Three quarters of a century ago, it was decided by the Supreme Court of New York that a record of a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts was admissible in evidence, it appearing that it was authenticated in the ordinary method practiced in the courts of that Commonwealth; and they placed their decision upon two grounds: (1) That the record was the record of a Federal Court. (2) That the Act of Congress requiring exemplification did not apply in such a case. Jenkins v. Kinsley, Col. & C. Cas., 136.

Viewed in the light of these authorities, to which many more might be added, we are all of the opinion with the Supreme Court of Con necticut, that it is not absolutely necessary that the record of a judgment should be authenticated in the mode prescribed by the Act of Congress referred to, to render the same admissible in the courts of the United States; that the District Court of the United States, even out of the State composing the district, is to be regarded as a domestic and not a foreign court, and that the records of such a court may be proved by the certificate of the clerk under the seal of the court, without the certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form. Adams v. Way, 33 Conn., 419; Michener v. Payson, 13 Nat. Bk. Reg., 50; Mason v. Lawrason, 1 Cranch, C. C.,

190.

Bankruptcy proceedings are, in all cases, deemed matters of record, and are to be carefully filed and numbered; but they are not re quired to be recorded at large. Short memoranda of the same shall be made in books provided for the purpose, and kept in the office of the clerk; and the provision is that the books shall be open to public inspection. Copies of such records, duly certified under the seal of the court, shall in all cases be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 14 Stat. at L., 536. Suffice it to say, that the records of the bankruptcy proceedings admitted in evidence by the court below were authenticated in exact conformity with the directions of the Bankrupt Act, and were, in the judgment of the court, properly admitted in evidence; which is all that need be said in response to the fifth exception. Exceptions were also taken to the rulings of the court in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant, and to the instruction given to the jury; but it is not necessary to give those exceptions a separate examination, for the reasons that the material questions in volved are substantially the same as those presented in the exceptions to the rulings of the court, already sufficiently considered. Even suppose the assignment of errors presents all the questions involved in the exceptions, still it is clear that there is no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

Cited-107 U. S., 10; 7 Sawy., 31.

FANNY BEECHER, Exrx. of LABAN

BEECHER, Deceased, Piff. in Err.,

v.

DAVID WETHERBY ET AL.

(See S. C., 5 Otto, 517-527.)

sale of Indian lands.

sin.

The case is stated by the court.

Mr. Chas. W. Felker, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. W. P. Lynde, E. P. Finch and Charles Barber, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action of replevin brought by the plaintiff to recover two million feet of pine saw-logs of the estimated value of $25,000, alleged to have been the property of the deceased, and to have been wrongfully detained from him by the defendants. The complaint was in the usual form in such cases, and the answer consisted of a general denial of its averments. The logs were cut by the defendants from the tract of land in Wisconsin which constitutes section sixteen (16), in township twenty-eight (28), range fourteen (14), in the County of Shawano, in that State. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the logs by virtue of sundry patents of the land from which they were cut, issued to him by the United States in October, 1872. The defendants asserted property in the logs under patents of the land issued to them by the State of Wisconsin in 1870. The question for determination, therefore, is: which of these two classes of patents, those of the United States or those of the State, transferred the title. The logs were cut in the winter of 1872 and 1873; they were, therefore, standing timber on the land when all the patents were issued, and as such constituted a portion of the realty. Although when severed from the soil the timber became personalty, the title to it remained unaffected. The owner of the land could equally, as before, claim its possession, and pursue it wherever it was carried.

The State asserted title to the land under the compact upon which she was admitted into the Union. The Act of Congress of August 6, 1846, 9 Stat. at L., 56, authorizing the People of the Territory of Wisconsin to organize a State Government, contained various propositions reS. specting grants of land to the new State, to be submitted for acceptance or rejection to the convention which was to assemble for the purpose of framing its Constitution. Some of the proposed grants were to be for the use of schools, some for the establishment and support of a un

School lands-title of State-Indian occupancy-iversity, some for the erection of public build

