defendant and one J. B.," and then averred that the defendant only executed it, and not the said J. B. Gurney. The words of the lease are, "This indenture, &c. made by James Cook and H. his wife." The declaration, therefore, follows the words of the lease, as far as it goes, which is sufficient. ABBOTT Ld. C. J. The declaration professes to be on a lease made by James Cook of the second part. At the commencement of the lease he is so described; but in subsequent parts of it he is called George. On the face of the lease, therefore, it is uncertain which is the true name. Then, to remove the doubt, it appears by the execution that the true name is George. There is a variance therefore. Gurney and Talfourd for the plaintiff. Nonsuit. 1826. MAYELSTONE v. Lord PALMERSTON. 1826. Dec. 9. WESTMINSTER, WILSON and Another, Assignees, &c. v. WHITAKER and Another, Sheriff, &c. and HARRIS. The statute 3 G. 4. c. 39. filing warrants of attorney to render the TRESPASS for wrongfully taking the bankrupt's § 2. (as to the goods in execution under a writ of fieri facias, issued upon a judgment signed on a warrant of attorney. The warrant of attorney from the bankrupt to judgments en- Harris to confess judgment was executed on the 25th October 1823. It was not filed till the 8th May 1824, on which day judgment was signed. The goods were taken in execution in December 1824, after an act of bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt, but more than two months before the issuing of the commission against him, and without the defendant Harris (the execution creditor) having any notice of the act of bankruptcy. tered on them effectual against subse. sequent commissions of bankruptcy) is not repealed by the statute 6 Geo.4. c.16. $81. Quære whe ther the stat. 3 Geo. 4. c. 59. § 2. extends to cases where there has been no act of bankruptcy at the time of rant of attor ney. Campbell and Patteson for the defendant Harris objected, that the provisions of the stat. 3 G 4. giving the war- c. 39. s. 2. (by which all warrants of attorney, and the judgments and executions thereon, are declared fraudulent and void as against the assignees under any commission of bankrupt afterwards issued against the person giving such warrant of attorney, unless such warrant of attorney, or a copy of it, were filed with the clerk of the dockets and judg ments in the King's Bench within twenty-one days from the time of its execution, or unless judgment were signed, or execution issued on it, within the same period,) were virtually repealed by the stat. 6 G. 4. c. 16. s. 81., which enacts, that all execu 1826. WILSON V. WHITAKER tions against the goods of a bankrupt, bona fide executed more than two calendar months before the issuing of the commission, shall be valid, notwithstanding any prior act of bankruptcy com- and OTHERS. mitted by him, unless the execution creditor had then notice of such act. The ABBOTT Ld. C. J. I am of opinion that the stat. 6 G. 4. c. 16. s. 81. is no repeal of the stat. 3 G. 4. c. 39. s. 2. The statute of 6 G. 4. is confined to executions bona fide issued. statute of 3 G. 4. declares executions issued under such circumstances as the present to be fraudulent and void as against the assignees. I think, therefore, that this execution, issuing after an act of bankruptcy, under circumstances which render it fraudulent under the stat. 3 G. 4., is not under the protection extended by the stat. 6 G. 4. to executions bonâ fide executed. If it were necessary to consider what might be the effect of such a warrant of attorney, judgment, and execution as the present, when the execution had been executed before any act of bankruptcy, I should be very unwilling to decide that question here. Even such a case would satisfy the words of the statute 3 G. 4.; but it is necessary to affix a reasonable construction to a statute, and the inconvenience consequent on extending it to cases where there had been no act of bankruptcy, might be very great; since, in that case, a warrant of attorney might be given without the requisite formalities, and judgment signed, and execution issued upon it, even before the party was at all in trade; and all these proceedings would subsequently become 1826. WILSON void. On this question, however, as the act of bankruptcy has been proved (a), I need not give any opinion, and I should be very unwilling unneand OTHERS. cessarily to decide it. บ. WHITAKER Verdict for the plaintiff. Scarlett and Andrews for the plaintiff. Holt for the defendants Whitaker and Laurie. Campbell and Patteson for the defendant Harris. In Hilary Term 1827, Holt obtained a rule nisi to enter a verdict for the defendants, the sheriffs, on another point reserved to him at the trial of the cause. (a) It had not been so in the first instance. As to the statute 3 G 4. c. 39. see 5 B. & C. 650. Hurst v. Jennings. WESTMINSTER, DOE dem. NEVILLE v. DUNBAR. Service of a EJECTMENT. The only question was as to the notice to quit on a servant at service of a notice to quit. the tenant's dwelling Mr. Neville's attorney went on the 22nd March, house is suffi- to the defendant's house, and there served two cient, although the te- copies of a notice to quit, one on the servant, the nant be not other on a lady there. The attorney was told till within half that the defendant would not be there till the 26th. a year of its informed of it expiration. 1826. DOE บ. DUNBAR. The notice was to quit on the 29th September. It was attempted to show that both the lady and the servant on whom the notices were dem. NEVILLE served were dead; and it was argued that in that case, as the defendant would be unable to call them to prove that they did not communicate the notice to him by the 25th March, according to the course suggested by Buller J. in Jones d. Griffiths v. Marsh, 4 T. R. 464, and as the sufficiency of the notice was treated, both in that case and in Doe d. Buross v. Lucas, 5 Esp. 153. and in Doe d. Lord Bradford v. Watkins, 7 East, 553, as depending on the presumption that it came to the tenant's hands, there would be no sufficient evidence that it did so, to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. The proof however failed as to the servant. ABBOTT Ld. C. J. I have no doubt that the service of the notice was sufficient. The question does not arise here, for the servant might be called: but I have no doubt of the absolute sufficiency of the notice; were it to be held otherwise, a landlord would have no means of determining a tenancy, if his tenant happened to be absent from his house at the time when it was necessary to serve the notice. Verdict for the plaintiff. (a) Campbell and Whateley for the plaintiff. (a) See Widger v. Browning, infra, 27., that personal service of notice is not generally necessary; and in Jones d. Griffiths v. Marsh, 4 T. R. 464., although Buller J. suggested that the |