 2. If the defendants, in erecting the piers and booms mentioned in the plaintiffs' complaint, did so under authority given by the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, in which State the Chippewa River lies, and put therein in the manner provided by the Act giving them authority, they are not liable in damages to the plaintiffs for any injury caused by reason of their doing the thing authorized. 3. If you find the stream navigable within the rules I have laid down for determining that question, you will next proceed to determine whether the piers alleged and conceded to have been placed on the river at Chippewa Falls were a material obstruction to the navigation thereof. If they were, the defendants had no right to place them there, nor could the Legislature confer authority upon them to do so. navigation of the river. That these inquiries were not the same is very clear, for no one can read the statute without perceiving that it did authorize a material obstruction to the general navigation of the river. It authorized the construction of dams entirely across the stream, and it authorized booms, with sufficient piers, across the stream to stop and hold all logs and other things which may float in said river. It is a waste of words to attempt to prove that this would create a material obstruction to the navigation of the river by every species of water craft. The fact that directions are given to facilitate the passage of these dams and piers by boats and rafts only shows that the evil caused by the obstructions was to be mitigated as far as possible consistently with their erection, and not that they were so to be built as to present no material obstruction to navigation. Taking all the instructions together, and in connection with the prayer of the defendants refused by the court, we are of opinion that the jury must have understood that if the structures of defendants were a material obstruction to the general navigation of the river, the statute of the State afforded him no defense, though they were built in strict conformity to its provisions. We are confirmed in the belief that we have correctly construed the language of the court by the argument of counsel in support of the charge, which asserts the want of power in the State to pass the Act here relied on. This was unquestionably the opinion of the court as given to the jury, and its soundness is the principal matter to be considered by us. This want of power is supposed to rest on the repugnance of the statute to that provision of the Constitution which confers upon Congress the authority "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The proposition is not a new one in this court, and cannot be sustained as applicable to the case before us without overruling many well considered decisions, no one of which has ever been overturned, though the doctrine announced has been occa sionally questioned. The Chippewa River is a small stream lying wholly within the State of Wisconsin, but emptying its waters into the Mississippi. Without the aid of the Constitution of Wisconsin, or the decision of its Supreme Court or the 3d section of the enabling Act of 1846, by which Congress authorized the formation of a State Government, we may concede that the stream, though small, is a navigable river of the United States, and protected by all the Acts of Congress and provisions of the Constitution applicable to such waters. If there were no other objection to these three propositions in the charge of the court, it appears to us that they must have been confusing to the minds of the jury. The first and the third propositions distinctly enough declare that, if the piers and booms materially obstruct ed the navigation of the river, the Act of the Legislature was no protection; while the second as distinctly affirms that if they were built in the manner provided by the Act giving them authority, they are not liable for any injury aris- The principle established by the decisions to ing from them when so built. As they appear which we have referred is, that, in regard to to us, these propositions, given each as an in- the powers conferred by the commerce clause dependent one on that subject, are necessarily of the Constitution, there are some which by contradictory, and we cannot tell which of them their essential nature are exclusive in Congress, the jury accepted as the foundation of their and which the States can exercise under no cir verdict. If the second proposition alone had cumstances; while there are others which from been given the only inquiry of the jury on that their nature may be exercised by the States unbranch of the case would have been as to the til Congress shall see proper to cover the same conformity of the structures to the directions ground by such legislation as that body may of the statute. If the other two were to govern, deem appropriate to the subject. Of this class then the jury must inquire whether those struct- are pilotage and other port regulations, Cooley ures were a material obstruction to the general | v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How., 299; bridges across nizes the right of Congress to interfere and control the matter whenever it may deem it necessary to do so, the exercise of this limited power may all the more safely be confided to the local Legislatures. navigable streams, Gilman v. Philadelphia; | trine we have deduced from the cases recogand, as specially applicable to the case before us, to erect dams across navigable streams, Wilson v. Blackbird Cr. M. Co., 2 Pet., 245. This general doctrine was very fully examined and sustained in Gilman v. Philadelphia. 