440

ings, and some were to be of lands containing

salt springs. They were promised on condi- | binding, it is true, the public faith, and dependtion that the convention should provide by a ent for execution upon the political authorities. clause in the Constitution, or by an ordinance Courts of justice have no authority to mark out irrevocable without the consent of the United and define the land which shall be subject to States, that the State would never interfere with the grant. But, when the political authorities the primary disposal of the soil within it by the have performed this duty, the compact has an United States, nor with any regulations Con-object upon which it can attach, and if there is no gress might find necessary for securing the title legal impediment, the title of the State becomes in such soil to bona fide purchasers; that no tax a legal title. The jus ad rem, by the performshould be imposed on lands the property of the ance of that executive act, becomes a jus in re, United States; and that in no case should non- judicial in its nature, and under the cognizance resident proprietors be taxed higher than resi- and protection of the judicial authorities, as dents. And the Act provided that if the prop- well as the others." In this case, the townositions were accepted by the convention, and ship embracing the land in question was surratified by an article in the Constitution, they veyed in October, 1852, and was subdivided should be obligatory on the United States. The into sections in May and June, 1854. With first of these propositions was "That section this identification of the section, the title of the numbered sixteen (16) in every township of the State, upon the authority cited, became compublic lands in said State, and where such section plete, unless there had been a sale or other dishas been sold or otherwise disposed of, other position of the property by the United States lands equivalent thereto, and as contiguous as previous to the compact with the State. No may be, shall be granted to said State for the use subsequent sale or other disposition, as already of schools." stated, could defeat the appropriation. The plaintiff contends that there had been a prior reservation of the land to the use of the Menomonee Tribe of Indians.

The convention which subsequently assembled accepted the propositions, and ratified them by an article in the Constitution, embodying therein the provisions required by the Act of It is true that, for many years before WisCongress as a condition of the grants. With consin became a State, that Tribe occupied that Constitution the State was admitted into various portions of her territory, and roamed the Union in May, 1848. 9 Stat. at L., 233. It over nearly the whole of it. In 1825, the was, therefore, an unalterable condition of the United States undertook to settle by treaty the admission, obligatory upon the United States, boundaries of lands claimed by different Tribes that section sixteen (16) in every township of of Indians, as between themselves, and agreed the public lands in the State, which had not to recognize the boundaries thus established, been sold or otherwise disposed of, should be the tribes acknowledging the general controlgranted to the State for the use of schools. It ling power of the United States, and disclaimmatters not whether the words of the compact ing all dependence upon and connection with be considered as merely promissory on the part any other power. The land thus recognized of the United States, and constituting only a as belonging to the Menomonee Tribe embraced pledge of a grant in future, or as operating to the section in controversy in this case. Subsetransfer the title to the State upon her accept- quently, in 1831, the same boundaries were ance of the propositions as soon as the sections again recognized. But the right which the Incould be afterwards identified by the public dians held was only that of occupancy. The surveys. In either case, the lands which might fee was in the United States, subject to that be embraced within those sections were appro- right, and could be transferred by them whenpriated to the State. They were withdrawn ever they chose. The grantee, it is true, would from any other disposition, and set apart from take only the naked fee, and could not disturb the public domain, so that no subsequent law the occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy authorizing a sale of lands in Wisconsin could could only be interfered with or determined by be construed to embrace them, although they the United States. It is to be presumed that were not specially excepted. All that after- in this matter the United States would be govwards remained for the United States to do with erned by such considerations of justice as respect to them, and all that could be legally would control a Christian people in their treatdone under the compact, was to identify the ment of an ignorant and dependent race. sections by appropriate surveys; or, if any that as it may, the propriety or justice of their further assurance of title was required, to pro-action towards the Indians with respect to their vide for the execution of proper instruments to transfer the naked fee, or to adopt such further legislation as would accomplish that result. They could not be diverted from their appropriation to the State.

In Cooper v. Roberts, reported in the 18th of How., 173 [59 U. S., XV., 338], this court gave construction to a similar clause in the compact upon which the State of Michigan was admitted into the Union, and held, after full consideration, that by it the State acquired such an interest in every section sixteen that her title became perfect so soon as the section in any township was designated by the survey. "We agree,' said the court, "that, until the survey of the township and the designation of the specific sec. tion, the right of the State rests in compact

Be

lands is a question of governmental policy, and
is not a matter open to discussion in a contro-
versy between third parties, neither of whom
derives title from the Indians. The right of
the United States to dispose of the fee of lands
occupied by them has always been recognized
by this court from the foundation of the gov-
ernment. It was so ruled in Johnson v. Mcln-
tosh, 8 Wheat., 543, in 1823; and in U. S. v.
Cook, 19 Wall., 591 [86 U. S., XXII., 210],
in 1873. Other cases between those periods
have affirmed the same doctrine.
Smith, 13 Pet., 195. See, also, Jackson v. Hud-
son, 3 Johns., 375; Veeder v. Guppy, 3 Wis.,
502; and Portage City case, 8 Opin. Atty-
Gen., pp. 262-264. In U. S. v. Cook, the
United States maintained replevin for timber

Clark v.

libeled by the authorities of the United States on the alleged ground of his treason and rebellion; that, by a decree of the District Court for that district, the property was condemned and forfeited to the United States, and sold; and the net proceeds of the sale, amounting to the sum of $11,000, were paid into the Treasury of the United States, the proceedings for its condemnation and sale having been taken under the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862; that subsequently, by virtue of the amnesty Proclamation of the President, of December 25, 1868, the claimant was pardoned and relieved of all disabilities and penalties attaching to the offense of treason and rebellion, for which his property was confiscated, and was restored to all his rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and thus became entitled to receive the said proceeds of sale; but that the United States, disregarding his rights in the premises, had refused to pay them over to him and, therefore, he prayed judgment against them. Upon demurrer, for insufficiency of the facts thus alleged to constitute a cause of action, the petition was dismissed; and hence the present appeal.

the case at bar. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333 [71 U. S., XVIII, 366]; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall., 766 [73 U. S., XVIII., 882]; U. S. v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531 [76 U. S., XIX., 788]; U. S. v. Klein, [supra]; Armstrong v. U. S., 13 Wall., 155 [80 U. S., XX., 615]; Par goud v. U. S., 13 Wall., 156 [80 U. S., XX., 646]; Carlisle v. U. S., 16 Wall., 147 [83 U. S., XXI., 426]; Osborn v. U. S., 91 U. S., 474 [XXIII., 388]. A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable and within control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its direction. It re leases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him all his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offense, that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise; it does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does it impose upon the government any obligation to give it. The offense being established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. Neither does the pardon affect any rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the offense, or which have been

The Proclamation of the President extended unconditionally and without reservation a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of giving aid and comfort to their enemies, to all persons who had directly or indirectly participated in the rebellion, with a restoration of all rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof. Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be made, between pardon and amnesty. It is some-acquired by others whilst that judgment was in times said that the latter operates as an extinc- force. If, for example, by the judgment, a sale tion of the offense of which it is the object, of the offender's property has been had, the purcausing it to be forgotten, so far as the public chaser will hold the property notwithstanding interests are concerned, whilst the former only the subsequent pardon. And if the proceeds of operates to remove the penalties of the offense. the sale have been paid to a party to whom the This distinction is not, however, recognized in law has assigned them, they cannot be subseour law. The Constitution does not use the quently reached and recovered by the offender. word "amnesty;" and, except that the term is The rights of the parties have become vested, generally employed where pardon is extended to and are as complete as if they were acquired in whole classes or communities, instead of individ- any other legal way. So, also, if the proceeds uals, the distinction between them is one rather have been paid into the Treasury, the right to of philological interest than of legal importance. them has so far become vested in the United At all events, nothing can be gained in the con- States that they can only be secured to the forsideration of the question before us by showing mer owner of the property through an Act of that there is any difference in their operation. Congress. Moneys once in the Treasury can All the benefits which can result to the claim-only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law. ant from both pardon and amnesty, would equally have accrued to him if the term " pardon" alone had been used in the Proclamation of the President. In Klein's case, this court said that pardon included amnesty. 13 Wall., 128 [80 U. S., XX., 519].

The rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution and laws which the Proclama tion restored to parties embraced by its terms, are such as all citizens possess and enjoy. That instrument does not declare that any subjects of property are restored with reference to which such rights, privileges and immunities might be invoked; nor can its language be thus construed without a manifest perversion of its sense.

The effect of a pardon upon the condition and rights of its recipient has been the subject of frequent consideration by this court; and principles have been settled which will solve the question presented for our determination in

However large, therefore, may be the power of pardon possessed by the President, and however extended may be its application, there is this limit to it, as there is to all his powers, it cannot touch moneys in the Treasury of the United States, except expressly authorized by Act of Congress. The Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.

Where, however, property condemned, or its proceeds, have not thus vested, but remain under control of the Executive, or of officers subject to his orders, or are in the custody of the judicial tribunals, the property will be restored or its proceeds delivered to the original owner, upon his full pardon. The property and the proceeds are not considered as so absolutely vesting in third parties or in the United States as to be unaffected by the pardon until they have passed out of the jurisdiction of the officer or tribunal. The proceeds have thus passed

when paid over to the individual entitled to them, in the one case, or are covered into the Treasury, in the other.

that it relieved the offender from the consequences of his offense; and as in that case the forfeiture of his property was one of those consequences, it restored the property to him, unless the rights of other parties had vested, and the power of restoration was thus gone.