3 Wall., 713 [70 U. S., XVIII., 96], and again in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35 [73 U. S., XVIII., 745]. As we have already said, the Blackbird Creek case is directly applicable to the one before us; and as it has never been overruled, but, on the contrary, though much criticised, has always been sustained, it is alone sufficient to control this one. In that case, the Legislature of the State of Delaware authorized the construction of a dam across the creek for the purpose of reclaiming some marsh land, and improving the health of its inhabitants. "But the measure authorized by the statute," said Chief Justice Marshall, "stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those accustomed to use it." He then says that if Congress had passed any Act which bore upon the case, any Act in execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to control State legislation over the small navigable streams into which the tide flows, the state law would be void; but that as no such action had been taken by Congress, the Act of the State was not repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state. It is obvious from these remarks that the court, in its charge to the jury and in refusing the prayer of plaintiff, did not give to the Act of the Legislature of Wisconsin the effect to which it was entitled as a defense in the action. It is argued by counsel that there is no evidence connecting the defendants with the authority conferred by that statute. But as the record does not purport to contain all the evidence, and as the charge of the court is based upon the idea that there was evidence to go to the jury on that subject, so much so that the most important part of the charge relates to that matter, we must presume there was such evidence. It is also insisted that the record shows no exception to the charge of the court. But the objection is hypercritical. A close examination of the bill of exceptions satisfies us that the plaintiffs in error did except both to the refusal to grant the instruction prayed for and to those given by the court on the same points. For the error in the charge of the court in that matter, the judgment will be reversed and a new trial awarded. I concur in the judgment of the court, but adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in the case of Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 732 [70 U. S., XVIII., 102]. Nathan Clifford. 548. In the case of Gilman v. Philadelphia, the plaintiff was owner of a wharf on the Schuylkill River in the City of Philadelphia, at a point where that river had been navigable for time immemorial by a large class of vessels. The State of Pennsylvania passed a law in 1857 authorizing the city to build a bridge across Cited-95 U. S., 488; 96 U. S., 387; 105 U. S., 563; 107 that stream just below plaintiff's wharf, and be-U.S., 686; 1 McCrary, 605; 43 Wis., 266: 28 Am. Rep., tween it and the mouth of the river. There was no question that this bridge would wholly exclude a large part of the vessels which had theretofore navigated the Schuylkill up to plaintiff's wharf. He applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for an injunction, and that court dismissed his bill. On appeal to this court, the decree was affirmed, on the express ground that in the absence of legislation by Congress the Act of the Pennsylvania Legislature was not repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution. THE HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAIL- v. JOHN F. HUSEN. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 465-474.) Missouri statute as to cattle, unconstitutionalinterstate transportation-State police powers. *1. A statute of a State which prohibits driving or conveying any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into the State, between the first day of March and with the clause of the Constitution that ordains the first day of December in each year, is in conflict Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." the police power of the State. It is more than a 2. Such a statute is not a legitimate exercise of quarantine regulation. 3. The police power of a State cannot be exertation of subjects of commerce, confided exclucised over a subject, such as interstate transporsively to Congress by the Federal Constitution. The present case falls directly within the principle established by these cases, and aptly illus trates its wisdom. There are, within the State of Wisconsin and perhaps other States, many small streams navigable for a short distance from their mouths in one of the great rivers of the country, by steamboats, but whose greatest value in water carriage is as outlets to saw-logs, sawed lumber, coal, salt, etc. In order to develop their greatest utility in that regard, it is often essential that such structures as dams, booms, piers, etc., should be used, which are substantial obstructions to general navigation, and more or less so to rafts and barges. But to the Legislature of the State may be most appropriately confided the authority to authorize these structures where their use will do more good than harm, and to impose such regulations and limitations in their construction and use as will NOTE. Power of Congress to regulate commerce; best reconcile and accommodate the interest of state licenses; power of State to tax commerce. See note to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.), 1; and all concerned in the matter. And since the doc-note to Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.), 419. 4. While a State may enact sanitary laws, while, for the purpose of self-protection, it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection regulations, while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases from en*Head notes by Mr. Justice STRONG. tering the State, it cannot interfere with transportation into or through its borders, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. 5. Neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. 