The views here expressed have been applied in practice, it is believed, by the Executive Departments of the Government. In 1856, the question was submitted by the Secretary of the An attempt is made by counsel to give some Treasury to the Attorney-General, whether, expressions used in the opinion of the court a under a pardon of the President remitting a for- wider meaning, so as to support the claim here feiture to the United States, imposed by a judg-presented; but the language will not sustain the ment of a United States District Court, the pro- conclusion sought. There was no consideraceeds of the forfeiture deposited by the marshal tion of the effect of the pardon upon the proin one of the public depositories to the credit ceeds of the forfeited property when paid into of the United States, but not brought into the the Treasury, but only of its effect upon those Treasury by a covering warrant, could be re- proceeds whilst under the control of the court funded to the marshal, and through him to the in its registry. Any language which seemingly party entitled, in execution of the remission admits of a broader interpretation must be regranted by the President; and the Attorney-stricted to the facts of the case. There was no General replied that the pardoning power was intention of expressing any opinion that a parcompletely vested in the President, and did not don could do away with the constitutional rerequire in its exercise any aid from Congress, quirement as to money in the Treasury. Whilst nor could it be curtailed by Congress, but that, there, it is the property of the United States. if the money had actually passed into the Treas There is another view of this case, which ury, it could not be refunded without an Act must lead to an affirmance of the judgment of of Congress; for the Constitution itself, in the the Court of Claims. The jurisdiction of that provision that "no money shall be drawn from court is limited to claims founded upon a law the Treasury but in consequence of appropria- of Congress, or upon a regulation of an Executions made by law," opposed an insuperable tive Department, or upon a contract, express obstacle to such a proceeding, and that this pro- or implied, with the Government. The claim vision was of equal efficiency with the pardon- | here presented rests upon a supposed implied ing power, and operated as a restriction upon contract to pay to the claimant the money reit. But the Attorney-General held, and so ad- ceived as the proceeds of the forfeited property. vised the Secretary, that, if the money had only To constitute such a contract, there must have gone into the hands of some officer of the Gov- been some consideration moving to the United ernment, and the right of third parties had not States; or they must have received the money, attached, it might be refunded. 8 Ops. Atty charged with a duty to pay it over; or the claimGen., p. 281. As an instance where property ant must have had a lawful right to it when it acquired by a third party, whilst the judgment was received, as in the case of money paid by against the offender is in force, cannot be af- mistake. But here there was no consideration fected by a subsequent pardon, he cited the case moving to the United States; they were charged of the disposition of a convict's property dur- with no duty in respect to the money; there was ing the time of his civil incapacity. The par- no legal claim by any one to it when received don does not restore the property. And, as an into the Treasury; and no law since has reinstance where a right other than of property, quired it to be paid to the claimant. There can acquired during the same period, is also unaf be, therefore, no implied contract in the case. fected, he cited the case where, by the law of Judgment affirmed. the country, a conviction of felony operates to dissolve a marriage, and the innocent party contracts new bonds of matrimony. The subsequent pardon does not dissolve the new bonds. Matter of Deming, 10 Johns., 232.

The same views were, to some extent, applied in the recent case of Osborne v. U. S., supra, where proceeds of property, confiscated under the Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. at L., 589, for the alleged treason of the claimant, remaining in the registry, were ordered by the circuit court to be delivered to the claimant who had been

Cited-8 Biss., 325; 39 Ohio St., 377; 48 Am. Rep., 462..

JOHN MILNER, JR., Appt.,

V.

WILLIAM M. MEEK, Assignee in Bankruptcy of ABRAM A. MOORE.

(See S. C., 5 Otto, 252-259.)

by one of several.

1. Where the pleading filed by the assignee în bankruptcy was appropriate in form for a petition stance as a bill in equity, and both the parties and in the bankrupt suit, but it was equally good in subthe court treated it as a bill in equity, an appeal lies from the decree of the circuit court therein, to this court. 2. Where appeal was allowed in open court during

pardoned, Mr. Justice Miller, presiding in the Bill in equity, what sufficient-citation-appeal circuit court, holding that, until an order of distribution of the proceeds was made, or the proceeds were actually paid into the hands of the party entitled, as informer, to receive them, or into the Treasury of the United States, they were within the control of the court, and that no vested right to the proceeds had accrued so as to prevent the pardon from restoring them to the claimant; and impliedly holding, that, had they been thus paid, either to the informer or into the Treasury, the right to them would have passed beyond the control of the court. On appeal this court affirmed the decision, observing, that it was of the essence of a pardon,

NOTE.-Jurisdiction of U. S. Supreme Court depending on amount; interest cannot be added to give jurisdiction; how value of thing demanded may be shown; what cases reviewable without regard to sum in controversy. See note to Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), 33.