6. Since the range of a State's police power comes very near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion. [No. 130.] Argued Dec. 6, 1877. Decided Jan. 7, 1878. IN ERROR to the state line by some competent person, to ascertain whether they are diseased or not, and upon such inspection, if they were found not to be diseased, then they might be carried by the railroad companies into the State and unloaded at such points as their owners desired, then this Act would not be obnoxious to the objection of regulating interstate commerce, or of discriminating against certain species of property coming from a particular State. If the State of Missouri has the lawful right to absolutely prohibit the introduction of cattle from Texas-from being brought into the State between the times named in this Act-then it might conceive a prejudice against some other species of property which is The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in the subject of interstate commerce, and on the error before a justice of the peace of Kidder convenient plea of its being a police regulation, Township, Caldwell Co., Mo., for damages re- absolutely prohibit its introduction into the sulting from the communication of the Texas State. This would be a regulation of interstate fever to certain cattle of the plaintiff, from cat-commerce as much as was the Statute of Califortle conveyed, contrary to a statute of Missouri, into the County of Caldwell, by the plaintiff in error. The justice rendered judgment for the plaintiff upon default of the defendant. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Caldwell Co., and the venue was afterwards changed, by consent, to Grundy Co. The trial in that court resulted in favor of the plaintiff, now defendant in error, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. On the trial it was objected by the defendant, now the plaintiff in error, that the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, for violation of which the action was brought, was contrary to that part of section 8, of article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and among the Indian Tribes. This objection was overruled. The case further appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. James Carr and E. H. Owens, for plaintiff in error: I. The following portion of the 8th section and 1st article of the Constitution of the United States, viz.: The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes," confers exclusive power on Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 189; Passenger cases, 7 How., 283; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall., 236 (80 U. S., XX., 624); State Freight Tax cases, 15 Wall., 232 (82 U. S., XXI., 146); R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall., 560 (84 U. S., XXI,, 710); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S., 259 (XXIII., 657); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S., 275 (XXIII., 550); In the Matter of Ah Fang, 1 Cent. L. Jour., 516. nia, which inter alia prohibited vessels from landing "lewd or debauched women," without first giving the required bond. Chy Lung v. Freeman (supra). Mr. M. A. Low, for defendant in error: I. The Act of the General Assembly of Missouri here drawn in question, is in no proper sense a regulation of commerce. It may affect, but it does not regulate commerce. "Not everything which affects commerce is a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution." State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall., 284 (82 U. S., XXI., 164); Munn v. lll. (ante, 77); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.. 1; Passenger cases, 7 How., 283; Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wall., 62 (83 U. S., XXI., 404). II. The power to regulate commerce is vested exclusively in Congress; the power to establish police regulations within the States, belongs to the States exclusively. There is no residuum in either case. The power to regulate commerce once belonged to the States, but they gave it away, without reserve. The States never delegated to Congress the power to make police regulations; yet, in regulating commerce, Congress may incidentally affect or even abrogate the police regulations of the States. And, on the other hand, in the exercise of its inherent power to establish police regulations, a State may incidentally affect commerce and such regulations, when not in conflict with any regulation of Congress, are valid. These powers are distinct and separate, but it is no objection to a regulation made in pursuance of one of them that it would be appropriate to the exercise of the other. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; City of N. Y. v. Miln, 11 Pet., 102; Slaughter-House cases (supra); Foster v. Master & Wardens of New Orleans (ante, 122); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713 (70 U. S., XVIII., 96); Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall., 236 (80 U. S., XX., 624); Story, Const., sec. 1070; Polk v. Ry. Co., decided at the present Term of this court. II. The Act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri in question, is a regulation of commerce between the States. It discriminates against certain property which may be brought from the State of Texas into the State of Missouri. It absolutely prohibits the bringing of III. "The Legislature may, no doubt, prosuch property into the State of Missouri Be-hibit railways from carrying freight which is tween the first day of March and the first day of December in each year." This is no police regulation. It does not even require the cattle brought from Texas to be quarantined. If there were some reasonable regulation established by this Act, requiring.such cattle to be inspected at regarded as detrimental to public health or The power of the States to pass quarantine and inspection laws has never been questioned. The right in the States to make and enforce such regulations has been repeatedly recognized | conflict with the clause of the Constitution of by this court and by Congress. Power to establish quarantine regulations has been repeatedly recognized by this court, and by Congress. Power to establish quarantine regulations necessarily includes the power to determine when, how and under what circumstances, and to what extent such regulations shall be imposed and executed, as well as the subjects to which they may be applied. And so the power to pass inspection laws includes, necessarily, the right to impose restraints upon the use and disposal of articles found upon inspection to be injurious to the health, morals or general welfare of the citizens of the State. Inspection would be a farce if it did not involve the power to impose regulations sufficient to avert the danger, to prevent which the inspection was made. The law of Missouri under considera tion was in the nature of a quarantine regula. tion, and, as such, is valid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; Brown v. Md., 12 Wheat., 419; City of N. Y. v. Min, 11 Pet.. 102; Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 245; License Cases, 5 How., 577; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet., 615; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How., 319; Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 462 (72 U. S., XVIII., 497); Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall., 475 (72 U. S.. XVIII., 608); U. S. v. De Witt, 9 Wall., 41 (76 U. S., XIX., 593); Ex parte McNeil (supra); Slaughter House Cases (supra); R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall., 560 (84 U. S., XXI., 710); Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 279 (82 U. S., XXI., 162); Munn v. Ill. (supra); Foster v. Master and Wardens, (supra); St. Louis v. Boffinger, 19 Mo., 13; Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254; Cooley, Const. Lim., 584: Potter, Dwarr., 457. IV. The statute, as respects the case at bar, is merely declaratory of the common law. The damages sued for are the proximate result of the wrongful act of the Railroad Company in bringing diseased cattle into the neighborhood of defendant in error whereby his cattle were exposed to infection. Whart. Neg., secs. 16, 21, 76, 77, 145; Shear. & Redf. Neg., 3d ed., sec. 594; Sedg. Dam., secs. 90, 97; Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa., 192; Clemens v. R. Co., 53 Mo., 366; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl., 892. V. It is a nuisance for a person to take an animal infected with a contagious disease to any place not on his own premises, where other animals are exposed to infection thereby. the United States that ordains "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The statute, approved January 23, 1872, by its 1st section, enacted as follows: "No Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into, or remain, in any county in this State, between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, by any person or persons whatsoever." A later section is in these words: "If any person or persons shall bring into this State any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle, in violation of the 1st section of this Act, he or they shall be liable, in all cases, for all damages sustained on account of disease communicated by said cattle." Other sections make such bringing of cattle into the State a criminal offense, and provide penalties for it. It was, however, upon the provisions we have quoted that this action was brought against the Railroad Company that had conveyed the cattle into the county. It is noticeable that the statute interposes a direct prohibition against the introduction into the State of all Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle during eight months of each year, without any distinction between such as may be diseased and such as are not. It is true a proviso to the first section enacts that When such cattle shall come across the line of the State, loaded upon a railroad car or steamboat, and shall pass through the State without being unloaded, such shall not be construed as prohibited by the Act; but the Railroad Company or owners of a steamboat performing such transportation shall be responsible for all damages which may result from the disease called the Spanish or Texas fever, should the same occur along the line of transportation, and the existence of such disease along the line of such route shall be prima facie evidence that such disease has been communicated by such transportation." This proviso imposes burdens and liabilities for transportation through the State, though the cattle be not unloaded; while the body of the section absolutely prohibits the introduction of any such cattle into the State, with the single exception mentioned. It seems hardly necessary to argue at length, that, unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce; a regulation exMills v. R. R. Co., 2 Rob. (N. Y.), 326; Bar-tending to prohibition. Whatever may be the num v. Vandusen, 16 Conn., 200; Regina v. Henson, 1 Dears. (C. C.), 24; Rex v. Vantadillo, 4 M. & S., 73; Anderson v. Buckton, 1 Str.,ulate that which is interstate than it can that 192. In such case the owner, agent, director, in stigator, aider and abettor, are all liable to a person who sustains damages in consequence thereof. State v. Bell, 5 Port. (Ala.), 381. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: power of a State over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or reg which is with foreign nations. Power over one is given by the Constitution of the United States, to Congress, in the same words in which it is given over the other, and in both cases it is necessarily exclusive. That the transportation of property from one State to another is a branch of interstate commerce is undeniable, and no attempt has been made in this case to deny it. Five assignments of error appear in this rec- The Missouri Statute is a plain interference ord; but they raise only a single question. It with such transportation; an attempted exercise is, whether the Statute of Missouri, upon which over it of the highest possible power-that of the action in the State Court was founded, is indestruction. It meets at the borders of the |